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, Sectarianism' is often viewed with unease in contemporary Scotland. as an 
exclusively Scottish and Irish peculiarity, and evidence that Scotland is unworthy of 
modem nationhood. This thesis argues that such views represent a superficial 
analysis, lacking in particular a comparative framework looking beyond Scotland and 
Ireland. A broader view reveals that religious identity is, or has been until recently. a 
key organisational principle in European politics, and that . sectarianism' has been a 
feature of most societies where Catholic and Protestant have mixed. If the term 
'sectarian' is used to denote a society in which systematic discrimination affects the 
life chances of religious groups, and within which religious affiliation maps closely 
on to other social cleavages, the thesis argues that Scotland is not sectarian. 
Scotland's 'sectarianism' is not systematically structured and is better understood as 
bigotry or prejudice. In terms of religious connections and activities, Scotland is an 
increasingly secular country. Through analysis of social surveys it is demonstrated 
that religion does not provide the marker of political cleavage that some of the 
literature on modem Scotland would suggest. Most accounts of religious conflict in 
Scotland agree on one thing: it was worse in the past. A key focus of this study, 
therefore, is an examination of inter-war Scotland, a period which saw a particularly 
sharp polarisation between Protestants and Catholics. This demonstrates that most 
accounts of the present depend upon a selective interpretation of the past. The 
relationship of religion and politics defies a simple and symmetrical division between 
Catholic and Protestant. Religious conflict was not the defining character of inter-
war Scotland - rather, it was an outcome of other, secular and profane processes. The 
study concludes by examining why religious division emerged as a controversial 
topic at the end of the 20th century. The question of sectarianism belongs within a 
broader debate about issues of identity and the place (or the absence) of religion 
within anew, re-imagined, configuration of Scottishness. The debate around 
sectarianism has been an invocation of past (and selectively interpreted) ghosts, an 
echo of a misunderstood past at the outset of a new era for Scotland. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines 'sectarianism' in twentieth century Scotland. Relating to 
division or conflict between Catholics and Protestants, sectarianism is viewed \\ith 
unease, evidence that Scotland is unworthy of modern nationhood. It is often seen as 
a peculiarity exclusive to Scotland and Ireland, something other modern nations have 
outgrown. This question has particular resonance at the present time given the re-
establishment of the Scottish Parliament, and the debate over the meaning and nature 
of Scotland and Scottishness. It has strong implications for 'new' Scots, from an 
English or New Commonwealth background, given that the dominant theme of 
sectarianism has been held to be hostility on the part of 'native'. Protestant Scots 
towards Catholic, and particularly Irish Catholic, immigrants. For some, sectarianism 
reveals that Scotland "has no capacity for tolerance ... Scotland is a divisive. bigoted 
society"l. Sectarianism represents the dark underbelly of the forward-looking, self-
confident, apparently inclusive civic nationalism of contemporary Scotland; no ghost 
from the past but a cancer behind the civic facade. 
This thesis argues that such views represent a superficial analysis of contemporary 
Scotland, their key weakness the absence of a comparative framework. It is assumed 
that Scotland and Ireland are deviant, in that religious differences elsewhere are 
largely absent. It is to Ireland, particularly Ulster and, subsequently, Northern Ireland 
that most accounts look for comparison. Research into party politics, class, gender, 
indeed any number of social and political issues, routinely compares Scotland with 
the rest of Britain, Western Europe and beyond. Popular accounts of religious 
division, by and large, look little further than Northern Ireland2. To some degree this 
myopia springs from belief that religion and politics should not mix, and that in most 
parts of the modern world they do not mix. Northern Ireland, where politics and 
religion are inextricably linked, and with which Scotland has very many cultural 
connections, is seen as the obvious, the only, comparator. A broader view reveals 
that religious identity is, or has been until recently, a key organisational principle in 
2 
O'Hagan (2000:25) 
For example, Witness: Football. Faith and Flutes (Channel 4. 12111 95) 
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European politics. Religion and politics have mixed, and do mix. in societies 
generally regarded as outstanding examples of post-war European pluralism and 
tolerance. In West Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. the class 
politics of left and right have largely mapped onto religious divisions between 
Protestant, Catholic and secularist. In England, Wales, North America and 
Australasia a clear political division between Protestant and Catholic, . native' and 
'Irish' can be historically traced. 
There is also a fundamental problem with the terminology with which the debate is 
conducted. Terms such as Protestant, Catholic and sectarian are used without 
precision, taken as self-evident. Sectarianism in particular is imprecisely used, often 
as a casual, often superfluous, prefix. In this thesis 'sectarian' is used more carefully. 
denoting a society in which systematic discrimination affects the life chances of 
religious groups, and within which religious affiliation stands for much more than 
theological belief. It will be argued that, in this sense, 'sectarian' is not a sustainable 
description of contemporary Scotland. Scotland is an increasingly secular society 
where religious differences are diminishing in social significance. What passes for 
sectarianism in modem Scotland is better described as bigotry or prejudice - it is not 
systematic and it does not materially affect the life-chances of entire religious 
groups. This being said, there is a widespread perception that religious bigotry, or 
even simple religious difference, remains a serious social problem - hence the debate. 
Bigotry, of course, offers a challenge to any society, but the concern of this study is 
whether bigotry is a reflection of structured patterns of religious division in Scottish 
society. 
In large part, Scots are concerned about religious bigotry because it lingers in one 
particular high-profile arena of Scottish life: football. Scottish football is uniquely 
dominated in the European game by just two clubs - Celtic and Rangers, collectively 
known as the 'Old Firm' - which have appropriated distinctive ethno-religious 
identities. Celtic 'represent' Scotland's Catholic community and its Irish inunigrant 
heritage. its fans adopting the symbols and songs of NationalistlRepublican Ireland. 
Rangers, on the other hand. 'represent' a version of Protestant Scotland. its fans 
") -
Introduction 
adopting the songs and symbols of British Unionism, of Orangeism and of Ulster 
Loyalism. Rivalry between the clubs is thus given an exotic twist~ one that suggests 
that sectarian divisions have a worrying resonance in Scottish society. Many studies 
of sectarianism begin with this rivalry, and some go little further, viewing it as a 
measure of the vibrancy of religious and political identities in Scotland. Indeed, it 
seems the obvious place to begin: where else can one find regular confrontations 
over religion? This is itself revealing. Studies of religious conflict in. say. Northern 
Ireland or Latin America would view the obvious starting point as the political 
system itself. It would look to Church-State relations; the role of religious identity in 
political organisation and support; relations between the Churches themselves. Sport. 
if investigated at all, would be seen as an interesting, but subsidiary, arena of study. 
Many studies of Scotland have reversed this process, looking at the conjunction of 
religion and political identities in Scottish football, and then generalising their 
findings to a societal level. This study does not focus on football. not because it is 
seen as unimportant (to many Scots, including the author, it is anything but that). nor 
because it is seen as unworthy of academic attention, but because it stands as a 
distorting mirror for broader Scottish society. Football is a voluntaristic realm where 
partisanship is intrinsic, indeed demanded. Searching for religious bitterness 
precisely where we know it exists tells us only what we already know - that some 
football supporters utilise religious and political symbolism to demonstrate loyalty to 
their team, but also (and just as importantly) to offend, annoy, and infuriate 
opponents. In other words, the dynamic of the Old Firm may be at heart a 
footballing, rather than religious, rivalry. 
This study asks whether religion really makes a difference in Scotland. More 
precisely, it asks how widespread religious activity is in Scotland, and whether 
religious affiliation in Scotland can be shown to stand for more than just theological 
belief. In terms of religious connections and activities, Scotland is an increasingly 
secular country. Religious attendance and membership are declining; little more than 
a half of all Scottish marriages are celebrated religiously: once consecrated buildings 
lie empty, or have been converted to secular use. Further. it will be shown that on 
two central issues in the supposed religious divide - Northern Ireland and separate 
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Catholic schools - religion actually plays a fairly weak role; the Scots are not 
religiously polarised on these core 'sectarian' issues. Yet a significant proportion of 
Scots view the influence of religion, or more precisely of religious antagonisms. as a 
worrying problem in contemporary Scotland. Such a paradox seems puzzling: the 
perception of conflict remains although conflict itself has diminished. This paradox 
can be explained in terms of Scotland's increasingly secular nature. As fewer people 
are actively religious their knowledge of religious controversies is only rarely formed 
through personal experience. Rather it is media coverage of religious division - most 
frequently football-related bigotry and violence - which frames the public view of a 
sectarian problem. Those who are religiously active are most likely to dismiss 
religious conflict as not very serious or non-existent. Perceptions of religious conflict 
are highest amongst those who are not religiously committed, or who have no 
religious affiliation. 
More importantly, this study seeks to determine how far religion matters in terms of 
political attitudes and behaviour. Scotland stands at an important point in its history: 
the rise of political nationalism, expressed not only in the emergence of the Scottish 
National Party but also in broad support for constitutional change, has given 
Scotland a Parliament. Have these changes received support from all the religious 
constituencies of Scotland, or is there an underlying religious division on key 
political questions? Has the increasing sense of Scottishness embraced all religious 
groups, or have some proved more reticent, perhaps fearful of the religious 
dimensions of Scottish identity? A good deal of the literature highlights these issues 
as potential problems for Scotland. Scottish Catholics, it has been argued, have 
historically felt distanced from Scottishness, in part due to the Irish heritage of many 
Catholics, in part because of the historic connections between Scottishness. 
Protestantism and Britishness. It is claimed that Catholics have suspected that 
constitutional change contained a danger that the 'new' Scotland would also be a 
more vibrantly Protestant Scotland, that an Edinburgh Parliament might have 
parallels with Stormont. The demonstrable weakness of the SNP vote amongst 
Catholics has been taken as evidence that Catholics feel "less' Scottish than other 
Scots and that they have opposed constitutional change - in other words that they 
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stand apart on two of the defining political issues in late twentieth century Scotland. 
The weakness of such an analysis is shown in twenty-five years of social suryeys. 
painfully under-used in this area. While Catholics are less likely to vote SNP than 
others they do not hold particularly negative attitudes towards the SNP. It will be 
demonstrated that there seems to be little religious difference in terms of Scottish 
identity, and that Catholics have been as supportive of constitutional change. 
including independence, as non-Catholics. In short, religion does not provide the 
marker of political cleavage that much of the literature on modem Scotland would 
suggest. 
Where does this leave 'sectarianism'? In particular why do so many Scots view the 
relatively rare demonstrations of religious animosity with concern? Firstly. 
expressions of religious animosity in Scotland - whether on the football terrace or on 
the ritualistic parades of the Summer Marching Season - have adopted the symbolism 
and political aspirations of the Northern Irish conflict. Scotland and Northern Ireland 
share not only geographic proximity, but close cultural and human connections. It is 
unsurprising that Scotland should be sensitive to expressions of the kind of political 
and religious animosities that have tom a close neighbour apart. But there is another 
reason, encapsulated in Bruce's dismissal of a continuing 'sectarian iceberg' - "the 
relatively rare public displays of sectarian animosity" are feared to be only "the 
visible tip of a submerged mass of ice,,3. For Bruce only the visible tip remains; 
others discern a mass of ice. 
Most accounts of religious conflict in Scotland - whether concerned with prejudice, 
bigotry, violence or discrimination - agree on one thing: it was worse in the past. 
There is a strong sense that the potential for very serious religious conflict - and 
indeed for a sectarian social system - existed in the Scottish past, and that to some 
extent it still exists. At its most superficial, such a view is encapsulated in the claim 
that Scotland is 'Ulster without the guns'. More sensitive analyses point to 
apparently deep divisions in the nineteenth century between, and the mutual hostility 




this study makes is that, once again, a broader comparative horizon is instructive. 
Such divisions were not uniquely Scottish and Irish, they existed - often more 
violently - throughout the receiving societies of the Irish Diaspora, in North America. 
Australasia, and in England and Wales. The second point is that we cannot simply 
transplant the concerns of the present into the Scottish past: present day religious 
animosity cannot be understood as 'the same as in the past, only less of it·. it is 
qualitatively, not just quantitatively, different. In large part this is because Scotland 
was more religious in the past. Religious imagery, practice and controversies 
resonated differently in the past because they mattered more. Religious antagonisms 
must be seen within the historical context of their time. 
A key focus of this study, therefore, is an examination of religion and politics in 
inter-war Scotland, a period widely agreed to have seen the sharpest polarisation in 
modern times between Scotland's Protestant and Catholic communities. What this 
section of the thesis shows is that the understanding of religious conflict in the 
present is to some degree the result of a misunderstanding (or rather a selective 
interpretation) of the past. Whilst sectarian conflict - in terms of ideas, of political 
action, and physical violence - was indeed very sharp between c.1918-39, it can only 
be understood in the quite extraordinary circumstances of the time. Economic slump 
coincided with real fears of 'the end of Scotland' as a distinctive national 
community, and the emergence of a new British political dualism, firmly rooted in 
class cleavage. It was also a period of bullish Catholic confidence and dispirited 
Protestant gloom - found internationally and not simply in Scotland - which 
provoked a 'Protestant' backlash in many societies. But what this study shows is that 
even in that period of sharp religious conflict, the relationship of religion and politics 
defies a simple division between Catholic and Protestant. Religious conflicts were 
secondary to, and depended upon, the seismic social events of the period. Mass-
produced poverty followed victory in the war to end all wars. Imperial confidence 
was shaken in Ireland, close to the (geographical and ideological) heart of the British 
sense of world mission. The rise of mass popular entertainment accompanied the 
universal franchise, the rise of Labour, and radical street politics of Left and Right. 
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An inexorable drift back to War, Churches emptied by poverty. the attractions of 
mass leisure: these were the defining features of the period. 
Religious conflicts mapped on to these transformations and were provoked by them. 
but they rarely influenced them. Religious conflict was not the defining character of 
inter-war Scotland - rather, it was an outcome of other, secular and profane. 
processes. Unlike Northern Ireland, where social and political conflict was conducted 
through a religious prism, Scottish religious controversies were short, sharp, and with 
little consequence (except the impression that 'sectarianism' was more important 
than it really was). This is not to say that there were no genuinely religious conflicts, 
for there were. However, religious controversies produced, at least to late twentieth 
century eyes, unexpected alliances - there was, for example, a section of the Scottish 
Left resolutely wedded to Protestantism and prepared to defend it, all the while 
defending the liberties of Scotland's Catholics. Such controversies did not always 
involve a cleavage between Protestants and Catholics. More frequently the 
controversy stemmed from antagonism between the sacred and the secular, pitching 
clerical interests against that of the secular state. In such cases the close tactical 
association of supposed sworn enemies (Catholic priests and Orange chaplains, for 
example) reveals the poverty of an analysis which focuses on Catholic versus 
Protestant alone, and ignores religious versus secular. 
A key problem in studying religious conflict in Scotland is that the past, to a varying 
degree, represents a 'Golden Age' for sectarianism. Accounts of the present are 
invariably drawn into history, either to explain the decline of sectarian conflict, or to 
support claims for its contemporary divisiveness. By convention, it would seem to 
make sense to design the structure of this study in a roughly chronological fashion: 
examine the past to illustrate the present. However, this study inverts this 
conventional architecture: Section One examines the position of religion, and of 
religious conflict, in contemporary Scotland, whilst section Two is concerned with 
conflict, and its context, in the inter-war period. Such an approach is necessary 
because. above all, this is a debate about contemporary Scotland. about what 
Scotland is as it enters a new era. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that 
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Scotland is not a sectarian country (at least when the term is used \\ith care), and. 
further, that the Scottish past was not sectarian in the way it is often claimed to be. 
The importance of the second part of the study is that it serves two functions. 
Primarily this is to show that the contemporary absence of a deep religious cleavage 
in Scotland politics is entirely consistent with the position of religion in politics 
during the relatively recent, and politically polarised, Scottish past. Secondarily. it 
circumvents the response that 'maybe Scotland isn't sectarian now, but it certainly 
used to be', by illustrating that the concerns of the present cannot be simply pushed 
neatly into a vaguely defined 'bad old days'. The second part of the study. then. 
emphasises the argument of the first: twentieth century Scotland is not, and was not, 
polarised between Catholic and Protestant. 
Chapter One argues that an adequate treatment of this topic reqUIres careful 
consideration of the central terms involved. In particular, consideration is given to 
the casual deployment of the term 'sectarianism' and, building upon research in 
Northern Ireland, a more concrete definition is provided. Evidence that a broader 
international view reveals that Scotland is not unique in possessing religious 
divisions is presented, focusing upon party politics, violence, education, and the 
'ghettoisation' of a Catholic minority. 
Chapter Two demonstrates that on two core 'sectarian' issues in Scottish politics -
Northern Ireland and Catholic schools - there is little religious polarisation. 
Sectarianism - as a systematic phenomenon - is examined, concluding that Scottish 
'sectarianism' comprises religious bigotry and prejudice at the level of ideas, more 
rarely in the realm of action, and not in terms of the social structure. Many Scots, 
however, are concerned with religious conflict: whilst in objective terms religion is 
declining in its social significance, in subjective terms many Scots view religious 
conflict as a serious problem, that religion still matters. 
Having found scant evidence of a religious divide over these . sectarian' issues, 
Chapter Three demonstrates that religious affiliation matters less in terms of Scottish 
political behaviour and attitudes than has often been assumed. Whilst religion plays a 
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significant role - at least amongst some denominational groups - in how people VOle. 
it is shown that the position in terms of attitudes towards political parties is less 
clear. The Chapter focuses on some defining issues in late twentieth century politics: 
the rise of political nationalism; the constitutional question; the emergence of the 
SNP; the fall of Scottish Conservatism; the decline of British identity and the 
dominance of Scottishness. That religion does not appear to be a significant factor in 
predicting individual attitudes on these crucial issues suggests that religious divisions 
have been exaggerated, in large part through a historical selectivity on the question 
of sectarianism. 
Chapter Four, therefore, considers the religious divide in inter-war Scotland, a period 
widely viewed as experiencing the sharpest communal tensions in twentieth century 
Scotland. The period witnessed high levels of political and criminal violence on 
British streets, and sectarian violence is placed within this context. The period was 
one of international Protestant crisis and Catholic confidence, and it is shown that 
Scotland was by no means unique in experiencing religious tensions in this period. 
Finally, the controversy over 'mixed marriage' in Scotland and England is examined, 
revealing that the barriers between Protestants and Catholics were more permeable 
than many clerics liked to admit. 
In Chapter Five the relationship between religion and politics is more closely 
examined, revealing that a party politics did not map easily on to religious divisions. 
The weakness and marginality of anti-Catholicism amongst the Scottish Unionist 
Party is shown, explaining a historic frustration amongst those who wished to place 
'Protestantism before Politics'. The campaign of the Presbyterian churches against 
Catholic Irish immigration reveals real Governmental concerns about immigration 
more generally, but that the campaign was utterly lacking in support or influence. 
The relationship between anti-Catholics, Protestantism and Scottish nationalism is 
explored, and the curious case of the Scottish Nationalist movement - which included 
both anti-Catholic and anti-Protestant tendencies - is highlighted. 
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Chapter Six demonstrates that the incorporation of Catholic schools into Scottish 
state-funded education has never been under serious threat of revision, let alone 
annulment. This issue continues to be controversial, and it is shown that Catholic 
schools - far from being a unique defence against Scottish Protestant bigotry - are an 
international phenomenon rooted in Catholic doctrine. Legal and political opposition 
to the 1918 Act in the first decade of its operation is examined, revealing both its 
strength and limitations. While it is shown that religious prejudices were mobilised 
with some short-lived electoral success, ostensibly antagonistic religious interests on 
the Boards themselves co-operated closely. 
Chapter Seven examines the intrusion of anti-Catholic parties into 1930s municipal 
politics. Far from demonstrating the vibrancy of anti-Catholicism during this highly 
polarised decade, they illustrate the marginality of anti-Catholicism to mainstream 
Scottish political life. Whilst militant Protestant success does reveal a latent, and 
relatively passive, reservoir of religious prejudice, it was an insufficient basis upon 
which to build anything other than an ephemeral, and sensational, protest over what 
were in fact largely secular grievances. 
It seems puzzling that a serious debate on 'sectarianism' did not arise until the late 
twentieth century, by which time Scotland had undergone rapid and deep-reaching 
secularisation. The study concludes by considering why religious division has 
emerged as a controversial topic now. The question of sectarianism belongs within a 
broader debate provoked by constitutional change and the necessity to confront key 
questions of identity. Who are the Scots, where are we going, where have we been? 
At the heart of the debate on sectarianism is a question about the place (or the 
absence) of religion within anew, re-imagined, configuration of Scottishness. 
National identities are not summoned from the void. and neither are they fixed, 
constant. The debate on . sectarianism', therefore, can be seen as part of a broader 
debate on the identity of Scotland and the Scots. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC IN MODERN SCOTLAND 
One day in the Abbotsford School playground ... a gang of boys had rushed at 
us shouting a challenge: 
'Wba' are yese - Billy or a Dan? Billy or a Dan!' Fists up, they were going to 
beat us to a pulp if we gave the wrong answer. This was the first time either 
of us had heard of 'Billy' or 'Dan'. And we had no idea what faction they 
belonged to. This was war and no mistake ... we stood a fifty-fifty chance of 
getting that beating ... 
Charlie's deeply sunken chin moved up a fraction. Undisturbed, he studied 
the gang one by one as they crowded round us. Red faced, their excitement 
crackling electrically in the air, they hurled the challenge at us over and over 
again. In a quiet, enquiring voice, he asked: 'Whit's a Billy? An' whit's a 
Dan?' 
They were shocked into silence. Then from their midst came a thin, plaintive 
cry: 'Och don't yese know then?' 
'No.' 
The leader, a heavily built, shock-headed boy ... pushed up close to us and 
seemed about to explain. And then, as if something snapped in the air around 
us, all the dynamism of the moment faded. To explain to us a cause whose 
meaning they themselves almost certainly did not understand, was suddenly 
too heavy a burden. They had never enquired into it, sanctified by battle as it 
was. Charlie's question came to them as sacrilege, and ... left them nothing to 
oppose, nothing to do battle about .... The gang shuffled and muttered, and in 
a moment streamed away to find some other target, and we were left alone. 1 
The key motif of much writing on Protestant and Catholic in modem Scotland has 
been that of conflict. The dominant chord discord, the defining images football 
rivalry and the Marching Season. The key reference point and the symbolism, has 
been provided by Northern Ireland. In 1995 a television documentary broadcast 
across the UK portrayed a post-industrial wasteland saturated with ethno-religious 
hatred as a 'natural' result of the religious mix in Scottish society. The film ended 
with the apocalyptic words of a young Orangeman: "The only difference between 
Scotland and Ulster is there's no guns on the street ... that the guns aren't here yet -
and hopefully it will never happen',l. 
Glasser (1990:2-3) 
2 Witness: Football. Faith and Flu/es, Channel 4, 12111/95 
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The theme re-emerged with a controversial lecture at the 1999 Edinburgh 
International Festival. Composer James MacMillan complained that Scottish "anti-
Catholicism, even when it is not particularly malign, is as endemic as it is second 
nature,,3. The speech was controversial before it was made, Scotland on Sunday 
reporting "Scotland is 'Ulster without guns' says composer" (this was not a parallel 
MacMillan drew)4. More interesting than the speech was the media reaction it 
spawned: Scottish front-page news for two weeks, the issues raised were examined 
by the UK broadcast media and led to hand-wringing by expatriate journalists that 
their former home was "a divisive, bigoted society"s. Significantly, interest in the 
issue led to the most comprehensive written treatment yet of the question of 
sectarianism in Scotland6. The collection was serialised by the Herald, which had 
carried three editorials and almost 100 letters on the issue in the fortnight following 
MacMillan's speech7. Intriguingly, the serialisation did not elicit the same interest in 
the Herald's letters pages. The issue, it seems, had faded as quickly as it had arisen8. 
A useful point about MacMillan's speech, and the resultant debate, was made by 
Walker: 
The extreme nature of the claims made and the language employed have been 
the cause of both the vigour of the subsequent debate and, it might be said, 
the frustrating circularity of it. ... The long-standing difficulties of debating 
this issue - of penetrating the fog of anecdote, grievance, claim and 
counterclaim in the absence of much hard evidence - have been compounded 
by a sterile stand-off between demands for acknowledgement of guilt, and 
irritation about being invited to feel guilty. 9 
Walker's comments highlight the problems facing research into religious conflict: 
instead of "hard evidence" there is myth and grievance. 'Myth' is chosen with care: 
3 MacMillan (2000a: 15). The lecture was given on 09/08/99 
4 Scolland On Sunday (hereafter SoS). 08/08/99. Also Daily Record and Guardian, 09/08/99 
s O'Hagan (2000:25) 
6 Devine [ed.] (2000) 
7 Between 10-23/08/99 there were seven news reports; three editorials; ten feature articles; and 
98 letters on sectarianism. This interest was not sustained into the third week. 
I The serialisation, and related features, were published between 28-31//03/2000. Only eleven 
related letters were published by the Herald. all within days of the seria1isation. 
9 G. Walker (2000: 125) 
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Like traditions, myths connect with past realities. They do, however, draw 
selectively from the past, a process which involves selective exclusion as well 
as inclusion. In doing so, myth becomes a contemporary and an acti ve force 
providing, in most instances, a reservoir of legitimation for belief and 
action. 10 
Such myths are not constructed out of falsehood, but from a highly selective 
understanding of the past. As such, myths are "fairly impervious to falsification": 
they represent "a truth [or truths] held to be self-evident" 11 • 
Where, then, should a study of sectarianism in Scotland begin? Much of the 
following chapter will tease out some of the initial problems in addressing the myth. 
firstly by examining two common-sense starting points, subsequently by noting that 
common-sense - that which is portrayed as self-evident - is itself a central motor of 
the myth. In subjecting the term 'sectarianism' to some scrutiny. the need for a re-
evaluation of religion's place in modem Scottish politics will become clear. All 
accounts of Scottish sectarianism agree on one general point: conflict was worse in 
the past. This consensus informs the basic outline of this study. Section One, using 
survey data covering the last quarter of the twentieth century, will examine the 
significance of religious identities in contemporary Scottish society. Section Two 
then examines the place of religion in the politics of Scotland's past, specifically in 
the period c.1918-39. Both of these approaches provide an analysis of sectarianism in 
contemporary Scotland and in the first half of the twentieth century. In doing so it 
will give perspective not just to 'Ulster without the guns', but also Scotland as Ha 
divisive, bigoted society". 
RELIGION, POLITICS AND FOOTBALL 
The starting point for such enquiry has been taken for granted. Many accounts begin 
(and some end) with the bitter atmosphere pervading football in Glasgow, because it 
seems the obvious, the common sense, place to start. Gallagher is correct to argue 
that HThe hate and hysteria on display at Old Firm matches does not tumble out of 
10 
II 
McCrone ( 1992:90) 
McCrone (1992:90); (1996: t 13. t 14). See also Schoptl in ( t 997) 
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the social void"l2, but there is danger in assuming that attitudes expressed on the 
terraces are straightforwardly imported from other areas of life. Bradley, for 
example, has argued that research amongst Scottish football supporters "gives some 
validity" to the view "that Conservative Unionism is as strong as ever among 
Protestants in Scotland" 13 • It is difficult to reconcile this claim with the hard fact of 
Conservative electoral collapse occurring as it was written. The culture of the 
football terrace need not translate into actual political behaviour. We can relate this 
disparity more widely to the problem at hand: is the rivalry between Celtic and 
Rangers reflective of wider social conflict between Scotland's Catholics and 
Protestants? This is a fairly popular view in Scotland, but one can easily point to 
fierce rivalries in Scotland and elsewhere which seem to have little social 
significance except in sport. The problem is to distinguish how far Old Firm rivalry 
is fuelled by the ordinary processes of sporting competition, and how far by wider 
social cleavages14• Football is theatre, and fans often tailor their songs and 
symbolism as much to antagonise their opponents as to display particular allegiances. 
It is far from clear that we can take the symbolic claims of football supporters at face 
value. 
Football's lusty expressions echo weakly in Scottish politics. Taking Rangers fans' 
ultra-Loyalism at face value, for example, we might have expected a larger protest 
than 300 Loyalists for Gerry Adams' 1995 visit to Govan Town Hall. After all, the 
day before 40,000 Rangers supporters had loudly expressed their hatred of 
Republicanism half-a-mile away at Ibrox. When John Paul II met Kirk Moderator 
John McIntyre under the statue of Knox at Edinburgh's New College in 1982 - a 
meeting rich in symbolic meaning - barely 800 militant Protestants were present to 
demonstrate. Such protests were overwhelmed by the huge crowds (Catholic and 
non-Catholic) welcoming the Pope. '''No Pope here' said the predictable wall 
graffiti. 'He's been and gone' a 1982 postscript added,,15: 
12 Gallagher (1985c:44) 
13 Bradley (1997:29) 
14 For Kuper (1994:217): "the Old Firm rivalry has outlived religious hatred ... the Old Firm 
has survived as a phenomenon because the fans enjoy it so much. They are not about to give up their 
ancient traditions just because they no longer believe in God." 
., Aspinwall (1989:76) 
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~~ final nail in the coffm of Scottish sectarianism was driven in by the Papal 
VISIt of 1982, less by His Holiness himself ... than by the Protestants and 
agnostics, Jews and atheists and others who welcomed him. The Pope' s visit 
to Ireland seemed more a reaffirmation of monoculturalism, while in 
Scotland he symbolised polyculturalism. This may be a starting point for 
some constructive reflection. 16 
ECUMENICISM & SECULARISATION 
That the Churches have not offered the most obvious starting point reflects the fact 
that relations between the major Christian Churches since the 1960s has been 
characterised not by conflict but by co-operation. Emphasis on sectarianism 
marginalises the fact of ecumenical co-operation, and more importantly, fails to 
adequately acknowledge the central process in religion in the late-twentieth century: 
secularisation. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland has been described 
as "the whisper that was once the voice of Scotland,,17. Clerical diminuendo - hardly 
unique to Scotland - has pushed historically hostile denominations together; co-
operation has replaced competition (and conflict) as religion'S influence has waned. 
Whilst Scottish Protestantism has a fairly long history of co-operation, until recently 
Catholicism viewed such initiatives with mistrust. In 1928 Pius XI denounced 
ecumenicism as leading to "indifferentism" and emphasised that worship alongside 
non-Catholics was "entirely forbidden,,18. From 1950, the Vatican allowed local 
Catholic-Protestant conferences "to further the union of all Christians" and the 
W orId Council of Churches welcomed this "clear indication that the ecumenical 
movement has begun to make its influence felt" amongst Catholics l9. The broad 
trend since has been towards co-operation and fellowship, although prejudice and 
mistrust lingered on both sides. In 1962 Protestant bodies were invited to a Catholic 
conference in Glasgow, a delighted Clerk to the Glasgow CoS Presbytery noting: 
For a long time we have lamented the intransigent attitude which has been 
taken by the Roman Catholic Church, and their refusal to admit that those 
outside their Church are in the body of Christ. Here we have evidence of a 
16 o. D. Edwards (1994: 181-82) 
17 Ian Bell, 'Whisper that was once the strongest voice', Scotsman 20/05:2000 
18 McCarthy (1998: 179-181) 
19 Glasgow Herald (hereafter GH) 01/03/50; 10/OJ'50. Whilst the Catholic Church is not a 
member it has had close relations with the wee since 1966. 
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change in attitude ... We see here the suggestion that we should sit do\\n 
together as Christians. If anyone feels he cannot do it, I would suggest it is 
not his function as a Pres~rian but his function as a Christian that he ought 
to look at with great care. 
The Dowanhill Convent conference received prominent and sympathetic coverage in 
the press, as "almost certainly the biggest gathering of Roman Catholics and 
Protestants, meeting as such, which has been held anywhere since the 
Reformation,,21. 
Dowanhill marks a public break from the cold war of the preceding four centuries. 
From here the Churches immersed themselves in co-operation, and although this has 
certain limits - for example shared communion is still a matter of dispute - it ushered 
in an atmosphere of mutual respect. By the early 1970s, Catholics and Protestants 
were joining in religious services, notably during a Week of Prayer for Christian 
Unity. Detente led to small protests at Kirk General Assemblies: unperturbed, a 
Catholic observer attended in 1969, and from 1971 the Kirk issued a standing 
invitation. In 1975 the Archbishop of Glasgow, Thomas Winning, addressed the 
Assembly, Cardinal Gray attended in 1977, and in 1995 Cardinal Winning attended 
not only the Kirk's Assembly but also that of the theologically conservative Free 
Church. Within a decade cautious dialogue had led to joint worship and cordial co-
operation: since 1989 Action of Churches Together in Scotland (ACTS) has brought 
together the bulk of Scotland's Christians in discussion, social initiatives and 
worship22. This is, in institutional terms, the big picture of Catholic-Protestant 
relations in contemporary Scotland, and it would be a central failure not to address 
this from the outset. The contrast with Northern Ireland is instructive. In 1999 the 
Presbyterian Church of Ireland voted against involvement in the Irish Council of 
Churches, rejecting formal links with Catholicism23. One can find examples of 
mutual religious dislike in Scotland, but such instances should not obscure the fact 
20 Rev. Andrew Herron, quoted in Scotsman 07/03/62. Presbytery members attended two 
private meetings with Catholics in 1961. What made 1962 different was that it was a public meeting. 
~I GH27/04/62 
21 ACTS member bodies comprise 90% of Scotland's Christian churchgoers. 
2] McKay (2000:69) 
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that the Churches have developed a relationship of mutual trust and co-operation that 
seemed improbable as recently as the 1950s. 
Beginning with the Churches, however, would only partially penetrate the myth of 
sectarianism in Scotland. Being a Catholic or a Protestant in Scotland can mean 
much more, or indeed less, than attending a particular Church or holding a particular 
view of God. A fundamental difficulty of getting to grips with sectarianism in 
Scotland is that of disentangling the meanings invested in seemingly straightforward 
terms, not least of 'Protestant' and 'Catholic'. 
'PROTESTANTS' AND 'CATHOLICS' 
In 'common-sense' terms the meaning of Protestant and Catholic appears 
unproblematic. However, common-sense is a cultural construct, specific to a 
particular place in a particular time. 'Religion' in contemporary Scotland has a 
variety of meanings relating not to the nature of God, but to cultural practices, ethnic 
identity, and a range of leisure choices. This complexity is revealed in the informal 
mechanisms for 'identifying' another person's religion according to school attended; 
place of residence; name; political party supported; and football team followed. If 
O'Brien, educated at a Catholic school, living in Coatbridge, voting Labour and 
following Celtic football club, meets Robertson, non-denominationally educated, 
living in Larkhall, voting Conservative and supporting Rangers, then the cues are 
present for each to place the religious identity of the other. Such stereotypes are 
highly fallible: Catholic schools are not exclusively Catholic, and many Catholics do 
not attend Catholic schools; residential segregation is not a marked feature of 
Scotland24; and there is no easy denominational demarcation in political preference. 
Football cues may seem more robust, in that both Glasgow giants have cultivated an 
identity that stresses a Catholic (Celtic) or Protestant (Rangers) heritage. However, 
neither support is exclusively Protestant or Catholic, whilst other clubs have long 
discarded any 'religious' identity, or never had one in the first place. It is difficult to 
place an Aberdonian, a St.Mirren supporter, or a Liberal Democrat. Ascertaining a 
17 
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person's name is the most basic (and discreet) way of placing them. but is highly 
inefficient, not least because of high rates of religious intermarriage. Some research 
utilises men's 'Irish' names as a marker for Catholicism, and Catholic parentage as a 
marker for Irish descenrs, conflating Irishness and Catholicism. Williams estimates 
that "in Scotland as a whole around 65 per cent of Catholics - and in Clydeside ... 80 
per cent or more - are of Irish descent,,26. This reveals the limitations of conflating 
'Irish' and 'Catholic'. One-third of Catholics, if Williams is correct are not of Irish 
ancestry, and since this proportion falls to one-fifth in the industrial west it is 
necessarily higher in the rest of Scotland. 'Irish' names might well be a good 
indicator of Irish ancestry, but they are less efficient as a marker for Catholicism. 
Further, not all Catholics of Irish ancestry have identifiably 'Irish' surnames: 
Edinburgh's Hibernian football club in the 1870s - whose players were all, by 
definition, practising Catholics and almost exclusively Irish or Scoto-Irish - featured 
players named Watson, Browne, Smith and Clarke, alongside more readily 
identifiable Irish surnames27• 
Such cues create a hierarchy of religious identity - being a real Catholic, or a real 
Protestant depends on a range of demographic and attitudinal characteristics. A 
politically-neutral Highland Catholic possesses fewer cues - is 'less Catholic' - than a 
Lanarkshire Celtic supporter with strong Irish Republican leanings. In a secular 
society within which many people claim no religious affiliation, this makes the terms 
Protestant and Catholic very complex indeed. A tension exists between self-
definition and ascription, with 'religious' identities ascribed on the basis of traits 
which are, at the very best, only indirectly connected with religious belief and 
practice. 
24 Scotland bears no resemblance to Northern Ireland where Housing Executive figures suggest 
that "Belfast housing estates were almost totally segregated by 1998. In the rest of Northern Ireland 
70 per cent of public housing was segregated, and that figure was rising". McKay (2000:78) 
!5 See Mullen et al (2000) 
26 Williams & Walls (2000:233) 
27 See Lugton (1999) 
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SCOTLAND AND 'THE IRISH' 
The key issue in Scottish sectarianism was mass emigration from Ireland. From the 
early nineteenth century the Irish Diaspora created a substantial Irish presence not 
only in industrial Clydeside, but Northern England and, subsequently, the English 
Midlands and South28• Irish immigration transfonned Scottish Catholicism from the 
small pockets in the Gaidhealtachd and North East to a sizeable community 
concentrated in the industrial central belt. Most accounts focus on this aspect of 
Scottish Catholicism to the detriment of the other influences on its development. 
Burnett describes the "Catholic Gaedhealtachd's cultural absorption into the Greater 
Glasgow [Catholic] ghetto" suggesting that this: 
highlights the continuing hegemony of the Irish Catholic urban West as the 
dominant cultural bloc within Catholic Scotland and the continuing insistence 
that the 'basic background' to understanding modem Scottish Catholicism 
remains the historical experience of this constituency. There is profound 
irony in the fact that the obstacle to a further understanding of the nature of 
the contemporary Scottish [Catholic] community is ... the denial of parity of 
esteem by an overbearing hibernocentrism?9 
In recent years other ethnic components within Scottish Catholicism - Italian and 
Lithuanian - have received some attention3o, but as Aspinwall has recently 
emphasised "the suggestion that Catholicism in Scotland is an Irish phenomenon 
needs to be challenged,,3l. 
Devine argues that this "almost exclusive concern with the Catholic Irish" proves a 
"weakness in the traditional historiography of the Irish in Scotland": 
Scotland ... was distinctive within mainland Britain because it attracted large 
numbers of Protestant Irish from Ulster ... This important and substantial 
minority has resisted detailed and systematic historical treatment. Unlike the 
Catholic Irish they appear to have assimilated relatively quickly and did not 
stand out as different or alien. Contemporary evidence about them is 
therefore thin and meagre. 32 
28 J.Jackson (1963), Drudy (1986b), Delaney (1999), Handley (1943 & 1947), Devine [ed.] 
(1991 ) 
29 Burnett (1998: 178,186-87) 
30 Burnett (1998), Macdonald (1978), Colpi (1993), Millar (1998), Bradley (1995d) 
31 Aspinwall (2000a: 105). US Catholicism also experienced this "hegemony of the Irish" -
Herberg (1960: 136-161) 
.12 Devine ( 1991 :vi) 
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The dearth of historiography is surprising: a majority of Irish immigranb to ~(otland 
in the first half of the nineteenth century. and over 800/0 in the period c.1880-1 q 1 O. 
came from heavily Protestant Ulster. Estimates for thc o\"crall proportion of 
Protestants amongst nineteenth century immigrants \'ary bet\\c~n onc fi fth and onc 
third, although it is clear that at certain times. and in ccrtain placcs. the proportions 
were significantly greater33 . During 1880-1910 behveen a quarter and one-third of all 
Irish migrants to Scotland came from predominantly Protestant .-\ntrim3.t. Thc Irish 
brought with them a reservoir of mutual suspicion and a legacy of contlict. 
expressed for Protestants through the Orange Order. The Ordcr arri \'cd in Scotland 
around 1800, and by 1848 had an estimated membership of 700: by c.191-+ its 
membership was 40,00035 . Into the 1930s .. the most salient characteristic of the 
Orange Order was its importance as a focus for the Protestant Irish in SCt)tland'", 
demonstrating "that an Irish Protestant community identity \\as a fact of lite ... 
although its profile was not as high as that of its Catholic Irish counterpart" 1('. The 
Irish, then, "formed a significant part of the \\"orking-dass membership" of man: 
Protestant congregations in west central Scotland37 . Into a strongly Protestant culturc 
with its own anti-Catholic traditions came large numbers of Irish Catholics and 
Protestants with a bitter history of contlict. 
Contlation of . Irish' with . Catholic' can imply that Catholics are . alien', and 
relegates Irish Protestants and non-Irish Catholics to the margins of discussion. In the 
1940s, Handley complained that "the Scottish equation: Irish and therefore Catholic 
= Catholic and therefore Irish" denied "absorption into the stock" to "descendants of 
l Irish] immigrants ... so long as they remain Catholics .,ys. Of \Villie (iallacher' s 
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It is perfectly illustrative of their marginal status that even a sympathetic 
observer termed the Catholics as 'the Irish' - as members of a separate 
nationality - when, by the closing decades of the previous century. the 
majority of Roman Catholics hailing from immigrant stock were already 
Scottish-born. 39 
Others claim equating 'Irish' with 'Catholic' is denigratory. For Reilly. "The glib, 
age-old equations - Catholic = Irish, Presbyterian = Scot - will no longer serve. and it 
is long past time to have done with such perniciously anachronistic labels',40. For 
Bradley, "Irish and Catholic are clearly not the interchangeable terms they once 
were, though for those of an explicit anti-Catholic disposition, they remain SO·,-lI. 
It seems strange, therefore, that Bradley and Handley themselves conflate the terms. 
Irish Protestants were marginal to Handley who claimed that the "vast majority" of 
Irish immigrants between 1798-1845 were, contrary to the evidence, Catholic. 
Quoting an 1834 claim that "a large number of the Irish in [Wigtownshire] are not 
Catholics", Handley comments "Originally their forebears were, but lost that faith 
through lack of Catholic pastors and through intermarriage with the natives,,42. The 
eight Orange Lodges operating within a 25 mile radius of Wigtown in 1835 suggest 
that many of the Wigtownshire Irish were, in fact, Protestant. Bradley's conflation is 
explicitly expressed as 'Catholic/Irish' or 'Irish/Catholic' and contemporary 
Catholics are termed the "Scottish born Irish,,43. MacMillan too conflates the term, 
marginalising other threads within Scottish Catholicism: "Is the Pope Catholic?, asks 
the joke. Not ifhe is Italian, MacMillan would seem to answer,,44. 
The invisibility of the Protestant Irish stems from the fact that Ulster Protestants 
claimed Scottish ancestry, and to some extent had maintained a Scottish culture in 
Ireland. This leads to an assumption that such immigrants "had little difficulty in 
39 Gallagher (198 7b: 1), quoting F onvard, 4111/33. Willie Gallacher was of a Scoto-Irish 
Catholic background. 
40 Reilly (1998:160) 
41 Bradley (1995a:464). Note the marginalisation of Irish Protestants and non-Irish Catholics in 
this statement. 
42 Handley (1943:287,294,82) 
43 Bradley (1995e: 137), (1998d:216), (1998b: 110) 
44 O.D.Edwards (2000:8) 
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settling down in Scotland and indeed re-integrating with their kith and kin .. ~5. \\ bilst 
it seems clear that the Protestant Irish had fewer problems in Scotland than their 
Catholic compatriots, some aspects of their culture and politics were seen as 
problematic, indeed alien, to 'native' Scottish Protestantism. From its arrival. 
Orangeism, the foremost organisational expression of Ulster Protestant emigrant 
identity46, faced hostility: 
feelings of outraged and contemptuous neutrality in the face of what was seen 
as an 'alien import' of party feeling were to remain constant in the 
'respectable' bour~eois view of the Orangemen's activities throughout the 
nineteenth century. 7 
Scottish Protestant suspicion of the Orange Order was motivated by its perceived 
national complexion, leading to complaints that Orangeism was "misunderstood and 
misrepresented", dismissed as "a mere Irish faction, a foreign import brought to 
disturb the peace of the country,,48. Orangeism also faced a religious problem, as it: 
tended to be viewed by Presbyterians for a long time as essentially an 
Episcopal or Anglican organisation. Protestant Irish participation in militant 
lay Protestant organisations ... seem to have been minimaL and these 
organisations were careful to keep their distance from the Orange Order. 49 
One must be cautious not to overstate the ease with which the Protestant Irish were 
absorbed into Scottish society: Orangeism had many aspects which were seen as 
alien, even in the eyes of home-grown No Popery campaigners. 
One explanation of Protestant Irish invisibility is the perception that authentic 
Irishness is Catholic Irishness. This view is shared by those employing the 'Scottish 
equation' to denigrate Scotland's Catholics as alien and those who employ a parallel 
'Irish equation': that in Ireland, Catholic = Irish; and Protestant = alien/British. 
4S Bradley (1995e: 134) 
46 Witness the opening line from two versions of The Sash My Father Wore: 
For it's here I am an Orangeman,just come across the sea .. . 
Sure I am an Ulster Orangeman,/rom Erin's Isle I came ... . 
47 McFarland (1990:52,54). One 1856 Orangeman complained that Scottish Orangemen "are 
usually shunned as returned convicts, many intelligent and conscientious men avoid them as the) 
would a mad dog." Quoted in McFarland (1994:80) 
48 Quoted in McFarland (1994:80) 
49 G. Walker (I991 :52) 
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Bradley, for example, quotes an elderly Scottish Catholic dismissin~ LTbter LTnionisb 
as "impostors from Scotland")(), 'Irish'. like 'Scottish' in the Scottish equation, 
denotes not geographical origin or ancestry, but a political claim tl) ethni~' 
authenticity. It seems clear that most ;..; orthern Irish Protestants have abandoned 
claims to Irishness: 
In a 1968 survey, the three labels of 'British', 'Irish'. and 'l'lster' were 
chosen with equal frequency. In 1992 two-thirds of Protestants but onl\' one 
in ten Catholics called themselves British. Three out of five Catholics but 
only one in fifty Protestants called themselves' Irish'. 51 
'Irish', then, is an identity claimed by 600/0 of Northern Ireland' s Catholics. but only 
20/0 of Protestants: conversely. 10% of Catholics and 6500 of Protestants describe 
themselves as 'British'. The Irish equation plays \n~l1 in )Jorthern Ireland. yet the 
Scottish equation plays very poorly in Scotland. Sur\"t~ys find that both Catholics and 
Protestants primarily define themselves as Scottish and only a small minority of 
Catholics describe themselves as 'Irish,52. Although many Catholics feel an affinity 
with Ireland, for most - like non-Catholics - their primary national identity is 
Scottish. The issue of national identity does not play the concrete and crucial rok in 
Scottish constitutional politics as is \vitnessed in Northern Ireland53 . Neverthekss, 
the link between Irishness and Catholicism has been deployed from t\\O quite 
different perspectives - to portray Catholicism as essentially alien and 'disloyal" to 
Scottish values, and to claim that Catholics suffer from a deep ethno-religious 
cleavage in Scotland. Aspin\\all argues that: "Irish equals Catholic is a useful tool 
for interested parties on both sides. Unfortunately it \\as not al\\ays true in Scotland. 
Reality is somewhat more complex,·54. 
~I 
BradleY (1995c: 1 09) 
BnIL'l' ( 1994: 146) 
~1 Sl'l' Chaptl:r .'. 
~.l On thl: SCI.)ttish 'non-ali1.!l1ment' of national identity, \otil1~ and constitutiunal attituJe see 
Bond (.:'000) 
~I Aspil1wall (2000a: 1 (l()) 
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"ALONE AMONGST THE NATIONS"? 
Memories of religious injustice - and the myths that envelop them - linger long: 
Catholics still labour under the heavy weight of the bitter memory of non-
acceptance in a society overwhelmingly and self-consciously Protestant ... 
Despised as foreigners of low-grade stock, ... they early developed the 
minority defensiveness that led them to withdraw into their own . ghetto' with 
a rankling sense of grievance and to divide the world into 'we' and 'they' ... 
These feelings of rejection, exclusion and grievance, though they no longer 
correspond to the facts of ... life, and though they are deplored by more 
thoughtful Catholics, are still a real force among the great mass of Catholic 
people in this country. It takes a long time for such wounds to heal. 55 
Such wounds were deep between c.1870-1914: 
Protestants regarded Catholics as lazy, as primitive and superstitious in their 
religion, as slavishly submissive to pope and priests; they believed that 
Catholicism was associated with economic and technological backwardness; 
... and ... regarded Catholics as being generally unpatriotic ... Of course, 
Catholics were equally uncomplimentary about Protestants, but the 
concentration of economic, and often political, power in Protestant hands ... 
meant that Protestants were far more often in a position to put their prejudices 
into practice. 56 
Whilst the above passages could pass as descriptions of Scotland, they in fact 
describe the United States and Germany. In North America, like Scotland, 
Catholicism's immigrant heritage played an important role in defining Catholics as 
'alien', but German sectarian suspicions had no clear ethnic component. The bitter 
legacy of the Reformation echoed wherever Protestants and Catholics mixed. 
Comparisons between Scotland and Northern Ireland seem obvious, common sense, 
but wider comparisons are revealing. 
One reason that Ireland is deemed the most obvious comparator lies in the perception 
that politicised religion belongs firmly in a backward past and that "whenever they 
have been mixed the result has generally been explosive,,57. Religio-political 
loyalties, in this view. are a throwback to what other, mature and civilised, societies 
have discarded. However, "'The image of Scotland as a society riven with 
Herberg (1960:232-33) 
McLeod (1986:421-422) 
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sectarianism proves less convincing when the importance of religion in the politics of 
every European state is considered"s8. Religion is - or has been until recently - at the 
heart of western European politics. Confessional parties have been key players in 
every western European state except the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic 5Q• 
These parties belong to the mainstream of popular European politics: the largest bloc 
in the European Parliament, for example, began life as the Christian Democrat 
Group60. 
Religious identity provided a key organIsIng principle in Western European 
democracy and extended far beyond the electoral realm. John Whyte has attempted 
to explain differing forms of religio-political engagement, and his model is useful in 
constructing an international perspective. Whyte describes two poles of religio-
political structure, 'open' and 'closed'. Closed structures feature parties drawing 
support from, and dominating, a particular religious community, complemented by 
confessional social organisations (such as associations of workers, employers, 
farmers, youth and women), and confessional leisure, media and education systems. 
Open structures are precisely the opposite: there is no specifically religious party, nor 
one which draws exclusively from one particular religious group; social 
organisations are generally secular; and the Churches play a subordinate role within 
the political system61 . For Whyte, a clear division exists between Continental 
Europe, tending towards a closed system, and the 'Anglo-American' countries 
tending towards the open62: "In Continental Europe, it might be said that a closed 
Catholicism has been faced by a closed socialism, a closed communism, even a 
closed Protestantism,,63. 
57 SoS editorial 27/10/96 
58 J .Mitchell (1996:29) 
59 The position here of Northern Ireland is less clear, although no party has appropriated a 
!Pecifically religious label. 
Now clumsily known as the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) 
and European Democrats. See S.Berger [ed.] (1982); Hanson (1987); Whyte (1981) 
61 Whyte (1981). The relationship between confessional organisations and their respective 
churches has not been straightforward, vacillating between clerical patronage and hostility. 
62 For Whyte: Australia. Canada. New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. 
63 Whyte (1981:21) 
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The closed system reached its zenith in the Netherlands with confessional parties 
taking half the popular vote as late as 1967, and confessional economic, social and 
leisure organisations commanding the loyalty of their communities64. Education. 
broadcasting and the printed media were organised on confessional lines with 
Catholics expressly forbidden to listen to Socialist broadcasts until 196565. Politics 
was organised in distinct 'pillars' (verzeilung) which expressed social and political 
cleavages in vertical (denominational) rather than horizontal (class) terms. 
Pillarisation produced a remarkably stable form of democracy by rigidly isolating 
religious and political communities in their own organisational pillars. and pursuing 
a 'politics of accommodation' between the leaderships of these structures66. In the 
1950s 95% of Dutch Catholics belonging to a women's, youth or farmers' 
organisation belonged to a specifically Catholic one. Similarly, 90% of Catholic 
primary school children were Catholic-educated; 79% of Catholic newspaper readers 
bought a Catholic daily; and 61 % of Catholics belonging to sports clubs were 
members of the Catholic sporting federation: 
But the central importance of sectarian sub-cultures was reflected in two 
other statistics: 91 per cent of [Dutch] Catholics marrying in 1957 married a 
fellow Catholic; a study of friendship networks showed that 85 per cent of 
practising Catholics included fellow Catholics among their closest friends, 
and a majority of them had no non-Catholic on their liSt.67 
Rigid separation led not to religious conflict but to an elite-dominated "regime of 
peaceful though unfriendly co-existence,,68. Although Dutch pillarisation far 
exceeded that found elsewhere - Switzerland and Germany for example - a 
thoroughgoing fusion of religious, political and social behaviour has produced 
cultures generally admired for their pluralism and tolerance
69
. 
64 In 1946 the various confessional parties accounted for 54% of the Dutch vote and 47% in 
1967. By 1977, with the merger of the major religious parties into 'Christian-Democrat Appeal', the 
confessional vote had declined to 35%. Bakvis (1981 :3) 
65 Bakvis (1981 :15) . . . 
66 Lijphart (1968). Thung el al (1982: 130) described this process as "coupltng polttlcal 
fassivity of rank-and-file members with close co-operation at the level of elites". 
7 McLeod (1986:413) 
68 McLeod (1997: 18) - emphasis added. 
69 Swiss Catholics "remained loyal to the Catholic butcher. cafe, plumber and carpenter. even 
when the quality of a Protestant competitor was said to be better". Linder ( 1994: 19) 
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Specifically Catholic parties exist in overwhelmingly Catholic countries - Spain. 
Italy, Portugal - and this should alert us to a major aspect of religion and politics in 
the modern world. Religious conflicts have often been at their most fierce when 
waged between Churches and the secular state. Conflicts over education, marital law. 
and the constitutional role of the Church were defining questions across Europe until 
c .1914. The Kulturkampf against late nineteenth century German Catholicism had 
strong echoes elsewhere in Europe7o• Conflict between Liberalism and the Catholic 
Church led to disestablishment in France (1905) and Portugal (1910)71. 
Increasing state dominance in the realm of education led to the consolidation, or the 
beginning, of largely self-funded systems of Catholic education throughout Europe, 
North America and Australasia. Scottish Catholic schools have proved a focus of 
debate on the religious question in Scotland and it is symptomatic of the narrow. 
even parochial, focus of much of this debate that some commentators argue that this 
is largely, or exclusively, a Scottish phenomenon: 
only in Scotland are Catholic schools [seen as] perniciously divisive, which 
tells us more about the country than the schools ... Alone among the nations. 
we are allergic to Catholic schools ... 72 
The day Scotland is relaxed enough to recognise separate Catholic schools as 
the absolute right of a community which contributes to the enrichment of our 
national life and ethics, and is therefore not questioned as to its rights, 
Scotland will have arrived. 73 
In these accounts Scotland is abnormal in its view of separate religious schools, that 
alone amongst the (mature, democratic) nations, Scotland has yet to arrive. Again, a 
broader view is instructive. Since 1918 the state has funded, administered and 
extended the Scottish Catholic school system; Catholic religious instruction is 
guaranteed by law; and the Church enjoys a religious veto on the teachers employed. 
70 The Swiss Constitution, for example, prohibited the Jesuits and the (re)establishment of 
monasteries between 1874-1973. Linder (1994: 19-20). Similar prohibitions occurred in Germany and 
France. 
71 In Portugal the founding of the republic "led not merely to the separation of Church and State 
but to a programme of anti-clerical legislation on a scale not witnessed in Europe since the French 
revolution". Conway (1997:26) 
n Reilly (2000:37) 
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The Scottish State-Church compact on Catholic education goes far beyond that found 
in many other modem societies, and at no point in the last 80 years has it come under 
serious threat of revision, let alone dissolution. As Chapter Six of this thesis 
demonstrates the Catholic 'struggle for the schools' was an international 
phenomenon, and Catholic schools remain politically sensitive in many countries. 
One might also note that even in ostensibly Catholic societies the Church has 
maintained its own schools: "the Church has sought, wherever possible, to develop 
its own structures of Catholic ... education independent of the secular power of the 
state,,74. In short, it is quite obvious that Scotland is not 'alone amongst the nations' 
in finding separate Catholic education problematic. As the Tablet recently noted: 
Division and controversy, not always conducted with the charity that is due 
from the followers of the Prince of Peace, have dogged the issue of religious 
education in Catholic schools in England & Wales as long as most people can 
remember.75 
Neither does one have to search too far for sectarian violence in societies to which 
Scotland is all too rarely compared. The United States witnessed two nineteenth 
century Catholic-Protestant riots resulting in 100 deaths76. As Aspinwall notes, 
"Unlike American sectarian savagery, the Scottish variety never developed into 
burning down convents or firing cannons on bigoted opponents,,77. In England the 
re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy in 1850 (to some 'the Papal Aggression') 
fuelled serious disturbances with deaths in Liverpool and Stockport. In 1862 Irish 
Catholic attacks on pro-Garibaldi rallies led to rioting in West Yorkshire, London 
and Birkenhead. In the 1860s William Murphy provoked anti-Catholic riots across 
the English Midlands and North ending only with his violent death. Orange-Green 
violence was common in Northern English areas of Irish settlement into the 1900s, 
73 Jim Sillars in the Archdiocese of Glasgow's monthly journal, Flourish, May 1991, 
afProvingly quoted by Bradley (1995e: 158) 
7 Conway (1997:42) - emphasis added. 
7S Tablet, 20/0512000 
76 See Herberg (1960:141-142); Carwardine (1992). In 1871 New York 100 died as militia 
protected Orangemen from Irish Catholic rioters. For a hi.ghly biased contemporary account see 
Headley (1873). McGimpsey (1982) otTers a more measured view. 
n Aspinwall (1989:76) 
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and in Liverpool, "Britain's sectarian capital", until the Second \\" orld \\' ar -8. 
Scotland also experienced considerable sectarian violence, particularly in the mid-
nineteenth century, Coatbridge witnessed "a particularly vicious riof' in 1857 as 
Catholics attacked an Orange parade, Shots were exchanged and "After routing the 
Orangemen, the mob took control of the town, assaulting anyone and everyone at 
will ". Order was not restored ... until the military arrived from Glasgow .. 19. A 
provocative march by Paisley Orangemen in 1859 was attacked by Catholic Irish 
miners, leading to severe rioting, one death, and 150 troops being sent to the town80. 
Partick saw Scotland's "most notorious" sectarian clash in 1875 after Irish Home 
Rule demonstrators were attacked by "hundreds of Orangemen armed with clubs and 
stones. Fighting broke out and continued well into the night". During three days of 
disturbance the Riot Act was read and 90 arrestedsl . In 1883 Coatbridge, after 100 
arrests in July, the August Home Rule procession was attacked. In Motherwell, 
returning Home Rulers were attacked and shots fired. In both towns the Riot Act was 
reads2. 
Whilst such disturbances represent a very serious level of violence, it can be seen 
that their scale and ferocity were equalled in England and surpassed elsewhere. This 
extended to non-violent protest: the restoration of the Scottish Catholic Hierarchy in 
1878 occasioned no dissent comparable with the English 'Papal Aggression' scare of 
1850. Indeed, the Scottish Restoration "was received with civilised tolerance; the 
few exceptions were predictable and they made little impact on public opinion"s3: 
78 MacRaild (1999: 172-84). On Murphy see MacRaild (1996 & 1998) and Arnstein (1975); on 
the 'Garibaldi riots' see Gilley (1973); on Liverpool, see Waller (1981), Bohstedt (1992), and 
Murdoch (1992) 
79 Marshall (1996:34-35) 
80 McFarland (1990:64); Marshall (1996:35-37). Handley (1947:117) notes only that the 
procession "became involved in a row with some miners" but his primary source (GH 13/07/1859) 
states unequivocally that the miners twice attacked the Orangeman, the second assault being the 
bloodier. 
81 Handley (1947:117) 
82 Handley (1947:117). McFarland (1990:153) claims that the 1875 Partick fracas was .. the last 
time the riot Act was read in Scotland", but Handley has it read eight years later. 
83 McRoberts (1978b:28). See also Handley (1947:111). The Catholic adoption of English 
ecclesiastical titles was interpreted as an insult to the Church of England. In Scotland such a challenge 
was offered only to the small and fairly influential Episcopal Church as the Presbyterian Churches. of 
course, had no bishoprics. 
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Recent work on CatholiclProtestant conflict in England shows that it was not 
a phenomenon peculiar to industrial Scotland but one which could flourish 
just as vigorously, perhaps even more so, in areas like the north-west of 
England which witnessed serious outbreaks of large scale disorders in the 
1850s and again in the later 1860s ... Therefore, given the Scottish reputation 
for religious extremism, one is tempted to wonder not at the many incidents 
of communal friction as such but, given the scale they could take in England. 
that they were not worse.84 
'GHETTO' 
One final comparative aspect remains to be addressed: the issue of the Catholic 
'ghetto'. The term is used in this context to imply the careful separation of Catholics 
from non-Catholics in terms of culture, religious ideology and institutional and 
personal life. The creation and sustaining of the Catholic ghetto in Scotland had three 
central, inter-related, factors. The first was desire to maintain the Faith, to protect it 
from corrosive contact with Protestants and agnostics. The second was the immigrant 
character of many Catholics in Scotland and their desire to maintain a distinct 
identity. Lastly, there was hostility from the wider society both towards Catholicism 
and the expression of immigrant identities. The ghetto was fortified from within and 
without, and suspicion and hostility on both sides fed off each other. The use of the 
ghetto concept has been criticised, Bradley arguing that: 
The use of ghetto, with its inevitable conceptual limitations, means that the 
Irish are frequently seen as being in some way broadly responsible for 
limiting their own life chances and in becoming victims of prejudice ... [Tom] 
Gallagher is typical of some writers on the Irish in that he is often too willing 
to accept that the ghetto to which Irish Catholics often belonged was 
frequently self-imposed, particularly by sometimes cruel, prejudiced and 
small minded clergy, and that the Irish were willing dupes to the will of the 
cassock and a contradictory emotional attachment to their 'homeland' which 
invariably kept them in a social, religious and political hinterland. 8s 
Bradley, rejecting that isolation was self-imposed, shifts 'culpability' onto hostility 
from the wider society. Others have emphasised the role of such hostility: Callum 
Brown argues that a "fortress mentality" developed in face of "discrimination in 
employment and Protestant hostility in politics and culture". Bruce argues that the 




Bradley (1998b:96-97). Again the easy conflation of' Irish' with 'Catholic' should be noted. 
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hostile reception by turning inwards',86. Anti-Irish prejudice is undeniable: the 1871 
Census noted that the presence of the Irish-born in Scotland: "has undoubtedly .. 
produced deleterious results, lowered greatly the moral tone of the lower classes, and 
greatly increased the necessity for the enforcement of sanitary and police 
precautions,,87. 
It is equally clear that influential components of the Scoto-Irish community saw 
isolation as a necessary defence against the lower moral tone of the non-Catholic 
community. For one Irish Nationalist newspaper in Victorian Scotland: 
The dangerous association with ... those who differ so much from us in 
morals, manners, habits, customs, and religion ... is hard to avoid and so sure 
as we associate with them, so sure will we be defiled; their very breath is 
enough to do it ... If we do not gather ourselves from among them, they will 
corrupt the hearts of even the wise and good amongst US. 88 
In England, the Irish Nationalist Hugh Heinrick insisted that "Isolation so far as 
possible, is the safety and salvation of the Irish people resident ... in the large towns 
of England". Of the English urban working class: 
Their example is evil, their contagion moral ruin. I am not stating this of the 
English people generally, though on the whole their example is bad enough. I 
am referring to those with whom the poor Irish are forced to associate, and of 
those it may be safely affirmed that Christendom does not produce anything 
lower or worse.89 
The maintenance of Catholic Irish identity was essential to the Nationalist project, 
for it ensured that "the Irish vote [in England] will be held for the service of Ireland, 
irrespective of the needs of English political parties". Integration diluted the 
community's Irishness and weakened the 'Irish' nature of its politics. Heinrick 
regretted any reduction in hostility: "the destruction of the barriers of prejudice 
86 C.G.Brown (1992:70); Bruce (1995:25). For McEwan (1973:93), Scotland's Catholics were 
"too ready to accept with silent thanks the ghetto status which had been conferred on them", although 
the Church's role in constructinglbuttressing such status was ignored. 
87 Census o/Scotland, 1871. volume II, xxxiv 
88 Free Press, 20/08/1864 - quoted in W.M.Walker (1972:651) 
89 Heinrick (1872:36). Of the English rural labourer, Heinrick (1872:37-38) was more scathing: 
"The typical Saxon .. .is slow. heavy and inelastic [with] pumpkin head, listless, unmeaning eyes ... His 
beard, in common with all inferior races. is scant and weak ... His ... mind. which is slow, dull. and 
unimaginative [is] not capable of originality or the less elevated mental qualities:' 
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promotes a social intercourse which is a curse rather than a blessing to the Irish 
people,,90. 
More importantly, however, the Scottish Catholic ghetto represented one outpost of a 
global Catholic movement behind defensive walls. Internationally, Catholicism 
responded to the social and political transformations of the nineteenth century by 
retreating into the certainties of dogma: 
F or the Catholic Church the initial response to the new environment in which 
it found itself was to denounce modernity .... The Church encouraged 
detachment and isolation ... [and] promoted a 'ghetto Catholicism' in which 
Catholics were encouraged to forge their own institutions and organisations 
which stressed Catholic autonomy from political institutions. 91 
Viewing itself "as the divinely appointed embodiment of true religion" and all other 
religions heretical, Catholicism insisted that the 'isms' of modernity were transitory, 
ephemeral: 
By choice the Church became an isolated fortress surrounded by an alien 
world made up not only of other Christian churches and other religions but 
also of atheists, secular scientists, and governments that had overthrown ... 
traditional values ... in the name of liberalism and democracy. The Church 
developed what has been aptly called 'a state of siege mentality' .92 
The organisational expression of this mentality across Continental Europe was the 
closed politics Whyte contrasts with the politically open Anglo-American world. For 
Hugh McLeod, however, such a division: 
overstate[s] the difference between the forms of Catholicism found in the two 
areas. In both there was a strong tendency towards the formation of a 
Catholic 'ghetto' in this period [1870-1914], though the types of organisation 
that this entailed were not precisely the same. 
90 Heinrick (1872:67,51) 
91 Williamson (1998:17) - my emphasis. 
92 McCarthy (1998:40,39-40). Pius IX's 'Syllabus of Errors' (1864) denounced. amongst other 
things: freedom of religious conscience and worship; salvation outwith the Catholic Church; secular 
public schools; and the separation of Churc~ an~ state. The ~nal condemn~d Err?r was that "The 
Roman Pontiff can. and ought to, reconcile himself ... With progress. liberalism and modern 
civilisation" . 
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One key difference was the immigrant dimension of Catholicism in the Anglophone 
world: 
The concentration of Catholics within certain ethnic communities assisted the 
Church in its endeavours to isolate them from anti-Catholic influences. 
Furthermore, the mutual reinforcement of religion and nationalism made it 
less likely that Catholics would give up their faith entirely. But the possibility 
of mobilising Catholics as Catholics was limited by the fact that ethnic 
loyalties were as strong as sectarian loyalties, and when the two came into 
conflict, ethnic loyalty often received a higher priority ... Thus in [pre-1914] 
Britain, preoccupation with Ireland meant that Catholics voted 
overwhelmingly for Liberal candidates ... in spite of the insistence b~ many 
clergy that Catholic schools would fare better with the Conservatives. 3 
Given the coincidence of Liberal (and later Labour) and Catholic interests on both 
Ireland and wider socio-economic issues, there was little scope within Britain for a 
specifically Catholic politics, at least at the nationallevel94 . The strategic position of 
the Catholic vote in Britain's industrial centres blunted Liberal secularism and anti-
Catholicism, and the Catholic vote was attractive to Conservative supporters of 
Church of England schools. For these reasons the ghettoisation of Catholics in 
Britain did not develop politically in the same way as it did over much of Europe. It 
did, however, develop socially and culturally. Scotland is by no means unique in 
possessing a culturally defensive Catholic community. Indeed one need only look 
southwards to where a key change in English Catholicism in the latter half of the 
twentieth century has been the "dissolution of the boundaries which defended a 
distinctive Catholic sub-culture from contamination in a basically secular society,,9s, 
PROBLEMATISING 'SECTARIANISM' 
The final concept which requires exploration is sectarianism, a term so pejorative 
that there are grounds for avoiding it altogether. Boyle & Lynch suggest: "Rather 
than the emotive use of sectarianism with all its historical baggage, the simple terms 
93 McLeod (1986:415-16). On Irish Nationalist -v- Catholic tensions in Scotland. see I {and ley 
(1947:47-92) . 
94 However. School Board elections in England & Wales (1870-1902) and an Scotland (1873-
1928). were generally fought between explicitly religious/secular platforms (See chapter 6) 
9~ Hornsby-Smith (1987:214) 
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of prejudice, bigotry, dislike, and at certain times discrimination would b~ r"',-'rhaps a 
more usefullexicon,,96. 
Likewise, for Finn: 
Although sectarianism usually signifies some allusion to bigotry, its rr~~is~ 
meaning still remains confused and lacks genuine clarity ... S~ctarianism is ;1 
coy term that blankets the social phenomenon to \\-hich the speaker allud~s. 
Its very use allows the accuser, for that is the intent behind thc speaker's 
action, to make the accusation without the need to substantiate th~ C::bC with 
anything resembling evidence.97 
Before asking how significant sectarianism is within Scotland we must decidL' what it 
is, and, indeed, what it is not. This is an approach markedly lacking in much 
academic literature. Lynch argues: 
Key questions lack clear answers. l-IO\\" much scctarianism is there, whcn and 
where does it occur. who is invoh'ed in the discrimination, what efkct docs it 
have? Is it institutionalised or indiyidualised, is it \'iolent or merely low-Ien:l 
banter? These are all questions for \\hich \\C han: Ycr;. kw anS\\L'rs. Instl.'ad, 
we have lingering suspicions. stories our parcnts tdl us and lots of 
speculation.98 
Lynch's concern, therefore. is to quant~h' sectarianism, and implies that the term 
alludes to "religious discrimination" 99. For Darner. 
Sectarianism in Glasgow can be defined as an insensate anti-Irish Catholic 
feding. historically expressing itself as an actin; and pernicious 
discrimination in the housing and labour markets, not to mention physical 
violence. Its roots are old and deep and complicated ... 100 
1 Ierc sectarianis1l1 entails a mixture of prejudice and discrimination and goes beylmd 
religion, in that its target is not simply Catholics. but Catholics of an Irish 
background. This accords Scotland's Catholics a rather passi\c status as Yictims. 
96 Boyle & Lyneh (1998: 197) 
'17 Finn (1999:869) 
'IS L\ neh (2000:~5.') 
99 l~ nch (..2000:255). Ht)\\l~\ cr, L~ Ih.:h also talks of "sl.'ctarianism .JlilI rcligious Ji..,(r1l11ination" 
[~l1lphasis ~ddl.·d]. sliggestin!! th~ t\\l) are s~paratc. ifentwincd, pilL'nOn1L'll.\ 
101.1 Darner (1990:94) 
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Sectarianism, thus defmed, becomes something that non-Catholics do, and Catholics 
suffer. 
Bradley, criticising abuse of the term sectarianism, notes: "'Of course, the ... term ... 
is appropriate in a number of instances; certainly when applied to narrow 
mindedness, bigotry and intolerance". Such sectarianism by "many different sections 
of the populace has been responsible for much of the change that has taken place in 
the character of the Irish identity in Scotland"lOl. For Bradley. sectarianism is 
exclusively Protestant: "there is no anti-Protestant history in Scotland and there are 
no specifically anti-Protestant bodies that sectarian Catholics can join. Indeed. there 
is no demand for such bodies from Catholics,,102. Gallagher, however, notes that 
some Catholics "can at times actively promote sectarianism" and that up to the 1950s 
some parishes "could be firmly anti-Protestant in outlook,,103. As Chapters Four to 
Seven of this study will confirm, an anti-Protestant history is not difficult to unearth. 
In some accounts of sectarianism its meanIng is treated as self-evident, and 
definitions remain implicit104• Murray, for example, claims that Hibernian H were the 
first sectarian [football] team in Scotland", as it was initially open only to 
Catholics 105. Here sectarian means exclusive, 'Catholic-only,I06. Finn accepts that 
"By definition, a church choir is a sectarian body", but insists this should not 
"identify the choir ... as sectarian in any pejorative sense". However, he rejects that 
Hibs were sectarian: "it was not anti-Protestant. Participation by Hibernian in 
Edinburgh football was seen to be a means of mixing with Protestants and breaking 
101 Bradley (1995a:443,453). Again the interchangeable use of Catholic and Irish may be noted. 
102 Bradley (1995e: 182) 
103 Gallagher (1997:423) 
104 In his Old Firm: Sectarianism, Sport and Society in Scotland, for example, B.Murray (1984) 
finds no place in his index for 'sectarian/ism'. Likewise, in an article entitled 'Racism, Sectarianism 
and Football in Scotland', Horne (1995) makes no attempt to draw out the parallels and differences 
between the two phenomena. 
105 B.Murray (1984:19). The club, formed in 1875 emerged from, and required (until c. I 892) 
that all members belonged to, the Catholic Young Men's Society (CYMS). The club's official 
centenary history describes it as founded on "sectarian grounds" .. Docherty ~ Thomson (1975:·0) . 
106 Denominational schools and colleges in the USA routmely deSCribe themselves as sectanan 
in this sense. Kenneson (1999:30) 
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down barriers and prejudices,,)07. For Finn a Church choir is sectarian by definition 
due to its religious exclusivity, but a similarly exclusive sporting body is sectarian 
only if it fulfils some other criteria. Finn clearly believes that the connotations of 
sectarian in terms of choirs are relatively neutral, whereas in football they are heavily 
value laden. 
This reflects normative views about the 'proper' position of religion in modern 
society. Exclusivity in organisations operating only in the religious arena is accepted, 
indeed expected. In other social contexts religious exclusivity is less acceptable 
because such contexts are widely viewed as 'properly' secular. One might expect 
that in an increasingly secular Scotland, the scope of acceptable religious exclusivity 
is rapidly diminishing108• As Kenneson writes of US education: 
to label something as sectarian requires that there be a normative mainstream 
from which sectarians deviate. The assumption ... is that being part of the 
mainstream entails being 'secular'. This reinforces the widespread 
assumption that being secular is synonymous with being open, rational, and 
inclusive, whereas almost by definition being religious or sectarian involves 
being narrow, dogmatic, and parochial. 109 
Bruce insists that certain issues associated with sectarianism in Scotland do not entail 
discrimination or prejudice, and in fact represent a desire for religious separation: 
That a separate Catholic school system still exists is entirely due to the wish 
of the Catholic Church in Scotland to socialise Catholic offspring in the 
culture and ethos of Catholicism. This can hardly be regarded as evidence of 
anti-Catholic discrimination ... Some degree of segregation follows inevitably 
from the desire of orthodox Catholics and Protestants to maintain their own 
religious cultures. To see separation as a 'social problem' is to endorse 
improperly the view that religions should be liberal and ecumenical. 
Likewise, to regard membership of voluntary associations (such as the 
107 Finn (1999:869,873). See also Finn (1994). Any 'mixing' was regulated by the club's rules -
barriers and prejudice remained. One player was released because his faith had lapsed: "Brogan was 
in a quandary, all alone in a strange place. So he contacted Hearts - and signed for them with shouts of 
traitor echoing in his ears" Docherty & Thomson (1975:39). Finn insists that the 'first' sectarian club, 
due to the supposed influence of anti-Popery campaigner John Hope, was the Edinburgh RV club. 
However, Hope's biographer - Jamie (1907) - makes few references to football, and Lugton (1999:)7) 
describes Hibernian-ERV relations as unusually friendly. 
lOS Note that the first debate of the Scottish Parliament was concerned with whether "non-
denominational" prayers were an appropriate part of its official business - see Scottish Parliamt'nl 
Official Report, 1 (3), 36-53, 18/05/99 
169 Kenneson (1999:30) 
36 
Protestant and Catholic in Modern Scotland 
Orange Order or the Troops Out Movement) which support conflicting 
political positions as a matter of public concern, as something which modem 
democracies should have outgrown, is curious. It seems most sensible to 
confine the shorthand 'sectarianism', and the concern it connotes, to the 
maintenance or re-introduction into the public arena of religious 
particularisms which, in modem societies, are supposed to be confined to the 
private world. The question of whether there is in Scotland a degree of 
sectarianism which is significant ... should not be answered by a measure 
which includes voluntary association as an index. More properly, what is at 
issue is the extent to which private prejudices are acted upon in the public 
sphere so as to affect the lives of those who do not wish to be affected. 1 10 
It is worth dwelling upon Bruce's point. Much of what passes for sectarianism in 
Scotland could be better understood as 'separation', a desire to maintain a distinctive 
religious culture or identity. As this study demonstrates, this is an extremely useful 
distinction. 
DEFINING SECTARIANISM: A NORTHERN IRISH MODEL 
It should already be clear that sectarianism remains under-theorised. A theoretical 
framework has, however, been developed by Brewer based on Northern Ireland. 
Examination of his arguments provides a working definition of sectarianism with 
which Scotland can be profitably compared to Northern Ireland. Brewer notes 
sectarianism is "more nebulous" than racism: 
Its social markers are more opaque and less deterministic, and are much more 
context-bound to the beliefs of the people involved. It also invokes a social 
marker (sect/religion) whose saliency was long thought to have declined in 
the western world (unlike that of 'race'). Instances where religion remains a 
potent social marker are usually marginalised by being seen as a third-world 
problem (India) or as an aberration of modernity (the Lebanon, Northern 
Ireland). Thus, sectarian conflict is seen as both peculiar to the context in 
which it occurs ... and relatively unintelligible ... 
This has led to a greater propensity to draw upon "lay notions of sectarianism" than 
in the analysis of racism. Brewer notes "points of convergence" between racism and 
sectarianism - both produce "inequality in a structured manner rather than randomly" 
and: 
110 Bruce (1988: 155-56) 
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Both also describe a set of social relations which permeate through all levels 
of society, rather than refer simply to a set of individual attitudes or 
prejudices ... Thus, there is similarity in the way that they are experienced at 
the levels of ideas, individual action and the social structure. Both are 
expressed, in various forms, as negative and pejorative beliefs, inequality. 
discrimination and harassment. III 
Brewer provides the definition for sectarianism used in this study, and offers an 
illuminating point of contrast between Scotland and Northern Ireland. Sectarianism 
is here defined as: "behaviour, policies and types of treatment that are informed by 
religious difference"; where "Sectarianism describes a set of social relations that are 
codified into a stratification system which religion causes or comes to represent". 
Thus sectarianism "involves recognisable social patterns of inequality, some of 
which are predicated on discrimination" 1 12. 
Brewer argues that Northern Irish sectarianism "involves stereotypical cues ... 
generalisations and stereotypes concerning behaviour rather than the perception of 
variations in physical appearance" 1 13 • Such cues: 
cannot exist independently of sectarianism; they only function as cues 
because of sectarian beliefs about the assumed or real differences between the 
groups ... the use of stereotypical cues is only possible because of the social 
significance placed on assumed or real differences in behaviour, the attaching 
of importance to which already constitutes sectarianism. 1 14 
Brewer concludes that sectarianism in Northern Ireland is experienced on three 
levels: ideas, individual action, and social structure; and that "in one form or another, 
is experienced by all groups in Northern Ireland": 
At the level of ideas ... sectarianism is expressed in negative stereotypes, and 
pejorative beliefs ... about members of the other religion. It thus exists on this 
plane as much within the Catholic community as within the Protestant one. 
At the level of individual action, it shows itself in direct discrimination and 
III Brewer (1992:352, 353) 
\12 Brewer (1992:359) 
113 Brewer (1992:360) 
114 And crucially. "sectarianism depends for its existence on a popular culture which invokes 
religion as the boundary marker and hence is already sectarian." Brewer ( 1992:360-61 ) 
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various forms of intimidation and harassment ... [to which] Individual 
Protestants are just as subject as individual Catholics ... 115 
Sectarianism in Northern Ireland is not monodirectional, but is perpetrated, and 
suffered, by Protestant and Catholic alike. However: 
At the level of the social structure, sectarianism is experienced solely by 
Catholics, because it expresses itself in the patterns of indirect or institutional 
discrimination that Catholics alone experience and in their greater social and 
economic disadvantage. 116 
SQUARE HOLES AND ROUND PEGS: 
SCOTLAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
Whilst Brewer's model highlights points of connection between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland, there are clear and fundamental differences. Brewer firmly roots Irish 
sectarianism within British colonialism and the fact that Northern Ireland is a "settler 
society,,1l7. Scotland was not a colony but a coloniser, a junior partner in the imperial 
mission1l8. Neither is Scotland a settler society: migration to Scotland was 
economically rather than imperially inspired. Whilst the Planters saw themselves 
creating a new Ireland, many coming to Scotland saw themselves, initially at least, as 
sojournersll9. Whilst orthodox historiography has long claimed that the Catholic 
Irish were from the outset a despised minority in Scotland: 
It is now evident that the Catholic Irish in the west of Scotland in the first half 
of the nineteenth century were not as isolated and despised as some historians 
have claimed. Many members of that community participated in strikes, trade 
unions and political movements with native workers. Scottish reformers 
welcomed the Catholic Irish presence in the political agitations. 120 
liS However, "Catholics in the working-class ghettos (as distinct from those in the middle-class 
suburbs) are subject to intimidation from a source which Protestants do not experience; namely the 
security forces" Brewer (1992 :362-63) 
116 Brewer (1992:363) 
117 Brewer (1992:354) 
118 One could, of course, make a case that the Gaelic-Highland 'periphery' was victim to British 
imperialism, but 'culpability' rests as much with the Scottish Lowlands than with England. Neither 
were the Highlands settled by non-Gaels, rather it depopulated. 
119 This mirrors the expectations oflater migrant groups. See, for example, Ballard [ed.] (1994) 
120 M.Mitchell (1998:258). The welcome was broad: after Glasgow Presbyterians raised a 
petition against Government fundi?~ to Ir=land's Cathol.ic. Maynooth. C~.lIege in 1832. Glasgow 
Reformers raised a larger counter petition. to encourage ReligiOUS Toleration . (1998: 167) 
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This contribution to Scottish politics illustrates the different political resonance of 
Protestant-Catholic relations in Scotland and Ireland. Whilst there was considerable 
antagonism within Irish Protestantism before c .1800, the rise of Nationalism forced 
Protestants together, polarising Irish politics between CatholiclNationalist and 
ProtestantlUnionist121 • "Catholic demands for fIrst emancipation and later home rule, 
brought Protestants in Ulster together into a homogenous political bloc" and the 
'double minority' problem became the central political issue in Ireland l22• Protestants 
found themselves on one side of a serious conflict over the meaning of Ireland and 
Irishness itself. Religio-national loyalties had far less consequence in Scotland, and 
did not map onto conflicting views of the meaning and future of the Scottish polity. 
Along with the bulk of the electorate, Scotland's Catholics supported the Liberals 
until c.1918. Whilst this support has been largely attributed to Liberal policy on 
Ireland, it was also consistent with the broader aspirations of Scotland's urban 
Catholics 123. Whilst religio-political schism entrenched a sectarian political culture in 
Ireland, the Scottish political reality - Liberal hegemony - severely limited the 
potential of religious antagonisms 124. Scotland's relationship with the British state 
was never seriously questioned in the nineteenth century, and Catholics remained a 
small minority, regionally concentrated and of limited economic power. Further, 
whilst Irish Protestantism spent the nineteenth century drawing into defensive 
alliance, Scottish Protestants were busily engaged fighting between themselves. 
Catholics did not pose sufficient threat to: 
counter ... the [Protestant] fragmentation which already existed and which 
increased between 1870 and the present ... Scottish Protestants spent most of 
the nineteenth century arguing with each other, rather than with Catholics, 
and produced a de facto pluralism which hastened secularisation. 125 
121 More precisely it might be noted that Irish Presbyterianism, like Irish Catholicism, long 
suffered a number of legal disabilities when compared to the Church of Ireland. . . 
122 Bruce (1988: 159). The 'double-minority' refers to the fact that Protestants were a majority of 
the Ulster population, but a minority across all Ireland whereas the position of Catholics was the 
reverse. 
123 See M.Mitchell (1998); Smith (1980) 
124 This was as true for antagonism between Protestants as it was for antagonism between 
Protestant and Catholic. 
m Bruce (1988: I 59, 160) 
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SCOTLAND AND SECTARIANISM 
Bearing these major differences in mind, where does Scotland fit with this model of 
sectarianism? The first point to make is that the informal processes of 'placing' 
someone's religion in Scotland seem almost identical to the 'stereotypical cues' of 
Northern Ireland. Brewer notes that such cues "cannot exist independently of 
sectarianism,,126 but there does seem to be a key difference between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland in the way such cues are used. In Northern Ireland they may be 
employed to ensure that "people avoid offending one another", but they may also 
serve to highlight those who are to be avoided, mistrusted, discriminated against. 
attacked or murdered because of their religion. More generally they serve to 
demarcate those who are safe to be associated with from those with whom contact is 
undesirable or dangerous - they are, in other words, the means to discern the key 
social marker in Northern Ireland, religious affiliation 127. Cues are essential for 
everyday life across much of Northern Ireland, and for that reason they are generally 
effective in placing other individuals. In Scotland, as we have seen, the purposes of 
stereotypical cues are much more limited and much more fallible. 
Crucially, Brewer insists that sectarianism "involves recognisable social patterns of 
inequality, some of which are predicated on discrimination,,128. If, then, Scotland is 
to be seen as sectarian in this sense, we would expect to find religious identity of 
central social importance, and materially determining life-chances. It has proved 
remarkably difficult to substantiate religious discrimination and disadvantage in 
Scotland. Nearly all accounts agree that discrimination was fairly widespread in the 
past and directed against Catholics, primarily by small, locally owned companies
129
• 
Fundamental shifts in the labour market reduced the capacity for discrimination: 
As the old economy based on shipbuilding and heavy engineering collapsed 
between the 1960s and the 1980s, the main employers came to be firms 
126 Brewer (1992:360-361) 
127 A.Finlay (1999: 1.18) 
128 Brewer (1992:359) 
129 It might be noted that past discrimination is widely assumed but poorly documented. 
41 
Protestant and Catholic in Modern Scotland 
owned in Eniland or overseas who operated much more meritocratic fonns 
of selection. I 
Such meritocracy is largely based on educational credentials, and a number of 
studies have noted that Scottish Catholic schools, once social class is taken into 
consideration, outperform the non-denominational sector. Research by Paterson 
found that whilst the likelihood of getting a job upon leaving school "shows a 
persisting but small disadvantage [for pupils] in Catholic schools", Catholic schools 
had "a clear advantage" in the proportion of their pupils entering Higher 
education131 • Labour market change and the rise of credentialisation means that .. the 
occupational status of both younger Catholic men and younger Catholic women is 
now close to that of non-Catholics" 132. The key problem in this respect is the scarcity 
of data. No consensus has formed other than that the disadvantage experienced by 
the Catholic community has declined in the late twentieth century. Williams & Walls 
in their interpretation of the occupational data used by Paterson, insist that Catholic 
disadvantage is still measurable, although declining: it "is indeed going but it is not 
yet gone" 133. 
Disadvantage and discrimination are not the same thing, although if discrimination 
was widespread one would expect to fmd more convincing evidence of disadvantage. 
There is a perception within the Catholic community that it suffers from 
discrimination134, and some argue that this reflects a tangible social reality: 
It is, of course, all too easy to claim that you lost the game because of a 
biased referee, but that in itself does not prove that every referee is fair. The 
fact that some people pretend to be victims doesn't mean that there are no 
real victims: there have to be real ones, otherwise why bother to pretend?135 
\30 L.Paterson (2000a: 146). A similar argument is found in Gallagher (1987a); McCrone (1992); 
Bruce (2000) . 
131 L.Paterson (2000a: 149) - it must be stressed that in this part of the analysis, Paterson IS 
discussing pupils at Catholic schools, rather than young Catholics per se: this distinction is more 
significant than it first appears. See also L.Paterson (2000b & 2000c) 
I3r L.Paterson (2000a: 155) 
133 Williams & Walls (2000:247) 
1304 Bradley (1995b: 91-92) found that 45% of Catholics surveyed in the St Mary's. Hamilton 
study "believe that discrimination in favour of Protestants is a social reality in Scotland". 
\J5 Reilly (2000: 31). The foo!ball me.tapho~ refers to a pe~cep.tion amongst. Celt.ic supporters 
that Scottish referees are biased agamst CeltIC. ReIlly compares rejection of such bIas WIth Holocaust 
Denial in an article in Celtic fanzine Not the View, February 'March 1997. 
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On the surface this position seems strong, but one might ask how much anecdotal 
evidence about a phenomenon, how widespread the perception of it. is required 
before we must assume that there is an underlying and significant social reality 136. 
The lack of convincing empirical evidence - despite considerable contemporary 
interest on sectarianism - casts significant doubt on any claim that Scotland' s social 
stratification system fits with Brewer's defmition of sectarianism. 
Whilst accepting that economIC change has removed sectarianism from the 
occupational sphere, Reilly maintains a pessimistic note: 
Crucially important though employment is, it is not the only thing that counts. 
And the trouble is that sectarianism does not disappear. but simply moves to 
other lodgings. That a cancer moves from lung to colon is not really a cause 
for celebration. It is pointless to look for discrimination where. by definition. 
it can no longer exist ... 137 
Reilly's argument begins bullishly: "To ask if there is anti-Catholicism in Scotland is 
like asking if there are Frenchmen in Paris·,138. It seems highly significant that once 
he concedes that sectarianism is no longer prevalent in the occupational lung he turns 
to football to provide the colon. 
CONCLUSION 
This introductory chapter illustrates that much thinking on sectarianism in Scotland 
has adopted a common-sense view, and often this has simply served to perpetuate 
"the fog of anecdote,,139. The central terms of the debate - Protestant, Catholic, 
discrimination, prejudice, disadvantage - have frequently been deployed without any 
consideration of their complexity, their meanings taken as self-evident. To 
understand a concept or process it is essential to disentangle some of the meanings 
invested in the core terms used. As this chapter has demonstrated this is an approach 
markedly lacking in much of the literature concerned with 'sectarianism' in Scotland. 
136 How are we to judge. for example. the perception that some Catholic Labour councillors in 
the west of Scotland 'look after their own' to the detriment of the wider community? See G. Walker 
(1995:182) 
137 Reilly (2000:33) - emphasis added. 
138 Reilly (2000:29) 
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The lack of clarity adds to the mythology of religious diyision in Scotland, a~ d0c~ 
the tendency for the debate to degenerate into a grie\ance-fuelled swapping of 
generalities. A more critical approach - and one that considers broader comparatiYe 
horizons - illustrates the poverty of generalities. The adoption of Brewer's definition 
of sectarianism reveals the need for a careful account of religion' s pla(~ in 
contemporary Scotland. As Aspinwall notes, the question descf\t?s "some 
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Secularisation and 'Sectarianism' 
CHAPTER TWO: 
SECULARISA TION AND 'SECTARIANISM' 
In the last chapter, sectarianism was defmed as "a set of social relations ... codified 
into a stratification system which religion causes or comes to represent"". and 
involving "recognisable social patterns of inequality, some of which are predicated 
on discrimination"!. Empirical evidence for religious disadvantage, let alone 
discrimination, in late twentieth century Scotland has proved remarkably elusive. 
Further, allegations that Scotland is 'sectarian' run up against another problem: 
sectarianism is founded upon the perception of, and the building of social inequality 
around, religious difference. Yet Scotland is increasingly secular, a society in which 
religious difference is declining in social significance. Can we then reconcile claims 
of a sectarian Scotland with the evidence of widespread secularisation? The short 
answer is that we cannot, unless we accept that what passes for • sectarianism' in 
Scotland is, in fact, better understood as religious bigotry or even religious 
difference. This is not to claim some easy connection between religiosity and 
sectarianism: to define a society as religious is not the same thing as defining it as 
sectarian. On the other hand, a sectarian society depends upon high levels of 
religiosity, and inequality is structured around religious differentiation. The first 
concern of this chapter, therefore is to develop the definition of sectarianism 
(focusing on its anti-Catholic form) and its connection with popular religiosity. The 
decline of religiosity in Scotland will be examined and it will be shown that whilst 
popular religious connections remain high in Northern Ireland, Scotland fits into a 
broader international pattern with a sharp decline across a number of indices of 
religiosity since the 1960s. In this 'objective' sense, religion is declining in social 
significance in contemporary Britain, but not in Northern Ireland. However, it is also 
demonstrated that there is a widespread perception that religious conflict remains a 
problem in Scottish society. In this 'subjective' sense, many Scots seem to believe 
that religion still matters in a negative and divisive way. This lies at the heart of the 
question in Scotland: Scotland is not a sectarian country (at least when that term is 
used carefully) but concern about religious conflict, or. perhaps, religious difference 
Brewer (1992:359) 
45 
Secu/arisation and 'Sectarianism' 
seems widespread. Consideration, therefore, is given to the form of such conflic~ and 
concludes that public concern is based on media reports rather than direct personal 
experience. The chapter concludes by examining Scottish attitudes on two 
cornerstones of the alleged religious divide in Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Catholic schools. It is on these issues that conflict is alleged to be focused, and it is 
here that we might expect to find sharp attitudinal differences between Scotland' s 
Protestants and Catholics. The absence of religious polarisation underlines that 
'sectarianism' in Scotland is more a matter of perception, of myth, than of tangible 
social division. 
ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
To recapitulate Brewer's view of sectarianism, it produces "inequality in a structured 
manner rather than randomly" and involves: 
a set of social relations which permeate through all levels of society, rather 
than ... simply ... a set of individual attitudes or prejudices ... [Sectarianism 
is] experienced at the levels of ideas, individual action and the social 
structure ... [and] expressed, in various forms, as negative and pejorative 
beliefs, inequality, discrimination and harassment. 2 
Anti-Catholicism has systematically "permeated the social and cultural structures of 
Northern Ireland" and has "shaped a whole social structure for centuries,,3. Brewer 
and Higgins argue that anti-Catholicism at the level of the social structure should. be 
understood as a resource "which achievers] some purpose in society". Anti-
Catholicism: 
is used to expedite goals, forms a source of support, and supplies material 
benefits .... anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland is a sociological process for 
the production of different rights, opportunities and material rewards between 
people in a society where religious labels are used to define group 
boundaries. 
Northern Irish Protestants mobilise anti-Catholicism to establish, defend. and 




Brewer with Higgins (1998:viii-ix) 
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has proved an effective mechanism of demarcating group identities. and of 
reinforcing feelings of group solidarity: 
[Anti-Catholicism] is used as part of a hegemonic process by which a sacred 
canopy is thrown around Protestants when their unity is essential to their 
interests. It has helped to overcome divisions between Protestants and to heal 
past conflicts between them ... 4 
The effectiveness of anti-Catholicism explains "its continued resonance" in Northern 
Ireland: "it helps to define group boundaries and plays a major sociological role in 
producing and rationalising political and economic inequality". More importantly, 
anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland "fits seamlessly with society and its patterns of 
cleavage and conflicts. Without this seamlessness, there is no sociological dynamic 
to facilitate its reception amongst those who listen to it, believe it, and who use it" s. 
This seamlessness exists partly because the emergence of a modem industrial society 
in the North of Ireland "has not produced secularisation on a grand scale, and 
religious difference remains critical to many Protestants": 
However, the continued saliency of religion is only partly to be explained by 
the slow ravages of secularisation, with the commensurate high levels of 
religiosity in Northern Ireland. It also continues because religion stands in 
place for ethnic identity and thus represents the patterns of differentiation in 
an ethnically structured society. 6 
Crucially, that ethnicity in Northern Ireland is reducible to religion, and that religious 
identity remains of great importance to the people of Northern Ireland, means that 
the "seamlessness" of anti-Catholicism and Northern Irish society proves a serious 
"constraint for those people and groups which seek to move beyond sectarian 
politics". In particular, attempts to mobilise on the grounds of social class in 
Northern Ireland have foundered "because of the saliency of ethnic differences as 





Brewer with Higgins (1998: 11-12,14) 
Brewer with Higgins (1998:211) 
Brewer with Higgins (1998:212) 
Brewer with Higgins (1998:211,209) 
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Anti-Catholicism is not monolithic in character. Brewer describes several modes. 
with an important distinction between its 'active' and 'passive' forms. Passive anti-
Catholicism is "unsystematic at the level of ideas and not reflected in behaviour": 
imbibed unreflexively, without thought or systematic formulation. and 
reproduced unthinkingly in language with no malicious or discriminaton" 
intent .... the kind that some Protestants have transmitted to them as part ~f 
their social learning but which remains as a cultural backdrop. rarely 
articulated and enacted. 
In its active form, on the other hand, anti-Catholicism "represents a fully formulated 
structure of ideas, language and behaviour"g. Brewer outlines three modes of active 
anti-Catholicism", differing in ideological motivation, rhetoric, and articulation. Two 
of these modes - 'covenantal' and 'secular' - can be used "as a resource in social 
stratification and closure", that is in the production of sectarianism, whilst the third -
'Pharisaic' - "has no implications at the social structurallevel,,9. The Pharisaic mode 
is rooted in the belief that Catholicism is founded upon doctrinal error, and 
articulated through "irenic language based on the New Testament" - love for the 
sinner but not for the sin. It is characterised by its theological content and the 
absence of a political agenda. Covenantal anti-Catholicism fuses theological and 
political concerns. Founded on notions of a Protestant chosen people, it articulates 
itself through prophetic Old Testament rhetoric. Catholicism is "'baptised paganism', 
worshipping wafers, idols, and pre-Christian deities", the Pope the predicted 
Antichrist 10. 'Rome' exists as a political conspiracy bent on obliterating political and 
religious liberty, with Republicanism (and, indeed, secularism) its instrument in 
Ireland. The religious struggle against 'Rome' is identical to the political struggle 
against Irish Nationalism, hence the historic slogan: 'Home Rule is Rome Rule'. 
Secular anti-Catholicism is primarily political, focused on the defence of Northern 




Reference is made to Protestantism, but it is primarily used as a political 
identity marker and political affiliation. Little stress is laid on the theological 
dispute with Catholicism; the complaint is more with the political and 
Brewer with Higgins (1998: 132) 
Brewer with Higgins (1998: 135) 
Brewer with Higgins (1998:141) 
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constitutional position that [Irish] Catholicism represents ... the intent is 
political, the context secular: the struggle is clearly identified as a political 
one. 11 
Here anti-Catholic Protestants need not attend Church, need not even believe in God. 
Their' Protestantism' is political, its "idee fixe" the defence of the Union of Northern 
Ireland and Britain. Paradoxically, however, anti-Catholicism in its 'secular" form is 
dependent on continued high levels of religiosity in the wider society, in that 
conservative Protestant beliefs and activities remain popular amongst the broader 
Protestant community: 
secular Protestants in Northern Ireland are attached to the symbols of religion 
despite their own low level of church participation because they are so 
exposed to conservative evangelicalism. In part this is also because there are 
no alternative lines of division other than religion in Northern Ireland around 
which to construct identity ... so closely do religion, politics, nationhood and 
locality coincide ... 12 
ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN SCOTLAND 
Anti-Catholicism is the predominant form of alleged sectarianism in Scotland, and 
Brewer's account allows us to understand its decline. Any given society possesses 
numerous lines of cleavage, and in Northern Ireland there is close alignment between 
ethnic (indigenous/Planter), religious (Catholic/Protestant) and political 
(nationalist/unionist) cleavages. In Scotland, however, because Irish immigrants 
were both Protestant and Catholic, ethnic (Irish/Scot) and religious 
(Catholic/Protestant) cleavages were not closely aligned: ~~Catholicism was thus a 
poor boundary marker for ethnicity and could not represent other conflicts". The 
only way a sense of ~Catholic threat' could be manufactured in Scotland, according 
to Brewer, was through "claims of malevolent conspiracies emanating from Rome" 
but "the liberal inclination of Scottish Protestants made these unbelievable" 13 • Bruce 
notes that the Reformation developed unevenly in Scotland: by the time the 
Highlands had become largely 'Calvinised', ''the Lowlands had become secularised 




Brewer with Higgins (1998: 155) 
Brewer with Higgins (1998: 130) 
Brewer with Higgins (1998:217) 
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rational, and ecumenical". Lowland Scotland simply did not have the religious 
conditions essential for "sustained ethnic tension" by the time the Catholic Irish 
began to arrive in numbers 14. Conservative Protestant evangelism - the 'sacred 
canopy' for Ulster Protestant cohesion - gave Highland Protestants the ideological 
basis for ethnic conflict, but the Highlands were overwhelmingly Protestant. and 
untouched by Catholic Irish immigration: 
The position for the working-class Scots of the Lowlands was the reverse. 
They had day-to-day competition with Roman Catholics for employment and 
housing, for political power and for the superior status of their culture and its 
symbols but they did not possess the religious beliefs which could have given 
a sustainable legitimate basis to their conflict. This can be seen very clearly in 
the complete alienation of working-class Protestants (in this sense meaning 
no more than 'non-Catholics') from the major Protestant Churches. IS 
It might be noted that Mitchell concludes that Catholic Irish immigrants in nineteenth 
century Lowland Scotland were participating in "strikes, trade unions and political 
movements with native workers", and suggests that socio-economic conflict between 
these groups should not be overstated l6• 
Secularisation, therefore, played a central role in the decline of anti-Catholicism in 
Scotland and highlights the sharp contrast with Northern Ireland: 
Scottish society was ... experiencing secularisation, with reduced levels of 
religiosity, a declining social role for the Church in politics and a reduction in 
the salience of religious affiliations within the social structure ... Patterns of 
differentiation gave religious difference no resonance ... there was no 
specifically Protestant politics, no recognisable set of political or economic 
interests for Protestants, and no cultural stress on Protestantism as an ethnic 
d k · th .. c. 17 boun ary mar er In e competitlOn lor scarce resources. 
This is not to deny that some Scots attempted to utilise anti-Catholicism as a resource 
for political mobilisation, but these processes made Scotland infertile ground for 
sectarian politics l8 . Precisely the same processes are found in England, a society 








Brewer with Higgins (1998:217-8) 
50 
Secularisation and 'Sectarianism' 
"Catholicism becomes less objectionable, if only because religion no longer 
provokes strong emotions": 
Moreover, Protestantism does not have the functional role in forging social 
unity and national identity that it formerly had in Britain ... National myths 
are no longer religious, politics is not structured by theological allegiance, 
and sets of interests do not correspond to religious differences. Thus, even if 
one claims that anti-Catholicism at the level of ideas remains latent in English 
society, it does not occur there at the level of individual action or the social 
structure. Other lines of fissure at the structural level make anti-Catholicism 
irrelevant to the competition for scarce resources and pointless as a means of 
social closure. All of this marks Ulster in the late twentieth century as unique 
in the British Isles. 19 
How does Brewer's work help us to characterise that anti-Catholicism still evident in 
Scotland? His typology of anti-Catholicism can be summarised around the axes of 
theology and of politics - where does Scottish anti-Catholicism fit? 




high secular mode covenantal mode 
low passive mode Pharisaic mode 
For MacMillan, Scottish anti-Catholicism is "as endemic as it is second nature. 
Scotland is guilty of 'sleep-walking' bigotry, [as] a writer recently claimed,,21. Such 
'unconscious' bigotry matches Brewer's definition of a 'passive' anti-Catholicism, 
"without thought or systematic formulation, and ... which remains as a cultural 
backdrop, rarely articulated and enacted,,22. For the most part, Scottish anti-
Catholicism exists at the level of ideas, it is unsystematic and unstructured, and only 
rarely reflected in behaviour, that is at the level of individual action. How do the 
'active' modes play in Scotland? The theological modes do not play well at all. 
18 See Bruce (1988) 
19 Brewer with Higgins (1998:219). See also Colley (1992) 
20 Brewer with Higgins (1998:134) . 
21 MacMillan (2000a:15-16). The writer was Patrick Reilly (Herald 31/0799). MacMillan 
draws more heavily on Reilly than his vague reference implies. 
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Contemporary anti-Catholicism is remarkably bare of theological content although 
some (mainly Highland) Protestants continue to insist on Catholicism' s 
'unscriptural' character, and it is possible to find small organisations virulently 
opposed to 'Rome,23. However, the dominant form of anti-Catholic expression in 
Lowland Scotland - whether on football terrace or Orange Walk - is saturated by 
political, secular issues24. In its symbolism, Scottish anti-Catholicism is resolutely 
secular: the Union Flag; Red Hand; the initials of Loyalism - UDA, UVF, UFF ~ the 
Sash and Derry's Walls. The most common abusive epithet for Catholics in Scotland 
is 'fenian', at heart a political term while the rarer 'papist' is resonant of theology. 
The politics here are not directly the politics of Scotland, but the historic conflict in 
Ireland. The flags, the symbols, the songs, the concerns, are effectively that of 
'Protestant Ulster' expressed in a Scottish setting. However, there are crucial 
differences between 'secular' anti-Catholicism in the two countries. In Northern 
Ireland it is embedded in the social structure, expressed within important social, 
paramilitary and political organisations, and focused upon the key political issue in 
Northern Ireland. It also inter-connects with a powerful covenantal anti-Catholicism 
pursuing the same political goals within a theological framework. Additionally. 
Northern Ireland is a society where religion and religious identity matters, even to 
those who are themselves not particularly religious. In Scotland, on the other hand, 
theological disputes have lost their popular resonance. Anti-Catholicism (or, for that 
matter, anti-Protestantism) is articulated, but within very limited arenas, namely 
through football and the Marching Season. 
The argument thus far is that sectarianism is a system of structured inequality, 
permeating a social system, and operating at the level of ideas, of individual action, 
and the social structure through pejorative beliefs and discrimination founded upon, 
23 E.g. the Scottish Reformation Society (SRS) which, since 1850, has sought "To resist the 
aggressions of Popery [and] To promote the instruction of Roman Catholics in ~ible Truth" [SRS 
Annual Report. 1936], and the Scottish Protestant Union (SPU) who sell 'Loyalist fancy goods' at 
Orange gatherings. . . . . . 
24 Many Orangemen possess deeply sincere theological convictions - the pomt IS that the 
popular culture of Scottish Orangeism is political. 
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and articulated through, religious difference. Sectarianism is not "simply ... a set of 
individual attitudes or prejudices"2S: 
Religious bigotry is found throughout the world and in all faiths ... but what 
distinguishes Ulster Protestant bigots is not the level of religious bigotry but 
the sociological purpose to which it is put and the enactment of this project as 
the social structural level. 26 
It seems striking that what passes for 'sectarianism' in Scotland is precisely that 
which does not constitute sectarianism proper, that is "individual attitudes or 
prejudices". Anti-Catholicism largely takes a passive form, a set of pejorative beliefs 
existing - unsystematically - on the level of ideas, and only rarely manifested in 
behaviour. Anti-Catholic behaviour in Scotland is mainly focused upon episodic 
'showpiece' events, such as the Orange Walk or football fixtures and expressed in 
political terms, the frame of reference being Northern Ireland. 
A key question is whether or not religion still matters in Scotland. Whilst one cannot 
say that a religious society is sectarian, it can be said that a sectarian society is 
necessarily religious. Northern Ireland is sectarian because religion still matters, is 
the social marker, and this is partly expressed through continuing high levels of 
religiosity. We must ask, therefore, how religious is Scotland? Has it higher rates of 
religiosity than the rest of Britain, and how does it compare to Northern Ireland? 
Equally important, however, is the way in which the Scots view religion, the 
importance they invest in it. As we shall see, there is a significant constituency which 
views 'religious conflict' in Scotland as a serious problem, and some Scots view the 
influence of religion in Scottish life as undesirable. There is some disjuncture 
between 'objective' and 'subjective' answers to the question of religion'S place in 
Scotland. One way of posing the question is to ask whether religious affiliation can 
be shown to have an effect on political attitudes and political behaviour. The 
concluding sections of this chapter will examine some of the key issues around 
which 'sectarianism' has been constructed in Scotland. The key political issue here is 
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in Scottish society we would expect to see strong support amongst Protestants for the 
continued union of Britain and Northern Ireland. Similarly, the issue of Catholic 
schools has been trailed as symptomatic of religious cleavage in Scotland. and again 
here we will investigate how important religious affiliations are in formulating 
attitudes. 
SECULARISATION IN BRITAIN 
One of the crucial elements of sectarianism in Northern Ireland is the continuing 
high level of religiosity. By contrast, religious connection has declined dramatically 
in Britain suggesting, on the face of it, that a sectarian society proves fairly resistant 
to secularisation27• A range of statistics illustrate the trends in popular Church 
connection28• The overall picture in the United Kingdom has, in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, been one of sharp decline. One-third of UK adults in 1900 were 
'members' of a Christian Church. By 1950 this had declined to one-quarter, by 1975 
to less than one-fifth, and the estimated proportion in 2000 is around one-eighth29. 
Membership has not simply been outstripped by population increase; since the early 
1960s the number of Church members in the UK has fallen by four million, a decline 
of 41 %. Between 1960 and 2000 the number of active Church of England 
communicants halved, whilst Catholic Mass attendance across the UK fell by 39%. 
In 1900 over half of Britain's children were enrolled in Sunday Schools; by 1950 this 
proportion had declined to one third and the projected proportion for 2000 is just 
4%30. In 1900 85% of marriages in England & Wales were solemnised in a 
consecrated religious building; by 1950 this had fallen to 69%; by 1975 52%; and by 
1999 stood at 39% in England and 44% in Wales3l . This has been an international 
phenomenon: "Different countries show different rates of decline and different sorts 
27 This is not to say that resistance to secularisation is evidence of sectarianism - Church 
connection remains remarkably high in the USA - rather to say that we would expect that sectarian 
societies would retain a large degree of religiosity. 
28 An overview of religious statistics and their strengths and weaknesses is provided by Currie 
el al (1977) 
29 Brierley (1989 & 1999). 'UK' figures include England. Scotland. Wales and only those 
counties of Ireland remaining in the UK after 1922. 'British' figures exclude Northern Ireland. 
30 Brierley (1999) 
31 Brierley (1989); Office of National Statistics 'Where people marry in England & Wales', 
ONS (2000) 121.31 March 2000 (www.statistics.gov.uk). 
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of measures show different aspects of the change, but the direction of change in all 
indices of involvement in institutional religion is the same: downwards,,32. 
Critics of the secularisation thesis, while accepting institutional decline. point out 
that religious belief remains widespread: 
Regarding practice or active membership of religious organisations, the 
findings [are] unequivocal. Such activities involve a relatively small 
proportion of the population ... But it is equally evident that between two-
thirds and three-quarters of British people indicate fairly consistently that 
they believe in some sort of God, though exactly what they mean by this 
phrase is not at all easy to say. 33 
F or Davie the vagueness of this "some sort of God" suggests that the key issue is a 
"drifting of belief ... nominalism remains a more prevalent phenomenon than 
secularism,,34. However, whilst belief in God remains high throughout Western 
Europe, it too is falling and disbelief rising35 . There has also been some 
secularisation of religious institutions themselves, most reducing "the specifically 
supernatural in their product": 
Major elements of the Christian faith - the miracles, the Virgin Birth, the 
bodily resurrection of Christ, the expectation of Christ's return, the reality of 
eternal damnation - have quietly been dropped from the teachings of the 
major Christian churches.36 
Finally, it is worth noting that secularisation is a fiercely contested concept. Berger 
argues that "the assumption that we live in a secularised world is false. The world 
today, with some exceptions ... is as furiously religious as it ever was ... ". Berger 
concedes that "modernisation has had some secularising effects", but insists that "it 
32 Bruce (1996:31) 
33 Davie (1994:74-75) 
34 Davie (1994:76) 
35 The British belief in God declined from 84% in 1947 to 71% in 1990 - Ashford & Timms 
(1992:40-42). According to Brierley (1999), disbelief has risen from 2% in the 1940/50s to 27% in the 
1990s. The drifting from Orthodox belief makes such data somewhat unreliable: Bruce (1996:33) 
reports that two differently worded questions in one 1991 survey measured belief in God at 72% and 
50%. 
36 Bruce (1996:36). Robertson (1987) notes that 87% of CoS churchgoers regarded themselves 
as Christian; 87% believed in God: 74% believed in the resurrection; 53% in life after death. Catholics 
were more orthodox. being more likely to regard themselves as Christians (98%); believe in God 
(94%); the resurrection (92%); life after death (72%) 
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has also provoked powerful movements of counter-secularisation": '"The world today 
is massively religious, is anything but the secularised world that had been predicted 
(whether joyfully or despondently) by so many analysts of modernity". However, 
Berger makes a key exception to his position: "In Western Europe, if nowhere else, 
the old secularisation thesis would seem to hold" 37. 
SECULARISATION IN SCOTLAND 
Whilst Scotland may not be wholly secular, it is certainly deeply secularised. Some 
indices of the decline of religious connection in Britain and the UK have already 
been noted, but how far has Scotland shared in this decline? One problem underlying 
the available data is that they mask underlying demographic trends. In particular. 
Church membership, communicants etc. have declined over a period where the 
general population has increased. The English population, for example, rose by 27% 
between 1900-50 and by 17% between 1950-2000, whilst over the same periods the 
Scottish population rose by 12% and 1 %. As our concern is with the rate of religious 
decline, in the following tables the positions in 1950 have been indexed at 100 so 
that broad historical change can be quickly grasped. The figures for 1900 and 2000 
have been adjusted to take into account overall population change relative to 195038. 
The tables thus reflect more accurately the decline in the level of church connection 
over the twentieth century. 
Taking first membership of Protestant churches (as the Catholic Church regards all 
baptised Catholics as 'members' their inclusion in the following table is 
inappropriate), there is clear evidence that: "Secularisation as a widespread breach of 
popular church connection ... occurred only from about 1963-65. From then until the 
present, the slide in all indices has been very severe for most Protestant churches,,39: 
37 P.L. Berger (1999:2,3,9) 
38 The population bases (not shown in the tables) are based on the 1901 and 1951 C~nsuses and 
on mid-1999 estimates by the Office for National Statistics www.statsbase.gov.uklpopest_mld99.asp 
39 C.G.Brown (1992:54) 
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INDLX OF SCOITISH PROTESTi\\:T CHURCH ~IE~IBERSHIP. 1900-2000~' : 
Year CoS FCoS UFC SEC SBU SCC ~ICS 
1900 104 79 121 98 98 65 
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2000 48 68 21 -l6 7-l 27 18 
Bases: 
1900 1155000 15740 116000 16899 30170 8000 
1950 1271000 22720 24556 109000 1970-l 3S0)0 1..+( I( 10 
2000 609450 15600 5300 49900 14550 9550 4000 
Key: 
CoS - Church of Scotland FCoS - Free Church of Scotland 
UFC - United Free Church SEC - Scottish Episcopal Church 
SBU - Scottish Baptist Union SCC - Scottish Congregational Church 
MCS - Methodist Church in Scotland 
All the main Scottish Protestant Churches have seen a sharp decline in members 
since 1950. Until c.1965 Church of Scotland membership rose roughly in proportion 
with the population, constituting 24-260/0 of all Scots. By 2000 the proportion of 
Scots who are Kirk members has fallen to 12%.11. For the Episcopal Church there is 
evidence that decline set in slightly earlier (during the 1950s). and for the smalkr 
liberal Churches (UFC', Methodist and Congregationalist) there has been particularly 
severe decline since the 1980s. The Baptists and Fre~ Church han~ b~~n more 
successful in maintaining their membership. although there is ~Yid~nc~ of thc 
beginnings of a sharper downward trend. 
Protestant membership decline in Scotland is Ycry similar to that in Lngland and 
Wales. What is most striking. however, is that Northern Ireland bucks the trend: 
III 
41 
Bril'rll'~ (1989 l\: 1(99). Pre-19.29 CoS and UI-C figure" combined. 
Brierley t 1999) 
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INDEX OF UK PROTESTANT CHURCH MEMBERSHIP, 1900-200042 : 
Year Church United Methodist Presbyterian Church Presbyterian Methodist 
of Reform (E& W)43 Church of of Church in (NI) 
England Church Wales Ireland Ireland (NI) 
1900 127 161 140 106 99 107 139 
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2000 38 26 38 24 64 67 73 
Bases: 
1900 2796000 333506 762406 158000 183800 226986 63573 
1950 2959000 279266 730321 160000 204900 234800 50634 
2000 1360000 87250 331000 41200 160800 193960 45400 
Scottish Protestant membership decline has proceeded a little more slowly than in 
England & Wales, but considerably more rapidly than Northern Ireland. With 
Northern Ireland, where the Census measures religious identity, we can trace 
demographic effects more accurately. Here the key change is an increasing Catholic 
population: between 1951-1991 there was an 18% decline in the number claiming to 
be Presbyterian, a 21 % decrease in Church of Ireland identifiers, and a 28% increase 
in self-described Catholics44• Much of the membership decline amongst Northern 
Ireland's main Protestant denominations, therefore, is explained by demographic 
changes. 
Changes in membership figures are problematic, in that they may reflect changes in 
record keeping or the removal of those who were no more than nominal members45. 
However, when we turn our attention to active communicants46 we find remarkably 
similar patterns since 1950: 
42 Brierley (1999). No figures available for the (Anglican) Church in Wales. Th: URC ~as 
formed in 1972 through merger of the Presbyterian Church of England and the Congregational Umon 
of England. Figures for 1900 & 1950 comprise the membership of these bodies. 
43 That is, the British Methodist membership minus its Scottish members. 
44 NI Census, 1991. 'No religion' accounted for 4% - Scottish surveys around that time found 
25% claiming such an identity. 
45 See Brierley (1989:6) 
46 For Presbyterians, those members receiving communion at least once in the year. for 
Episcopalians/Anglicans those receiving communion on Easter Sunday 
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Again Scottish decline IS very similar to that in the rest of Britain, and agalll 
Northern Ireland stands apart. The stable leyel of 1\'orthern Ireland's acti,"e 
Presbyterian communicants amongst a shrinking Presbyterian community sugg~sts a 
relative increase in participation over the past 50 years~s" This is confirmed by 
survey data: 460/0 of Northern Irish Protestants claimed to attend Church at least 
weekly in 1968; by 1978 this had fallen to 39° o. but by 1989 had risen again to 440/0. 
The proportion of Scottish Protestants claiming to attend \\~ekly in 1992 was I hO o. 
little more than a third of the Northern Irish lcn~I~\I. 
Institutional decline is not ~\:clusin?ly Protestant: adult Catholic Mass attendance in 
Scotland almost halved since 1950, a rate of decline only slightly 10\\ er than that of 
h1g1and and exceeding that of Wales. Northern Ireland is once more e\:ceptional 
with the level of Mass attendance falling only slightly: 
~1 Bril:rk\ (1989.\: 1999) 
48 comp~ing Presbyterian (llmmunicants and the C~nsus population suggests that participatl(lIl 
amongst Northl:rn Irish Preshyterians rose from '27°0 in 1901 to 38°0 in 1991. :\ssuming arl)UnJ -+0
0
0 
of S(l)tS \\l)uld id~l1tify themseh ~s with the Church l)t S(l)tland (as sun ~ys SUg~L'''t) th~n 
parti(ipatil)11 is around half the Northern ~rish.le\t~1 an~ falling. . . .. 
~<) Curtice l\: Gallagher (1990:18,); S(l)ttlsh l:kdlon '-,lIney ('-,1'-,). 19l)2. F\'r ~vlljen(~ th.lt 
respondents "gwssly" l)\ crstate (hurch attendan(~ "L'e Bru(~ (1996: 130-1 ) 
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INDEX OF ADUL T CATHOLIC MASS A TIENDANCEso: 
Year Scotland England Wales N.lreland 
1900 93 100 95 101 
1950 100 100 100 100 
2000 54 51 61 94 
Bases: 
1900 341660 1109020 42610 408870 
1950 420100 1495390 57460 447890 
2000 226500 922000 39720 521500 
Again these figures are confirmed in surveys: in 1968 95% of Northern Irish 
Catholics claimed to attend Mass at least once a week, and in 1989 86%. Census 
figures suggest an attendance rate of 95% in 1901 and 1951, and 85% in 1991. In 
1992 51 % of Scottish Catholics claimed to attend at least weekly and in one 1994 
survey 41 % of Catholics were found at Mass51 • 
Further data support the case that Scotland fits a British pattern of secularisation. In 
1900 94% of Scottish marriages were celebrated religiously, compared to 85% in 
England & Wales, and 98% in all Ireland. In 1999 the rates were 58% in Scotland. 
39% in England, 44% in Wales, and around 75% in Northern Ireland52. There is 
considerable regional variation. In Greater London only 250/0 of marriages in 1999 
were religious, whereas on Merseyside they accounted for 480/0, and in Greater 
Manchester 43%; Welsh rates vary between 31-54%53. Recent Scottish figures are 
not available, but in 1982, when 60% of marriages were religious, rates varied 
between 50% in Lothian and 85% in the Western Isles54. Relatively low rates 
(around 50%) were found in parts of urban East-Central Scotland, and high rates 
(70% and over) in some rural areas and in parts of Strathclyde. In sharp contrast, 
whilst 75% of Northern Irish marriages in 1995 were religious, the lowest rates were 
found in North Down (57%), Carrickfergus (59%), and Newtonabbey (660/0)55. These 
districts share two other features - the lowest proportions of Catholics, and the 
so Brierley (1999) 
SI Curtice & Gallagher (1990: 187); NI Census; SES, 1992; Brierley & Macdonald (1995) 
S2 Brierley (1989), Annual Report for the Registrar General for Scotland (hereafter RGS) 1999. 
Brierley estimated the 2000 rate in N .Ireland as 82% but the RGNI 1998 reports the 1997 rate at 77% -
the 1999 N .Irish estimate is my own. 
SJ Adapted from ONS (2000): 121 
54 Calculated from RGS 1982. No regional breakdown published subsequently. 
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highest proportions of those describing themselves as being of no religion56. This 
suggests that where Protestantism is numerically dominant, and less immediately 
'threatened' by ethno-religious rivals, there is evidence of a greater degree of 
secularisation. More generally, it would seem reasonable to assume that the 
continuing strong popular connections with institutional religion in Northern Ireland 
are in some part a consequence of sectarianism. Bruce argues that "modernity 
undermines religion" except where religion possesses social roles beyond the 
ostensibly religious, such as cultural defence: 
where one has two communities in competition and they are of different 
religions - as is the case with Protestants and Catholics in Ulster, or with 
Serbs and Croats in what was Yugoslavia - then the religious identity of each 
side can acquire a new significance and call forth a new loyalty as church 
affiliation becomes a way of asserting ethnic pride. 57 
Secularisation amongst Scottish Catholics gathered pace later than amongst 
Protestants: Callum Brown notes the "late development of - thus far - relatively-mild 
religious alienation amongst Catholics,,58. This may be partly due to the Church's 
role in cultural defence, and partly through the experience of a largely immigrant 
Church: 
Ethnic minority religions in the United States and Britain not only give 
beleaguered minorities a sense of self-worth (and in that sense they are aiding 
in cultural defence) but they also help new immigrants in making the 
transition from old world to new world ... The church, by bridging old and 
new helped immigrants adjust to their new circumstances, and in doing so it 
acquired an importance and a loyalty it had often lacked in the old country. 59 
Comparison with Northern Ireland is illuminating. There both religious traditions are 
mobilised in cultural defence of their respective communities and weakening in 
commitment to the faith is often seen as disloyalty to the community. Where in 
Scotland 'marrying out' may, at worst, lead to estrangement from family and friends, 
in Northern Ireland it may lead to harassment, even murder. "Mixed marriage' 






RGN11995, NI Census 1991 
Bruce (1992: 146) 
C.G.Brown (1992:54) 
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level. Aspinwall claims that the evidence of "surprising numbers of mixed marriages 
from the late nineteenth century to the present" serves to undermine ""hitherto 
unquestioned assumptions about a prevalent feverish bigotry until recent times"..60. 
Whilst the proportion of non-Catholic marriages involving 'mixed' religious partners 
is unclear, between 1966 and 1977 the proportion of Scottish Catholic marriages 
involving a non-Catholic increased from one third to just under half. The lowest rate 
was found in the Diocese of Motherwell, but even here some 37% of Catholic 
marriages in 1977 were 'mixed,61. Recent figures are difficult to find, but 43% of 
Catholic marriages in the Diocese of Motherwell were mixed in 199862. We might 
estimate that over half the Catholic marriages in the West of Scotland and a very 
sizeable majority elsewhere are religiously mixed. The highest rate of mixed 
marriage in Northern Ireland is found in Down & Connor (which includes Belfast) 
where, in 1991, some 20% of Catholic marriages were mixed. In strife-torn Armagh 
the proportion was 4%63. This suggests that 'cultural defence' imbues Northern Irish 
religion with a deep importance at the most intimate level, but also that any ideas that 
Scottish Catholics and Protestants are embroiled in anything like the same kind of 
conflict, or the same kind of social segregation, require serious revision. 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE IN CONTEMPORARY SCOTLAND 
The 1994 Scottish Church Census provides a detailed snapshot of Church attendance. 
It found 746,420 Scots in Church on the last Sunday of October, 15% of the 
population. Whilst a substantial proportion of Scots remained churchgoers, their 
number declined by 140,000 since 1980. Between 1990-94 alone the decline was 
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SCOTTISH CHCRCH A TTE~DANCE, 1980-9464 : 
All Church of Other 
Year Churches Scotland Protestant Catholic 
1980 887,070 371,220 148.770 367.000 
1984 863,620 361.340 146,050 355.870 
1990 814,610 320.770 146.720 347.120 
1994 746,420 293,170 148.230 305.020 
By focusing on attendance. we can begin to place the importance of religious uctidty 
in contemporary Scotland. Firstly, how does Scottish Church attendance fit in 
international perspective? The following table outlines the proportions of both 
Protestants and Catholics in a number of countries claiming to attend religious 
services at least monthly in 1992, as well as the proportion in each society daiming 
to have no religious affiliation. It can be seen. first of alL that in religiously mixed 
societies, Catholic rates of attendance are higher than rates amongst Protestanb (the 
only exceptions here being the USA and Netherlands). Additionally. Scntland has a 
relatively high proportion of the "non-religious'. \\'hilst Scotland is hardly in the 
vanguard of secularisation, it is not far behind: 
Brierk~ & \ taL'donald (199:,) 
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CLAIMLD MONTHLY RELIGIOLS .-\ TTE?\DA~CE A~D PROPORTf( )\ 
CLAIMI~G ~() RELIGIOCS AFFILIATIO~. 199~'" 
Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of 
Catholics Protestants population 
attending attending claiming no .... 
monthly monthly religious 
affiliation 
Scotland 58 25 ' --=' 
Britain 55 28 36 
Northern Ireland 89 63 9 
I rish Republic 83 50 , -
New Zealand 43 28 31 
USA 56 56 7 
West Germany 40 14 1 1 
Netherlands 55 68 55 
Norway 10 6 
Italy 59 6 
East Germany 50 10 64 




Although Scotland' s rate of church attendance is higher than that of England, it 
remains lower than in comparable societies. \\'ithin Scotland, as the next table 
demonstrates, the Church Census re\'eals significant regional \'ariations. 
Proportionately four times as many people in \\'estern Isles. Skye & Lochalsh \\ere 
in Church than in Aberdeen. whilst double the proportions attended Church in 
Motherwell & Monklands and Renfre\v & Inverclyde than in \\'est Lothian or Fife. 
Such variation reflects denominational concentration. \\'hilst Strathclyde accuunted 
for 430/0 of the Scottish population and 400/0 of all Protestant attenders, it cuntained 
740 0 of Catholic attenders: 
h~ Adapted from lkath l'{ 01 (199~~ I L SI S. Il)9~ )"l'ar Book. A 11.\ {rulia. IvW rL'pl1rh that 170,0 
t)f Australians de~Lribe themsL'I\L's as 'no religion'; Canada rear Book.. 19v- repllrts 1-"0 \'1 
('anadians tah' the ~alllL' \ iL'\\. 
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CHURCH A ITENDANCE BY REGION AND DISTRICT. 199466: 
Attenders Denominational share of 
as%of attenders 
REGION Total total Church of Other 
- District Population population Scotland Protestant Catholic 
SCOTLAND 5,120,200 14.6 39.3 19.9 40.9 
CENTRAL 273,530 11.6 48.1 20.0 32.0 
FIFE 351,200 10.1 46.9 24.8 28.3 
GRAMPIAN 528,100 10.5 59.8 28.2 12.0 
-Aberdeen 218,220 9.1 51.2 32.0 16.7 
- Rest 0/ Grampian 309,880 11.5 63.4 2-1.9 1 I. :-
LOTHIAN 753,900 11.3 45.6 25.3 29.1 
-Edinburgh 441,620 11.9 -17.2 28.1 247 
- East Lothian & Midlothian 165,550 10.6 4-1.5 20.0 35.6 
- West Lothian 146,730 10.0 42.5 17.2 40.3 
RURAL NORTH 342,160 18.3 40.7 41.3 18.0 
- Highland 258,290 15.4 -17.6 32.8 19.6 
- Orkney 19,760 14.9 67.6 24.7 7.8 
- Shetland 22,830 13.8 37.5 58.2 -1.3 
- Western Isles, Skye & Lochalsh 41,280 41.1 27.8 56.9 15.3 
RURAL SOUTH 253,200 11.7 62.6 20.0 17.4 
- Borders 105,300 11.8 60.9 21.9 17.2 
- Dumfries & Galloway 147,900 11.6 63.8 18.6 17.6 
STRATHCLYDE 2,223,540 18.0 30.2 13.8 56.0 
- Cumbernauld & Kilsyth 63,930 16.1 17.5 16.3 66.2 
- Dumbarton & Clydebank 125,080 16.4 25.2 9.7 65.1 
- East Kilbride 85,360 19.3 25.3 1-1. -I 60.-1 
- Eastwood, Bearsden etc67 /87,650 18.0 34.5 1-1.7 50.8 
- Glasgow 68/,470 16.2 26.2 12.5 61.3 
- Hamilton & Clydesdale 165,790 17.2 33.5 13.2 53.3 
- Kyle, Cumnock, etc68 376,800 13.9 51.7 20.1 28.2 
- Motherwell & Monklands 246,320 25.9 23.5 12.2 64.3 
- Renfrew & Inverclyde 291,140 22.1 27.2 13.0 59. 7 
TAYSIDE 395,200 11.6 50.9 20.6 28.4 
- Dundee 170,120 12.4 40.2 18.8 41.0 
- Rest o/Tayside 225,080 11.0 60.0 22.2 17.7 
Regional concentration is not limited to Catholicism: two-thirds of the smaller 
Presbyterian Churches' attenders were found in Highland (25%) and Western Isles, 




Brierley & Macdonald (1995) 
Eastwood, Bearsden & Milngavie. and Strathkelvin 
Kyle & Carrick, Cumnock & Doon Valley, Kilmarnock & Loudon. and Cunninghame 
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population
69
• Episcopalianism is weak in the west of Scotland. \vith 750/0 of 
Episcopalian attenders found in the east and north, 20% in Edinburgh alone. A 
quarter of Baptist attenders (27%) were found in the two major cities, eight other 
urban areas accounting for a further half. The Church of Scotland was spread more 
evenly but had a majority of attenders only in the rural south, Grampian, Orkney and 
Tayside. In the area where Kirk services attracted the highest proportion of the local 
population (Western Isles, Skye & Lochalsh) it attracted fewer attenders than the 
other Protestant Churches 70. 
Two further points should be noted. Firstly, more than 80% of Scottish Church 
attenders in 1994 were found in two denominations, the Church of Scotland and the 
Catholic Church. The primary focus in the rest of this study, therefore, will lie with 
these two bodies. However, it should be noted that whilst the largest share of 
attendance since 1990 has been Catholic this is because Catholic attendance is falling 
slower than that of the Kirk. Attendance at the other Protestant Churches has 
remained stable, suggesting that churchgoing will become less dominated by the two 
major bodies 71. In some areas Catholics have held a lead in attendance for some time. 
One 1954 survey found 20% of Glasgow's adult population in church, with Catholics 
making up 62% of worshippers, twice as many as the Church of Scotland72• One 
must treat with caution claims that Scotland is a "land where the Kirk holds sway" 
and where "Presbyterianism still places its clear stamp upon the life of the land,,73. 
Scottish culture has been shaped by Presbyterianism, but it is difficult to see how 
Presbyterianism (except in a rather loose and secularised sense) can continue to be 
regarded as a hallmark of Scottish identity. The numerical decline of 
Presbyterianism, and the emergence of Catholicism as the leading denomination in 
69 The Highland concentration of conservative Presbyterianism is often overlooked by those 
~uoting FCoS and FPCoS attacks on Catholicism. 
This is an exceptionally religious area of Scotland, often mocked with reference to 
'Hebridean Ayatollahs' and claims that Portree Calvinists disapprove of sex before marriage because 
'it might lead to dancing' . 
71 Cardinal Winning's ill-received claim that twenty-first century Scottish Christianity would be 
united under Catholicism should be seen in this light. See Scotsman 16/0 I /99 
72 The survey was repeated in 1956 and 1957 although Catholic authorities refused to 
participate. Highet( 1958:729-731) . ' . . 
"h Bisset (1989:51-52). Bisset's compares Presbyterian membership With adult Catholic mass 
attendance, two quite different measures. 
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terms of attendance has not resulted in defensive hostility on the part of Protestant 
bodies. This contrasts sharply with the extent of Protestant sensitivity to Catholic 
advances prior to 1939, as Chapters Four to Seven of this study will demonstrate. 
Is there any evidence that particular areas of Scotland have proved particularly 
resistant to attendance decline? In particular, do urban areas associated with 
Protestant-Catholic tensions show higher levels of attendance than elsewhere? 
Outside the Western Isles the highest rate of attendance is found in Motherwell & 
Monklands (26%). Motherwell was a historic focal point for sectarian tensions, and 
Monklands (comprising the towns of Airdrie and Coatbridge) the scene of serious 
allegations of sectarian bias on the part of the District council in the mid 1990s. 
Lanarkshire has been described as "the historical cock-pit of sectarian friction in 
Scotland,,74 so it is here, if nowhere else, that we might expect to find evidence that 
'cultural defence' has imbued religious connection with added importance. Rates of 
church attendance are comparatively high in the other parts of Lanarkshire and 
Renfrew & Inverclyde, another area with a 'sectarian' past, has the third highest rate 
in Scotland (22%). However, the key explanation for high attendance rates in urban 
Scotland is not 'cultural defence', but the presence of Catholics. Whilst it is difficult 
to make cross-denominational comparisons, Catholics - internationally - are more 
likely than Protestants to attend church. If we accept the Church's own estimates of 
the Catholic population we can compare rates of attendance between Catholics and 
non-Catholics across Scotland by calculating the proportion of Catholics attending 
Catholic services, and the proportion of the non-Catholic population attending 
Protestant services 75. Such comparisons are crude, not least because they involve the 
clearly inaccurate, but adequate for our purposes, assumption that all non-Catholics 
are Protestant. Bearing this in mind we find that non-Catholic churchgoing remains 
low across all urban Scotland: 
74 G.Walker(1995:84) 
75 That is. Catholic attenders as a percentage of the estimated Catholic population and 
Protestant attenders as a percentage of everyone else. 
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COMPARATIVE CHURCH ATTE\:DA~CE (selected areas). 199476: 
Proportion Catholic :\on-
RLGIO~ Total who are attendance Catholi( 
- selected districts Population Catholic attendance rate 
ratl..' 
SCOTLAND 5,120,200 1~ ~1 10 
CENTRAL 273,530 9 39 9 
FIFE 351,200 7 43 8 
GRAMPIAN 528,100 2 57 9 
- Aberdeen 218,220 3 ,,' 8 
LOTHIAN 753,900 7 ~5 9 
- Edinburgh ././ 1,620 7 38 10 
- West Lothian 1./6, -30 8 -19 
RURAL NORTH 342,160 5 58 16 
- Highland 258,290 5 59 1 ' J 
- Western Isles, Skye & Lochalsh '/1,280 11 58 39 
RURAL SOUTH 253,200 6 35 10 
STRATHCLYDE 2,223,540 25 ~O 11 
- Cumbernauld & Kilsyth 63,930 29 3; s 
- Dumbarton & Clydebank 1]5,080 ::() -11 :\ 
- East Kilbride 85,360 ::-1 -18 10 
- Eastwood, Bearsden etc l?Si,650 20 -16 11 
- Glasgow 681,-1-0 ::9 3-1 9 
- Hamilton & ( '/n/t'sdale 165, -W) 20 -15 10 
- Ky/e, Cumnock, etc 3-6,800 9 -11 11 
- Motherwell & Monkland\' ]./6,3]() 37 -15 15 
- Renfrew & !m'i.!rc(l'£/i.! ]c)I,I./O 31 -13 13 
TAYSIDE 395,200 9 37 9 
- Dundee 170, J]() 15 35 9 
There is no c\'idence that Protestants ha\e maintained higher !e\'els uf attendance in 
those parts of Scotland associated with religious di \'ision. In other \vords urban 
Protestants han:- not maintained church connections as cultural defence against urban 
Catholics. Catholic attendancc has no clear pattern: it is relati\'t~ Iy 10\\ (though still 
much higher than amongst non-Catholics) in the cities. and high not only in the 
smaller urban areas of the \\cst but also in those areas historically free of religiolls 
friction. 
Secularisation and 'Sectarianism' 
The argument thus far has been that where religion possesses social characteristics 
beyond the ostensibly religious we would expect secular erosion of popular church 
connection to proceed relatively slowly. Whilst this is precisely what we find in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland has seen a steep decline in popular church connection 
since the 1960s, a trend shared with much of Western Europe. There is little evidence 
that religious connection is any higher in those areas traditionally associated with 
Protestant-Catholic tensions. In this sense, we can say that, objectively speaking. 
religion is losing its social significance. When we add to this the lack of convincing 
evidence that religion materially affects people's life chances through systematic 
discrimination or disadvantage, there is no case for arguing that Scotland is a 
sectarian society. However, there is evidence that the Scots are concerned about 
'conflict' between Protestants and Catholics, suggesting that the perception of 
'sectarianism' (used loosely to denote bigotry or difference rather than systematic 
discrimination) remains a feature of contemporary Scotland. 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF 'RELIGIOUS CONFLICT' 
Following James MacMillan's 1999 speech one poll found 34% agreeing "that there 
is a deep-rooted anti-Catholic attitude throughout Scottish society": 45% disagreed, 
the remainder answering 'neither' or 'don't know,77. An earlier Glasgow poll found 
55% believing that "sectarianism in Glasgow is still a big problem", 34% a "small 
problem" and only 6% "no problem at all". There was no difference in the responses 
of Protestants and Catholics, but other variables, particularly age and gender, showed 
considerable variation78• Such polls are carried out when they are topical, when 
alleged 'sectarianism' is in the media spotlight, and they shed little light on the 
meaning respondents invest in the term 'sectarianism'. It seems significant that the 
Glasgow poll also asked whether Celtic and Rangers "have done enough to combat 
sectarianism among their supporters" and whether state-funded Catholic schools 
should continue79• We are confronted again with the difficulty that in its popular 
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religious bigotry and what we might call religious separatism. between football 
violence and Catholic schools. 
A longer perspective can be found in the Scottish Election Surveys 1974-97, and the 
Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey of 199980 which, since 1979, have asked 
respondents about 'conflict' between Protestants and Catholics in Scotland: 
PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN SCOTLANDS1 : 
%bycolumn 1979 1992 1997 1999 
Very serious conflict 16 9 12 15 
Fairly serious conflict 20 25 27 36 
Not very serious conflict 41 49 48 40 
There is no conflict 21 14 11 8 
Don't Know 3 2 2 2 
Base 660 957 882 1482 
In such surveys we cannot know how respondents define . conflict': it might be 
understood as anything between irreconcilable and potentially violent tension to 
differing lifestyles with little social consequence. What is striking is that over a 
period of 20 years there has been a steady decline (from 21 % to 8%) of those 
believing there is no conflict, whilst those believing that conflict is fairly serious 
have risen steadily (from 20% to 36%). In all four surveys there were no statistically 
significant variations across religion or gender, and social class proved significant 
only in the 1997 samples2• Age and region proved statistically significant in all cases, 
with those aged 18-34 and those in west central Scotland more likely to believe that 
conflict is very serious than other groups. Church attendance proved significant in 
three surveys83, with non-attenders much more likely to believe that conflict is very 
serious, and much less likely to believe there is no conflict, than those who attend at 
least monthly. In 1997 those describing themselves as 'very religious' were much 
more likely to believe that there was no conflict than those 'not at all religious'. In 
order to find those groups most or least likely to believe that religious conflict was 
80 On these surveys see: www.crest.ox.ac.uk 
81 The precise question is "Turning now to Protestants and Catholics in Scotland. Using a 
phrase from this card. how serious would you say conflict between them is?" 
l2 All tables reported from the SES and from the British Social Attitudes Survey 1999 are 
statistically significant at the .OS level. 
83 1992.1997 & 1999. 
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either 'very' or 'fairly serious', a logistic regression analysis was conducted on the 
1997 data. This confmned that age, region of residence, and occupational class were 
significant predictors on this question whilst religion, church attendance and 
religiosity were not. Being younger rather than older, having a manual rather than a 
non-manual occupation, and living in west central Scotland all proved to be 
significant predictors of a perception that religious conflict was 'very' or 'fairly 
serious' 84. 
Given that few argue that actual religious conflict in Scottish society is growing, 
how can we explain the apparent rise in the perception of conflict? One likely answer 
is the context in which people answer this question. Given the reducing levels of 
religious connection it is likely that, for an increasing number of Scots, knowledge of 
religious controversy is gleaned from the media rather than through direct 
experience. Frequent church attenders and the 'very' or 'somewhat religious' are 
more likely than others to believe that there is no religious conflict. Younger 
respondents - relatively unlikely to be church attenders - are most likely to believe 
that conflict is 'very serious'. The 1997 and 1999 surveys were conducted against 
precisely that background that led to MacMillan's speech. The Monklands scandals 
brought allegations of 'sectarian' corruption into prominence and Old Firm rivalry 
was unusually tense and violent. Indeed, many of the incidents used by MacMillan in 
his 1999 speech to underpin claims of Scottish anti-Catholicism were intimately 
related to football. The resignation of Rangers vice-chairman Donald Findlay (filmed 
singing sectarian songs), and the murder of two Celtic fans in 1995 and 1999, 
provided MacMillan with a powerful and contemporary motif. The Findlay incident 
undermined "the sanctimonious Scottish myth that all bigots are uneducated loutish 
morons from the lowest level of society,,85. These surveys, therefore, were conducted 
against a media background in which violence, bigotry and prejudice were 
prominent. 
IJ.l Logistic regression estimates the probability of an outcome on a binary dependent variable. 
Thus the analyses found that age and region - other factors held constant - were significant predictors 
of an answer of very/fairly serious (as opposed to any other answer) whilst religion. religiosity, and 
Church attendance were not. More detail of the analysis can be found in Appendix 2. 
U Indeed. his own drawing of "interesting parallels between Mao Tse-tung and John Knox, Pol 
Pot and Andrew Melville (well perhaps not)" prove this point. MacMillan (2000a: 17-18) 
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The surveys also asked respondents how serious they perceive the 'conflict' between 
the Scots and the English to be, and it is interesting to note that there has been an 
even greater shift in responses to this question. Between 1979-99 the proportion 
believing there was a very or fairly serious Scots-English conflict rose from 15% to 
43%, and those believing there was no such conflict fell from 35% to just 6%86. 
There is a very strong overlap between the two questions, 51 % of the 1999 sample 
giving identical answers to both. A further logistic regression analysis on the 1999 
data found that a perception of a 'very' or 'fairly serious' Scots-English conflict was 
a very strong predictor of a similar perception of serious religious conflictS7• It 
seems, therefore, that changes in the perception of religious 'conflict' have less to do 
with religious conflict itself, and more to do with media-led concerns about 
'divisions' in contemporary society. 
On the ritualistic demonstrations of the Marching Season, the Scottish media has 
been "emphatic" in its condemnation although it "has stopped short of calling for 
parades to be banned,,88. Such a call seems in tune with public opinion: one 1995 poll 
found belief that Orange and Republican parades encouraged intolerance, and a 
desire for their prohibition: 
ATTITUDES TO THE 'MARCHING SEASON', 1995
89
: 
Do you think marches tend to encourage religious intolerance? 
Yes 64% 
No 20% 
Don't know 16% 
Should the Government ban sectarian marches in Scotland? 
Yes 57% 
No 29% 
Don't know 14% 
86 The question was not asked in 1997: in 1992 the proportion claiming there was no conflict 
remained comparatively high at 19%. 
87 See Appendix 2 
88 G. Walker (2000: 130) 
89 SoS, 28/05/95 
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Parades are also viewed as an inconvenience: proposed Republican and Orange 
Marches in Edinburgh were reported under the headline '''Marching towards a 
shoppers nightmare: Three processions in one month": 
it is disappointing that in the year 2000 ... people should still wish to close the 
Capital's streets and march in the name of triumphalism ... Rather than 
aspiring to make noble demands to end inequality and difference, both appear 
to extol sectarianism and bigotry. Their songs and banners are divisive and 
inflammatory. And though they seem to represent the very worst of 
intolerance and closed mindedness, in a democracy they must be tolerated.90 
It seems clear that most Scots resent such marches, not least because of a widespread 
feeling that religion and politics should not be mixed. The extent to which religious 
identity is influential in contemporary Scottish politics is investigated in the 
following chapter. Before doing so it is necessary to examine two particular issues 
which loom large in narratives about Scottish 'sectarianism', and which will reveal 
much about the role of religion in determining political beliefs: Northern Ireland and 
Catholic schools. 
SECTARIAN QUESTIONS: NORTHERN IRELAND 
Northern Ireland provides the dominant motif of religious conflict in modern 
Scotland. Finding three quarters of Rangers supporters taking a unionist position on 
Northern Ireland, and a similar proportion of Celtic fans supporting a united Ireland, 
Bradley concludes: 
Given the extent of support for Rangers, such evidence is an indication of the 
variation of attitudes towards the Northern Ireland question in Scotland as 
compared to the rest of Britain. Whereas many people in Britain ... wish to 
end Britain's involvement ... , the evidence here indicates a si~nificant number 
of people have a more partisan view of the problem/solution. 1 
Again, the football terrace is taken as a barometer for Scottish opinion: as Rangers 
are very popular; the unionist position must be strong in the broader population. In 
fact, surveys suggest that Scottish opinion is close to that of Britain as a whole: 
90 Edinburgh Evening News (hereafter EN), 11/0412000 . . 
91 Bradley (1998d:213).The sample sizes for the Glasgow clubs were 89 and 97. Fmdmgs for 
the other clubs. with samples of between 18-56, were less clear cut. 
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THE LONG-TERM FUTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND92: 
% by column Scotland Britain Scotland England Scotland 
(1992) (1995) (1997) (1999) (1999) 
Remain part of United Kingdom 35 29 31 28 27 
Reunify with rest of Ireland 46 52 48 55 52 
Base 957 882 905 95 
There is little evidence that Scottish opinion is religiously 'partisan'. Presbyterian 
support for continued union is stronger than that of Anglicans, but English Catholics 
are more likely than their Scottish co-religionists to support a united Ireland. In both 
countries the non-religious (whose 'partisan' positioning is unclear) are strongly in 
favour of unification: 
DENOMINATIONAL POSITIONS ON NORTHERN IRELAN093 : 
Scotland (1997) England (1999) 
% by column Church of No Church of No 
Catholic Scotland Religion Catholic England Religion 
Remain UK 17 42 23 23 34 23 
Reunify Ireland 60 33 60 66 49 60 
Base 126 365 270 71 292 396 
In both countries Catholic support for reunification is very strong, indeed stronger 
than in Northern Ireland where 56% of Catholics favoured reunification in 1996. 
Protestant support for continued union is stronger in Scotland than England, although 
far below the 86% of Northern Irish Protestants wishing to remain in the UK94. In 
1992 those favouring either of the main options were asked how important that 
policy was to them. Equal numbers of Scottish Presbyterians felt unification or union 
was 'very important'. It also emerges that Catholics invest greater importance in 
reunification than the non-religious: 
92 Scotland. 1992 & 1997: SES. Britain. 1995: G.Evans (1996:129).1999 figures from British 
Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) 1999 
93 SES 1997, BSAS 1999 
94 a.Evans (1996:128) reports N.lrish Catholic support for reunification varying between 49-
60% 1989-96. Protestant support for the Union varied between 86-93°0. 
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IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO N. IRISH POLICY. 1992: 
% by column Church of 0:0 
Catholic Scotland religion 
Remain UK, very important 5 16 9 
Remain UK, quite important 7 20 1 " -' 
Remain UK, not very important 7 6 "'\ 
Other option/Don't know 17 19 20 
Reunify Ireland, not very 
important 12 -+ 8 
Reunify Ireland, quite important 24 20 26 
Reunify Ireland, very important 30 14 20 
Base 148 4·1] :}35 
Presbyterian support for continued union is. hov·;eyer. a function of demography 
rather than of denomination. Logistic regression analysis on \\hether or not 
respondents favour continued union reveals that. other factors h~ing equal. being 
Catholic is a highly significant negative predictor of that outcome, \\'hilst b~ing u f 
no religion is not found to be significant, being Presbyterian also proyes a significant 
predictor of not supporting continued unionlJ5 , In other \\'ords there is no 
denominational polarisation on this issue. no symmetry between ('athol ics (/\ 
( 'atholies opposing union and Presbyterians (IS PreshylL'rians supporting it. It is 
difficult to sustain the argument that Scottish opinion is any more religiously divided 
on this issue than the rest of Britain. Again \\'hat is striking is the \\ay that football 
culture stands as a distorting mirror of Scottish opinion, This issue is at th~ \ery heart 
of the sectarian myth in Scotland. the yery touchstone of a . sectarian' identity. That 
PreshytL'rian Scots do not position themsehes on :":orthern Ireland according to th~ir 
religion demonstrates the marginality of sectarian politics in Scotland, 
Sec Appendl\. ~ 
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SECTARIAN QUESTIONS: CATHOLIC SCHOOLS 
The existence of state-funded Catholic schools has long provided a focus for 
religious friction. MacMillan complained of an "anti-Catholic-schools industry" in 
Scotland: 
Fear and alarm are spreading in the Catholic community over what is 
perceived as an ideologically motivated campaign against Catholic education 
which seeks to remove a Catholic voice and Catholic presence from Scottish 
society. The slavering at the mouth, in some quarters, at the prospect of the 
new [Scottish] parliament being involved in this vandalism has become a 
depressing and frightening spectacle for many of us. 96 
MacMillan is not alone. Bradley frames a discussion of the "antagonists of Catholic 
schools" under the heading "The Constant Threat,,97; and Finn describes the 
"prejudicial framework" of "repetitive, near-obsessive" criticism of Catholic 
schools98. Cardinal Winning recently complained that "Catholic schools exist all 
over the world yet only in Scotland are they seen as socially divisive,,99. What makes 
the issue frustrating is that 'antagonists' are often presented as an undifferentiated 
bloc implicitly united by anti-Catholic prejudice. Bradley notes that the Churches, 
the Orange Order, the Liberal Democrats, the Educational Institute of Scotland (ErS), 
and elements of the media have opposed separate Catholic schools using arguments 
"thematically similar over the period of time since these schools were accepted into 
the state system"IOO. No attempt is made to differentiate those who oppose Catholic 
schools for their Catholicism, and those who oppose denominational schools more 
broadly. Secular criticisms of state-funded religious schools are thus merged with 
Calvinist and Loyalist critiques of 'Rome on the rates'. Finn argues that opposition is 
evidence of the continuing influence of anti-Catholic prejudice, and though he 
concedes that "some opposition" springs from "secular humanism" this perspective 
is relegated into a footnote 101 • The Church itself seems defensively entrenched: when 
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complained that the decision was "unfair and discriminatory", making no comment 
on the simultaneous decision to close four non-denominational schools 102. 
Highland Calvinists and Orangemen believe that state subsidy to transmit . false 
religion' is fundamentally wrong. For other 'antagonists', however, the complaint is 
that religious belief belongs in family and church, not in state-provided schools. This 
is a secular argument, directed towards state sanction of religion. Some reject this 
distinction: for Bradley "almost non-existent hostility" towards Episcopalian schools 
"seems to bear out the argument that it was Catholics who remained the target" 103. 
This rather misses the point. There are around 420 state-funded Catholic schools in 
Scotland, and "a few Episcopalian primaries and one Jewish primary"104. Any 
'targeting' of Catholic schools springs from the fact that they form perhaps 98-99% 
of Scottish denominational schools. Notably, the Catholic system has expanded and 
flourished since 1918, whilst the Episcopal system has virtually disappeared 105. 
Many critics of denominational education claim that the • segregation' of pupils on 
religious grounds is socially divisive, some going so far as to claim that the dual 
education system perpetuates, or fosters, religious bigotry 106. Many opponents of 
Catholic schools see their opposition as motivated by explicitly anti-sectarian 
motives. This point has been made elsewhere lO7, leading Finn to comment: 
It is a dramatic self-contradiction for McCrone and Rosie to hold that 
Catholic schools cause division in the middle of an account that 
'sectarianism' has all but disappeared. Indeed, this accusation against 
Catholic schools cannot be sustained by anyone who does accept that 
religious conflict in Scotland has been much reduced. 108 
102 Scotsman, 18/02/98 
103 Bradley (2000: 160). This closely echoes Gallagher (1987a: 139) 
104 L.Paterson (2000b:39) 
lOS Urban Episcopalianism was too weak to maintain its schools. See. for example, Minutes of 
the Edinburgh Corporation Education Committee, 1933. . .. 
106 The Humanist Society of Scotland sees denominational education "as dangerously diVISive ... 
it fosters suspicion and antagonism ... bigotry, distrust and social strife", Scotsman 10/02/98 
107 McCrone & Rosie (1998) 
108 Finn (2000:76). Finn mistakes a description of a widespread criticism for the personal 
opinions of the authors, an example of the obtuse defensiveness this issue can provoke. 
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Leaving aside his distortion of the argument, Finn identifies an important point: 
state-provided Catholic schools have flourished as religious antagonisms have 
withered 109. 
In the 1992 & 1997 Election Surveys, respondents were asked whether separate 
Scottish Catholic schools should be retained or phased out, the results indicating 
widespread opposition to the present system. Opinion is largely divided on 
denominational grounds, Catholics alone favouring retention of separate Catholic 
schools: 
PREFERENCE ON SCOTTISH CATHOLIC SCHOOLS, 1997: 
% by column Church of No Other 
ALL Catholic Scotland religion religion 
Retain separate schools 20 52 18 12 14 
Phase out 77 45 80 86 86 
Don't know 3 2 2 3 1 
Base 882 126 365 270 no 
The non-religious are most supportive of change and least supportive of separate 
schools, suggesting that secular opposition is particularly strong. More interesting is 
the substantial minority of Catholics who support change (45% in 1997 and 470/0 in 
1992). Some argue that the timescale implicit in this question explains the Catholic 
figures: Catholics may favour integration, but only in the long, and distant, term 1 10. 
However, the Surveys have also asked, without any time dimension, whether or not 
the Government should maintain Catholic schools, and the results are very similar. 
Here too we find strong opposition to the status quo, 33% believing in 1974 that it 
was 'very important' that the Government should not maintain separate Catholic 
schools, and (with a slightly different range of options to the same question), 40% in 
1999 believing that the Government '"Defmitely should not": 
109 On the academic achievements of Scottish Catholic schools see L.Paterson (2000a) 
110 Bennie el 01 (1997: III); Finn (2000:76) 
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GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN SEPARATE CATHOLIC SCHOOLS?: 
% by column 1974 1979 1999 
Very important they should 9 10 Definitely should 6 
Fairly important they should 11 7 Probably should 11 
Doesn't matter 25 20 No matter either way 13 
Fairly important they should not 16 26 Probably should not 27 
Very important they should not 33 34 Definitely should not 40 
Don't know 7 3 Don't know 1 
Base 928 667 Base 1-I8J 
Whilst a logistic regression analysis on the 1999 data finds being Catholic, all other 
factors being held constant, is the only significant predictor of believing that the 
Government definitely or probably should maintain separate Catholic schoolsll', 
there are significant numbers of Catholics who oppose the present system: 
GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN SEPARATE CATHOLIC SCHOOLS?, 1999: 
% by column ALL Catholic Church of No Other 
Scotland Religion religion 
Definitely should 6 25 5 2 3 
Probably should 1 1 23 10 10 11 
No matter either way 13 10 10 16 16 
Probably should not 27 19 28 28 28 
Definitely should not 40 23 46 43 40 
Don't know 1 1 1 1 3 
Base 1482 201 521 594 162 
On this question Catholic respondents in 1999 split 48% - 42% on whether or not 
present policy should continue: broadly similar to the results on the question of 
phasing out. As many Catholics believe that the Government "definitely should" 
maintain Catholic schools as believe that they "definitely should not". In the 1974 
and 1997 data there were no differences in opinion between those Catholics who 
were parents of school age children and other Catholics, suggesting that there is no 
parent/non-parent split in opinion. Claims that "most informed research points 
towards an overwhelming support for [Catholic] schools amongst Catholics, 
111 See Appendix 2. 
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particularly amongst their church-going sector"l12, are not substantiated here. 
Catholic opposition to Catholic schools is well-documented. One 1994 poll found 
that 60% of Catholic Scots felt that "Catholic and Protestant children should go to 
the same schools" I 13 • In 1978 a Church-commissioned poll described "overwhelming 
practical support for Catholic schools wherever they are available", although "a 
sizeable minority [of Catholics] thought that Catholic schools should not 
continue" 114. The issue of 'practical support' has been an important one for the 
Church, with regular claims that Catholics 'vote with their feet' in support of 
Catholic schools 115. 
Finn describes Catholic opposition to the present system as "the biggest cross-
generation Catholic cringe", directly attributable to anti-Catholic prejudice l16• This 
seems to deny the presence of a secular critique of denominational schools, and may 
imply that Catholic opponents of Catholic schools are deficient in their Catholicism 
(real Catholics support their schools); and that the 1918 settlement is beyond 
reasonable criticism. Are those who question the educational status quo anti-Catholic 
bigots or weak Catholics? Is there evidence that such opposition is related to other 
questions relating to sectarianism? Strong connections between the schools issue and 
opinion on Northern Ireland and religious conflict would suggest that this issue was a 
strongly 'sectarian' one. But are there such connections? 
THE ABSENCE OF SECTARIAN CONNECTIONS 
Regardless of views on religious conflict in 1999, a clear majority of respondents 
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GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN SEPARATE CATHOLIC SCHOOLS, A!\D 
PERCEPTION OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT, 1999: 
% by column Perception of religious conflict in Scotland 
Government maintain ALL Very Fairly Not very There is 
Catholic schools? senous senous senous no conflict 
Definitely should 6 5 7 6 9 
Probably should 11 10 10 13 13 
No matter either way 13 8 12 15 18 
Probably should not 27 26 27 28 22 
Definitely should not 40 52 42 37 36 
Don't know 1 2 1 2 
Base 1482 223 526 590 11] 
We also find that opposition to the present system is highest amongst those who 
believe that religious conflict in Scotland is very serious - 52% of this group believe 
the Government 'definitely' should not maintain separate Catholic schools, 
compared to 36% of those who believe there is no conflict. But it must be stressed 
that even amongst those who believe there is no religious conflict, a majority (581%) 
believe that the Government should not maintain Catholic schools. A logistic 
regression analysis of the 1999 data confirms this conclusion. On the question of 
whether or not the Government should not maintain separate Catholic schools, 
believing that religious conflict was very serious proved to be the only significant 
positive predictor1l7• Whilst being Catholic was a significant negative predictor, 
being Presbyterian or non-religious was of no predictive significance. In other words, 
being Catholic, other factors being equal, is a significant predictor of supporting 
Catholic schools, and believing in serious religious conflict is a significant predictor 
of opposing them. There is no symmetry on the issue - being non-Catholic, or 
believing there is no conflict, are not significant predictors in supporting or opposing 
Catholic schools. However, perceptions of conflict are not a decisive factor in 
determining opposition to Catholic schools, except. perhaps, amongst Catholics 
themselves. Amongst Catholics there is a strong relationship between the two issues: 
50% of those Catholics perceiving conflict as very/fairly serious oppose continued 
support for separate schools compared to 32% who see conflict as less serious or non 
117 See Appendix 2. 
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existent. This suggests that Catholics themselyes may see the existcnce of scpar3te 
schools as connected to religious conflict: 
CA THOLICS, RELIGIOUS CO:\FLICT A:,,\D CATHOLIC SCHOOLS, 1999: 
Government maintain All Very/fairly :"\ ot Ycry 
Catholic schools? Catholics senous senous no 
% by column conflict conflict 
Definitely should 25 20 31 
Probably should 23 20 26 
No matter either way 10 10 11 
Probably should not 19 25 11 
Definitely should not 23 ,--) 21 
Don't know 1 I -
Base 201 112 85 
Neither do we find strong connections \\·ith attitudes towards \:orthern Ireland. In 
1997 a large majority favoured the phasing out of scparate schools rcgardless of 
views on Northern Ireland: 
POSITION ON NORTHERN IREL:\ND, :\~D :\ TTITUDI·:S TO C.\ n 10l.lC 
SCHOOLS, 1997: 
% hy column Remain Reunil\ Other Don't 
ALL in UK In~land option kno\\ 
Retain separate schools 20 2.+ 18 17 It) 
Phase out 77 76 79 76 7.+ 
Don't know '"' * I 6 6 -) -
Ii ust' 88': 
1-1 .f':() 6': 1':-1 
In \l)l)2, no differcnccs \\crc found when attitudes to schools \\cre comparcd to thc 
preferred policy, and the importance attached to thc prefercnce, on ;\orthern IrelanJ. 
I n other \\ords, those \\ ho felt that a united Ireland \\ as \cry important wcre ju-...t as 
likely to belieye that Catholic schools should be phased out. and just as un\il-..cl~ to 
t~l\our their retention, as those \\ho regarded continued union as \cry impl)rtant 
S..., 
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CO:\CLLSIO:\ 
Scotland, then, has undergone rapid and far-reaching secularisation in the latt~r h~llf 
of the twentieth century. In this. Scotland has shared the experienc~ of th~ r~st l1f 
Britain and other comparable societies. :\orthern Ireland. on the other hand. has 
proved exceptionally resistant to secularisation. This is only the first point of 
departure between Scotland and Northern Ireland. On issues c~ntral to the debatc 
over religious conflict in Scotland - 1\'0rthern Ireland and Catholic schools - w~ find 
that religion resonates more weakly than is often claimed. Opposition to s~paratc 
Catholic schools is widespread. including a significant minority of the most-
frequently attending Catholic churchgoers, and this opposition is only weakly 
connected to concern about religious conflict in Scottish society. Scotland is not 
religiously divided over Northern Ireland. Indeed being Prcshytcrian. other factors 
being equal, is a significant predictor of not supporting the continued union of 
Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Neither do Catholics ha\"c a monopoly on 
support for Irish reunification. although they are the group most I ikely to lay most 
importance upon it. None of this fits particularly \\"ell \\ith the Scottish myth of 
sectarianism, but it does fit rather \\ell with the picture of a largely secular Scotland 
with which this chapter began. We find a Scotland sitting uneasily \\ ith its sel\"-
perception as a society bedevilled with religious conflict. 
\.'~ 
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Religion and Politics in Contemporary Scotland 
CHAPTER THREE: 
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY SCOTLAND 
This chapter broadens the analysis of religion's place in Scottish political attitudes. 
In terms of voting, it seems clear that religious affiliation does playa significant role 
in party choice, but it is equally clear that Scotland is by no means unique in this. 
This chapter investigates whether Protestants, Catholics, and the irreligious differ in 
their attitudes towards some of the defining questions of contemporary Scottish 
politics. These issues can be summarised: the decline of the Conservative Party: the 
emergence of the Scottish National Party; increasing Scottish "national sentiment'; 
and the Constitutional Question. These issues have dominated Scottish politics since 
the late 1960s, and it is likely that they will continue to do so for the foreseeable 
future. To what extent has religious affiliation impacted on these issues? In 
particular, can we substantiate claims that Scotland's Catholics have remained cool 
towards Constitutional change, the SNP, and a sense of their Scottishness? 
RELIGION AND THE VOTE 
In an important study of Scottish politics, Kellas noted that: 
There is considerable acceptance of the view that religion or quasi-religion 
divides Scots in parts of Scotland along Catholic-Labour and Protestant-
Conservative lines .... Although no survey work has yet been done, it is 
widely believed by observers that certain constituencies are strongly affected 
by Orange and Green conflicts, which distort · normal' class voting 
behaviour. 
Kellas urged caution, noting that "the disunity which such religious cleavages bring 
about should not be exaggerated"l. However, a simplistic association between 
religion and politics percolates into academic research. Finding that half of his 
sample of Church of Scotland attenders favoured the then constitutional status quo 
(Scottish affairs to be dealt with at Westminster); three quarters viewed the 
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Church of Scotland attenders are perceptibly unionist. The evidence does not 
differentiate between a unionism emphasising Royalty, the Northern Ireland 
connection, 'class' oriented politics, or even in terms of the constitutional 
position of Scotland within the United Kingdom. It does stress the links 
between factors which in other social settings are considered to be ... 
characteristics of a strong 'Protestant' identity... the Conservative 
identification of many members of the Church of Scotland is not simply 
related to class but is rather an aspect of a broader Protestant identity.:! 
Ignoring his own finding that Conservatism is a minority taste amongst 
Presbyterians, Bradley characterises a 'strong 'Protestant' identity' in Scotland that. 
but for the absence of Orange sash, stands as an exact description of Ulster 
Unionism. We have already seen that Presbyterian support for a unionist position in 
Northern Ireland is far weaker than Bradley suggests, and it might be noted that in 
the 1992 Election Survey, only 11 % of Conservative-voting Presbyterians believed 
continued union between Britain and Northern Ireland was 'very important'. Almost 
as many Presbyterian-Conservatives (8%) viewed Irish reunification as 'very 
important' . 
These initial comments serve only to highlight the need for precision in investigating 
the links between religion and politics. Religion is not an inconsequential factor in 
Scottish elections, remaining a significant predictor of the way in which one 
particular religious group vote. In their analysis of the 1997 Scottish and British 
Election Surveys, Brown et al found that being Catholic was a significant predictor 
of voting behaviour independent of other variables such as age, gender or class. 
Being Protestant or non-religious, on the other hand, was not found to have any 
significant effect. Scottish Catholics were more likely to vote Labour than can be 
explained solely in terms of their socio-economic position, and were (to a weaker 
degree) less likely than non-Catholics to vote for the SNP. A similar Labour-Catholic 
relationship holds true in the rest of Britain3. However, the absence of symmetry 
must be stressed - it is amongst Catholics that religion appears to have an electoral 
significance, not amongst Presbyterians or the non-religious. 
2 Bradley (1995e: 124). Bruce (1999:3) describes Bradley's sample as "informally 
constructed" . 
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Crewe et al summarise the overall trends of the British Llection Studies hi~hli{!htin~ 
~ ~ ~ 
that connections between religion and voting is by no means an exc1usi\"ely Scottish 
phenomenon: 
RELIGION AND VOTING IN BRITAI);, 1964-924: 
% by column Anglicans Catholics 1\0 religion 
1964: 
Conservative 40 26 
Labour 47 65 
Other 13 9 
Base 1120 120 
1974 (Oct.): 
Conservative 44 26 30 
Labour 35 60 51 
Other 21 14 19 
Base 819 169 6-11 
1983: 
Conservative 52 34 4~ 
Labour 23 43 30 
Other 25 I" --) ~8 
/JUS£! 1-178 373 7,C) 
1992: 
Conservative 54 "" 40 -) -)
Labour 28 50 38 
Other 18 17 II 
Base 1006 l-l5 ~..,--
Neither are such differences limited to Britain. Some 56° ° of l'S Catholics bnlllreJ 
the Democrat presidential candidate in 195~ compared to 3 7°~) of Protcst~I1h: in 
1996 the proportions were 55~/o-44~o5. Lapp argues that the "religious dea\ agl'" in 
Canadian voting remains "'quite vital ... the 1997 Canadian l-:Iection Study, like its 
precursors, found Catholics significantly more likely than Protestants to \nte I. ihl'raL 
other factors being equal'·('. It is necessary. therefore. to \ie\\ the rok of Catholicism 
in electoral politics as something that Scptland shares \\ith other countries. rather 
than something that Sl'ts it apart. 
---~----- -----
:\. Bwwn l'I (II (I (N\) (IS-70) 
('r~'\\ c: el al (I \)l):,) 
Scc 'Religion and \ l)tc: in liS PrcsiJc:nliall kctll)Il'>·. \\ W\' .gallup.cl)11l . ~ 
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In the last UK general election in Scotland a differential pattern of religious voting 
was apparent although it should be stressed that Labour proved the best supported 
party in all groups. Amongst those who voted, three quarters of Catholics, over half 
the non-religious, and almost half of Presbyterians supported Labour: 
SCOTTISH VOTE BY DENOMINATION UK GENERAL ELECTION. 1997: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Conservative 14 19 5 10 
Labour 51 46 76 53 
Liberal Democrat 12 13 4 10 
SNP 19 19 12 23 
Base 694 313 98 198 
There are a number of important points here, not least that a significant minority 
across all groups (14% of Presbyterians; 22% of Catholics; 27% of the non-religious) 
did not vote. Variations in this respect are related to the age profile of the religious 
groups; the Church of Scotland sample containing a larger proportion of older 
people, a group more likely to vote than younger age groups7. The level of non-
voting alerts us to the fact that this is only one measure of political behaviour. and 
one in which a significant minority do not involve themselves. With this important 
caveat in mind we can now turn to some of the interesting relationships in the table. 
Conservatives find themselves a very poor third behind Labour and Nationalist 
amongst Catholics and the non-religious, and amongst the Church of Scotland and 
'other religion' groups (the latter composed largely of Protestants8) gamer about the 
same amount of support as the SNP. Protestant support for the Conservatives may be 
higher than amongst other groups, but we find only 19% of Church of Scotland 
voting Conservative: this hardly suggests that Protestant Conservatism remains a 
potent force in the Scottish electoral equation. It should be recalled that Brown el al 
6 Lapp (1999:28.1) 
7 Some 53% of the CoS sample were aged 55+ compared to 360 0 of the sample ovC'rall and 
34% of Catholics. The age profile is partly due to a higher 'drop out' rate amongst ~ ounger 
respondents from a Protestant background: the non-religious are disproportionately ~ oung, and 
disproportionately from a Protestant family background, further evidence that secularisation has gone 
further and deeper amongst Scottish Protestants. 
8 See Appendix I. 
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did not find that being Protestant was a useful explanatory variable for voting 
Conservative (or for any other party). In other words, the relatively high 
Conservative vote amongst the Church of Scotland sample in 1997 is explained by 
its demographic rather than its religious profile. We also fmd that 760/0 of Catholic 
voters supported Labour, a degree of support which sets Catholics apart. and which 
Brown et al found could not be explained solely through the demographic character 
of the sample. In the first Holyrood election the religious differential is also apparent, 
although there are some differences. The SNP vote rose across all religious groups at 
the expense of Labour, although Labour voting remains remarkably high, and SNP 
voting relatively low, amongst Catholics: 
SCOTTISH VOTE BY DENOMINATION, HOLYROOD ELECTION. 1999: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Conservative 16 24 3 12 
Labour 38 33 60 38 
Liberal Democrat 15 17 8 13 
SNP 28 25 20 35 
Other 2 2 8 2 
Base 1045 397 J.l7 381 
Before investigating the ways in which the connections between politics and 
religious affiliation cast doubt on a 'sectarian' analysis of Scotland, it is necessary to 
delineate how reliant the different parties have been over the last thirty years on each 
religious constituency. For example, Labour polls remarkably well amongst 
Catholics, but Catholics make up only a quarter of Labour voters. Conversely, whilst 
we cannot argue that Protestants are Conservative, we can say that Scottish 
Conservatives are largely Protestant9. The following tables show the Scottish vote 
broken down by denomination in the 1974 and 1997 general elections in Scotland: 
9 The 'other religion' group is largely made up of Protestants of various denominational hues. 
See Appendix 1. 
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scornSH PARTY VOTE BY DENOMINA nON, 1974: 
% by column All sample Conservative Labour Liberal SNP 
Church of Scotland 45 56 38 54 49 
Catholic 12 5 24 3 5 
Other religion 16 23 10 19 16 
No religion 26 16 28 24 29 
Base 1187 252 38/ 78 283 
SCOTTISH PARTY VOTE BY DENOMINATION, 1997: 
% by column All sample Conservative Labour Lib-Dem SNP 
Church of Scotland 42 60 40 49 46 
Catholic 15 5 21 5 9 
Other religion 13 16 10 22 11 
No religion 31 19 29 24 34 
Base 871 99 356 85 132 
The Conservatives remain reliant upon Protestant support, with around three-quarters 
of their vote in 1974 and 1997 drawn from the non-Catholic religious groups, and are 
under-represented amongst Catholics and the non-religious. The Liberal Democrats, 
(and 1974 Liberals) also rely on Protestants, though less markedly so. The 
denominational profiles of Labour and SNP voters, on the other hand, has been 
closer to that of the population overall, with the exception that the Catholic presence 
amongst Labour voters is disproportionately strong, and amongst SNP voters is 
disproportionately weak. What is remarkable about these two tables is their striking 
similarity. Shifts in party fortunes have only marginally affected the denominational 
composition of each party's vote suggesting that these shifts have cut across religious 
boundaries. There is little evidence here that Conservative decline has meant that the 
party now relies on a core support which is any more Protestant than the 1970s. This 
relationship between Protestantism and Conservatism requires further examination. 
For Kellas, the presence of a substantial Catholic (and Labour-voting) population in 
certain constituencies in the west of Scotland ~~has affected the political behaviour of 
working-class Protestants" to the benefit of the Conservatives
lO
• Such a view requires 
to be approached cautiously. In the mid 1960s, Budge & Urwin argued that one 
10 Kellas (1989: 110) 
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might expect religion to be important to Scottish voting patterns ·"because of the 
[religious] division which appears in ... English voting studies": 
Those studies carried out in the Lancashire area find significant correlations 
between religion and voting, whilst those conducted in southern England 
show no correlation. Since Lancashire is an area which is in many respects 
more similar to Scotland than is southern England, we might find a similar 
correlation among Scottish electors. I 1 
Budge & Urwin reported strong correlations between religion and voting in 
Glasgow's Cathcart and Govanhill: "Catholics vote disproportionately for the Labour 
Party, while among Protestants there is a less marked tendency to support the 
Unionists". However, they also found that: 
It is only among Protestant voters that class relates strongly to political 
choice, due to the overwhelming preference of the middle class for the 
Unionists ... For Scottish Catholics religion appears as a more powerful 
influence. 12 
It should be noted, however, that Budge & Urwin's study relied upon small sample 
sizes and it is difficult to generalise their findings further I3• 
More recently, in examining the decline of Scottish Conservatism, Seawright & 
Curtice have argued that Conservatism has not suffered from a 'dealignment' of 
religion and voting in contemporary Scotland. Rather, they argue that "'The 
Conservatives appear, if anything, to be more of a Protestant party now than they 
were in the 1950s; they are just no longer a successful one"14. This conclusion, 
however, is based upon a comparison between only those Protestants and Catholics 
who vote either Labour or Conservative. If we use a different measure from 
Seawright & Curtice's own data we find that 890/0 of Conservative voters in 1959 
were Protestant compared to 79% in 199215. In terms of reliance on any given 
religious constituency it is difficult to argue that the Conservatives were more 
II Budge & Urwin (1966:60) 
12 Budge & Urwin (1966:61) 
13 For example, in terms of Catholic and Protestant voters. their Cathcart sample numbered 133. 
and their 'Scottish national sample' 67. 
14 Seawright & Curtice (1995 :327) 
" Their data for 1959 was dependent on recalled vote in a 1963 Gallup poll. 
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'Protestant' in the late 1990s than in the late 1950s. However, this supports the 
general point that Seawright & Curtice wish to make. The Conservatives have not 
suffered unduly from a de-coupling of religion and politics in recent decades. 
Conservative decline has cut across religious boundaries: "Conservatism may no 
longer dominate the affection of Protestants but Protestantism remains an important 
social base for the Conservative party"16. The nuances of this point have been lost on 
some commentators: Seawright & Curtice are not arguing, as has been claimed, that 
"Conservative Unionism is as strong as ever amongst Protestants in Scotland,,17. 
How far can Conservative voting amongst Scottish Presbyterians be explained by 
demographic rather than religious factors? In 1974 the Conservative vote amongst 
the entire sample stood at 25%, amongst Presbyterians 30% and Catholics 11 %. How 
far can this be attributed to variations between the samples in terms of age, class, 
gender etc. and how far to religion? Using a logistic regression analysis on 
Conservative voting in the 1974 data supports the view of Budge & Urwin noted 
above. Other factors held constant, being Catholic or non-religious had a significant 
negative effect, while being Presbyterian had no significant effect either way. In 
other words, being Catholic or non-religious, regardless of age, class or class identity 
was a strong predictor of not voting Conservative in 1974. Being Presbyterian, on its 
own, had no significant predictive value on voting, or not voting, for the 
Conservatives l8• To some extent this relates to the differential impact of 
secularisation on different religious denominations. The Presbyterian samples in the 
election surveys tend to be older and more middle class than the Catholic and non-
religious samples, largely because secularisation has impacted very heavily upon 
young working class persons of a Presbyterian background. In other words, a young 
person from a Protestant background is more likely to describe themselves as being 
of 'no religion' than a young person from a Catholic background
l9
. 
16 Seawright & Curtice (1995:331) 
17 Bradley (1997:29) 
18 Full details in Appendix 2 
19 In the 1992 sample, 21 % of those who described their family background as Church of 
Scotland described themselves as being of 'no religion' compared to 11% of those describing their 
background as Catholic. The non-religious sample was disproportionately young and male. 
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Another factor militating against a simple reading of the relationship between 
religion and the vote is the issue of tactical voting. Many Scots in the 1980s and 
1990s voted against Conservative candidates, with Conservatism: 
victim of a tendency by Scottish voters to see the non-Conservative parties as 
inter-changeable: people who do not want the Conservative candidate to \\in 
... are willing to switch to the best placed challenger. That has been most 
obvious in by-elections ... But there is evidence that this anti-Conservative 
voting happened even in general elections?O 
Before examining the development of anti-Conservatism in Scotland in further detail 
(and beyond the confines of the vote) the flip-side of 'Protestant-Conservatism' - the 
received wisdom on Catholics and 'Scotland' - needs close examination. 
CATHOLICS AND SCOTTISH POLITICS: THE RECEIVED WISDOM 
Tactical voting brings into question the orthodox view that Scottish Catholics have 
maintained their Labour loyalties through mistrust of other parties. That Catholics 
have been relatively unlikely to vote for the SNP has been taken as evidence of the 
unpopularity of the party amongst Scotland's Catholics. Further, it is said to reveal a 
relatively low level of Scottish sentiment amongst Catholics, and fears of what 
constitutional change might entail. Examination of this issue is crucial to the political 
position of Catholics in modern Scotland. Should we find that this received wisdom 
is accurate, there would be strong grounds for suspecting that religious divisions are 
an important factor in modern Scottish politics. After all, the rise of the SNP, the 
demand for constitutional change, and the emergence of a strong and politicised 
sense of Scottish identity are key markers of Scotland's political landscape since 
c.1960. If Scotland's Catholics have not shared in these crucial phenomena then we 
need to explain it. 
In the 1 970s, noting the low Catholic SNP vote, Brand argued that: 
If we are to identify support for the SNP we would not expect to find it in 
strength amongst Catholics. We would expect Scottish sentiment to exist in 
20 A.Browneta/(1998:153) 
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the Church of Scotland since this institution bears much of the tradition of 
Scotland ... 21 
As well as this equation of 'Scottish sentiment' with Presbyterianism, Brand suggests 
that Catholicism's "universalistic tradition" mixed with suspicion that an 
independent Scotland might be "a more intransigently Protestant Scotland. The 
experience of Ulster would alienate Catholics from this solution,,22. This has become 
the orthodox explanation of the seeming reluctance of Scotland's Catholics not 
simply to vote for the SNP, but also to support constitutional change or to embrace a 
Scottish identity. For Walker, the political emergence of the SNP "was identified as a 
Protestant phenomenon by Catholics who largely steered clear, fearful of a Stormont-
style Parliament in Edinburgh. In the 1979 devolution referendum this was one factor 
in the substantial 'No' vote,,23. Likewise, Gallagher has argued that: 
in the last 200 years we have had the paradox that it has tended to be Orange 
and Catholic members of the working-class who are most willing to support 
the unionist status-quo, who are most opposed to devolution. It is too much of 
a leap into the unknown for Catholics, and a betrayal of the Unionist heritage 
for Protestants.24 
A number of authors have also noted a Catholic perception that the SNP remains a 
broadly 'Protestant' party. Gallagher claims that ''the body language of the otherwise 
blameless SNP contains a whiff of the Presbyterian superiority that was often to be 
found in some of the worst detractors of the Catholic community before the war,,25. 
Boy Ie reported "a strong perception of the SNP as being a party with links with 
Orangeism and Protestantism" amongst Celtic supporters. One young interviewee 
commented: "I definitely think the identity of Scotland is to be Protestant and that is 
what they (the SNP) are trying to achieve ... I couldn't vote for them,,26. In his 1999 
speech, James MacMillan claimed that "it is usually the SNP who have played the 







Brand (1978: 130) - emphasis added. 
Brand (1978: 130) 
G. Walker (2000: 127) 
Tom Gallagher, Two Tales ola City, BBe Radio 5 Live, 24112/95 
Gallagher (1991 :39) 
Boyle (1994:90). Such perceptions were strongest among those fans aged under 25. 
MacMillan (2000a:21). His evidence was somewhat anecdotal. 
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The SNP have proved sensitive to Catholic feeling in recent years, particularly after 
the Monklands East by-election in 1994, during which one newspaper accused the 
party of 'taWdry' campaigning, an accusation subsequently withdrawn with full 
editorial apology28. One leading Nationalist felt obliged to complain: 
[We are] aware of the ability of other forces to stir up anxiety about our 
message in the Catholic community. We are conscious of an element of 
smear that has been labelled against the SNP. We want to display our 
credentials as the party of all of Scotland.29 
Here the party seems to have been successful with a reduced gap between support for 
the SNP amongst Catholics and non-Catholics. A Church statement prior to the 1999 
election seemed warm to the Nationalist social-democratic policies 'New' Labour 
was thought to be abandoning, and was interpreted as a clerical warning that Catholic 
support for Labour remained conditional 30. Gallagher has discerned a "swing to 
nationalism among Catholics", and that: "The [Catholic] fear that, in the absence of a 
British safety-net, a Scottish state might reproduce some of the ugly features of a 
self-governing Northern Ireland seems to have receded,,31. This is a view shared by 
Curtice, who in 1994 argued that: "One of the big differences between SNP support 
now and in the 1970s is that the party has managed to overcome Catholic fears that 
an independent Scotland would be a Protestant Scotland,,32. For Seawright & Curtice 
this shift is a key one in Scottish politics: 
In so far as there has been any religious dealignment in Scotland in recent 
years it has been in the apparent crumbling of traditional Catholic hostility to 
the SNP, an indication of the threat that the Nationalists now pose in 
Labour's traditional heartland.33 
How can we explain this remarkable change in Catholic attitudes? Gallagher argues 





Thanks in no measure to the long-term occupant of Downing Street. ordinary 
people from an Irish Catholic background find the composite Scottish image 
Herald, 01 & 02/07/94 
John Swinney, Herald. 24/09/94 
The statement was issued four days before the election. Herald. 03/05/99 
Gallagher (2000:43) 
SoS. 26/06/94 
Seawright & Curtice (1995:330) 
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more appealing than at any time perhaps in the past 200 years. Suddenly, the 
Scots have been revealed to them divested of their imperialist, military and 
ultra-Calvinist livery and as people thinking and acting like underdogs - an 
increasingly vulnerable minority in a state fuelled by an aggressively 
competitive culture that threatens to rob them not only of their national 
identity but their material prospects. 34 
This has been the orthodox view in recent years: until some point in the 1980s the 
Catholic relationship with the SNP, with constitutional change, and with Scottish 
identity, was an uneasy one. Such an orthodoxy fits well the notion that religious 
divisions were, until relatively recently, of considerable significance in Scottish 
politics. There is, however, a problem: this orthodoxy is challenged at every point 
by the Scottish Election Surveys. 
CATHOLICS AND THE SNP: A REVISION 
The orthodox view of Scottish Catholic difficulties with constitutional change and 
Scottishness is largely based upon evidence (not disputed here) that Catholics were, 
and to some extent still are, less likely to vote for the SNP. For Hickman "Many 
[Scottish Catholics] would fear an SNP victory as it could give expression to the 
anti-Catholicism and anti-Irishness with which Scottish nationalism has long been 
associated,,35. From such a view, non-SNP voting amongst Catholics is only to be 
expected. However, many commentators offer little evidence for a Catholic fear of 
constitutional change beyond lack of support for the SNP. The indisputable evidence 
of one phenomenon (low Catholic SNP-voting) is assumed to be a consequence of, 
and evidence for, other phenomena. Brand el ai, convincingly demonstrating that 
being Catholic (other things remaining equal) was an influential variable in 
predicting a Labour rather than SNP vote in 1992, continued: "This finding supports 
commentators' claims regarding the traditional support of the Catholic community 
for the Labour Party and the 'fear' of the Nationalists among Catholics,,36. 
The vote, however, is only one measure of political sympathies: under a majoritarian 
system with evidence of tactical voting it may in fact be a poor one. What is striking 
34 
36 
Gallagher (1991 :38-9) 
Hickman ( 1995 :218) 
Brand et al (1993: 1 54) 
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about the evidence of the Election Studies is that on a whole range of attitudinal 
questions in the period 1974-99, Scottish Catholics have not shown any marked 
antipathy towards the SNP. 
In 1974,24% of Labour voters said they had ''thought of [voting for] another party" 
during the election campaign, and most of these (18%) had considered the SNP. 
There was no statistically significant variation across religion. Catholic Labour 
voters were just as (un)likely to have considered supporting the SNP in 1974 as non-
Catholic Labour voters. Amongst Catholic Labour voters, 48% in 1992, and 530/0 in 
1997, named the SNP as their second choice party. Catholics as a whole are more 
likely to name the SNP as their second choice party, in part a reflection of the high 
levels of 'first choice' loyalty to Labour37. Given respondents were free to answer 
that they had no second choice party, it seems remarkable that a religious group 
which has been characterised as antipathetic towards the Nationalists should be so 
likely to name them as their second choice party. There is further evidence that 
Catholic antipathy has been grossly inflated. 
The surveys have asked whether respondents are in favour or against the parties. 
Again the received wisdom is clearly undermined. Whilst the optional answers differ 
somewhat, it is clear that Catholics were not markedly hostile to the SNP in either 
1979 or 1999: 
FEELINGS ABOUT THE SNP, 1979 & 1999: 
1979 1999 
% by column CoS Cath NR CoS Cath NR 
Strongly in favour 13 8 15 Strongly in favour 11 9 16 
Mildly in favour 28 32 35 In favour 25 31 30 
Neither 26 30 26 
Mildly against 25 25 19 Against 24 19 17 
Strongly against 34 35 31 Strongly Against 14 10 I 1 
Don't Know/n.a 2 2 1 
Base 300 84 196 Base 
5]1 201 594 
)7 Amongst Catholics as a whole (including non-voters), 320 0 named the SNP as their second-
choice in 1997, compared to 27% of the sample overall. In 1992 the proportions were 28% compared 
to 22% overall. 
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There is little here to commend the thesis that Catholics were particularly opposed to 
the SNP prior to the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. To gauge the influence 
of underlying variables such as gender and age, a logistic regression analysis was 
used on the 1999 data to discern which variables proved significant in predicting a 
response of 'against' or 'strongly against' the SNP. Age proved a significant 
predictor of opposing the SNP, as did being in a non-manual occupation or regarding 
oneself as middle-class. Religion, on the other hand, had no significant value. 
Catholics, as Catholics, are no more or less likely to oppose the SNP than other 
religious groups38. 
In 1979 (before, as the received wisdom would have it, Catholic antipathy and 
suspicion began to dissipate) respondents were asked whether they trusted the 
political parties in several policy areas39. There were statistically significant religious 
variations on all three questions with regard to the Conservatives, but none regarding 
either Labour or the SNP - Catholics were just as likely to trust, or distrust, the 
Nationalists as non-Catholics in 1979. Crucially, the survey also asked whether 
respondents felt that they could trust a Nationalist government in an independent 
Scotland: 16% felt that in such a scenario the Nationalists could "usually" be trusted; 
41 % "some of the time"; and 43% "rarely". Whilst this question does reveal a 
reservoir of mistrust there were no significant differences between religious groups -
Catholics were no more or less suspicious of an SNP government than non-
Catholics. Likewise, there were no significant religious differences over the question 
of whether or not the SNP had "been good for Scotland',4(). Once again the evidence 
would suggest that Catholics in the 1970s were no more or less likely to mistrust the 
Nationalists than their fellow Scots. 
How. then, are we to explain the persistent belief that Catholics were. and to some 
extent still are, antipathetic towards the SNP? Much of it can be ascribed to 
sensitivity towards the 'Scottish equation'. described in Chapter One, reading 
· Protestant = Scottish, Catholic = alien'. I f one accepts that the Scottish equation 
38 
39 
See Appendix 2. 
These were: the economy: Scottish affairs: the preservation of democracy. 
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holds force, or at least did so until fairly recently, then one might easily assume that 
Catholics would not be drawn towards Scottish Nationalism. Less contentiously, if 
one assumes that Protestantism is a key variable in the construction of Scottish 
identity, and that the SNP are a politicised expression of that identity. then one might 
conclude that Catholics would find the SNP less attractive than non-Catholics. Such 
conclusions are supported, superficially at least, by the relatively low SNP vote 
amongst Catholics. They are also supported by research amongst Celtic supporters. 
amongst whom there seems to be a perception that the SNP are a . Protestant' 
entity41. There is much here that can be criticised, not least that national identity is 
more malleable than such positions imply, and that national identities and political 
behaviour do not so neatly intersect. These points will be returned to. Before doing 
so, it is worthwhile noting that another party, to whom Catholics were. and are. 
undeniably hostile, received little electoral support from Scotland's Catholics. 
ANTI-CONSERVATISM IN CONTEMPORARY SCOTLAND 
The evidence revealing the lack of Catholic hostility toward the SNP also illustrates 
the growth of anti-Conservative feeling over the last 25 years. In 1974 respondents 
were asked whether they trusted the two main parties - whilst Presbyterian trust was 
invested equally in Labour and Conservative, Catholics and the non-religious were 
rather more trusting of Labour, and less so of the Conservatives: 
POLITICAL TRUST, 1974: 
% by column Trust Conservatives? Trust Labour? 
CoS Cath NR CoS Cath NR 
Usually 18 12 11 18 33 20 
Some of the time 57 46 56 59 53 56 
Rarely 22 34 30 20 8 20 
Don't know/n.a 3 8 3 3 6 3 
Base 530 137 304 530 
/37 304 
The position in 1974 should not be overstated: only a third of Catholics and the non-
religious claimed that they "rarely" trusted the Conservatives. It is noticeable. 
however. that the same proportion of Catholics "usually" trusted Labour as "rarely" 
40 55% said the SNP had been good for Scotland. 450 0 that they had not. 
41 E.g.: Boyle (1994 & 1995). 
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trusted the Conservatives. These results might be compared to a more specific 1999 
question on whether the political parties could be trusted to "work in Scotland's 
interests": 
TRUST TO WORK IN SCOTLAND'S INTERESTS?, 1999: 
% by column Trust Trust Trust Trust Liberal 
Conservati ves Labour SNP Democrats 
Just about always 3 8 24 5 
Most of the time 15 43 33 33 
Only some of the time 37 38 24 43 
Almost never 42 8 14 1 1 
Don't know/n.a 3 3 5 9 
Base 1482 1482 148] 148] 
Quite clearly the Conservatives were widely mistrusted on Scottish issues in late-
1990s Scotland. How did this play amongst the different religious groups? Firstly it 
is clear that even amongst the Church of Scotland sample - that constituency 
described by Bradley as "perceptibly unionist',42 - less than one-quarter trust the 
Conservatives to work in Scotland's interests 'always' or 'most of the time'. There 
are very high levels of mistrust across all three religious groups, but it is particularly 
strong (89%) amongst Catholics: 
TRUST CONSERVATIVES TO WORK IN SCOTLAND'S INTERESTS?, 1999: 
% by column Church of No 
Scotland Catholic religion 
Just about always 3 1 2 
Most of the time 19 8 11 
Only some of the time 36 31 38 
Almost never 39 58 45 
Don't know/n.a 4 2 4 
Base 521 201 594 
Attitudes towards the Conservatives cannot be properly judged without examination 
of the trust invested in the other parties43 . As far as Labour is concerned, opinion 
within the Presbyterian and non-religious groups is fairly evenly balanced between 
those who trust them to work in Scotland's interests always or most of time. and 
those who only trust them some of the time or almost never. Catholics, on the other 
Bradley (1995e: 124) 
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hand, are much more likely to invest their political trust in Labour, with 60% trusting 
them always or most of the time. In terms of the SNP, both Catholics and 
Presbyterians are fairly evenly balanced, whilst the non-religious are just as likely to 
invest trust in the Nationalists (64% trusting them always or most of the time) as 
Catholics are in Labour. It might be noted, however, that marginally more Catholics 
"just about always" trust the SNP on Scottish issues (18%) than invest a similar 
degree of trust in Labour (15%): 
TRUST LABOUR AND SNP TO WORK IN SCOTLAND'S INTERESTS? 1999: 
Trust Labour? Trust SNP? 
% by column Church No Church No 
of Catholic religion of Catholic religion 
Scotland Scotland 
Just about always 9 15 5 23 18 27 
Most of the time 41 50 43 30 31 37 
Only some of the time 37 31 41 25 31 21 
Almost never 10 3 8 16 13 12 
Don't know/n.a 3 1 3 5 7 3 
Base 521 201 594 521 ]01 59-1 
Conservative electoral decline can be mapped onto growing levels of mistrust in 
terms of Scotland's interests. In terms of second choice party the Conservatives fare 
poorly. In 1997 only 3% of Catholics and 4% of the non-religious named the 
Conservatives as their second favoured party. Even amongst the Church of Scotland 
group, only 7% named the Conservatives as their second choice. There is clear 
evidence across all religious groups - including, contrary to the received wisdom, 
Catholics - of a close association between SNP and Labour sympathies. In 1997. a 
majority of Labour voters (56%) named the Nationalists as their second choice party; 
and a majority of Nationalist voters (61%) named Labour as their second choice. 
Amongst Conservative voters, 50% name the Liberal Democrats as their second 
choice, but this is not reciprocated - only 18% of Liberal Democrats regard the 
Conservatives as their second choice. 
We can more directly measure the depth of anti-Conservative sentiment amongst 
Scotland's religious groups. In 1997 respondents were asked to what extent they 
4~ There were no significant religious variations with regard to the Liberal Democrats. 
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liked or disliked the major political parties in tenns of a 0-10 scale ranging from 
'strongly dislike' to 'strongly like'. The following table notes those who scored each 
of the three main parties at the extremes of this range, revealing the large proportion 
of Scots who chose the strongest indicator of dislike of the Conservatives. The table 
also shows the mean score on this scale for each party amongst the three religious 
groups, indicating the overall strength of like or dislike shown to each party - lower 
scores indicate high levels of dislike for a party, higher scores indicate warmth: 
HOW THE MAJOR PARTIES ARE VIEWED, 1997: 
Conservatives: 
All sample 




































































It is striking that one third of all Scots regard the Conservatives with the strongest 
possible degree of dislike. There are interesting religious variations, with the 
strongest dislike accounting for almost half of the Catholic sample, and more than 
two-fifths of the non-religious. Dislike of the Conservatives is less evident amongst 
Presbyterians. but even here a significant minority chose the strongest indicator of 
dislike. There is no symmetry between strongly disliking the Conservatives and 
strongly liking the other parties: what unites Scots, regardless of religion. is antipathy 
towards the Conservatives rather than attraction towards one of its rivals. In the table 
above the mean scores highlight the depths of this dislike. Taking' 5' as a neutral 
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point, then the Conservatives fall considerably below that point across all religious 
groups. The SNP score higher than 5 in all groups, although less markedly so than 
Labour. On this measure it is clear that Labour are Scotland's best liked party. with 
the SNP a little behind, and the Conservatives, simply, have accrued to themselves a 
deep reservoir of dislike. Scots are not divided in this regard on the grounds of 
religion. Whilst differences exist between religious groups, they are differences of 
degree rather than of direction. 
To summarise the evidence presented in terms of the Scottish political parties. it can 
be seen that whilst religion does playa significant role in mediating the ways people 
behave in the polling booth, it has a less significant role in terms of attitudes towards 
the parties. The crucial point is that religion does not divide the Scots in party 
political terms. The rise of the SNP and the decline of the Conservatives has 
occurred across the boundaries of religious affiliation. Whilst the over-representation 
of Catholics amongst Labour voters, the non religious amongst SNP voters, and 
Presbyterians amongst Conservative voters is still apparent, it is difficult to sustain 
the argument that these are, in any way, religious (or, in the case of the SNP, 
irreligious) parties. When the focus moves beyond electoral behaviour we find 
nothing to undermine such a view. That religion continues to matter in Scottish party 
politics does not set Scotland apart: evidence of its role in English and North 
American elections was noted above. Once more, comparison with Northern Ireland 
is instructive. In that country, religious affiliation maps closely onto political 
affiliation, and the defining political question (the constitution) is clearly expressed 
as divided between Protestant Unionist and Catholic Nationalist. In Scotland, a 
constitutional question has also been a defining political issue: how does religion 
play here? 
RELIGION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE 1970s 
As noted earlier. the orthodox view has been that Catholic mistrust of the SNP was 
evident in the 1970s. began to crumble over the 1980s, and had been largely 
overcome by the 1990s. That orthodoxy has been shown to be wrong in terms of 
party support, it will now be challenged on the constitutional question. Many 
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accounts have claimed that Scotland's Catholics are suspicious of constitutional 
change because they have worried that a self-governing Scotland might have 
unsavoury parallels with Northern Ireland. Other accounts have stressed the links 
between Protestantism and Scottishness and Britishness, arguing that Protestantism 
informs both support for, and opposition, to constitutional change. 
In 1974 respondents were asked for their preference in terms of the 'governing of 
Scotland' and were offered options ranging between 'Scotland should completely run 
its own affairs' to 'keep much as it has been'. Two thirds chose either that Scotland 
should run its own affairs or that more decisions about Scotland should be made in 
Scotland. There were only small differences between Catholics and Presbyterians, 
with the non-religious most likely to favour the greatest degree of devolved powers. 
The received wisdom about Catholic fears over constitutional change ring rather 
hollow for 1974: 
PREFERENCE ON CONSTITUTION, 197444: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Completely run own affairs 21 19 20 35 
More decisions in Scotland 44 49 42 35 
Scotland should be better understood 26 24 27 28 
Keep much as it has been 8 7 9 6 
Don't know 1 • 2 2 
Base 961 438 111 2-12 
Respondents were also asked for their view of a devolved Scottish Assembly. A 
large majority in all three religious groups, including 790/0 of Catholics, were either 
'very much' or 'somewhat' in favour. That two-fifths of Catholics 'very much' 
favoured an Assembly runs wholly against any notion that Catholics were more 
d .. I h 45 cautious on - never mind oppose to - constltutlOna c ange : 
"'"' The options offered read as: 'Scotland should completely run its own affairs'; . A How more 
decisions to be made in Scotland': 'Make sure the needs of Scotland are better understood h~ the 
Government in London'; 'Keep the governing of Scotland much as it has been' . 
• s The high incidence of missing data in the 1974 sample made a logistic regression analysis on 
this question impractical. 
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VIEW ON SCOITISH ASSEMBLY, 1974: 
%bycolumn Church of No 
Scotland Catholic religion 
Favour very much 39 41 35 
Favour somewhat 41 38 43 
Against somewhat 11 9 11 
Against very much 4 5 5 
Don't know 5 8 6 
Base 436 ill 242 
We can go one step further. It will be recalled that central to the orthodoxy was the 
relatively low electoral support amongst Catholics for the SNP. Respondents were 
asked for their party preference on the question of Scottish Government. Whilst 
Catholic affection for Labour is quite evident, a quarter of Catholics preferred the 
SNP, twice the proportion who said they had voted for the party: 
PARTY PREFERENCE ON SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, 1974: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Conservative 15 18 6 9 
Labour 21 19 45 20 
Liberal 7 8 3 7 
SNP 30 31 25 32 
Don't Know 27 24 23 32 
Base 946 428 110 241 
It might be objected that these figures mask an underlying difference in how 
different religious groups viewed the importance of this question. Might not 
Catholics, because of their ambivalent feelings towards constitutional change, have 
seen this issue as largely irrelevant? There are two problems with such a supposition. 
Firstly, it would undermine the contention that Catholic mistrust of the SNP was, at 
least partly, based on a fear of a 'Scottish Stormont' (a fear that would make the 
question of Scottish government very relevant to Catholics). Secondly, although 
Catholics were less likely to regard the constitutional question as the most important 
issue in the 1974 election, they were no more likely than non-Catholics to regard it as 
unimportant: 
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IMPORTANCE OF SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, 1974: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Most important thing 15 15 9 19 
Fairly important 45 45 49 39 
Not very important 38 39 38 39 
Don't know 3 2 5 3 
Base 956 436 III 2-11 
As early as 1974 Catholics were no more opposed to the SNP or to constitutional 
change than non-Catholics. Indeed, Budge & Urwin found no evidence of religious 
difference on Scottish Home Rule in their 1964 study in Glasgow's Craigton46• The 
question remains, however, as to whether those Catholics opposed to constitutional 
change were motivated by the same concerns as non-Catholic opponents. Might 
Catholic opposition have been centred on fear of the religious impact of an Assembly 
whilst non-Catholics were concerned about more secular disadvantages? Whilst this 
would hardly rescue the orthodox view, it might help to explain it. The 1974 survey 
asked respondents to name some potential disadvantages of an Assembly and, 
although the low response rate on this particular question makes detailed analysis 
difficult47, there is little evidence that Catholics had a different set of concerns than 
non-Catholics. Two concerns stood out clearly: the complexity and cost of the 
Assembly (50% of those who answered this question cited these as the main 
disadvantage of an Assembly), and the risk that devolution would lead to the break 
up of the United Kingdom (cited by 27%). Only one respondent - a non-Catholic -
believed an Assembly might foster '"religious trouble,,48. 
It has been argued that Catholic suspicion of devolution "was one factor in the 
substantial 'No' vote" in the 1979 referendum49• However, the 1979 survey does not 
support this. Catholics seem to have been more favourable to the proposed Assembly 
than Presbyterians: 49% of Catholics said they had voted or favoured -Yes' 
46 Budge & Urwin (1966:127-129). Although their sample size was small (n=186) it does 
suggest that the Catholic view of Constitutional change has been wrongly taken for granted for some 
considerable time. 
47 Only 40% of all respondents. and 31 % of Catholic respondents, answered this question. Very 
few respondents (2%) named more than one disadvantage.. . . 
48 It might be noted that this was named as a 'second dIsadvantage. not as the primary one. 
49 G. Walker (2000: 127). See also Gallagher (1987a:327-8) 
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compared to 41 % of Presbyterians. However, there is also evidence that Catholics 
were less likely to vote in the 1979 referendum - 25% of the sample overall had not 
voted in the poll, a proportion which rose to 36% amongst Catholics: 
DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM, 1979: 
% by column All Church of Catholic No 
sample Scotland religion 
Voted 'Yes' 37 36 37 47 
Did not vote, favoured 'Yes' 6 5 12 5 
All favouring Assembly 43 41 49 52 
Voted 'No' 37 43 28 22 
Did not vote, favoured 'No' 13 11 15 20 
All opposing Assembly 50 54 43 42 
Did not vote, no preference 6 5 9 7 
Base 645 307 87 155 
In considering the 1979 referendum, Gallagher notes: "It is impossible to ascertain to 
what extent working-class Catholics with reservations about devolution turned out to 
vote 'No' or merely stayed at home"so. Whilst the relatively small sample sizes in the 
1979 survey make analysis by class difficult, we can view the extent of Catholic 
abstention as a whole. Amongst those who favoured the Assembly, the rate of 
Catholic abstention (24%) was twice that of Presbyterians (12%) and the non-
religious (10%). Amongst those who opposed the Assembly, on the other hand, the 
Catholic abstention rate (35%) was higher than amongst Presbyterians (20%) but far 
lower than amongst the non-religious (48%). In other words, what really needs to be 
explained is why Catholics - regardless of their opinion - did not vote. To some 
extent this can be explained by the confused political message on the question from 
both Labour and SNP. In contrast to the divided "Yes' camp, the 'No' campaign had 
a simpler message, better funding, and the impetus of an Opposition galvanised by a 
weak and faltering Labour Government. 'No' campaigners insisted that the issue was 
not the principle of devolution, but of the proposal at hand: the Conservati \'es 
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There are good reasons, therefore, for a high rate of abstention In the 1979 
referendum. Amongst abstaining Catholics a factor may have been Labour's deep 
divisions. Given Catholic loyalty to Labour, it does not seem surprising that Catholic 
abstention was particularly high. The Catholic community received mixed messages 
on how they should vote. Gallagher argues that the 'Labour Vote No' campaign was 
"capitalising on [the] residual and atavistic fears about devolution in 1978-79" that 
Catholics might suffer in a devolved Scotland52. That the Orange Order backed a 
, Yes' vote in 1979 gave superficial credence to such claims53 . A quite different 
message emanated from the Catholic Church itself, Motherwell' s Bishop Joseph 
Devine urging a Catholic 'Yes': "As a Catholic, I belong to an international church, 
but internationalism flourishes best when rooted in a keen sense of one' s nation. 
culture and identity,,54. 
It must be emphasised that despite scare stories about the nature of a future 
Assembly (and Orange support for devolution) most Catholics favoured reform. The 
1979 survey - conducted after the devolution debacle - asked respondents for their 
preferred constitutional option. Three-quarters of Catholics and the non religious 
supported some form of Assembly or Independence compared to two thirds of 
Presbyterians, suggesting that the 1979 referendum was not a judgement on the 
principle of constitutional change, but of one particular proposal: 
~I See 1.Mitchell (1996: 163-4) 
52 See Gallagher (1987a:327). A key figure in 'Labour Vote No' was Tarn Dal~ell who. two 
months before the 1997 Referendum expressed "concerns" that the proposed Parliament could 
undermine the legal position of State-funded Catholic schools "without reference to Westminster". 
Scotsman 18/07/97 
53 The Order's motivation was the desire to have devolutionary powers returned to Stormont. 
and Orange enthusiasm for Scottish devolution rapidly evap~rat~d (it supported. a 'No' ~~te in. 19~7). 
"The issue of Ulster and of making gains for the [Ulster] UniOnists out of the given political situation 
was [their] primary objective" G.Walker (1995: I 57) 
5-4 Seol/ish Catholic Obsen·er. 19/01179, quoted Gallagher (1987a:.l28) 
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PREFERRED CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION, 197955 : 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Independent Scotland 8 6 8 15 
Scottish Parliament 30 28 31 36 
Scottish Assembly 32 32 35 25 
House of Commons Committees 17 18 17 13 
No devolution 13 16 10 11 
Base 630 300 84 150 
The constitutional issue remained important to the Scottish pUblic: 22% viewed the 
issue as 'extremely important'; 37% as 'fairly important'; and a sizeable minority of 
41 % as 'not very important'. There were no significant variations in the importance 
attached to this issue across religious affiliation. 
A further question in 1979 asked for views on Scottish independence and again the 
received wisdom is seriously undermined. Belief that independence was a 'very bad' 
proposal was, relatively speaking, very low amongst Catholics, while Catholics were 
just as likely as other groups to view it as 'very good': 
VIEW OF AN INDEPENDENT SCOTLAND, 197956: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Very good thing 9 8 10 13 
Good thing 25 22 35 31 
Make no difference 2 2 3 1 
Bad thing 40 40 38 32 
Very bad thing 25 29 15 23 
Base 630 300 84 150 
Respondents were also asked why they held their particular view: amongst those who 
viewed independence as a 'very bad' or 'bad' prospect, the most popular reasons 
were that Scotland "lacked capability" (15%), or was "too small" (14%). Only 50/0 of 
55 The offered options were: 'A completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament'; 
• A Scottish Parliament which would handle JllQ.S! Scottish affairs, including economic affairs, leaving 
... Westminster ... responsible m for defence, foreign policy and international economic policy'; 
'An elected Scottish Assembly which would handle ~ Scottish affairs and would be responsible to 
, .. Westminster'; • Have Scottish Committees of the House of Commons come up to Scotland for their 
meetings'; 'No devolution or Scottish Assembly of any sort'. 
56 The question read: 'If Scotland wg become independent some time in the future, do you 
think that this would be a ~ bad thing. a bad thing. a good thing, or a ~ good thing?' 
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those viewing independence negatively were concerned that Scotland might "get like 
Ulster", most of whom were Protestants 57 , 
The argument that Scottish Catholics in the 1970s were particularly opposed to 
constitutional change is not sustained, but is contradicted, by the election surveys. 
The supposed reticence of Catholics towards a Scottish identity remains to be 
examined. Before doing so, however, the issue of constitutional change in the 1990s, 
and the prospects for the evolution of the debate, merit exploration. 
THE 1990s AND BEYOND 
Scottish politics in the late 1980s and 1990s was characterised by the return to centre 
stage of constitutional change, motivated in great part by the fact that Scotland felt 
ill-served by Conservative governments rejected by Scottish electors, By the late 
1990s a substantial majority of Scots were in favour of some form of constitutional 
change, largely due to a feeling that Scottish interests were not being adequately 
represented under the existing system. In the Scottish Referendum Survey of 
September 1997 (conducted some months after the Labour election victory) 
respondents were asked the extent to which a UK Government and a Scottish 
Government could be trusted to act in Scotland's interests. Mistrust of UK 
Government was evident, even with a popular Labour administration in power: 710/0 
said they would trust a Scottish Government 'just about always' or 'most' of time 
compared to 35% who placed the same degree of trust in Westminster. 
How did constitutional change play across the religious groups during the 1990s? 
The short answer is that support for change accounted for a substantial majority 
across religion in 1992: 
" This includes those who saw it as a secondary reason. O,erall onl~ 20 respondents ga\'c this 
as a first or second reason (3 of whom were Catholic and 3 non-religious), representing .'% of all 
those who answered the question on independence. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE, 1992: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Independent, outwith European Union 6 6 6 6 
Independent, within European Union 17 14 22 24 
Devolution within United Kingdom 50 50 50 47 
No Change 24 28 18 20 
OtherlDon't know 3 3 4 3 
Base 957 442 1-18 l35 
The most important point about this table is the striking similarity across religious 
group: in all three around half were in favour of a devolved body. The differences, 
whilst secondary to this consensus for change, are also interesting. Presbyterians 
were most supportive of continued direct administration from Westminster (that is. 
they are most likely to be 'unionists') but this view accounts for only around one-
quarter of the Church of Scotland sample. Amongst Catholics and the non-religious. 
only one fifth favoured the then status quo with around 30% favouring some form of 
independence. Thus, in 1992 as in 1974, a broad consensus for change embraced all 
three religious groups. What was problematic about this consensus was that it was 
characterised more by what it opposed - the then status quo - rather than what it 
endorsed. By 1997, and the very real prospect of a Labour Government committed to 
devolution, some interesting religious variations had emerged. Catholic support for 
independence seems to have weakened and support for devolution strengthened 
between 1992-97. By contrast, amongst the non-religious support for independence 
appears to have grown: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE. 1997: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Independent, outwith EU 8 7 5 1 1 
Independent, within EU 18 12 15 26 
All Independent 26 19 20 37 
Parliament, with tax powers 42 43 49 41 
Parliament, no tax powers 9 9 12 6 
All Devolution 51 52 61 .1': 
No Elected Body 18 25 10 12 
Don't know 5 5 9 4 
Base 87/ 365 1:6 
l-() 
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The fluidity of opinion on this question - in terms of the nature of constitutional 
change, rather than on whether change should occur - can be seen in the Referendum 
Study conducted four months later. In that study support for no change remained at 
the same low level, but support for independence had grown across all three groups 
(to 29% of Presbyterians; 35% of Catholics; and 46% of the non-religious) and 
support for devolution had slipped. 
The result of the subsequent referendum, and the nature of the campaign preceding 
it, was as decisive as 1979 had been confused. With the 'No' campaign largely 
limited to the discredited Conservatives 74% supported the establishment of a 
Parliament, and 63% tax-varying powers for that body. The Referendum Study found 
that 72% of Scots cared "a good deal" about the outcome of the referendum, and that 
support for the proposed Parliament was substantial across all religious groups. In 
the sample overall, 24% said they had not voted but there was no significant 
variation by religion in the rate of abstention. Whilst Catholics were more likely to 
abstain in 1979 this was not the case in 1997. Further. Catholics seem to have been 
particularly favourable to the proposed Parliament and the granting of tax-varying 
powers to it: 
DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM, 1997: 
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The setting up of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 has not put an end to the Scottish 
Question. That the SNP, whose key political goal is an independent Scotland. is now 
the official Opposition at Holyrood signals that the Question has not been answered. 
but changed. In the Referendum Study a majority felt that an independent Scotland 
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within twenty years was either 'very' or 'quite likely'. Two years later. the 
Parliamentary Study found that this perception had faded a little, but that 12% felt an 
independent Scotland by c.2020 was 'very likely' and 39% as 'quite likely'. Neither 
study found significant differences on this question across religion. In the 
Referendum Study 37% of Catholics said that they supported independence 
compared to 31 % of Presbyterians and 47% of the non-religious. In 1999 the 
Parliamentary survey asked respondents which policy they felt offered the best 
constitutional future for Scotland. Around half in all three religious groups supported 
the present system (a Parliament with some taxation powers), but amongst Catholics 
and the non-religious around one-third favoured some form of independence, 
compared to one fifth of Presbyterians. Support for the status quo ante - direct 
administration from Westminster - accounted for only around 10% : 
CONSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE, 1999: 
% by column All Church of No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion 
Independent, outwith EU 10 7 12 10 
Independent, within EU 18 14 22 21 
Parliament, with tax powers 50 53 50 48 
Parliament, no tax powers 9 11 3 8 
No Elected Body 10 10 8 9 
Don't know 5 5 6 5 
Base 1477 521 201 594 
There is much scope left in the Scottish Question and it is clear that this Question has 
been fought across, and not between, religion. The orthodox view that Scotland's 
Catholics were particularly hostile to constitutional change has been disproved. and it 
seems clear, that in the battles over Scotland's future, Catholics will be well 
represented amongst those supporting more radical reform. Catholics have been 
committed to change in the way that Scotland is governed for at least 25 years, and 
they are now at the forefront of belief in further change. Where does this leave the 
last aspect of the received wisdom, that of Catholics and Scottishness? 
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RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The final aspect of the orthodoxy about Catholic political preferences lies in their 
relationship with Scottish identity. According to Gallagher, as ''the Catholic Irish in 
Scotland" became less immediately 'Irish', they faced an identity crisis: 
As Ireland became an emotional heirloom rather than a place that most in the 
community had direct experience of, it was not quite clear where they 
belonged. But the corporate identity of Scotland which singled out as 
achievements religious and historical events that the Catholic Irish re~arded 
as defeats, sometimes of a catastrophic kind, was not readily appealing. 8 
Additionally, Gallagher argues that in the 1930s, and for "a long time afterward" 
Catholics were unsympathetic to Scottish claims to self-government. in great part 
because: 
Working-class Catholics in particular found it difficult to relate to the 
symbols of Scottish nationhood (and many still do). The custodians of 
Scottish national identity have tended to be bourgeois institutions like the 
law, the Presbyterian religion, and the higher reaches of education which are 
uncomfortable entities to many working-class Catholics.59 
In a footnoted comment to this latter passage Gallagher argues that "it should not be 
surprising" that Brand's analysis of the 1974 election found "it was Catholics who ... 
showed the greatest resistance towards voting Nationalist,,60. We have already seen 
that if, indeed, Catholics showed "resistance" to Nationalism in the 1970s, it was 
only in their lesser propensity to vote SNP, and not in their attitudes towards the 
party or to constitutional change. What though of Catholic attitudes towards Scottish 
national identity? Before examining the evidence of the election surveys it is 
important to stress the limitations of a view of identity founded essentially upon 
"corporate identity", "historical achievements", and institutional "custodians". We 
might reasonably expect that working-class atheists would find the so-called 
"custodians of Scottish national identity" as alien to their lives as working-class 
Catholics. As to a "corporate" Scottish identity based on key historical events. one 




Gallagher (1991 :34) 
Gallagher ( 1991 :32) 
Gallagher (1991 :42) 
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of Presbyterian partner-in-Empire, we have the Scotland of "Red Clydeside', of the 
Highlands, or of progressive social democracy. The 'custodianship' of Scottish 
identity has long been contested and to focus on its dominant, bourgeois claimants is 
to obscure those progressive, radical movements drawing on other popular versions 
of 'Scotland,61. Nevertheless, the wide currency of notions of Scotland as "British' 
and 'Protestant' in the past are undeniable. The inter-war Presbyterian churches 
attempted to fuse Scottishness with a reactionary and anti-Catholic Protestantism. 
whilst some Nationalists were also peddling anti-Catholicism (although others were 
anti-Protestant). For many Catholics during this period: 
there was not much encouragement for them to feel Scottish while at the 
same time preserving their religion and their pride in their Irish heritage. For 
[some] Presbyterian clergymen ... religious and cultural pluralism was an 
evil, and to be Scottish was to be Protestant.62 
This aspect of anti-Catholic history, taken together with the relatively low SNP vote 
amongst Scotland's Catholics, has formed the justification of the orthodoxy about 
Catholic suspicion of 'Scotland'. Two pillars of that orthodoxy have already been 
shown to be hollow: what of the third? 
The 1974 survey contained an optional question on which nationality respondents 
felt best described them. Unfortunately less than half the sample answered and the 
small sample sizes should be emphasised. Two thirds described themselves as 
Scottish, under a third as British, and only small numbers gave another answer. 
There are two interesting differences in the 1974 data. Firstly, Catholics are only 
slightly less likely than the sample overall to describe themselves as Scottish, 
although if the small proportion (6%) describing themselves as Irish are omitted the 
figures are remarkably similar. More striking, however, is the response amongst the 
'Other religion' sample, who are less likely to describe themselves as Scottish and 
more likely to see themselves as British: 
61 Again M.Mitchell (1998 & 1999) is instructive as to radical Scottish movements in 19th 
Century Scotland and their relationship with Catholic Irish immigrants. 
62 SJ.Brown (1991 :42) 
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NATIONALITY, 1974: 
% by column All Church of Other No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion religion 
Scottish 65 67 61 51 69 
British 31 29 31 43 26 
Scottish & British 1 1 1 
English 2 1 2 3 2 
Irish 1 6 
Irish & British * 2 
Other 1 2 2 2 
Base 588 227 49 67 94 
The same question in 1979 garnered virtually the same result. Again Catholics were 
only marginally less likely to describe their nationality as Scottish, and again if the 
small minority (9%) who described themselves as Irish are omitted the figures are 
remarkably similar. In 1979 the differences between the 'Other religion' group and 
the rest of the sample were not repeated. It is noticeable that the balance between 
British and Scottish identity shifted in favour of the former - this may plausibly have 
been a function of a heightened sense of Scottishness in 1974, given the rise to 
prominence of the SNP. If this were the case then it can be seen that Catholics shared 
in the fluctuations in Scottish and British sentiment: 
NATIONALITY, 1979: 
% by column All Church of Other No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion religion 
Scottish 56 58 50 55 57 
British 38 39 39 35 39 
Scottish & British 2 2 1 2 
English 2 * 2 7 1 
Irish 1 9 
Other 1 1 2 1 
Base 658 318 88 99 /53 
During the 1970s, therefore, there was little difference in the ways in which 
Catholics and non-Catholics described their nationality. Catholics appear to have 
shared in a slight decline in Scottishness and rise in Britishness over the latter 1970s, 
as support for the SNP ebbed, and as devolution became mired in confusion. By 
1992, however. there was a considerable rise in the proportion viewing themselves as 
Scottish, and a fall in British. Again Catholics shared equally in this process: 
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NATIONALITY, 1992: 
% by column All Church of Other No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion religion 
Scottish 72 74 71 58 76 
British 25 25 21 36 22 
English 1 * 3 I 
Irish I * 5 2 
Other 2 I 3 1 * 
Base 957 442 148 127 235 
In 1992 the 'Other religion' group agaln showed a relatively low level of 
Scottishness, and a relatively high level of Britishness. This is due to the 
heterogeneity of this composite group. Much of this sample is made up of those 
describing themselves as 'Christian - no denomination' (numbering 49) and as 
'Episcopalian/Anglican' (35). In the former, the pattern of nationality matches that of 
the sample as a whole, whereas a majority of the latter (57%) describe themselves as 
British. Many of these British Episcopalians may, in fact, be English born, and from 
a Church of England background, perhaps going some way in explaining the 
different patterns of nationality. 
National identity has been the focus of increased academic attention and led to the 
application in Scotland of a more subtle approach by Luis Moren063. The so-called 
Moreno question is designed to measure national identity in · stateless nations' by 
offering options balancing identity between that of nation (e.g. Scotland) and that of 
state (e.g. Britain). How does the Moreno question play in Scotland?: 
THE MORENO QUESTION, 1992 & 1999: 
% by column 1992 1999 
All CoS Cath NR All CoS Cath NR 
Scottish not British 19 17 26 23 32 31 34 37 
More Scottish than British 40 41 37 45 35 40 41 31 
Equally Scottish & British 33 37 30 28 22 24 18 19 
More British than Scottish 3 2 1 2 3 3 • 4 
British not Scottish 3 2 1 2 4 1 2 5 
OtherlDon't Know 1 * 5 4 2 5 5 
Base 957 ·NJ 148 235 1482 5JI JOI 594 
6-' See Moreno (1988) 
116 
Religion and Politics in Contemporary Scotland 
Catholics, if anything, are more likely than Presbyterians to prioritise their 
Scottishness (Le. to claim to be 'Scottish not British', or "more Scottish than 
British'). Although the differences are small in 1999, a slightly larger difference is 
found in 1997. A greater difference, with 40% of Catholics claiming to be . Scottish 
not British' compared to 31 % of Presbyterians and 33% of the non-religious. is 
found in the 1997 Referendum Study. Far from displaying any residual ambivalence 
towards a Scottish identity, Catholics in the 1990s seem to have been at the forefront 
of a strongly Scottish identity. 
Where does 'Irishness' or, indeed, 'Britishness' fit with this strong sense of 
Scottishness? National identities are not absolutes: a majority of Scots (76% in 1992: 
60% in 1999) have, at least, a plurality of national identities in that they feeL to 
different degrees, both Scottish and British. Feeling Scottish does not require that an 
individual surrenders their Britishness, Englishness, Irishness, or anything else. The 
multiple nature of national identity is revealed in a set of questions asked in the 
Election and Referendum Studies of 1997. Respondents were presented with a range 
of national identities and asked 'Do you see yourself as X'. A very large majority 
claimed to be Scottish, and a narrow majority as British. The following table notes 
the responses on this question in the election survey. A number of categories proved 
to have no significant variation by religion, and are denoted "n.s' in the relevant 
columns: 
CLAIMED NATIONAL IDENTITIES, 1997: 
% by column All Church of Other No 
sample Scotland Catholic religion religion 
Scottish 82 89 81 67 81 
British 52 n.s n.s n.s n.s 
English 4 3 3 9 5 
Irish 1 3 1 • 
Northern Irish 1 2 3 
European 9 5 10 7 16 
Other 4 n.s n.s n.s n.s 
None • n.s n.s n.s n.s 
Base 882 365 126 110 2
70 
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The presence of Englishness (and a lower degree of Scottishness) is apparent in the 
'Other religion' group, probably a function of the presence of a number of 
Episcopalians of an English background. Catholics and the non-religious are less 
likely than Presbyterians in this sample to say that they feel Scottish. In a separate 
question in this survey, respondents were asked to name that nationality which best 
described them: 74% of Catholics chose 'Scottish' compared to 790/0 of 
Presbyterians. This is a small difference (5%) and much of it can be accounted for in 
a fairly unexpected way: slightly more Catholics in 1997 (21 %) chose 'British' as the 
nationality that best described them than Presbyterians (18%). 
When respondents in the 1997 Referendum Survey were faced with the above range 
of identities an overwhelming majority of Presbyterians (95%), Catholics (920/0) and 
the non-religious (95%) said that they felt Scottish, although this was an identity 
claimed by only 71 % of the 'Other religion' group. To some extent this may be 
explained by the relatively large presence in this group of those who feel English 
(22% compared to 4% overall) and who may feel that Englishness and Scottishness 
are not easily compatible. Of central importance is that Catholics are just as likely as 
other religious groups (and, indeed, more likely than some) to feel Scottish. It is 
likely that the circumstances of the Referendum Survey - conducted at a time when 
Scotland was at the heart of public debate - accentuated feelings of Scottishness, and 
Catholics undoubtedly shared in this feeling. These circumstances may also have led 
many Scots to reflect closely upon their own identity: some 16% of Catholics in this 
survey answered that they felt Irish, although it is quite apparent that this is 
compatible with also feeling Scottish. 
In the 1999 Parliamentary Survey - again conducted against a specifically Scottish 
event - a different approach was taken to the measurement of national identity. 
Respondents were offered a range of possible identities and asked to choose those 
with which they felt an affinity in order of their importance. In practice a majority 
(60%) chose only one identity (mostly Scottish) and only a very small minority (70/0) 
chose a third or subsequent identity. The following table shows the proportion of 
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each of the main religious groups choosing a frrst and subsequent (second. third etc., 
denoted in the table as 'plus') identity: 
CLAIMED NATIONAL IDENTITIES, 1999: 
Church of No 
Scotland Catholic religion 
% by column First First First 
choice Plus choice Plus choice Plus 
Scottish 71 19 78 7 71 11 
British 27 24 14 18 23 24 
English * 1 1 1 3 2 
Irish * 3 6 1 1 
Northern Irish * 1 1 
European 1 6 2 9 1 7 
Other * * * 1 1 1 
Base 521 521 201 201 594 594 
Catholics proved most likely to place Scottishness as their first choice national 
identity and were least likely to invest such importance in Britishness. Further, whilst 
around half of both the Presbyterian and non-religious groups chose Britishness as 
their first or subsequent identity, only one third (32%) of Catholics chose · British' at 
all. What is also interesting is that only 10% of Catholics chose 'Irish' or 'Northern 
Irish' as an identity, about the same number as chose 'European'. Identification with 
Ireland is certainly apparent in the surveys, although it has, over different measures 
of identity, fluctuated between 5% of Catholics in the 1992 and 1997 Election 
Studies and 16% in the 1997 Referendum Study64. What is of crucial importance is 
that an Irish identity amongst Scotland's Catholics co-exists with a very strong sense 
of Scottishness. Again, though, the influence of religious affiliation and other 
demographic factors need to be disentangled. To do so, two regression models were 
constructed from the 1999 data on the question posed to respondents "What 
nationality best describes you?" In terms of choosing 'British' on this question the 
only significant religious predictor was being Catholic. Being Catholic, other factors 
being equal, was a significant negative predictor. In other words, there is evidence 
that Catholics are ambivalent towards Britishness as Catholics, that is, when other 
M This fluctuation is not simply due to the different measures used: precisely the same measure 
was used in the two 1997 studies which threw up Catholic Irishness at 50 0 and 16%. 
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things are held constant. When the model was repeated in tenns of choosing Scottish 
as a 'best nationality', religion proved not to be significant: no religious group was 
any more or less likely to describe themselves as Scottish. Those small differences in 
the levels of Scottishness between Presbyterians, Catholics and the non-religious 
noted above are thus explained by the demographic, rather than religious. differences 
between the samples65• 
Another question offering a glimpse into the dynamics of Scottish identity is that of 
class and national loyalties. Respondents were asked whether they had more in 
common with a Scottish person of a different class, or with an English person of the 
same class. In 1979, 1992, and 1997 there was no significant variation over this 
question by religion. Whilst in 1999 Catholics and the non-religious appeared to be 
more likely to show a 'class' preference than Presbyterians, logistic regression 
analysis on the 1999 data shows that religion was not a significant predictor of either 
a class or national preference66• Two things are of interest here. Firstly there appears 
to have been a marked reduction of 'class' and a much smaller increase of 'national' 
preference since 1979. Secondly, all religious groups have shared equally in this 
process: 
MORE IN COMMON WITH CLASS OR NATION, 1979-9967: 
% by column 1979 1992 1997 1999 
English person of same class 40 27 24 24 
Scottish person of opposite class 35 45 45 43 
No preference 16 12 13 15 
Depends on the individual 5 11 15 
Don't know/n.a. 10 11 8 4 
Base 534 957 882 1418 
"A LANDSCAPE OF THE MIND" 
We can conclude that on all three counts - nationality, the SNP. constitutional 
change - the received wisdom about Scottish Catholics seems strangely misplaced. 
65 See Appendix 2. 
66 See Appendix 2. 
67 'Do you feel you have more in common with an English person of your own class or a 
Scottish person of a different class?' 
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How can we explain its persistence despite the contrasting view of 25 years' worth of 
survey evidence? To a great extent it is founded upon two misconceptions. It is the 
Irish-identity of many Scottish Catholics that forms the basis of both the Scottish 
equation and the misconception it encapsulates. Such a view treats Irishness and 
Scottishness as mutually exclusive - one is one or other, never both. We have seen 
that Scots hold a variety of identities contemporaneously. Such identities are not 
mutually exclusive, although they may be mobilised in different ways and at 
different times. Research into Celtic fans, for example, finds a high degree of 
sympathy for the Republic of Ireland national side, leading to claims of 
"ambivalence" towards the Scottish national side amongst "a majority of Celtic 
fans,,68. Bradley's research has utilised reactions to some "identifying symbols" of 
Scottishness and Irishness. Few Celtic fans, it was reported, felt "attraction" towards 
bagpipes, the thistle, the (long defunct) Scottish folk-band The Corries, Robert 
Bruce, or Robert Burns. By contrast the harp, shamrock, Padraic Pearse, Irish folk-
band The Wolfetones, and St. Patrick were symbols "Celtic fans positively identified 
with,,69. Two things are thus done to national identity: the nation becomes reducible 
to stereotypical images, and 'identity' is predicated on how one 'relates' to these 
images. In place of Norman Tebbit's infamous 'cricket test' by which the loyalties of 
Britain's (Le. England's) ethnic minorities were judged by which international side 
they favoured, cultural identity in Scotland is almost reduced by Bradley to a folk-
music test. 
A reductive view of national identity was demonstrated by philosopher H.J.Paton in 
the late 1960s. Paton noted of "the Irish invader - the Orange and the Green": 
Few reasonable men, and certainly few reasonable Scotsman, will regard it as 
an unmixed blessing that an unusually homogenous nation should be split up 
into two nations. Yet if the native stock is doomed to decline, Scotland may 
yet be considered fortunate in so far as the Irish invaders belong to a race not 
68 Bradley (1995a:448) .. Ambivalence' is based upon claimed attendan~e at Scotland's 
matches: if Bradley's figures were representative, one wonders why H~p,den. Park IS ~equently half 
empty. Boyle (1994) also notes Celtic fans affections for the Republic s SIde, but IS rather more 
circumspect. . . 
b9 Bradley (1995a:449-50). The choice of symbols seem more ~eveallng th~ the findmgs. One 
wonders whether other "identifying symbols" were considered unSUItable: the tricolour, Red Hand, 
leprechauns (Ireland); the saltire, St Margaret, haggis (Scotland). 
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wholly alien to her own. Provided their numbers were not too great. there 
would be some hope of their becoming assimilated in the course of time -
there are already signs of their being affected by some of the traditional 
Scottish ideals. Some of them have shown themselves men of abilitv, and 
they have strengthened Scotland in the field of sport. 70 • 
Leaving aside notions of 'stock', 'race', and sporting abilities it seems quite clear 
that Paton viewed nationality as an absolute - one could be either . Irish' or 
'Scottish', or, at best, on the way from being one to being assimilated in the other. 
National identity, however, is a much more complex phenomenon. Scottish familial 
connections with Ireland go far beyond the Catholic community. The 1979 Election 
Survey asked whether respondents had "any family connections with Ireland", 
Whilst 60% of Catholics answered positively, so too did 14% of Presbyterians, 14% 
of those of Other religions and 11 % of the non-religious. Although highlighting the 
strong Irish heritage of many Scottish Catholics, this question also reveals its 
limitations: many Catholics (40%) have no family connections with Ireland. 
Crucially, of all those with such connections, a majority (60%) were non-Catholic. 
For Benedict Anderson7l , the nation is an 'imagined community', an ideological 
construct, which can be, and is, re-imagined and re-constructed. We can conclude 
this review of national identity by asking why people say they feel Scottish. For the 
vast majority in the 1992 survey (88%) the first reason they gave was simply that 
they were 'Born in Scotland'. Respondents were given the opportunity to give as 
many reasons as they wished, although only 17% gave more than three, and none 
more than five. There was no variation across religion in the reasons respondents 
gave for feeling Scottish. The following table notes the proportions giving reasons as 
a first or subsequent choice (thus the columns do not add up to 100): 
70 Paton (1968: 178-79), The patronising sporting reference relates to Celtic' s 1967 European 
Cup win, 
71 Anderson ( 1991 ) 
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REASON RESPONDENT FEELS scornSH, 1992: 
Reasons given 
Born in Scotland 
Live in Scotland 
Just love Scotland 
Scottish culture 
Dislike English 














The practicality of Scottishness is striking - it predominantly relates to coming from 
Scotland, being born there. Only around a quarter gave 'Scottish culture' as a reason 
for feeling Scottish, and this accounted for only 2% of the first reasons given. This 
lends credence to McCrone's argument that Scottish nationalism (here understood as 
a sociological rather than political process): "Has developed without the 
encumbrance of a heavy cultural baggage. It is as if, having looked to see what was 
on offer, the Scots have decided to travel light" 72. 
In other words, Protestantism and Empire may have been decisive to the shaping of 
modern Scottish history, but they are not widely regarded as defining and essential 
components in the ways that contemporary Scots view their Scottishness. On the 
contrary, an important element in late twentieth century Scottishness seems to be 
"that a feeling of 'Scottishness' goes along with left-wing values": 
The deliberate linking of nationalist and left-wing values by both the SNP 
and the Labour Party in Scotland have led to a linkage of these two 
dimensions in the political ethos of the society. This leads to a situation in 
which to say one is Scottish is also to say one has left-wing views, and 
conversely to say that one is British, rather than Scottish, is to assert right-
wing views. No such link between these dimensions is visible in the rest of 
Great Britain and it is this linkage which explains Scottish distinctiveness.73 
In place of a Scottishness predicated upon Gallagher's "corporate identity" or 
Bradley's "identifying symbols", McCrone offers up a Hlandscape of the mind ... 
72 
73 
McCrone (1992: 196) 
A.Brown el al (1999: 83.90-1) 
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notions of the essential Scotland are what people want it to be,,74. If contemporary 
Scottishness is understood as a landscape of social justice, of welfare provision, and 
of collective responsibility for the weak, then is it really any surprise that Catholics, 
Protestants and the non-religious are united in a sense of themselves as Scottish? 
CONCLUSION: A PUZZLE 
The last three chapters have illustrated some of the major problems in applying the 
'sectarian myth' to a Scottish social and political reality. If Scotland is really divided 
along ethno-religious lines then why are religious divisions marginal in the life of 
institutional religion, in tenns of social structure, religious practices, and in political 
attitudes and behaviour? In other words, why does the myth persist? To a large 
extent its persistence can be explained using Bruce's 'iceberg' metaphor: concern 
about 'sectarianism' exists because the Scottish past is seen, in many respects, as a 
'sectarian' one. Indeed, it is notable that the literary landmarks in this area are 
thoroughly historical. Handley's histories were joined four decades later by Bruce's 
No Pope of Rome, predominantly concerned with Scotland before c .1950, and 
Gallagher's two volumes, the first largely concerned with the period 1819-1914, the 
second with 1930s Edinburgh75. Subsequent commentaries have all accepted the 
premise that 'things were much worse' in the past, although not all have shown a 
willingness to contextualise that past. It is frequently said that the past is another 
country, yet many accounts of 'sectarianism' in Scotland do not take this into 
account. To find that religion and politics mixed much more in the past is not the 
same thing as finding sectarianism, nor prejudice or bigotry. The following section of 
this thesis will thus offer a view of the Scottish past that shows that religion and 
politics mixed in Scotland without those connotations that late twentieth century (and 
secular) values might seek to impose on them. The period chosen was the inter-war 
decades, primarily because many commentators in the field view this period as 
witnessing particularly severe 'sectarian' friction. 
74 
" 
McCrone (1992: 17) 
Handley (1943 & 1947): Bruce (1985a); Gallagher (1987a & 1987b) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
"THE RISING TIDE OF PAGANISM" 
The initial chapters of this study have demonstrated that contemporary Scotland is 
not, at least when we use the term with care, a 'sectarian' society. But what of the 
Scotland of the past - can it justifiably be described as 'sectarian'? There is a broad 
consensus that the two decades between the world wars represent perhaps the 
sharpest period of conflict between Scotland's Protestants and Catholics. The 
orthodox view, following Handley, has been that a conjunction of economic slump 
with the concession, in 1918, of state-funded Catholic education, and with 
heightened tension in Ireland, destroyed the religious detente characterising the 
period c.l878-1916: 
The benign rays of the prosperous Edwardian era warmed native Scot and 
descendant of immigrant alike, and the old racial and religious differences 
slumbered in its genial glow ... But the industrial depression that followed the 
first world war awakened old discords. 1 
Some revision has been undertaken in regard to the discords of old, suggesting that 
during the nineteenth century the Catholic Irish in Scotland "may not have been liked 
but for the most part were regarded with indifference". Many studies have focused 
on the inter-war period, suggesting that this was a defining epoch in Catholic-
Protestant relations2• My purpose here is not to debate this point, but rather to 
demonstrate that, even in a period of intense dislocation, religious rivalries provided 
a very limited means by which to mobilise opinion and action in Scotland. In other 
words, the Scotland of the 1920s and 1930s was not a 'sectarian' society. 
THE 'ACRID FOG OF ANXIETY' 
Mass unemployment "stamped the years between the wars indelibly with the mark of 
bitterness and poverty". The effects of poverty and uncertainty were immeasurable: 
"[The] acrid fog of anxiety was the atmosphere which men and women breathed 
during a generation. Its effect cannot be statistically measured, but. equally, it cannot 
Handley (1947:302) 
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be left out of any account of these years,,3. In Scotland economic crises bit deeply _ 
unemployment in west central Scotland in the 1930s averaged 25% - and there was 
widespread concern over a "Southward Drift" of economic development. Economic 
crisis fuelled fears of the 'End of Scotland' as a distinct nation, offering a particular 
twist to the mood of anxiety4. Some Scottish Unionists were, by the early 1930s, 
"turning towards a nationalist interpretation of the economic crisis", John Buchan 
noting pessimistically: "We do not want to see Scotland become merely a Northern 
Province of England. We do not want to become like the Jews a race without a 
Jerusalem. We must save our national identity while there is still tirne"s. 
Such fears manifested themselves with the 1933 emergence of the Scottish National 
Party as an amalgamation of various nationalist organisations, indicating increasing 
concern about the future of Scotland6• Some were unconvinced that Scotland's ills 
could be best characterised as a 'national' problem: Edwin Muir, for example, 
insisted that "the fundamental cause of [Scotland's] many ills, including even the de-
nationalisation of its people, was economic and not national". Nevertheless, Muir 
advocated Scottish independence: 
What makes the existence of the mass of the people in Scotland so 
unsatisfactory, apart from their economic plight (which is the only urgent 
question ... ), is not the feeling that they are being subjected to English 
influence, but rather the knowledge that there is no Scottish influence left to 
direct them. They are not English, and they are ceasing to be Scottish for lack 
of encouragement. 7 
One aspect of Scotland's situation, mass emigration, "was seen as proof positive that 
the Scottish nation was in the process of terminal decline"s. Scotland's net loss to 
emigration peaked in the 1920s - almost 400,000 leaving - and produced the first 
2 Tom Devine, Herald, 18/07/98 and Scotsman, 17111197; M.Mitchell (1998 & 1999); 
McFarland (1999) 
3 Hobsbawm (1968:207-9). 
4 T.Fitzpatrick (1999: 136); R.J.Finlay (I 994b);Thomson (1935); E.Muir (1935) 
-' R.J.Finlay (l994b:247) quoting GH27/11131 ... . 
6 The SNP arose from a series of often uneasy mergers between the "left-leaning National 
Party of Scotland «.1928); the "celtic romanticism" of the Scots National League CjI920); and the 
Tory tinged Scottish Party «.1930) [A.Brown el al (1998:144-6)]. For a detailed study see RJ.Finlay 
()994a) 
1 E.Muir (1935:248.27-28) 
8 R.J. Finlay ( 1994b:251 ) 
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recorded drop in the Scottish population. Estimated out-migration between 1901-51 
was more than double that between 1861-1901. Unsurprisingly, "in a Europe which 
was becoming increasingly race conscious", this process was viewed with alann, and 
many "concluded that emigration was both the symptom and the cause of national 
decline,,9. 
Scotland was not the only area of the UK suffering and it did not always suffer most. 
Between 1927 and 1939 Scottish unemployment exceeded the overall UK rate. but 
between 1927-32 the Scottish rate was lower than that of North East England. After 
1932, however, unemployment in North East England fell to around the UK rate, 
whilst the Scottish rate fell more slowly and remained substantially above UK 
levels 10. In 1939 the Clydesdale Bank 'Business Index' provided "a reasonably 
reliable indicator of general fluctuations". It can be quickly grasped that Scotland's 
position after 1930 was particularly acute: 
INDEX OF SCOTTISH BUSINESS ACTIVITY, 1924-3811 : 
Index for Index for Index for Index for 
Scotland G.Britain Scotland G.Britain 
1924 100.0 100.0 1932 81.0 96.0 
1925 97.0 101.5 1933 83.5 101.0 
1926 91.5 1934 91.0 109.5 
1927 103.0 108.5 1935 94.5 113.5 
1928 102.0 107.5 1936 102.0 120.0 
1929 104.0 112.0 1937 109.5 126.0 
1930 97.0 106.5 1938 106.5 118.5 
1931 85.5 98.5 
POLITICAL FLUX 
Before turning to the specific concurrence of religious and political concerns, it is 
necessary to sketch the pattern of Scottish politics during the inter-war period. 
Between 1910 and 1945, there was a complete transition from the Conservati\'c-




RJ.Finlay (1994b:2S 1) 
Smout (1986: 114) 
C~ydesdale BanJc. 1939 
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unchallenged until the late 1960s. This process had particular consequences for 
Scottish politics because of the long-standing Liberal dominance north of the border. 
This had ensured for Scotland an influential position at the heart of British 
Liberalism when Liberalism was very much a party of Government. Liberalism was 
built upon a "painfully contrived coalition" of disparate socio-political interests, and 
in Scotland, to some degree, sectarian differences were blunted by - and subsumed 
within - the fact of Liberal dominance 12. Whilst a substantial minority of Liberals 
moved towards the Conservatives over Irish Home Rule from 1885, it is significant 
that the Unionist gains of 1886-1900 were swept away in Scotland in 1906 and 1910. 
The crumbling of the Liberal monolith, therefore, might well have removed an 
informal mechanism for bridging the religious divide in the sphere of party politics, 
and for containing the potential for political conflictl3• 
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTARY SEATS & SHARE OF THE VOTE. 1918-1945: 
NATIONAL-
UNIONIST LIBERAL LIBERAL LABOUR OTHER 
Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats 
1918 32.8 30 19.1 25 15.0 8 24.2 7 8.9 1 
1922 25.1 13 17.7 12 21.5 15 32.2 29 3.5 2 
1923 31.6 14 28.4 22 35.9 34 4.1 1 
1924 40.8 36 16.5 8 41.1 26 1.6 1 
1929 35.9 20 18.1 13 42.4 36 3.6 2 
1931 49.5 48 4.8 8 8.6 7 32.6 7 4.5 1 
1935 42.0 35 6.7 7 6.7 3 41.8 24 2.8 2 
1945 37.4 24 3.7 3 5.0 49.4 40 4.5 4 
Adding to the flux in Scottish national politics was a new element after 1918: 
women. The introduction of womanhood suffrage in 1918 (equalised with male 
suffrage a decade later) had obvious organisational implications for the political 
parties. The Unionists "enthusiastically developed" women's organisations, and laid: 
"Great emphasis .. on displaying visibly the place of women in the party" and in the 
. ' . .,\4 
1920s and 1930s their ""record in this respect was superIor to Its competitors . 
Labour's record in Scotland was poor. in relation not only to the Unionists. but to the 
12 Vincent (1976:47). See also Smith (1980) . 
13 RJ.Finlay (1996:70-71) notes that Unionist appeals over Irish Home Rule In December 1910 
failed "to pay electoral dividends" in Scotland. 
14 Hutchinson (1998:76-77) 
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English left: "Scottish Labour did not, unlike the English Labour Party. reach out to 
woman voters. It organised very few women's sections, and did not encourage them 
to affiliate to local parties,,15. Unionist figures certainly respected the potential of the 
newly enfranchised: John Buchan's The Three Hostages contains a prescient 
prediction for the mid-1920s: 
There is a mighty Tory revival in sight, and it will want leading. The newly 
enfranchised classes, especially the women, will bring it about. The 
suffragists didn't know what a tremendous force of conservatism they were 
releasing when they won the vote for their sex. 16 
RELIGION IN INTER-WAR EUROPE: CRISIS AND CONFIDENCE 
The inter-war period was one of profound religious anxiety and realignment. Two 
senior Protestant figures, from the USA and Germany, warned in 1927 of a crisis in 
Protestant Europe: 
Europe has become impoverished with many losses consequent upon the 
World War ... But political, economic, social and aesthetic maladies do not 
complete the diagnosis of Europe's sickness. In fourteen countries, due to an 
accumulation of calamities, the Protestant church is fighting for its life ... [It] 
suffers acutely in the general malaise which rests upon Europe .. .In large and 
fair sections of Europe it lives in an atmosphere of defeat, of hatred, of greed, 
and of fear - the four outstanding characteristics of the post-war turmoil in 
every belligerent country. 17 
This was not the view of reactionary conservatives, but of liberal, progressive 
theologians who saw "the serious impairment of the spiritual side of either 
Protestantism or Catholicism ... as a major disaster [ for] all who love European 
culture". The crisis resulted from an intensified "class struggle" and the continuing 
"high pitch" of "national pride". Economic downturn had struck particularly hard, 
they bemoaned, at the Protestant Churches of Europe (many were disestablished after 
the toppling of Central European monarchies in 1918-19), while "the Vatican [grew] 
ever richer". Catholic expansion (in terms of infrastructure and - crucially - in terms 






Keller & Stewart (1927: 19) 
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Across the dinner tables of Europe one often hears the statement that from a 
military point of view France won the war; from the political, England; from 
the economic, America; from the cultural, the Jew; from the racial, the Sla\,: 
from the religious, the Roman Catholic Church. In common with nearly all 
such generalisations, exceptions could be made to these claims, but there is 
enough truth in them to cause the serious student of European culture to 
reflect. 18 
It must be stressed, however, that the authors viewed Catholicism as a potential ally. 
not as a 'Romanising' menace to liberty. It was argued that Europe "must choose 
between Christianity and chaos", between the spiritual and the wholly material. To 
fend off the "the deadly embrace of materialism" a common Christian understanding 
was essential: "Bigotry now, on the part of either Protestants or Catholics, in the 
midst of appalling spiritual need, is falseness to Christianity. There is ample room for 
the best efforts of both" 19. 
The sense of struggle between material and spiritual interests was hardly new, but it 
was felt keenly by clergy and laity of all denominations and outlooks. These changes 
can be seen as an intensification - or acceleration - of processes of secularisation with 
roots further back in the modernisation of Europe, but to contemporaries of these 
changes the emptying churches and the seeming loss of religion's moral authority 
was bewildering. Coinciding as they did with the rise of material answers to the 
crises of the industrial world (most dramatically Socialism and Fascism), it is little 
surprise that the period saw many Churches on the defensive, and seeking a spiritual 
reawakening. 
Pius Xl's first Encyclical, in 1922, bemoaned "the dense fog of mutual hatreds and 
grievances" enveloping Europe. Class conflict offended the Vatican as "a chronic 
and mortal disease of present day society. which like a cancer is eating away the vital 
forces of the social fabric". Pius lamented "the morbid restlessness which has spread 
18 Keller & Stewart (1927: 19-22. 26-28. 157) 
19 Keller & Stewart (1927:47,50,28) 
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among people of every age and condition in life [and] the general spirit of 
insubordination,,20 : 
... there remains only the most terrible uncertainty, and ... fears for the future. 
instead of regular daily work there is idleness and unemployment ... [and] the 
restless spirit of revolt reigns ... In the face of our much praised progress, we 
behold with sorrow society lapsing back slowly but surely into a state of 
barbarism. 
Pius insisted that as the 'true Faith', Catholicism represented the only remedy to 
barbarism: 
Because the [Catholic] Church is by divine institution the sole depository and 
interpreter of the ideals and teachings of Christ, she alone possesses in any 
complete and true sense the power effectively to combat that materialistic 
philosophy which has already done, and still threatens, such tremendous harm 
to the home and to the state. The Church alone can introduce into society and 
maintain therein the prestige of a true, sound spiritualism ... 
In 1925 Pius insisted that the contemporary world suffered the "deplorable 
consequences" arising from "the rebellion of individuals and states against the 
authority of Christ", reSUlting in "society, in a word, shaken to its foundations and on 
the way to ruin,,21. 
For many conservative Protestants, far from offering a Christian alternative to 
atheistic materialism, Rome was a major contributor to Europe's woes. Likewise, 
many conservative Catholics looked on Protestantism - heir to the 'rebellion against 
Christ' - as part of the problem. Whilst traditional Protestants clung to notions of the 
Pope as Antichrist, traditional Catholics had only to look to the 1914 revision of the 
Church's Catechism: "Protestantism - or the reformed religion, as it was called 
haughtily by its founders, is the corollary of all heresies which have been before, 
after, or shall come to corrupt the soul,,22. 
In any consideration of the inter-war period certain points must remain fixed. It was 
a period of great economic and social uncertainty for all classes. A massive political 
20 Pius XI (1922:9.12.14) 
21 Pius XI (1922:15.42)(1925:24) 
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reorientation was occurring, with an increasingly politically confident (though 
economically anxious) left faced by a wary and defensive right. It was a time of 
economic misery for the poor, of acute uncertainty for the employed, and of fearful 
apprehension for the privileged. Economically it was an age where the orthodoxy 
perished. It was a time when the authority of religion was felt to be under serious 
pressure from secular ('materialist') forces antagonistic (or oblivious) to the spiritual 
needs of European civilisation. To many the period seemed to be one of religious 
decline, but many - especially the Catholic Church - saw in the advance of 
materialism a challenge with which to re-energise the faithful. Whilst many 
Christians felt that inter-faith co-operation was crucial in the face of 'barbarism'. 
many still preferred, and retreated into, the familiar comforts of historic enmity. 
RELIGION IN SCOTLAND BETWEEN THE WARS 
At this point it is instructive to examine some of the empirical evidence with which 
we can begin to gauge to what extent Scotland shared in the 'crisis' of Protestant 
Europe, and the revitalisation of Catholicism. It is useful to examine the evidence 
available to the Churches themselves between the wars, as it helps to explain the 
Presbyterian pessimism and Catholic optimism of the period
23
• Turning first to 
church membership, the dominance of the Church of Scotland and United Free 
Church is striking, accounting for about 600/0 of the table below (which does not 
include non-Christians, the smaller Christian organisations, and - of course - the 
unchurched) : 
22 Paragraph 111.129 - quoted in Keller & Stewart (1929:175) 
23 On such statistics. see Chapter 2. 
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CHURCH MEMBERSHIP, 1900-195024: 
1900 1910 1920 193025 1940 1950 
Church of Scotland 662,000 714,000 739,000 1,271,000 1,278,000 1.271,000 
United Free Church 493,000 507,000 530,000 16,600 23,600 2~,600 
Other Presbyterian 22,500 36,900 38,700 32,700 28,000 28,500 
Episcopalian 116,000 142,000 144,000 124,000 124,000 109,000 
Other Protestant 55,100 66,700 68,300 72,100 76,300 68,700 
Catholic 469,000 529,000 603,000 607,000 615,000 745,000 
Table total (m) 1.82 1.99 2.12 2.12 2.1-1 2.]5 
SCOTTISH 
POPULATION (m) 4.47 4.76 4.88 4.84 5.10 
The apparent growth of Scotland's Catholic community is also noticeable. in 
absolute terms and relative to other denominations26• Whilst Presbyterian27 
communion rolls rose by 10% between 1900-20, the estimated Catholic population 
rose by almost 30%. Increases over 1900-50 are even more marked, with a 12% 
Presbyterian increase compared to a Catholic increase of almost 60%. Whilst 
Catholics comprised an estimated 10.5% of the Scottish population in 1900, by 1930 
they accounted for 12.5%, and 14.6% by 1950. Presbyterian membership, 
meanwhile, remained fairly constant: 25.8% of the total population in 1900 and 
25.4% in 1950. The Church of Scotland's Sunday School roll fell from 458,000 in 
1900 to 290,000 in 1950, a 37% decline, suggesting an ageing Presbyterian age 
structure and a failure to recruit children28. To some degree this failure to maintain 
the momentum of religious connection amongst Scottish children helps to explain the 
considerable decline in Kirk membership which set in from c.1960. 
Church attendance data offer a somewhat more sensitive picture: 
















All figures rounded. Adapted from Brierley (1989 & 1999) 



















Catholic figures reflect an aggregate of 'best estimates' by parochial clergy. 
Limited here to CoS and UFC (accounting for 98% of Presbyterian membership in 1900) 
Brierley (1999:2.15) 
Adapted from Brierley (1989 & 1999) 
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It is these data which most graphically highlight the relative decline of the Church of 
Scotland during this period: Presbyterian reunion in 1929 coincided with a fall in the 
number and proportion of actual Kirk communicants. It seems fair to assume that 
average weekly attendance would be considerably lower than the total number of 
Communicants. The most illuminating aspect of the attendance figures, however. is 
that it fits with a contemporary sense of Presbyterian decay. Whilst attendance at 
Catholic and Episcopalian services was increasing, Presbyterian attendance was 
declining. Between 1900-1950 the number of communicating Presbyterians fell by 
11 %, despite a growing Communion roll. Catholic attendance, on the other hand. 
increased by 23% over 1900-50, although this increase was outstripped by the 
substantial growth of the Catholic population. 
There were further reasons for Presbyterian concern during the 1930s, not least that 
the Catholic Church improved and expanded their infrastructure at a time when 
Presbyterianism was undergoing drastic rationalisation. Put bluntly, as Presbyterian 
congregations were amalgamated, buildings sold and ministers pensioned off, the 
Catholic Church extended its physical presence: 
NUMBER OF CHURCHES, 1900-503°: 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 
CoSIUFC 3,458 3,188 3,186 2,920 2,483 2,340 
Episcopalian 354 404 416 415 404 397 
Catholic 279 322 352 397 453 506 
The period 1900-50 saw the number of Presbyterian churches fall by almost a third. 
whilst the number of Catholic churches increased by over 80%. The Catholic 
increase was at its most rapid during the 1930s, with as many churches built during 
that decade as in the previous thirty years. Noticeably, the 1930s also saw as large a 
net decline in Presbyterian churches as had occurred between 1900-30. Whilst there 
had been more than twelve Presbyterian churches in Scotland to every Catholic one 
in 1900, by 1940 it was less than six, and by 1950 less than five. 
)0 Adapted from Brierley (1989 & 1999) 
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Alongside the decline in the number of Presbyterian churches came a sharp decline 
in the number of ministers. Compared to 1900, there were 21 % fewer ministers in 
1930, and by 1950 the decline since the beginning of the century totalled 35%. In 
comparison, the number of Catholic priests in Scotland doubled between 1900 and 
1940, and by 1950 the increase on 1900 totalled 132%. While there had been eight 
Presbyterian ministers to each Catholic priest in 1900, the ratio had halved by 1930, 
and virtually quartered by 195031 . Presbyterian contraction was not so much the 
result of decline, but rather of reunion. Unions in 1900 and 1929 brought the vast 
bulk of the three nineteenth century Presbyterian denominations together: 
rationalisation after c .1930 should come as little surprise. Nevertheless, the 
mechanics of church closure and parish amalgamation tempered the joy of reunion 
and brought to sharp relief Catholic expansion. Catholic expansion was by no means 
a solely Scottish phenomenon: Mass attendance in England increased by 21 % 
between 1900-30, and by 35% between 1900-50, more than in Scotland. The 
increase of English Catholic churches and clergy over 1900-50 was remarkably 
similar to that in Scotland: Catholic clergy increased by 132% in England, 133% in 
Wales, and 132% in Scotland32. One Catholic writer noted: "No other religious 
denomination ... could even contemplate such steady expansion anywhere in England 
& Wales. Most of them were facing a continuous and demoralising decline in their 
numbers,,33. 
This expansion reflects the historic grounding of much of modern British 
Catholicism within poor immigrant - and, in particular, Irish - communities. By the 
early twentieth century the Church found itself in a position where it could meet the 
infrastructural demands of its community. Catholic expansion also reflects the 
improving socio-economic profile of British Catholics, and the removal of the 
educational burden Catholics had faced until the Education Acts of 1902 and 1918. It 
is important to note, however, that the expansion of Catholicism was not prominent 




Adapted from Brierley (1999) 
Numbers in Northern Ireland. on the other hand. remained constant. Brierley (1999:8.6) 
Gwynn (1950b:432) 
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under way. The disappointments of Presbyterian reunion - not least its failure to 
reinvigorate the Kirk - requires careful scrutiny. 
SCOTTISH PRESBYTERIANISM BETWEEN THE WARS 
Discussing Scotland's Protestants brings the problems of defmition outlined in the 
first section of this thesis into sharp relief. Defining a Catholic, then or now, is of 
course problematic, but within Catholicism there is one institutional Church to deal 
with. In contrast, it might be argued that a Protestant need have no attachment to a 
religious institution of any kind. The differences - in theology, liturgy, culture -
between Protestant Churches are outwith the scope of this study but some 
understanding of the internal differences in Scottish Protestantism is absolutely 
crucial in understanding (and contextualising) relations between Catholic and 
Protestant. It is worthwhile to reflect that the greatest challenge to Presbyterianism 
(the dominant form of Scottish Protestantism) between c.17S0 and c.1930 came not 
from Catholicism but Protestantism's "inherent fissiparous" nature. "Scottish 
Protestants spent most of the nineteenth century arguing with each other, rather than 
with Catholics, and produced a de facto pluralism which hastened secularisation,,34. 
It is relatively easy, then, to understand why 'No Popery' campaigning was fairly far 
down the list of Presbyterian priorities. A concerted front against Rome was quite 
impossible whilst Presbyterians were immersed in complex and bitter wrangles over 
buildings and legacies. We must be wary, therefore, of pursuing a simplistic 
Protestant-Catholic dichotomy, in which the Protestant population effectively 
consists of non-Catholics. Even during the 1930s (with the greatest Presbyterian 
fissure reconciled) bitterness lingered between Protestant denominations. It will be 
appreciated, therefore, that the following analysis can by no stretch of the 
imagination be considered a comprehensive account. However, it does offer a broad 
picture alongside the crucial caveat that the Protestant experience, institutionally and 
politically, is far more varied than has generally been allowed for. 
J4 Bruce (1988:157.160). For a sense of Protestantism's complicated Scottish family tree. see 
McFarland (1990: 1 16) 
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The central issue for Presbyterians at the tum of the century was reunion, an 
aspiration significantly advanced with the formation of the United Free Church in 
1900. The key stumbling block to further reunion was the state connections of the 
Church of Scotland. These were gradually severed - and the Kirk effectively 
disestablished - and reunion was secured in 1929. Reunion was motivated by 
ecclesiastical concern over secularism and with the unchurched. The first initiative 
after union was the 'Forward Movement' to 'bring back' 'the Churchless Million'. 
Running from 1930-33 it "failed to catch the national interest, and ... did little to 
instigate real enthusiasm,,35. Indeed, as early as 1931 optimism seems to have waned, 
one Scotsman correspondent arguing that: "To try and win back to empty pews the 
generation of the Great War is probably whipping a fog. The churches on average 
Sundays ... look as if a ruthless epidemic had laid the folk in the churchyard .. 36. Rev. 
John White conceded that the Forward Movement had, at the very least, been ill-
timed: "cradled in prayer but ... started before the country had been properly 
prepared for it,,37. 
There were broader reasons why the period was tinged with Presbyterian 
disappointment, with the dismantling of what had been - between c.1870-c.1920 - a 
significant role for the Churches in local administration. As Callum Brown has 
noted, "the 1920s proved to be cathartic for democratic religious administration,,38, 
with education and welfare passing into the hands of County and Burgh Councils. 
The abolition of ad hoc bodies in 1929 followed the abject failure of the long 
anticipated local veto polls to deliver alcohol Prohibition39. In essence, the 1920s 
witnessed a decisive breakthrough in Scottish administration and social policy for the 
secular state: 
Not only was direct church influence in local democracy diminishing, but 
evangelical social policy was in retreat as the state took greater control of 
public life. The decline in religious control over social policy by the early 
3S C.G.Brown (1997: 141) 
36 Letter in Scotsman, 20/05/3 I 
37 Quoted in A.Muir (1958:337). White was a key architect of union and minister at Glasgow 
Barony CoS. 
38 C.G.Brown (1992:66) 
39 The polls were held in 1920 after decades of campaigning. 
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1930s had a great bearing on public perception of the role of religion. The 
churches - predominantly the Presbyterian churches - no longer held the 
answers to social questions, no longer provided the ideology of social 
improvement. Social salvation was being divorced from religious salvation in 
an unprecedented way ... The old certainties of religious influence. which had 
survived industrialisation and urbanisation in the nineteenth century. were in 
the twentieth being swept away. 40 • 
The 1920s also brought an abrupt halt to warming relations between the major 
Churches and the labour movement. The development of Christian socialism helped 
to produce, by the 1900s, "a convergence [between the Churches and the labour 
movement] in much of the social-policy agenda (though not all of it) and in joint 
work in social investigations and schemes to ameliorate social problems,,41. War. 
Red Clydeside and the Russian Revolution, however, had by c.l918 "created a 
climate of hostility for Christian socialist ideas": 
Turning their backs on social reconstruction, the United Free Church and the 
Church of Scotland joined forces in December 1918 in calling a 'National 
Mission of Rededication'. It was a flop, regarded suspiciously by politicians 
and ignored even by church members. The people seemed unresponsive to a 
national church revivalism, and the churches seemed unresponsive to the new 
political inclinations of the Scottish working classes. 42 
This was by no means a specifically Scottish phenomenon. Protestant Churches 
throughout the modern world turned towards issues of individual morality: 
the trend among conservatives to deal with moral questions rather than 
broader social concerns was a feature of the times. There was in Britain, just 
as there was in the United States, what has been called 'the great reversal': a 
repudiation by Evangelicals of their earlier engagement with social issues.43 
Politically, the mood of the Presbyterian Churches mirrored that of the Coalition 
government which, facing economic slump in 1920-21, returned to the familiar fold 
of laissez loire capitalism. The Presbyterian Churches reneged upon wartime pledges 
of social reconstruction, as the progressive social vision crumbled in the face of 
economic crises. Rather than adjust to the material circumstances of the 1920s, the 
Presbyterian Churches retreated from them: 
C.G.Brown (1992:66-7) 
C.G.Brown (1997: 138). Sec also Knox (1999: 171-3) 
C.G.Brown (1997: 140) 
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For the Churches to remain behind their wartime pledges to reconstruction 
would now [c.1920-21] be to set themselves against the Government, and 
possibly to alienate middle-class church members who were taking the anti-
socialist cause to heart. In the face of growing social division, it seemed that 
the best course for the Church would be to withdraw from any involvement in 
social reform. It should proclaim itself neutral on social issues and restrict 
itself to spiritual work. 44 
In practice, however, there was a distinct political shift of the Churches to the right, 
and by c.l925 Presbyterianism was led by Churchmen of a resolutely Conservative 
hue. One consequence of this shift was that the Kirk "ceased attributing poverty and 
inequality to injustices in the social and industrial system" and instead emphasised 
"the individual moral failings of the poor themselves": 
As the Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland ceased its 
call for reconstruction, it gave increased attention to individual vice. The 
Church and Nation reports after 1921 were devoted largely to condemning 
gambling, intemperance, sexual promiscuity and failure to observe the 
Sabbath, and to calling for censorship of the cinema. By 1923 ... the United 
Free Church were taking a similar position ... The solution to mass 
deprivation was not to reform the social environment, but to transform the 
individual characters of the labouring poor.45 
Salvation in this world became, once again, an individual responsibility - the Kirk 
emphasised thrift, self-help, and self-restraint over collective efforts to ameliorate 
economic hardship. As British politics became increasingly dominated by the schism 
between Socialist and anti-Socialist, such a position clearly aligned the Presbyterian 
Churches with the right. Indeed the Moderator of the UFC declared the defeat of the 
1926 General Strike "a victory for God',46. This rightward lurch swung 
Presbyterianism towards "a new agenda of social conservatism, anti-Iabourism and 
racism". Racism was directed towards Scotland's Catholics, and - as we shall see -
contributed to what amounted to an official Presbyterian campaign against Irish 
Catholic immigration between c.1922-c.193847• As we shall also see. however. 









Rev. James Harvey, quoted in SJ.Brown (1992:91) 
CG.Brown (1997:140). See also Chapter 5. 
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Clyde siders were true heirs of the Covenanters: teetotal, Nationalist and 
Presbyterian,,48. To argue that the leading figures of Presbyterianism were 
Conservatives during the inter-war period, it must be stressed, is not to argue that 
Presbyterians, as a whole, tended towards the right. 
The joy of Presbyterian union was swiftly followed by the social realities of an 
economy on the brink of collapse. At the Union Assembly in October 1929 John 
White, the union Moderator, addressed a rally of 12,000: 
The first task that faces us is that which was a main motive in the reunion 
movement - the moral, social, and the religious well-being of the people of 
Scotland. The Churchless million is a fITst challenge ... In these late years, it 
has grown complex and intensive - a sphinx-like problem. It touches the slum 
and the suburb; woe-land and wealth-land. There must be a girding up of the 
loins. Great things must be done ... 49 
Such great things were overwhelmed by economic crisis and by unemployment. The 
Kirk was ill-prepared, finding itself: "hitched to a socially-conservative, racist, anti-
labour manifesto whilst the leaders of the Church washed their hands of the really 
big issue of the 1930s - unemployment,,5o. 
Whilst efforts to attract the 'Churchless million' into the Kirk did little to alleviate 
the material suffering of many working class families, and material suffering thinned 
Presbyterian attendance: 
During the slump of the early 1930s, working class congregations of the 
Church of Scotland reported church attendance and recruitment of men fell 
sharply because those on the dole would not appear in church without 
suitable clothes and money for collection; in addition, seat-renting continued 
and the poor were often made to apply for suspension of payments or for use 
of free seats ... Though the unemployed and the poor of the inter-war years 
kept their names on the communicants' roll of the Church of Scotland ... the 
stigma of the free seat drove many to the evangelistic missions.
51 
48 lain McLean, Sunday Herald, 30/01/00 
49 Quoted in A.Muir (1958:266) . . 
50 C.G.Brown (1997:141) To Edwin Muir (1935:100): "The Scot1lsh pulpits are as full As a 
drove of fat1ed stirksffhe unemployed are empty asffhe Sunday sermons and the kirks". 
51 C.G.Brown (1997: 152) 
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Such missions provided "an open and effectual door to those suffering through 
unemployment and poverty". Further, they demanded little from attenders "who 
could ... adopt an irregular connection"s2. It might be speculated that this increased 
popularity of independent missions heightened the profile of anti-Catholicism in 
some parts of urban Scotland. Bruce notes the "previously unremarked observation 
that militant Protestant leaders in modem Britain are drawn predominantly from the 
fringes of British Protestantism"s3. A religious milieu stressing traditional aspects of 
Protestantism - including 'No Popery' - was reinvigorated as economic anxiety 
created space for radical political ideas. As we shall see, municipal sectarianism in 
1930s Edinburgh and Glasgow was closely connected to independent evangelical 
. . 
mIssIons. 
Several points about inter-war Presbyterianism must be emphasised. The first is that 
its political meaning was a contested one, the symbolism of the Kirk used not only 
by social Conservatives, but also by the emerging left. Simplistic equations of 
Presbyterian with Conservative must be avoided. Secondly, and crucially, 
Presbyterians felt keenly their declining influence. The period saw Presbyterianism 
lose its position at the heart of Scottish society, and the exhaustion of its key excuse. 
This had been that Presbyterianism divided could not deliver the 'Godly 
Commonwealth' - disappointment came with the realisation that neither could 
Presbyterianism reunited. The following chapters outline a number of Presbyterian 
setbacks: failure to obtain statutory religious instruction in public schools (won by 
Catholics and Episcopalians in 1918); the apathy of the Education elections of 1919 
(and, to a lesser extent, 1925 and 1928) despite that failure; the resounding defeat of 
Prohibition; and, not least, the dismantling of the ad hoc local bodies in 1929. 
Attempts to revitalise Scottish Presbyterianism - such as the National Mission ( 1919-
20) or the Forward Movement (1930-33) - failed to arouse interest. Reunion, so long 
awaited, itself counted in some respects as a disappointment. Union provoked little 
enthusiasm outside clerical circles, and the ecclesiastical hopes invested in the 
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SCOTTISH CATHOLICISM BETWEEN THE WARS 
Whilst the inter-war years represented a period of unrealised aspirations for 
Presbyterianism, for Catholicism the period was largely characterised by 
infrastructural advance and a growing mood of confidence. The Catholic community. 
of course, remained overwhelmingly working class and vulnerable to economic 
downturn, but two aspects of its structure allowed it to cope with the economic 
anxiety of the inter-war decades. Firstly, the Education (Scotland) Act of 1918 
placed full financial responsibility for Catholic schools on the shoulders of the state. 
This not only removed a heavy financial burden from the Catholic community. but 
increased the social mobility of many Catholics through an improved and extended 
system of Catholic education. Secondly, the nature of Scottish Catholicism made it 
less vulnerable to economic dislocation: 
Arguably, the Catholic Church was the best-equipped denomination in 
tackling the adverse effects of economic depression, and does not seem to 
have suffered serious losses arising from recessionary periods. The Catholic 
faith is often seen as being invigorated by the combined effects of poverty 
and discrimination; priests tended to be drawn from the working classes and 
to relate well to economic hardship amongst their parishioners. Though 
Catholics moved increasingly during this period into skilled and white-collar 
jobs, the Catholic community retained a homogeneity which prevented a 
major social divide emerging between a practising Catholic bourgeoisie and a 
lapsed proletariat. 54 
At the same time, the relatively weak economic position of many individual 
Catholics (perhaps a majority of economically active Catholics could be found 
amongst the low- and unskilled) made them particularly (though not uniquely) 
vulnerable to discrimination. This was probably most acute where employment was 
short-term and casual, and where ties of kinship, locality, church or Lodge. played a 
key role in securing work55. The Church reacted to the Depression by forming the 
Catholic Union Advisory Bureaux, offering legal assistance and advice on 
employment and welfare. Without Presbyterian parallel, the Bureaux (op~n to 
~ C.G.Brown (1997: I 52-3) 
55 "Patronage was not an important avenue for unskilled workin~ men in GI~go~' ~.ntil a~er 
the First World War, and those firms that discriminated against Catholics were a mlnortty - Smith 
(1980: 153) 
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Catholic and non-Catholic alike) were set up in 1931 in response to the National 
Unemployed Workers Movement (NUWM), which the Church saw as dangerously 
influenced by the Communist Party. In time: "The idea of advisory bureaux was to 
flower to become one of the most significant forms of mass Catholic social action in 
the whole of the United Kingdom", becoming "the central focus of Catholic Action 
in the Archdiocese of Glasgow"s6. Services such as the CUAB, in conjunction with 
charities such as the St Vincent de Paul Society, formed an additional bond between 
working class Catholics and their Church. 
Although the Scottish Catholic community lay at the northernmost fringes of 
European Catholicism, it was shared in a resurgence of Catholic spirituality and 
confidence: 
the years between the two world wars can be seen in retrospect as the apogee 
of a particular model of Catholicism forged in the pre-1914 era and which - in 
comparison to the much more divided structures of the Protestant faith -
constituted a creative and remarkably effective response to the challenges 
presented by the more urbanised, educated and pluralistic character of 
European society. 57 
In England, this new mood had crystallised around the 1908 International Eucharistic 
Congress in London, an event which proved a triumph. a massive public 
demonstration of Catholic Faith58. The Congress climax was to have been the public 
carrying of the Host "as a test of Catholic piety, English law, and public 
toleration,,59. The Liberal Government dismissed ultra-Protestant protests that the 
planned procession was illegal, but with growing legal uncertainty made private 
representations to the Church. The legal point was never decided as, at the last 
56 Williamson (1998:32-33) 
S7 Conway (1997:2) 
S8 The Church described the Congress as .. the greatest religious triumph of its generation". the 
"flower and fruit" of "the tears and blood of persecution". Catholic £nc.'rclopaedia (19\3): 
'Eucharistic Congresses'. Its aim was to help "to bring back Pr~testant England .to the ~o.~hip of the 
Eucharist .. , the first stage of the triumph of the Holy Church In the great English nation .[Congress 
official quoted in Bohstedt ( 1992: \ 78)] 
~Q Bohstedt (1992: 178) 
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moment, the Church reluctantly agreed to a procession which offered no legal 
controversy - this, even without its sacred elements, proved a triumph60. 
At the heart of this self-confident model of Catholicism - owing as much to the anti-
modernism of Pius X as to the social Catholicism of Leo XIII - '~ere its hierarchy. 
its uncompromising doctrinal stance and its activist and associational structure". At 
the head of the model- between 1922-39 - was Pius XI, under whom Papal authority 
"acquired an unprecedented centrality in Catholic life". "Pius XI was determined to 
liberate the Church from the defensive priorities of the nineteenth century and to 
transform it into an apostolic organisation committed to the rechristianisation of 
modern society,,61. 
One of the most visible outcomes was the Catholic Action movement which "aped 
the structures of modern mass politics and consciously sought to reassert the public 
prominence of the Catholic faith,,62. The view that Scottish Catholicism has 
"Historically ... encouraged a low profile in all spheres of political and sociallife,,63 
fits rather uneasily against the backdrop of the era of Catholic Action. In Scotland 
this manifested itself in a number of ways. Organisations such as the Catholic Truth 
Society (CTS), and the Catholic Evidence Guild (CEG) were well established in 
Scotland by the mid-1920s64• Activists were bolstered by the belief that "In the 
present crisis in the world's affairs, the Catholic Faith becomes ever more clearly the 
one hope of the human race". Catholic Action offered a means to combat Scotland's 
"grotesque ignorance" of Catholic doctrine and represented "a great force for the 
return of Scotland to the Faith',6s. This 'return', in many Catholic circles, was felt to 
be within the reach of the Church. Protestantism, to many. had had its day. In 1929 
60 The legal issue was whether certain provisions of the 1829 Catholic 
Emancipation Act were still in force. See Machin (1983). 
61 Conway (1997:2,40) 
62 Conway (1997:41) 
63 Bradley (1995a:452). Also MacMillan (2000a) 
64 The CTS was founded in London in 1868 and re-established in 1884. [see Ralls (1993» The 
CEQ was founded in 1919/20. Whilst the CTS published Catholic apologetics, the CEG trained lay 
activists for street comer preaching. 
6$ Catholic Truth Society of Scotland. St Andrews & Edinburgh Diocesan Branch. Reports 
(hereafter CTSSIStAE Reports), 1930-31, 1931-32 
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Rev. Ronald Knox, a high-profile convert from Anglicanism, insisted that the 
English CTS should target its propaganda at: 
the normal member of the Church of England, who ... was drifting into 
secularism .. .It must be proved to them that the Catholic Church was the only 
refuge in these times of a sane philosophy and a consistent morality ~ and they 
must have drummed into them a sense of duty. 
The previous day, another priest assured Catholics that: "As people realise that 
Protestantism is dying they must instinctively tum to the ever growing Catholic 
Church. The Church of England was fast becoming a farce ... [it] will soon change to 
a sect and even possibly to an insect,,66. 
Such abrasive disdain towards Protestantism was felt, and expressed, by many 
Catholics during this period. One Scottish priest claimed in 1931 that "The 
Reformation reformed nothing. It deformed everything,,67. Another spoke in 1922 of 
the Devil's amusement at the state of the world: 
and of all the things over which he chuckled ... one must be Protestantism, for 
of all the unmitigated hoaxes that were ever foisted on a credulous world 
Protestantism was about the 'hoaxiest'. (Applause.) People called themselves 
Protestants, and if they were asked what they were protesting against they 
had not the remotest idea.68 
At the Scottish Emancipation Centenary held in Edinburgh in 1929 one speaker 
noted opportunities for proselytism amongst Protestants: "They realised their own 
Churches were losing their grip. They saw on the other hand the Catholic Church, 
constant and unchanging ... but yearly growing in strength and power,,69. The 
Church was thus burdened with the gravest of responsibilities. The CTS warned: 
"All other religious allegiance is dwindling, and if Scotland is not to fall into utter 
paganism, this can only be through the Catholic faith,,70. It should be emphasised, 
66 The Centenary was a triumphant statement of Catholic advance in England, achieving that 
which had been denied in 1908: amongst a march of 30,000 Catholic men "was the largest public 
assembly of priests in their religious dress which has ever been seen in London's streets" - Times 
16/09129; 17/09129; Scotsman 16/09129 
67 Kinning Parle Catholic Monthly, February 1931. 
b8 Fr. Hugh Pope. GH 24/04/22 
69 Dr Patrick McGlynn, Scotsman 16'10129 
70 CTSSIStAE Report 1932-33 
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however, that many Scottish Catholics insisted on the necessity of Christian co-
operation rather than competition: 
To stem the rising tide of paganism in Scotland the day is not far off. if it has 
not already dawned, when Catholics and Protestants must forget their old 
enmities and stand side by side ... to save their nation from the common 
enemy of indifference and unbelief.71 
To some Catholics the 'decline of Scotland' in both national and religious terms 
offered both grave danger, and the opportunity to advance the Catholic faith. By the 
inter-war period, with the numbers of Irish-born in Scotland rapidly diminishing '"the 
Catholic community was increasingly a Scottish community,,72. Rivalries between 
Catholics of Irish and Scottish ancestries had virtually disappeared, and in 1934 one 
priest noted that whilst Presbyterianism represented a difficult obstacle to "the 
restoration of the Catholic faith in Scotland", Scottish patriotism offered a means to 
surmount it: 
the Scots were a people of a very patriotic nature, and ... if they could get 
them to realise that Presbyterianism was, after all, imported from abroad, if 
they could make them realise that the Catholic Church was the Church 
international and super-national, yet in each country national, then they might 
prepare them for the reception of the true faith ... They wanted to save the 
Scottish race ... They wanted a Scotland not only peopled by Catholics, but 
peopled by Catholics who were Scotsmen and Scotswomen. If they did not 
hurry u~ about it, it would be too late, because there was such a thing as race 
suicide. 3 
Such conjunction of 'race', religion and patriotism bear unexpected parallels with the 
Presbyterian campaign against the Scoto-Irish discussed in Chapter Five. It is clear 
that elements in the Catholic Church were as concerned about the state of Scotland's 
national identity as many Presbyterians, although the emphasis laid on the causes of 
Scotland's ills, and the means to remedy them, clearly differed. 
71 Anson (1937:216): "It is mainly ignorance and prejudice which still keep alive the old 
enmity ... and until these can be broken down the enmity will exist. And it is for Catholics to make the 
first advances." 
72 Aspinwall (1991: 100) 
13 Fr. Giles Black. addressing the Caledonian Catholic Association (CCA). EN 30/ II, H. On 
CCA see Scottish Catholic Archives. DE171120 
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SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET 
The 1918 Education Act brought Catholicism frrmly into the mainstream of Scottish 
society and freed up Catholic finances and energies. Some of this energy was 
expended on the creation of two national pilgrimages, at Dunfermline and at Carlin 
Grotto in Lanarkshire. Both attracted large numbers - in 1934 10.000 pledged 
themselves at Dunfermline "to the great work of the conversion of their land": and 
60,000 witnessed the dedication of a statue of St. Patrick at Carfin in 1930. Both 
also proved controversial. Presbyterian bodies were deeply upset in 1930 when a 
Catholic service was held - without permission - in the nave of Dunfermline 
Abbey74. Carfin was a storm centre for sectarian rivalries: the unveiling of 8t. 
Patrick's statue was followed by a Conventicle of 4,000 Protestants. Although 
gathering "without molestation" it closed with "riotous scenes" and four arrests7S. 
On several other occasions, Carlin was to witness street battles during the Marching 
Season. In May 1931 "Wild Scenes" followed an Orange parade, ill-feeling 
continuing for several weeks. A Catholic procession in nearby Mossend-Bellshill 
descended into "mob fighting, the tension being at fever pitch". Another 
Conventicle, attracting 20,000, produced a "wild scramble" and nine arrests, despite 
calls from the platform "to live as Christians at all times" and the urging of the local 
priest that his congregation should "refrain from unseemly conduct". The Catholic 
community viewed Conventicles and Orange marches in Carfin as highly 
provocative. Likewise many Protestants viewed Catholic ceremonies at Carfin, 
Dunfermline and elsewhere as insensitive76. 
Similar disturbances occurred with depressing regularity during the Marching 
Season, ""the level and scale of the violence exhibited between 1931 and 1935 ... of a 
much more serious and concerted nature" than of any period since the reintroduction 
of Orange parades in the 1870s77. In particular, violence was common upon the 
return of Glasgow Lodges from gatherings outside the city. In 1928 there was 
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Glasgow, around 20 arrests being made. The following month eleven arrests 
followed a procession of the Royal Black Institution in Spring burn. In 1929 police 
were attacked by a "rowdy crowd" as an Orange band returned from Larkhall, and in 
1931 "wild scenes ... followed the return of Glasgow Orangemen from Kilwinning" 
with stones and bottles exchanged. Similar scenes in 1934 saw sixteen arrested78. It 
was not simply Orange parades which formed the focus of sectarian violence: 
"considerable excitement prevailed" after an Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) 
procession in Glasgow in 1929, and a 1931 St.Vincent de Paul Society procession 
was "deemed inadvisable" after Orange demonstrators gathered around Bridgeton 
Cross. As police attempted "to disperse the mob" there were "numerous free fights 
and minor disturbances" and "riotous scenes,,79. Rivalry between Glasgow's largest 
football clubs - 'Protestant' Rangers and 'Catholic' Celtic - also spilled over to 
increased violence between fans during the 1930s8o. The most common flashpoints 
were, however, the return of Orangemen to their home districts after Twelfth 
celebrations. Processionists were welcomed by both supporters and opponents with 
acute tension in areas with large Catholic populations81 • 
To some degree the routes chosen by Orangemen were deliberately provocative, 
designed to emphasise the right of 'Loyal citizens' to demonstrate peacefully on the 
public thoroughfares. The violence that such tests of liberty could provoke long 
taxed conservative Orange leaders. Grand Master A.D.MacInnes Shaw warned in 
1933: 
We want to maintain the dignity of our Order. The only way we can do that is 
by showing an example to other people. If we ... allow our feelings to run 
77 Marshall (1996: 147). Local authorities imposed a blanket ban on • sectarian ' processions in 
the late 1850s after serious disturbances - see McFarland (1990:62) 
78 Scotsman 09/07/28; 10/07/28; 13/08/28; 14/08128; 08/07/29; 13/07/31; 1~/07/31; E.\' 
13/07/3 I ; 09/07/34 
79 EN 06/09129; Scotsman 0 I /06131 
80 Times 05/03/34. B.Murray (1984) 
II In 1931. the 'True Blue Band' returned through Gallowgate: "A number of househol~crs in 
the vicinity of Charlotte Street leaned from their windows waving green flags and handkerchiefs. A 
bottle was thrown, and this was the signal for a deluge of stones". Scotsman 1) 07. 31 
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away with us, it gives the opposition a chance to point the finger and say that 
is the behaviour of the Orange Order. 82 
Many individual Lodges, however, not to mention the awaiting hangers on, often had 
more localised, agendas to pursue. Ignoring the cautionary words of their leadership. 
many Orangeman revelled in the provocation of their Catholic neighbours. Likewise, 
many of these neighbours - heedless of priestly appeals for moderation - revelled in 
returning the provocations. 
Inter-war violence peaked in 1935, with forty arrested, and five constables injured. in 
disturbances in Glasgow. Several weeks later "a series of running fights" followed a 
Scottish Protestant League meeting at Bellahouston Park, whilst "bottles, chairs", 
knuckle-dusters and other weapons" were employed in a disturbance outside 
Hamilton's AOH ha1l83. Glasgow was hardly unique in experiencing a high degree of 
sectarian friction as rising tensions in Edinburgh and Belfast caused considerable 
concern. Belfast's rioting was on a scale far beyond that on the British mainland -
with 10 dead, 83 seriously injured and 166 prosecutions - although Glasgow 
Orangemen were enthusiastically involved in disturbances in all three cities84 , The 
poisonous atmosphere of 1935 prompted "informal conferences" between the "civic 
leaders and police authorities" of the affected areas, and it was felt ·'that it would be 
in accord with public opinion if sectarian processions of a provocative character were 
prohibited". Glasgow Council, facing annual policing costs of £2,000 for such 
events, seriously considered the banning of all "religious and pseudo-religious 
processions,,85. There was no blanket ban, but tight restrictions were introduced and 
the only serious incident in the 1936 Marching Season occurred where Loyalists 
paraded without a permit in Parkhead86. Tensions had peaked, and 1935 "was the last 
year that the level of violence exceeded the norm,,87. 
82 GH 10/07/33, Such concerns were long-standing: in 1877 Twelfth Celebrants furled their 
banners upon leaving Glasgow Green "so in no way to offer provocation to their opponents", 
McFarland (1990: 151 ) 
83 Scotsman 08/07135; EN 19/08/35 
84 The Edinburgh disturbances are discussed in Chapter 7. The Belfast riots are documented in 
Hepburn (1990) 
8~ EN 20/07/35 
86 EN 14/09/36 
87 Marshall (1996: 148) 
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Whilst these events reveal that violent sectarian clashes were serious during the inter-
war period (in particular during the 1931-36 slump) it is important to contextualise 
such events within a broader understanding of the nature of street violence. politics 
and protest during the 1930s. Sectarian disturbances in and around Glasgow tended 
to involve larger numbers, and more fearsome weapons, than disturbances elsewhere 
in Scotland. Clashes in Liverpool rivalled Glasgow in their bitterness and violence. 
and both were eclipsed by events in Northern Ireland. Put bluntly, each locality had a 
different repertoire of violence. The Edinburgh disturbances of 1935-36. although 
rowdy and aggressive, were quite different in character to the ritual confrontations of 
Glasgow's Orange and Green factions. The rise in sectarian violence did not occur 
within a social vacuum: the latter 1920s and 1930s also saw a rapid escalation in 
gang-related violence in many British cities, as well as a sharp increase in political 
violence. 
Inter-war Glasgow was a breeding ground for violent gangs, and it is perhaps an 
indication of the relative seriousness of sectarian and gang related disorder that the 
courts punished the latter more severely. This is not to say that the courts treated 
sectarian violence lightly - the evidence suggests the contrary88 - but, rather, that 
there was a conscious recognition that gang violence was an evil meriting 
particularly severe punishment. Two points relating to gang violence require 
mention. Firstly, unlike sectarian disorders, gang confrontations were not largely 
confined to particular periods of the year. Its regularity brought gang violence to 
prominence: the authorities may sometimes have chosen to ride out violent Marching 
Seasons. The second point relates to whether the gangs themselves were organised 
on sectarian lines. Walker, for example, notes the fierce rivalry between Bridgeton's 
ultra-Protestant 'Billy Boys' and "Catholic gangs in the East end"s9. Whilst there can 
be no doubt that religion played some role in the demarcation of gang membership, 
its influence should not be overstated. The resurgent gangs of 1960s Glasgow "were 
18 In May 1931 eight men were tined a total of £35 after a Cartin fracas and warned "if these 
disturbances are repeated. very severe measures will be taken for their suppression." Several weeks 
later two men were gaoled for 30 days each after further trouble erupted. Scotsman 25/05/31; 16.'06/31 
89 G. Walker (1990: 143) 
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formed on a territorial rather than a religious basis,,90 and it might be presumed that 
territorial rivalries equalled, perhaps outweighed, religious divisions within Glasgow 
gangland
91
• Gang violence frequently extended beyond the authorities ability to 
contain them. In 1929, for example, 500 youths "marched from the Bridgeton district 
to Anderston" to revenge a stabbing: police struggled to maintain order and made 
five arrests. In 1931 four young men received gaol sentences with hard labour after a 
clash involving "a knobkerry, hatchet, cutlass, Indian knife, poker, file, police baton, 
'dead' bomb, and bars of iron and lead". The intensification of violence reached even 
the London press, the Times noting in 1934 that "A renewal on a large scale of 'gang 
warfare' ... has caused the [Glasgow] police grave concem,,92. 
Street clashes were not solely the preserve of sectarian mobs and violent gangs. 
Growing tension between the left and the Glasgow authorities, and splits within the 
left itself could, on occasion, manifest themselves in violent form. Most urban areas 
of Scotland had seen considerable disorder during the General Strike of 1926 and the 
extent of this violence in Scotland far surpassed that of the ritualistic confrontations 
of the Marching Season93. The fall of the Labour government in August 1931 split 
the Labour movement and led to bitter confrontations between Labour and I LP 
factions. Further to the left, the Communists, and the Unemployed Worker 
organisations became increasingly active. The differences between the factions of (or 
evolving out of) the Glasgow left sparked violently in September 1931. A meeting of 
the abortive New Party on Glasgow Green saw organised Communist heckling 
amongst the 15,000 crowd and a razor attack on Oswald Mosley94. The key political 
cleavage in Glasgow, however, remained between the left and the authorities. 
Meetings of unemployed workers were broken up and activists arrested. After the 
Chairman of the Moderate Group made dismissive remarks about Glasgow's 
90 Gallagher (1987a:248) 
91 In their voyeuristic No Mean City McArthur & Long made few connections between the 
'razor gangs' and sectarianism. 
92 Scotsman 03/06129; 08/07/31; 09/07/31; Times 05/03/34 
93 There was "considerable disorder" in Edinburgh with five policemen hurt, mounted police 
charges and shops looted. The level of violence and the incidence of looting was much hig~er in 
Glasgow. 200 arrests were made in the Bridgeton area alone where: "The s~~I~ w~ of the Wildest 
description, pots and pans, iron bars, pick heads and hamme~ were used ~ mlss~l~s . Times 100526 
904 GH 22109/31; 03/10/31. Skidelsky (1990:271) attributes Mosley s deciSion to become openl~ 
fascist to the rough reception he received in Glasgow. 
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unemployed, more than 20,000 demonstrators burned his effigy in St. Enoch Square. 
Defying warnings that no further demonstrations would be tolerated, 50,000 gathered 
the following evening at Glasgow Green. A sortie by mounted police caused panic. 
and three days of rioting ensued. On the first night 100,000 windows were broken 
during running battles and a dozen arrests were made - including Shenleston MP 
John McGovern. The following night rioting - and looting - spread across central 
Glasgow with Gallowgate and Bridgeton the worst affected areas. The police, better 
prepared, made 51 arrests95. 
The increase in sectarian violence over the latter 1920s and the 1930s should come as 
little surprise. A time of acute economic anxiety coincided with political flux on the 
left, and a confrontation between that left and the authorities in many parts of Britain. 
The inter-war period, put simply, was characterised by intensely violent periods in 
urban affairs. Whilst much of the literature on political violence during this period 
has focused upon the conflict between fascist and anti-fascist, it is clear that there 
was a general upsurge in violence - political and criminal - and that sectarian 
violence occupied only part of the violent space of Scottish urban life. Focusing on 
the more violent manifestations of Protestant-Catholic division during this period is, 
however, to miss much of the broader picture. Far removed from the politics of the 
street were a number of issues - theological and political - which sharpened the 
divisions between faiths. One such issue - that of 'mixed' religious marriages -
involved and nurtured considerable reservoirs of suspicion and intolerance on both 
sides of the ecclesiastical divide. 
THE NE TEMERE CONTROVERSY 
An important part of the resurgence of twentieth century Catholicism was the 
extension of Tridentine Law across the entire Catholic world - in many . Protestant' 
areas the decrees of Trent had never been fully implemented - in a unified Codex of 
Canon Law. Whilst this Codex was formally enforced in 1918, Tridentine Law on 
95 GH 28/09131 McShane & Smith (1978: 175-6); Scotsman 0211031; 03 10131 
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mixed marriages was extended in 1907 by the Decree Ne Temere96. The 1905 
Catholic Directory for Scotland noted that the Church allowed no mixed marriage 
without a Dispensation. This was granted only "for a sufficiently grave reason" and 
under three conditions: that any children be baptised and raised as Catholics; that the 
Catholic party have "full liberty" in the practice of their Faith; and, "that no religious 
marriage ceremony shall take place elsewhere than before the Catholic Priest". After 
Ne Temere these terms were more forcefully emphasised and an additional clause 
required: "That the Catholic party shall endeavour to effect the conversion of the 
non-Catholic party to the true faith of Christ,,97. 
For ultra-Protestants the Decree was an act of aggression in the domestic sphere, and 
a challenge to Civil Law. Ne Temere noted that "Non-Catholics ... if they marry 
among themselves, are in no way bound to observe the Catholic form of betrothal or 
marriage,,98 - but insisted that Catholics married outside of the Church -
ecclesiastically speaking - were not married at all, living in sin, their children 
illegitimate. Mixed marriages under "grave" conditions were tolerated only on 
sufferance: "For Mixed Marriages [the Church] has no blessing,,99. Bishop Henry 
Graham was deeply concerned about the extent and effect of mixed marriages, and 
his views are worthy of examination. Graham was no ordinary Bishop: only the 
second Scottish Presbyterian Minister to convert to Catholicism since the 
Reformation (the first being his close friend John Charleson), Graham was the first 
ex-Presbyterian appointed to the Scottish Catholic Hierarchy. As Auxiliary Bishop of 
St. Andrews & Edinburgh in the 1920s Graham was a high-profile figure and - often 
exhibiting the zeal and abrasiveness of a convert - highly controversial lOO• 
In 1918, Graham described mixed marriages as "rampant" in Scotland; "a grave evil 
in our midst"; with some parishes "positively plagued by them": 
96 The Decree was issued from Rome in August 1907 and came into force in Scotland the 
following September. It remained in place until 1970. 
97 Catholic Directory/or the Clergy and Laity in Scotland, (1905:37);( 1915:~~) 
98 Pius X (1907:XI-4) 
99 Graham (1921 :2) 
100 Charleson converted in 1901. Graham in 1903. Graham served as Auxiliary Bishop between 
1917-29. McEwan (1973) otTers a highly sympathetic biography. 
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the evil is here: we all know it and see it; and it is a great grief ... to see 
numbers of the flock thus led astray with disastrous consequences to the faith. 
I have found Mixed Marriages, taken as a whole, to be a source of untold e\ il 
to all parties concerned. I beg of you all, therefore, to co-operate with me in 
putting them down. 101 
Graham outlined the Church's "disapproval and disgust" to those mixed marriages it 
accepted on sufferance, refusing all but "the bare necessities" of ceremony: 
[the Church] does all she can to make [the couple] realise that she is standing 
gloomily aloof, her eyes turned away as if she would not look at them; her 
arms folded instead of raised in benediction; not blessing nor favouring the 
marriage but frowning upon it; tolerating it and no more; putting as many 
difficulties as possible in the way of it; only grieving in her Motherly heart 
that any of her children should be so perverse as to wring out of her, as it 
were, with tears, permission for a thing that she detests. 102 
Graham voiced concern over the spiritual welfare of the three Catholic parties in a 
mixed marriage: the Catholic spouse, the Catholic children, and the Catholic parish. 
For the spouse there was the eruption of religious quarrels "especially when there is 
drink in the house and the hatred of Catholicity, which is always there, vents itself': 
What effect has all this on the Catholic party - the wife, I am supposing? Can 
she keep up the fight for long? The chances are she will not fight for the Faith 
at all. The fact of her choosing a Protestant husband was in itself a sign of 
slackness and of weakness ... Almighty God and His Holy Religion are 
banished from the home and the devil reigns instead, and she calls it 'peace'. 
But what of her soul's salvation, living in what she knows, all the time, is 
mortal sin?103 
Conversely, the more the non-Catholic was a 'good' husband and father "so much 
greater is the danger" to the children, who "wonder whether they should follow 
father or mother". In such cases: "almost to a certainty some of them will end by 
marrying Protestants, as their mother did ... In this way hundreds of thousands are 
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To Graham, mixed marriages arose through the "culpable negligence" of parents 
who, when "company keeping with a Protestant" was discovered, "criminally co-
operate in it by silence or consent - perhaps pleased enough to find a son-in-law of 
any kind and at any price". "What a fearful thing to see a bright young life that might 
have formed a happy and contented home with a devoted Catholic husband. brought 
instead to ruin and desolation owing to the callous neglect of her parents" 105. 
Graham's Letter represents a careful re-tracing and buttressing of religious 
boundaries: an ecclesiastical patrolling of the inside of the ghetto walls. His 
comments highlight the gulf in ideas and expressions separating 1918 from the 
ecumenical (and increasingly secular) Scotland of today. Quite simply. religious 
debate in the past was often conducted using terms and allusions that many -
religious or otherwise - would now feel uncomfortable with. This, however, often 
represented separatism rather than conflict: Graham insisted that Presbyterians 
possessed "splendid characters and many natural virtues ... Yet I say, their Religion 
is not our Religion, and it is Religion that counts, first and foremost, with any 
Catholic worthy of the name,,}06. 
A resonant theme here is that of women acting as gatekeepers to the faith of the 
Mother Church. Graham's dire scenarios focus upon the threatened Catholicity of 
wife/daughter, and the ambivalent (or hostile) Protestant husband/son-in-Iaw. 
Catholic parents are urged to protect "their poor, thoughtless inexperienced girl - or 
boy as the case may be" from becoming "snared in undesirable intimacies" and 
"dishonour" 107. Beyond the implied need to protect Catholic girlhood from predatory 
Protestant immorality lies the recognition that, in an era where domesticity was the 
almost inevitable lot of most women, the responsibility for day-to-day inculcation of 
religious beliefs in children - quite literally the raising of good Catholics - fell upon 
women. Hence, Catholic women in particular needed to be shielded from the . grave 
lOS Graham (1918:9) 
106 He also claimed that Scottish Protestants were little better than the "heathen Chinee" -
B.Murray (1984:128) quoting Daily Record, 27/06/23. Kirk historian Rev. J.R.Fleming (1933:1~7), 
however, regarded him as "a man of high character and sincere conviction". 
107 Graham ( 1918:9) 
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evil' of mixed marriage
J08
• Feminine domesticity also spelled danger where it was a 
Protestant wife and mother charged with the care of Catholic children, in such cases 
"the evils mentioned are equally great, if not greater; especially as regards the 
children" 109. 
Sexual overtones are also evident in the ultra-Protestant reaction both to mixed 
marriages as a whole, and to Ne Temere in particular. Some Protestants feared that 
priests encouraged Catholic men to seduce Protestant women "to betray the faith of 
their fathers and [to] betray their country,,1I0. Rev. Frederick E. Watson (CoS -
Bellshill West) warned of "the terrible tragedy" of mixed marriages and argued that 
Ne Temere had introduced: 
a state of priestly interference and insolence that cannot be tolerated in 
Protestant Scotland. These priests are purveyors of social misery who must be 
brought to book if Scotland still retains her soul. Homes are being wrecked, 
husbands and wives separated, and children denied the care of parents, as the 
result of the sheer inhumanity of the Decree. 111 
For Watson, however, the key issue was the "solemn and sinister significance" of the 
alleged challenge to Scottish Civil Law: 
We are not seeking to interfere with the Roman Catholic Church in the 
discipline of her own members; she may prohibit her members marrying 
Protestants, but if they do so, she has no right to declare that such marriages 
lawfully made are invalid, and the children of such marriages are illegitimate. 
Yet this is what she does ... it offers a challenge of far-reaching consequence 
to any free and democratic state, which must be met and defeated if the 
paramountcy of the Civil Law is to be maintained. This is the crux of the 
problem. If the Civil law in Scotland is to reign supreme, then the Decree Ne 
remere must be withdrawn by the Roman Church. 
Watson proposed Parliamentary legislation to bolster civil law against the challenge 
of Rome. This was not an entirely fantastic proposal: both New Zealand (in 1920) 
108 McCrone (1998: 122-3) notes of national identity that women are often seen "as keepers of 
history; men [as makers]of the future": women act "as reproducers of the boundaries of national 
ftroups through restrictions on sexual relations". 
09 Graham (1918:8) 
110 Rev. Duncan Cameron (CoS - Kilsyth) quoted in S.J.Brown (1991:20) 
III Watson (1934:3.12). Watson (1884-1954), fonnerly a Methodist minister in England, and 
ministered CoS Bellshill West (1931-37) and St Andrew's Galashiels (1937-54). 
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and New South Wales (1925) passed such legislation1l2. Watson conceded that 
Scotland had offered "only sporadic opposition" but warned: 
It is unbelievable that Scotsmen will be content to lie supine and watch the 
priest flout the Civil law of the land, as he is doing while enforcing the 
Decree Ne Temere. The action of Rome in our midst strikes at they very 
foundation of civil liberty. The issue raised is not so much a matter of 
religious belief as an affair of civil freedom. It is an arrogant claim bv Rome 
to control the home. 113 • 
Whilst the issue in Britain aroused nothing like the interest it had (briefly) enjoyed in 
Australasia, there is evidence that the hardened Catholic position caused concern to 
some influential Protestant clerics. Watson - despite claims that his "strong views" 
expressed opinions that "a large number of ministers and their congregations ... 
shared, if in a somewhat modified form,,114 - was a peripheral figure in Scottish 
Church politics. In 1930-31, however, the issue provoked a remarkable public 
controversy between leading Churchmen in Liverpool. 
In late 1930, Dr. Albert David, Anglican Bishop of Liverpool, asked of the city's 
Catholic Archbishop, Dr. Richard Downey: "whether it was by his authority that 
Roman priests continually asserted that partners in mixed marriages who were 
unwilling to submit to Roman ... conditions were not married, and that their children 
were illegitimate?". David alleged that "Roman priests brought relentless pressure 
upon non-Roman partners in mixed marriages" and complained of "attacks" made on 
the Church of England by the Catholic Evidence Guild. David claimed that pressure 
was especially exerted on "the unlearned and the poor": 
It is upon the industrial population in the Roman Catholic dioceses of 
Liverpool, Lancaster and Glasgow that the Roman Catholics are 
concentrating these methods of force and fear, so alien to the mind and spirit 
f Chr' 'th . '1 . lIS o 1st, WI a pltl ess vIgour ... 
The claims came at a moment of high religious tension in Liverpool. A few weeks 
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winning one working class ward. Liverpool was very much a city in which "sectarian 
differences had been re-animated,,116. 
Downey retorted that: "Since [David] admits that priests have every right to declare a 
marriage invalid in Church law, why cite five cases of it?": 
His Lordship has wasted a great deal of time proving what is already 
admitted. What he has to prove is that the Catholic Church denies the validity 
of mixed marriages in civil law. It is regrettable that ... His Lordship did not 
make himself better acquainted with the law of the Catholic Church with 
regard to mixed marriages before launching his reckless attack. 
Downey dismissed the "flimsy and unsubstantial" allegations, based, he claimed. 
upon "hearsay evidence [which] would not be entertained in any court". On the issue 
of the CEG, Downey noted that David tolerated anti-Catholic lecturers in a city 
where Protestants "throw stones at defenceless nuns and the children under their 
charge,,117. Rather weakly, David warned Downey that any further "public attacks" 
by the CEG, or interference in "mixed marriages, contracted or contemplated" would 
result in the publication of full details in his Diocesan magazine. Downey called his 
bluff: six weeks later David announced that the situation had "distinctly improved" 
and that "the priests have, at any rate for the time being, abandoned this method of 
persuasion". He warned, however, that his clergy would "continue their 
watchfulness" 1 18 . 
The Liverpool controversy highlights a number of important points, not least that 
senior 'mainstream' Protestants were as concerned with mixed marriages as 
peripheral firebrands like Watson. But it also showed that the core of the issue was a 
semantic one: priests were telling Catholics that they were - in terms of Canon Law -
living in sin, their children illegitimate. It is this caveat, · in terms of Canon Law', 
which formed the point of contention. The subtle distinctions between illegitimacy 
in the eyes of the Church and in civil law (and, far more importantly. of friends, 
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non-Catholics 119. The Church itself did not always make the distinction clear, as 
shown in one Glasgow parish magazine in 1933: 
It is a very serious sin for a Catholic to attempt marriage before a non-
Catholic minister or a Registry Office. Even if only one of the parties is a 
Catholic, neither ceremony is a marriage at all. The parties are bound to put 
their marriage ri~t, as it remains null and void in the sight of God until set 
right by a priest. I 0 
Evidence that lay Catholics misunderstood or misinterpreted the Church's position 
can be found in a curious civil case in the Court of Session in 1930. Witnesses to an 
irregular marriage were sworn to secrecy because the Catholic groom feared 
religious difficulties with his family over the marriage. Upon his death. the family 
contested the non-Catholic wife's claim upon the estate. Once the marriage had been 
irrefutably proven, they insisted that there could have been no consent, on the basis 
that as a devout Catholic the husband could not in good conscience have contracted 
such a union. Lord Pitman dismissed their claim: 
His Lordship was unable to accept the suggestion that although [the husband] 
went through the ceremony he was not to be bound by it. If the defenders 
were to succeed in the case, it came to this, that a Roman Catholic who went 
through a ceremony and used words which were recognised by the law of 
Scotland as sufficient to constitute marriage ... was still entitled to say that in 
his heart he had given no consent at all just because his religion did not 
recognise such a marriage. 121 
There is little to back Watson's assertion that this case represented part of a broader 
campaign of the Catholic Church to "govern the social life of the nation"I22, but it 
does suggest that the issue of mixed marriages was a source of misunderstanding -
and antagonism - even amongst and between Catholics. 
The impact of Ne Temere in Scotland bore little relation to that in the Irish Free 
State, where the written promises required had force of law. A recent discussion in 
119 See. for example. the case concerning a County Down mixed marriage at the height of the 
Liverpool controversy. Scotsman 07/01/31 . . . . . 
120 Kinning Park Catholic Month(v. February 1933. E":,phasls In the o~lgl~al. The artIcle 
concluded: "All this. of course. does not apply when both the parties are non-Cathohcs. 
121 Scotsman 19/06/30 
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Ireland produced public apologies from Catholic Bishops who saw the Decree as 
"contrary to the spirit of Christian generosity and 10ve,,123. Nevertheless, the issue 
was contentious enough to warrant the investigation of the Church of Scotland in 
1937-38. They found it was "not a major interest except in some few localities, the 
great number of replies giving no indication to its effects"124. Crucially. there was no 
particular pattern of apostasy: "It is true that changes of denomination are almost 
entirely due to mixed marriages but the Church of Scotland seems to gain as much as 
it loses by such changes,,125. Handley, approvingly noted the report's finding that Ne 
Temere was not an issue of widespread concern, could not accept its conclusions. 
insisting that mixed marriages resulted "in almost all instances to a diminution of 
Catholic faith that becomes a total loss in succeeding generations,,126. 
CONCLUSION 
A number of factors were in place by the late 1920s which made Scotland fertile 
ground for acrimony between Protestants and Catholics. The dislocating effects of 
political flux and economic crises, allied to conflict in Ireland from c .1916, and 
widespread fears over the 'End of Scotland', produced conditions within which 
suspicion and resentment could flourish. Scotland, of course, was hardly alone in this 
experience: social and political conflicts over issues of resources, social authority, 
national identity, and - indeed - religion, were endemic during the period. The period 
was, in Hobsbawm's phrase, "the age of catastrophe,,127. The controversies over Ne 
Temere offer us a useful way of understanding the general picture of religious 
politics in inter-war Scotland. Behind the careful patrolling of denominational 
boundaries undertaken by clerics on all sides, there is the bare fact that the . ghetto 
walls' were, in fact, rather more permeable than those clerics liked to admit. Concern 
over mixed marriages reflected - whilst, paradoxically, obscuring - the fact that 
Catholics and Protestants were ignoring the 'ghetto' in the selection of their 
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they in the public realm. The next chapter shows the inability of the Catholic Church 
to dislodge the Labour loyalties of the Catholic electorate OYer birth cl)ntrol or 
Catholic schools. Movements of Catholic Action. whilst imbuing much of the 
Scottish Catholic community with a new found self-confidence. had little politil..'al 
impact beyond the specifically Catholic milieu. As the following charters will 
demonstrate, this had less to do with a majority Protestantism yigorously containing 
the 'Roman menace'. than with broader processes of secularisation in whid1 
religion's position in the public sphere was diminishing. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
"DUMB DOGS" AND "BONNETED CHIEFTAINS" 
The questions addressed by this chapter are complex, and to some degree can only be 
approached obliquely. Principally this chapter investigates the extent to which 
religious issues, or religious identities, impacted on Scottish politics in the inter-war 
period. It requires to be re-emphasised here that British politics typifies what Whyte 
has called an 'open' religio-political system. Religious separatism in Britain. 
therefore, has tended to be more social and cultural, and has had to accommodate 
itself to an open party political system. The problems of such an accommodation, 
and the limitations of religion's role in Scottish politics, is the primary concern of 
this chapter. The chapter will also illuminate the crucial difference between religious 
separatism and religious bigotry. Separatism refers to the belief that the faithful 
should refrain from undue contact with other faiths, or indeed with the secular world. 
In other words, the proper place for a Catholic is the Catholic Church and a Catholic 
marriage, their leisure time enjoyed with fellow Catholics in lay Catholic 
organisations, their children in a Catholic school. Separatism was less well defined 
for Protestants, but Church, youth and Temperance organisations did provide an 
institutional framework within which to lead a • Protestant' life. It can readily be seen 
that separatism represents a diluted form of the pillarisation characterising a number 
of European societies between c .1879-1960. Such separation implied a value 
judgement upon the Other, of course: a Protestant life was encouraged in part 
because it was seen as superior - morally and culturally - to that of a Catholic or 
secular life. It is here that separatism and bigotry coincide: religious bigotry relates to 
an active opposition to another faith, to (attempted) interventions into, and 
denigration of, its activities. This lays stress on the qualities of the Other as 
dangerously immoral. untrustworthy. as Hell-destined heretics. 
LABOUR AND THE 'CATHOLIC VOTE' 
Key to the rise of the Labour Party in the inter-war period was their ability to attract 
the 'Catholic vote' after 1922. The significance of this section of the electorate -
strongly represented amongst the urban poor - increased considerably after franchise 
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reform in 1918. Prior to c.l918 ··the political habit of the Catholic yote \\as ... to 
regard itself as unaligned. ready to vote wherever it thought pressur~ could b~5t b~ 
brought to bear to secure its aims,·I. In practice. this meant voting Libcral in what 
"proved to be an often tense marriage of convenience rather than a genuine 
.., 
partnership""'. Initially at least, this was mirrored in the Catholic-Labour relationship. 
On some issues, notably Ireland, there was a historical congruence of Catholic and 
Labour interests. On others there was scope for misunderstanding and mistrust. 
Catholicism, as an international institution. has long looked \\'ith some disdain on 
'-
modern ideas in politics and culture, and in particular those of the left. Under Leo 
XII I the Church developed a distinctive voice on social and political issuL's. most 
notably through the 1891 encyclical Rerum .vovarum which "chartered a precise 
middle course, a third way between the extremes of liberal laisse:-./clire capitalism 
and collectivist secular socialism,,3. From the late nindeenth century the \' atican 
criticised the social conditions created by capitalism. but more forcefully attackL'd 
socialism as "proposing a remedy far worse than the e\il itsdl'". S()cialism \\'as 
denounced as "a deadly plague": "a \\icked confederacy": and "an alluring poison··-t. 
'Christian socialism' elicited no s,)'mpathy. Leo XII I believing it a particular danger: 
although the socialists. stealing the very Gospel itself with a \'ie\\' tu decL'jn: 
more easily the unwary. ha\e been accustomed to distort it so as to suit their 
own purposes, nevertheless so great is the difference bet\\een their depraved 
teachings and the most pure doctrine of Christ that none greater could exist: 
"ror ... what fellowship hath light \\'ith darkness",5 
This was a \'iew echoed by national Hierarchies. In 1883 Herbert \' aug han, Bishop 
of Salford, warned "'that the doctrines of socialism wcre deriyed from the teachings 
t' s ,,6 o ,atan . 
1\ kl'atTn .. 'Y ( 1 (PS I:' I) 
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In 1931, Pius XI addressed the pressing issue of whether the reformist tradition of 
moderate socialism was acceptable to the Church: 
But what if Socialism has really been so tempered and modified as to the 
class struggle and private ownership that there is in it no longer anything to 
be censured on these points? ... This is the question that holds many minds in 
suspense ... We make this pronouncement: Socialism, if it remains truly 
Socialism, ... cannot be reconciled with the teachings of the Catholic Church 
because its concept of society itself is utterly foreign to Christian truth ... 
Religious socialism, Christian socialism, are contradictory terms; no one can 
be at the same time a good Catholic and a true socialist.7 
Of course, such a declaration was open to considerable interpretation and, m 
practice, Catholicism could be reconciled to socialism where it was moderate and 
where anticlericalism was weaks. The dominance of social democracy in a Labour 
Party only loosely committed to socialism meant that problems between Catholic and 
Socialist interests were not to the forefront of British politics, as they were 
elsewhere. Reconciling the world views of Catholic and socialist was hardly 
straightforward, but prior to the Great War: "the [English] Catholic hierarchy was 
able to convince itself that the Labour party, despite the socialists within it, was not a 
socialist party of the type ... condemned by Rerum Novarum,,9. Events such as the 
Bolshevik Revolution, wartime industrial unrest, and Labour's formal adoption of an 
ostensibly socialist constitution in 1918 put this interpretation under some pressure. 
However, the English hierarchy: "decided finally to continue to follow the line that, 
although the views expressed by some party members was abhorrent to the church, 
Labour was still not intrinsically socialist" 10 • 
Good relations between Labour and the Catholic hierarchy were contingent on 
Labour remaining a moderate party which did not threaten Catholic interests: "the 
Catholic Church was prepared to be adaptable provided Labour was disposed to be 
reasonable"ll. By the 1920s, the Church happy to "secure Catholic influence within 
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Catholics in socialism" 12. The Church accepted that the material interests of its 
community would draw it towards Labour, and that its key concern should be to keep 
Labour moderate13• As the Catholic Herald editorialised prior to the 1923 general 
election: 
The Tory Party is the party of privilege and monopoly. It is repulsive to every 
Catholic of democratic instincts. Liberalism is played out. The battle of the 
future will be between Labour and Toryism and unless Labour is 
revolutionary or anti-Catholic, it will command an overwhelming proportion 
of Catholic support. 14 
Of course, the term anti-Catholic here means the promotion of policies not to the 
Church's liking. This, rather than extremism, was to prove the key area of tension. 
In Scotland key figures such as John Wheatley and Patrick Dollan acted as bridges 
between the worlds of Catholicism, Irish Nationalism and Labour. but their 
relationship with elements of the Catholic community was often bitter. Wheatley 
(1869-1930) eventually developed a fairly cordial relationship with the Catholic 
hierarchy, but not without difficulty. In 1912 Wheatley's effigy was burned by a 
Catholic mob, and he faced frequent accusations of atheism and anticlericalism 1s. By 
the mid-1920s, however, he epitomised the opportunities for political and social 
advancement offered by the Labour movement to Catholics. In this crucial period of 
the Labour-Catholic relationship Wheatley's impact was profound. 
In the approach to the 1918 election it was widely felt that the 'Irish vote' would be 
highly significant in Scotland 16. However, the election found "the Irish political 
machine in unprecedented disorder as a result of the war and the experience of the 
Easter Rising"I'. The heart of the machine, the United Irish League (UIL), was tom 
between those Liberals who had remained sound on Ireland, and the realisation that, 
on Ireland, Labour possessed "the purest and most constant record". An awkward 
12 W.M. Walker (1972:666). See also Riddell (1997: 172) 
13 "the keynote became not the safe separation of Catholic[s] [from Labour] but the need for a 
Catholic presence acting within it as a purifying force". W.M.Walker (1972:665) 
14 London Catholic Herald, 17111123, quoted Riddell (1997: 169) 
15 See Gilley (1989); Hannan (1988); l.S. Wood (1980 & 1990) 
16 Scotsman 18/11/18: 09/12118 
17 McKinlay (1991:132) 
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compromise emerged whereby Labour was given "general support" except where 
"long and loyal service compelled [the UIL] to continue their adhesion" to Liberals. 
Sinn Fein, growing in influence, gave unreserved support to Labour and there was a 
clear "disposition among certain prominent [UIL] Nationalists" to do likewise l8 . In 
1918 the 'Free' Liberalsl9 suffered "a rout and humiliation on a scale almost 
unparalleled in British politics" losing all five of their Glasgow MPs20. If Catholics 
deserted the 'Free' Liberals, it is not clear that they had yet switched their allegiance 
to Labour. Gordon Brown has claimed that in 1918: "for the first time, the West of 
Scotland's Irish community swung decisively behind Labour, but that was not 
enough ... The decisive breakthrough in the industrial areas was still to come,,21. 
However, Labour fared poorly even in areas with a high concentration of Catholics: 
the Coalition won two-thirds of the vote in Glasgow, notwithstanding the high 
number of Catholic voters in the city22. 
By 1922 the British Catholic vote was definitely committed to Labour, and 
henceforth would constitute "one of the most consistently pro-Labour elements 
within the working class,,23. Labour's crucial breakthrough in 1922 depended upon 
several interlocking factors: 
the recruitment of the unskilled to Labour as the divisive issues of wartime 
socialist politics faded into the background; the ending of the electorally 
damaging association between Labour and prohibition; and, far the most 
important, the swing of the Irish machine from Liberal to Labour in national 
elections, and its increasingly loyal commitment to Labour in local elections. 
Of course, the three overlap. Not all unskilled were Irish, but most of the Irish 
were unskilled ... [and] much of Glasgow Irish community life revolved 
around the public house ... 24 
From the Catholic perspective we might add the committed support of the labour 
movement for Irish nationalism. Overtaken by events, the UIL agreed in 1920 that 
18 Several UIL branches openly backed Labour. 
19 'Free' Liberals were that section of the Party opposing coalition. 
20 Cook (1975:6-7). Only four of Scotland's 19 'Free' Liberal MPs were returned. 
21 G.Brown (1986:92) 
22 The Scotsman (09/12118) estimated Glasgow's 'Irish' vote at one-third of the electorate. On 
factors which "artificially depress[ed]" Labour voting, see McKinlay (1991: 133) 
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"it was in the best interests of the Irish to throw in their lot, wherever possible, \\ith 
the Labour party,,2S. 
The timing of this decision is curious, as Labour's long-standing commitment to 
Temperance jarred against the importance of the Trade in Catholic community life. 
Tension on this issue came to a head in 1920, when a general municipal election in 
Glasgow coincided with a Veto Option po 1126. Labour reaped limited benefit from 
the keen interest in working class wards. The commitment to Prohibition had become 
"an albatross round the neck of the Labour leaders of Clydeside,,27 and Labour's 
response was swift and simple: it dropped Temperance. Glasgow's Irish Wets, 
opponents in 1920, were quickly absorbed28 bringing immediate benefits. Whilst the 
left had limited campaigning resources: 
By contrast the Catholics had all the advantages of a tightly-knit community 
bound together by the bar, the pulpit, and the 'ethnic' press. The socialists 
were uncomfortably aware of the power of the public house as a hostile 
committee-room in 1920, and it was a power that could be turned to 
advantage only by having Irish community leaders, who were publicans or 
shopkeepers, as Labour candidates.29 
Whilst accommodating the national inclinations and the socio-economic concerns of 
Scotland's Catholics proved relatively easy for Labour in the 1920s, there were still 
issues which required very careful negotiation. The Church remained suspicious of 
the radical left of the party, and few priests were willing to publicly back the 
programme of Parliamentary Socialism. It fell to Melbourne's Archbishop Mannix, 
visiting Dundee in 1921, to bestow "a blessing on the Labour Party, here now and in 
the future,,30, in British terms, "an utterance without precedent, and probably without 
echo or emulation,,31. Concerns that contact with the far left had an eroding effect on 
the faith of Catholic workers were widespread, one writer noting in 1937: 
GH 10/08120 
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secure. In 1921 six Glasgow Labour candidates were connected to the UIL and 'the Trade'. 
29 McLean (1983: 185) 
30 Quoted in W.M.Walker (1979:470), On Mannix, see Santamaria (1978), Evatt (1942). 
McKernan (1976) 
31 W.M.Walker (1979:470) 
167 
"Dumb Dogs" and "Bonneted Chieftains" 
One of the greatest dangers to Scottish Catholics at the present time, at least 
to those in the industrial areas, is the rapid growth of Communism. where 
men are exposed on every side to infection from propaganda from Russia by 
close association with non-Catholics in the Labour world. It is not easy to 
combat such propaganda, and it can only be done by the intensive education 
of our own men in the principles of the Church's social policy. 32 
Such education was being attempted in Scotland, through the Christian democrat 
oriented Catholic Social Guild, the various organisations of Catholic Action, and (on 
its margins) through the Distributist League and the Catholic Land Movemene3. 
Some British Catholic intellectuals regarded the corporatism of Italian fascism as 
fitting well with the teachings of Rerum Novarum, although this was "atypical of the 
Catholic Right [which] had distinctly British roots,,34. 
British Catholicism was, however, mainly concerned with its ongoing relationship 
with the moderate left, and the Catholic press - dominated by the titles of Charles 
Diamond - tempered its support for Labour with an acute sensitivity to any leftward 
drift35. This could be expressed in combative terms - in the mid-1920s the ILP was 
attacked as "practically a Communist Party" possessing an "affinity to 
Bolshevism,,36, and, following the 1931 encyclical, one English title declared 
"Socialism is the Devil,,37. The Church "remained convinced in the late 1920s that 
too many prominent Labour figures were in sympathy with ... Bolshevik [Russia],,38. 
Catholic papers deprecated Labour's 1929 manifesto pledge to restore diplomatic 
relations with the Soviets, viewing the USSR as "a red-handed, anti-God state,,39. 
Neither was the Catholic press averse to recommending Conservative candidates 
where it deemed the Labour nominee unacceptable. Finding John McGovern 
unpalatable as Wheatley's successor, for example, Diamond backed Unionist 
William Templeton in the 1930 Shettleston by-election. Templeton - it duly emerged 
]2 Anson (1937:202) 
]] See Keating (1996); T.A. Fitzpatrick (1999); Scottish Catholic Archive HC 6/1-7, HC 6111 
34 Webber (1986:64). See J.S.Bames (1924a & 1924b) 
35 "[Diamond's] Dundee Catholic Herald supported .. Labour .. with reservations, and always 
provided Labour was prepared to be lectured." W.M.Walker (1979:472) 
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- had strong Orange links. Shettleston Catholics who had taken Diamond' s advice 
might have though twice before doing so again 40. 
Two issues which threatened the Labour-Catholic alliance were those of education 
and of birth control. Electoral losses in Glasgow in 1927 were attributed to Labour 
policy on contraception, with the Glasgow Observer warning that "'the mere mention 
of birth control is enough to set the Catholic electorate on its hind legs,,41. Labour 
leaders removed birth control from the policy agenda42, but the issue remained 
locally sensitive. Dundee's ILP were warned by the Catholic priest providing their 
hall that "blatant propaganda of such subjects as birth control, divorce. secular 
education, etc., would necessitate ... withdrawal of the ... premises,,43. Birth control 
deeply divided Catholic and non-Catholic elements within the British Labour 
movement, and during the 1920s "members and Catholics - both inside and outside 
the party - were coming to blows over the issue,M. Battle lines were not easily drawn 
between Catholics and the left: Wheatley, as Minister of Health in 1924, dented 
lingering clerical suspicion by refusing to change existing policy. Wheatley's 
appointment may itself have been "partially a result of a deliberate strategy to block 
birth control legislation" by the Labour leadership45. H.G. Wells felt that the Labour 
Government were pandering to the bigotry of celibates, "the unpleasant feelings and 
imaginations of priests and elderly lady spinsters,,46. The first Private Bill proposing 
public provision of birth control services revealed that the issue had "a larger and 
more varied base of support than had been recognised". Heavily defeated, it found 
more Labour opponents than supporters: Rev. James Barr (Labour - Motherwell) 
justified his opposition by claiming that "religious prejudices are just as sure a guide 
as science itself,47. Whilst elements of the left opposed birth control, it was also clear 
that many individual Catholics supported it, if not by public pronouncement then 
40 Gallagher (1987a: 194); Marshall (1996: 129); Scotsman, 21/06/30 
41 Glasgow Observer, 05/11127 - Quoted in Gallagher (1987a:192) 
42 See Soloway (1982:288-296) 
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through private practice. A declining Catholic birth rate led to calls for a return to the 
teaching of the Church, with the New Zealand Tablet complaining in 1937: ""The 
Catholic family is no longer, in a great many cases, what it used to be. We see one, 
two, and alas, worse still, none, where there used to be seven, nine and even more 
lusty scions of Catholic stock,,48. 
Catholic practice followed the Church more faithfully in the realm of education. 
Whilst, as the next chapter demonstrates, the religious education question had been 
answered in Scotland by 1918, in England & Wales the issue remained politically 
volatile. Catholics were satisfied with Labour's commitment to the Scottish 
settlement, but the English question highlighted a secularist strain in Labour's 
attitude to education. Like Temperance, secular education was increasingly soft-
pedalled by Scottish Labour49• In England, however, the Catholic-Labour 
relationship was strained in the 1920s because of Church concerns over the education 
policy of future Labour Governments. Before the 1929 election Labour was unable 
(or unwilling) to give the Church the assurances it sought: Conservatives, traditional 
champions of Anglican schools, were well placed to do so. Remarks by Cardinal 
Bourne, Archbishop of Westminster, on Socialism's "false principles", were 
"judiciously and anonymously" circulated but with little discernible effect. Labour 
entered Government for the second time, with their Parliamentary representation 
almost doubled5o. 
By the late 1920s a substantial number of Labour MPs felt personally (or electorally) 
committed to the protection of Catholic interests. Disagreements over schools peaked 
in January 1931 when 43 Labour MPs opposed the Education Bill. An Amendment -
proposed by John Scurr - attempted to tie the raising of the school leaving age to 
financial concessions to Catholic schools51 • The decision to call Scurr's bluff went 
badly wrong, despite Ramsay Macdonald's warning that "Under the cloak of what to 
48 Quoted in Van der Krogt (1998:322) . 
49 In 1919's Glasgow Education campaign. two Labour candidates argued against "the 
denominational teaching that put schools at enmity" and were not elected. A third. silent on the issue. 
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me is a legitimate religious claim, the whole position of the Bill is going to be 
knocked into smithereens"S2. 
The Scotsman described the Government defeat as "the most decisive which they 
have yet suffered" noting: 
the atmosphere was peculiar ... Behind all this was the fear of electoral 
consequences ... [Labour MPs] preferred not to commit themselves to speech. 
and onlookers had the unusual experience of seeing members who had 
derided Mr Scurr's argument go into the lobby [and vote] for his amendment. 
53 
Whilst Labour gained office despite Catholic misgivings, it found itself unable to 
secure educational reform without the goodwill (or the acquiescence) of its own 
MPs, a large minority of whom were not prepared to alienate Catholic voters. Some 
saw this as unprincipled: Jennie Lee (Labour - North Lanark) rejected Maxton's 
warning that: "You can't fight both the Labour machine and Catholic prejudice in 
West Scotland - make up your mind!" and voted against the Amendment54. Lee was 
amongst 27 Scottish Labour MPs to do so (the remaining 11 abstained), and it has 
been claimed that months later: "Controversy over the Scurr amendment cost Labour 
many seats and was the decisive factor in North Lanark"ss. 
Given the crisis which engulfed Labour in 1931, it is difficult to discern any effect of 
Catholics as Catholics in Labour's crushing election defeat. Lee alleged that Catholic 
prejudice intensified after Pius XI denounced socialism in May 1931, claiming: 
"Churches, chapels and press are out for blood"s6. There is certainly considerable 
evidence that the Catholic Church welcomed the idea of a National Government after 
the Labour split in 1931: 
the concept of a national administration free from the party political and. c~ass 
tensions had obvious appeal to the Catholic Church. It was not surpnSIng. 
'2 239 HC Deb.5s:1526-27;1546 (29/05/30); 247 HC Deb.5s:253 (21/01131) 
'3 Scotsman 22/01/31. The B ill was defeated 282 votes to 249. 
54 The Glasgow Observer opposed Lee in the 1929 by-election on education and birth control. 
Scotsman 21/03129. Hollis (1997:32.39) 
" Foot (1962:149). Lee (1980:94) complained: "I was livid with contempt ... All they cared 
about was saving their seats. They succeeded. 1 went under." 
56 Quoted in Hollis (1997:58) 
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then, that ... the Catholic hierarchy grasped the notion of National 
Government with both hands. The extent to which Catholic voters followed 
this lead is impossible to quantify. 57 
Riddell concludes there is "evidence to suggest that Labour may have experienced a 
disproportionate loss of its vote in the heavily Catholic areas of England and Wales", 
this being of "considerable secondary importance" to the 1931 result. He also 
concludes that the 1918 settlement in Scotland, and the fact that Scottish Labour 
"had been more careful ... not to offend Catholic opinion" meant that this pattern was 
not repeated in Scotland58• 
We should be cautious, then, in accepting Lee's analysis: of the eleven Scottish 
Labour MPs who abstained on the Scurr Amendment, seven subsequently lost their 
seats despite, presumably, a reservoir of Catholic gratitude59• Labour held St. Rollox 
in a 1931 by-election despite Church advice that Catholics should not support their 
candidate whose "opinion and advocacy of ... birth control is in direct conflict with 
the moral teaching of the Catholic Church,,60. The Scotsman noted that .. the 
disappearance of an element which [Labour] have hitherto regarded as mainly on 
their side is a disquieting indication of what may happen elsewhere,,61. However, any 
anti-Labour Catholic factor operated only in specific and localised conditions. In 
Dumbarton, David Kirkwood represented a division with one of the highest 
concentrations of Catholic voters in the West of Scotland: despite voting against the 
Scurr Amendment and his (then) leftist politics, Kirkwood held on to his seat in 
October 1931 62. 
It is extremely difficult to gauge the extent to which the Scottish Catholic-Labour 
electoral alliance was under stress during such episodes. Certainly Lee saw herself 
betrayed by a reactionary Catholic caucus, although left wingers survived in seats 
S7 Riddell (1997:193) 
S8 Riddell (1997:191-192). See also Fielding (1993:122-24) 
S9 Scurr also lost h is seat. 
60 Mgr Daly, Glasgow's Vicar General. quoted in Scotsman. 07/05/31 
61 Scotsman 09/05131 
62 In the Division 30% of marriages in Clydebank during 1931 were Catholic (compared to 
50% CoS); in Dumbarton more marriages were Catholic (43%) than were CoS (3)0 0 ). Annual Report 
of the Registrar Generalfor Scotland [hereafter RGS). 1931 
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with a greater Catholic presence. It is also interesting that Labour made a substantial 
recovery in Scotland in the later 1930s despite the explosive issue of Spain. Little 
work has been undertaken into the problems that Catholics had in reconciling 
electoral and religious loyalties on the Spanish Question, but it seems likely that 
many did so only with some difficulty. Similarly, pro-Republican elements found it 
difficult to maintain cordial relations with some sections of the Catholic community. 
John McGovern dismissing one priest as "an apostle of Christian terrorism". The 
same year 70,000 Catholics gathered at a Carfin Mass "for the crimes committed 
against the church in Spain,,63. Although the relationship was maintained, it has been 
suggested that Spain had the potential to overwhelm the Catholic-Labour axis: 
Undoubtedly, the Spanish Civil War engendered more heat and controversy 
in Glasgow than perhaps any other British city, but the political after-effects 
were remarkably few. If a general election had intervened between 1936 and 
1939 or if the Labour Party and the Catholic Union had been under the 
direction of less pragmatic figures ... the outcome might have been 
different. 64 
Against this view it can be noted that in the late 1930s the left - even accounting for 
Labour-ILP schism - consolidated its majority on Glasgow Council65. Five 
Parliamentary by-elections were held in the West of Scotland during the period 
1936-39, and their results do not suggest a reluctance to vote Labour. Indeed, Labour 
gained Dunbartonshire and Greenock as the Spanish Crisis unfolded in 1936
66
. The 
Greenock victory followed a municipal election campaign in which the Glasgow 
Observer accused Labour, in their Spanish policy, of having "joined the war against 
Christ,,67. William Knox argues that "there is little evidence to show that the Labour 
Party was harmed by its stand over Spain ... Labour's vote remained remarkably 
stable, in spite of the outpourings of the Catholic press,,68. The key target of the 
Catholic press was the ILP and Knox suggests that Catholic tactics may have "been 
63 Quoted in Gallagher (1987a:211.206) 
64 Gallagher (1987a: 213). In 1937 86% of Gallup respondents thought Franco's Junta should 
not be recognised as the legal government of Spain. Polls in 1938 saw support for Franco at only 7-
9%. Gallup (1976) 
65 Labour/lLP held 65 seats in 1934 and 66 in 1938. 
66 Of marriages celebrated between 1934-36. 27% in Greenock and ::!5.S
o
o in Dunbartonshire 
were Catholic. RGS. 1934-36 
67 Glasgow Obserwr 0311 0/36. quoted in Gallagher (1987a:207). see also Knox (1988:623) 
68 Knox (1988:623) 
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not to alienate Labour as a whole, but to target hostility on the ILP as a warning .. o~. 
Indeed the choice of A.D. McInnes Shaw, Scotland's leading Orangeman, as 
candidate in Springbum in 1937, suggests that Unionists held out little hope of a 
Catholic backlash over Spain. 
Despite areas of potential tension, the electoral alliance held fairly well, Labour soft-
pedalling sensitive issues in return for Catholic support. The conditional nature of 
this support was reflected in low rates of Catholic activism within the party 70. In 
Glasgow the religious distribution of Labour councillors matched the religious 
distribution of the city: elsewhere, and at a national level, Catholics were under-
represented in positions of authority within the party. Bradley claims this stemmed 
from the "sensitivities of Protestants and secularists" in the party, and a recognition 
by "dominant figures" that "to have Catholic candidates would have been 
detrimental,,71. Against such a view we might point to "dominant figures" who were 
Catholic, had Catholic backgrounds, or who had excellent relations with their 
Catholic constituents72. Secularism was soft-pedalled in most spheres of Labour 
politics, and - as we shall see - a Protestant influence was very strong on the Scottish 
left, and on good terms with the Catholic presence in the party73. A fuller 
understanding of the lack of Catholic Labour activism might look to the energies 
expended in specifically Catholic activities. Further, one cannot escape the long-
standing suspicion of the Catholic Church towards the left, and to its radical elements 
in particular. Clerical suspicion and fear of "anti-Christian" policies did not make 
simultaneous activism within the Catholic Church and the Labour Party particularly 
comfortable. 
69 The Glasgow Observer [31/10/36] claimed that "no Catholic can be a member ~f the I~~ 
because it is an avowedly Socialist organisation and at present an ally of the Communist party . 
Quoted in Knox (1988:624) . ' .. 
70 Over the inter-war period. less than 8 per cent of Scottish Labour offiCials. actIVISts ~d MPs 
and slightly under one-fifth of Glasgow Labour councillors between 1922-40 were Cathohc. Knox 
~ed.] (1984:29-30); McLean (1983:222) 
I Bradley (199Sb:9S) 
~ E.g. Wheatley. DoHan, McGovern: Ma.xt?~. Buchanan, Johns~on.. .. 
73 Of 59 Labour officials, unoffiCial actIvIsts and MPs dUring the mter-war. pt:~lod whose 
affiliations were known, twice as many were 'Protestants' PS) than were 'secularlsts (18). The 
remaining 6 were Catholic. Knox [ed.] (1984:29) 
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THE PROTESTANT LEFT 
Unsurprisingly, in a country where Presbyterianism dominated religion, Scottish 
Labour was deeply influenced by the Reformed Faith. Not all Presbyterians shared 
the rightward shift of their Church leaders, some complained that "The Church [of 
Scotland] preached to the rich and at the poor: it was quick to direct its 'tirades' at 
working men while saying nothing about the profiteer or the exploiter of labour .. 7",. 
Neither was the left without influence at the heart of Presbyterianism. Rev. James 
Barr remained highly influential in the UFC, although his adherence to Church 
voluntarism saw him marginalised by the later 1920s75. Labour Governments had no 
difficulty in finding a Lord High Commissioner for the Church of Scotland' s General 
Assemblies - South Ayrshire MP James Brown, an active Kirk elder. was cordially 
received in 1924, 1930 and 1931. Whilst Christian socialism may have been 
marginal to the policy initiatives of the Presbyterian churches it remained highly 
influential on the Scottish left. The view of Edinburgh's Rev. John Glasse (CoS, 
Greyfriars) in the early twentieth century that "Socialism is ... really an attempt to 
apply Christian principles to practical life,,76 remained popular. To Camlachie MP 
Campbell Stephens, a former UFC minister, socialism was "the economic fulfilment 
of the Sermon on the Mount,,77. Church membership amongst the inter-war Scottish 







Few, if any, ... could accept Marx's materialist concept of history ... Man was 
more spirit to them than the product of changing material circumstances. 
Clinging to religious or quasi-religious views it was difficult for a class 
analysis of Scottish society to emerge among the labour elite. The struggle 
was between good and evil; of fairness and decency against rapaciousness 
d I ·· 79 an exp oltatlon. 
Letter to Rev. John White quoted in SJ.Brown (1992:91) 
See Bogle (1983) 
Quoted in Knox (ed) (1984:27). On Glasse see McCabe (1998) 
Quoted in Knox led] (1984:32) . 
Knox led] (1984:29-30). See also Riddell (1997: 177) 
Knox led] (1984:33) 
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The same could be said for the Labour Party throughout Britain: Hobsbawm quotes. 
with unconcealed surprise, a survey of Labour MPs in 1929 which found that ··only 
eight declared themselves to be agnostics or atheists,,80. 
The Protestant commitment of Labour MPs surfaced clearly in the heated debates 
during 1927-28 on the proposed Revised Anglican Prayer Book. Scottish Labour 
Members played a key role in the Book's defeatSI • Opposition, across all parties. was 
theologically grounded: Rosslyn Mitchell (Labour - Paisley) argued the House was: 
"dealing with a great principle that goes right down to the very roots of religious 
life": 
In one generation, with [the proposed] Book. you can swing over all the 
children of England from the Protestant Reformed Faith to the Roman 
Catholic Faith ... I do not believe that the Church of England can permanently 
endure to be half-Reformist and half-Romanist. Either it will be the one thing 
or the other. Let the Church choose which it will be, and not throw the 
obligation on us. If they do, I for one, confirmed, convinced and determined 
in my Protestantism, thanking God from the heart that there were men who 
formed the Reformation which cleansed the Catholic Church as well as gave 
birth to the Protestant Church - I myself can do nothing but vote against this 
measure. I do not want to do it, but I can do no other, so help me God!82 
The interjection of Scottish MPs into English religion infuriated supporters of the 
Bill. Opposing a revised measure in July 1928, Rev. James Barr emphasised that by 
definition the State Church was accountable to all in Parliament: ·'We are told that 
Scotsmen should take no part in these discussions. One writer said that the rejection 
of December last was brought about by . Jews, Welsh ranters, and Scottish infidels'. I 
am one of the Scottish infidels"s3. 
A strong Protestant identity - and a belief in fundamental theological differences -
could be, and was, reconciled with Parliamentary Socialism. Another observation is, 
perhaps, more important. Mitchell's views might suggest anti-Catholicism, yet 
80 Hobsbawm (1959:128,141). Hobsbawm's source is Franz Linden. (So:ialismlls und Religion. 
Leipzig 1932) who also found that Anglicanism. was un~er-represent~d.. . 
81 A 'Protestant' critique can be found an HarriS (1928). Thirty-SIX Scottish MPs oppo~. the 
measure) in December 1927 - including ten from the Labour benches - and only 6 (all Unlonasts) 
supported it. 
82 211 He Deb. 5s:2566-67 (15 112127) 
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nothing could be further from the truth. Mitchell and Barr were hardly being anti-
Catholic - that was not the issue - they were defending a distinctive Protestant 
identity which they saw as under threat from 'ritualists' within the Church of 
England. They displayed a frrm belief in religious separatism - that the proper place 
for Catholic practice was within the Catholic Church, Protestant in the Protestant -
rather than a desire to stir religious conflict. This, indeed, was the religious 
orthodoxy of the times: the ecumenical movement had not yet reached beyond the 
broad confmes of Protestantism. 
THE CATHOLIC RELIEF ACT 
Scotland's Labour MPs also played a prominent role in the passing of the Catholic 
Relief Act, 1926, removing most of the remaining Catholic disabilities from the 
statute book. The Act was the legacy of sectarian animosities around Carlin where a 
Corpus Christi procession had, since 1921, become a highlight in the Catholic 
calendar. In 1924 the Procession was removed to private grounds after Motherwell 
MP Hugh Ferguson brought the dubious technicalities which had arisen at the 1908 
London Eucharistic Congress to the attention of the police. One English 
Conservative complained that arcane legislation could "be put into force at the 
instance of a common informer, a creature who is despised and loathed by 
everybody". Any feeling of ultra-Protestant success was short-lived as Parliamentary 
concern produced a Private Bill within six weeks84. Ferguson defied his Labour 
critics: 
There are some here, I know, who had a big majority in Scotland last time, 
but if they support this [Bill] they will not get back, and I will see to it that 
they do not get back. ... We in Scotland shall know exactly where they stand. 
That is what we want. We will fight this matter at the next Election, and they 
will realise it. 
George Buchanan replied that he was prepared "tomorrow to go back to my Division 
[Gorbals] and fight him on this issue", and complained that Lanarkshire Police had 
83 218 He Deb 5s: 1272 (14/06128) 
114 Francis Blundell (Con.- Onnskirk). 191 He Deb.5s:238 (03/02126) See McGhee (1965). 176 
He Deb.5s:2756 (05/08124) 
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"given in to a lot of local bigots"s5. At the General Election three months later 
Labour lost 12 Scottish seats, but this had little to do with any religious issue. One 
Scottish constituency bucked the trend: Motherwell. Ferguson's Parliamentary career 
was ended by Labour's Rev. James Barr, an outspoken advocate of the Relief Bill-
Ferguson's challenge had been answered in full. 
There was more to the issue than processions as the 1829 legislation meant that 
Catholic religious orders, technically illegal organisations, could not claim tax 
rebates available to charitable bodies. As one MP noted: "That takes the grievance 
from the academic sphere into the practical". In 1926 a revised attempt was made to 
fully extend to Catholics "that charity and toleration upon which all civilised 
religions are based"s6. The Third Reading of the Bill demonstrated the marginal 
position of ultra-Protestant interests in Parliament, even when Parliamentary 
Unionism in Scotland was relatively strongS7• 
Attempting to exclude Scotland from the Bill, Sir Alexander Sprot argued the 
measure would "encourage" religious processions and "a great deal of trouble would 
be occasioned". In support, A.D. McInnes Shaw insisted that "rancour and ill-feeling 
... may be engendered by passing this measure too quickly". Barr, however, insisted 
that the Bill would add to Scotland's "great pyramid of freedom", founded in "the 
very blood" of the Covenanters: 
I object strongly to the proposal made here that Scotland should be the last 
refuge of bigotry, injustice and inequality ... Is our Protestantism so weak in 
Scotland that we cannot stand to see those of another faith parading in the 
streets? 




We have been told that there is a strong anti-Catholic feeling against the Bill 
... My constituents number 41000, and I have received one penny postcard 
against the Bill. The fact of the matter is that in Scotland there is no feeling 
176 HC Deb.5s:2618, 2619, 2625 (04/08/24) 
/9/ HC Deb.5s:238 (03/02/26); 192 HC Deb.5s:2305-2308 (10103/26) 
The Unionists took 36 of 71 Scottish seats in 1924 with 41 % of the votes. 
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whatsoever against this Bill. On the contrary, the general feeling is that the 
Bill oUght to be passed without any discussion at all. 88 
With the Amendment heavily defeated the Third Reading passed without further 
vote, Sprot's Amendment the only point upon which the Scottish implications of the 
Bill were tested. Sprot's supporters consisted of one Liberal and 23 Conservatives, of 
whom seven were Ulster Unionists; nine English Conservatives; and seven Scottish 
Unionists. Two of the Scottish Unionists were Orangemen and all were on the right 
of the party. These seven represented an ultra-Unionist rump - the bulk of Scottish 
Unionists abstained or absented themselves in the knowledge that English 
Conservative and Labour votes would defeat the Amendment89: 
SCOTTISH VOTES ON THE SPROT AMENDMENT: 
Absent! 
Supported Opposed Abstained Total 
Unionist 7 5 24 36 
Labour 19 7 26 
Liberal 1 3 4 8 
Other 1 1 
Total 8 27 36 71 
The episode is imbued with irony, not least that the lasting success of the anti-
Catholic Ferguson was the removal of almost all the remaining Constitutional 
disabilities to Catholicism90• It also revealed the weakness of anti-Catholicism in the 
Commons, and the marginality of ultra-Protestant issues to the broader concerns of 
Parliamentary Conservatism. 
UNIONISM AND PROTESTANTISM 
The weakness and marginality of anti-Catholicism at a time when the Unionists 
enjoyed a majority of Scottish Parliamentary seats illustrates the absence of 
symmetry across a religio-political divide. Whilst one can identify a Scottish 
Catholic vote which supported the moderate left, there was no identifiable Protestant 
88 200 HC Deb.5s:1586-92,1587 (03/12/26). Sprot, MP for North Lanark, was not an 
Orangeman whilst Shaw was Scottish Grand Master. 
89 Five Scottish Unionists voted against the amendment, including the Solicitor General and the 
Scottish whip. Stanley Baldwin, then Prime Minister, was another notable opponent. 
90 On the remaining disabilities see Forsyth (1999) 
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(nor even Presbyterian) vote. let alone one which tended towards the right. Such 
asymmetry is hardly surprising, but worthy of exploration. The Catholic community 
had as its focus a single religious institution with a rigid hierarchy of authority: its 
own schools, press and lay organisations; strong ethnic: was geographically 
concentrated and overwhelmingly urban and working class. Scottish Protestantism. 
on the other hand, encompassed a myriad of denominations. classes and regions: had 
no press of note; nor (after 1872) did it have its own schools91 . Crucially. the 
parochial role of the minister was quite distinct from that of the priest. Clerical 
authority was accepted by Catholics in ways that Protestants could not tolerate: 
The most obvious feature of Irish Catholic parochial life was the power 
exercised by priests ... Veneration of the priesthood \vas of course traditional 
among the Irish, although ... obedience was not an unfailing reflex. No doubt 
the power of the priest reflected his superior education. his influence oyer the 
distribution of a little of the goods of this world, and his monopoly of the 
means of transport to the next. 92 
Priestly power can be overstated, but it must be emphasised that all yariants of 
Protestantism "share a common rejection of the Church as an institutional 
authority,,93. In political terms, the Catholic Church had a role in directing the vote 
of the faithful not enjoyed - nor sought - by Protestant Churches. Priests \\ere \"ithin 
their authority in exhorting parishioners to vote in a Catholic way: ministers \\ho did 
likewise would be ignored at best, and more likely seen as abusing their position. 
Protestant Churches did dabble in politics. but had neither authority nor inclination to 
organise and lead a Presbyterian, or a Baptist, or an Episcopalian "ate. 
It is clear, however. that prior to c.1914 there was in the industrial \\'est of Scotland 
"a popular Toryism based on the fusion of religious and imperial ideals .. 
94
. As Colley 
has argued, Protestantism. broadly defined. proved a crucial component in thc 
forging of the British nation-state: 
9\ 
to the questions: Who were the British, and did they e"en cxist? 
Protestantism could supply a potent and effectiye answer. perhaps the only 
SL'L' 8rueL' (1985b:592) 
\\'.~l\\·alker (1972:657) 
Bruce (1 I)X5b:598) 
\\',dker & C;allagher (1990b:87) 
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satisfactory answer possible ... Protestantism was the foundation that made 
the invention of Great Britain possible. 95 
The removal of France as Britain's foremost rival and Catholic Emancipation in 
1829 "unavoidably compromised Protestantism's value as a national cement" and 
"Britons could no longer posture so confidently as being exclusively and uniquely 
Protestant,,96. Though a linking of Britishness, Crown and Empire to Protestantism 
lingered, the meaning of Protestantism was increasingly contested. In Scotland, '"the 
success of the Liberal Party in tapping the democratic and culturally distinctive 
strands of Presbyterian tradition" must be emphasised97. Whilst most Tory-British-
Imperialist segments of the Scottish population were Protestant, not all Protestants 
exhibited such inclinations. Presbyterianism was "ripe for plunder by Liberal and 
Labour political movements in search of historic, democratic and egalitarian 
credentials,,98. 
There remains the question of how far - and indeed how often - political parties 
sought to explicitly draw upon anti-Catholicism to mobilise support. Writing in 
1936, after intense conflict in Belfast and disturbances in Edinburgh, Compton 
Mackenzie complained that: 
We know only too well that the savage, nay, the sub-human bigotry of 
Orangemen is beyond calculation, and we know with equal certainty that 
such ferocity would never have been tolerated but for the base interest one 
political party has in fostering it with the hope of political advantage. It is 
difficult to free the mind of the suspicion that the Protestant agitations both in 
Belfast and Edinburgh have been systematically fed by the secret elements of 
that same political party. Yet to divert into dark, foul channels the ?rowi~ 
discontent of the Scottish people ... is a very dangerous method of draInage. 
Yet the "political advantage" to be gained by the Unionists, or anyone else, in 









Walker & Gallagher (l990b:87) 
Walker & Gallagher (1990b:87) 
Mackenzie (1936: 177) 
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ORANGE-TORY CONNECTIONS 
Some Tories had strong Orange connections in the inter-war period: Sir John 
Gilmour one of the most prominent Unionists of the period, became an Orange man 
in the early 1920s and, as the Order's "most significant recruit", was appointed 
Honorary Deputy Grand Master (HDGM)loo. Six other inter-war MPs were 
Orangemen: Thomas Moore in Ayr (1924-64); McInnes Shaw in West Renfrewshire 
(1924-29); William Templeton in Banff (1924-29) and Coatbridge (1931-35); Hugh 
Ferguson in Motherwell (1923-24); Aylmer Hunter-Weston in North Ayrshire (1916-
35); and John Baird in Ayr (1922-24)101. Another figure of note was Sir Charles 
Cleland, Glasgow Tory Chairman (1914-25) and Chairman of Glasgow Education 
Authority (1919-30), also HDGM. The existence of such connections must be 
tempered by the recognition that the Order did not always find its interests 
represented. While Moore and Shaw supported the Sprot Amendment, Gilmour, 
Hunter-Weston and Templeton abstained. As a Government Minister, Gilmour did 
little to further the curtailment of Catholic Irish immigration demanded by both the 
Order and influential elements of the Church of Scotland (see below). As a leading 
figure in educational politics, Cleland "took a far from anti-Catholic line,,)02. 
Orange-Unionists "could not always deliver to those of its supporters who believed 
that 'Protestant interests' had to be looked after,,103. It might also be noted that 
Moore, who had supported Sprot, took pains to cultivate his Catholic constituents: 
Thus, in 1932, he found himself opening a Roman Catholic bazaar ... just 
hours before he ... was to address a gathering of 4,000 Orangemen. At the 
Catholic function he had declared that 'he was very happy to be associated 
with his friends in the Roman Catholic faith ... They were all common stock 
and they all had the same heavenly father' . 104 
Frank Dorrian, Shaw's deputy and successor as Grand Master, resigned from the 
Unionists in 1939, bitter that "the Order no longer had any real voice at all in the 
100 Marshall (1996: 127-28). Gilmour had the portfolios for Scotland (1924-29); Agriculture 
(1931-32); and was Home Secretary (1932-35) 
101 The only reference found to Baird and Hunter-Weston as ·Orange' MPs is G.Walker 
(1992: 187) so their connection should not be overstated. On Ferguson see Duncan (1991) 
102 G. Walker (1995:76) 
103 G. Walker (1995:76) 
104 Quoted in Gallagher (1987a:148) 
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affairs of Scottish Unionism,,105. One might question the extent to which it ever had: 
Orange history is replete with complaints that Conservatives took its support for 
granted. In the 1890s, the Conservative Government was warned that: "Orangemen 
would only support a Conservative candidate where they supported Orange 
principles": 
Glasgow MPs could come to their Orange soirees and talk a lot of amiable 
nonsense but when Protestantism was at stake they sat like a lot of dumb dogs 
... Unionists were smiling now on rebels and traitors ... while they insulted 
Orangemen and those who placed them in power ... Let them as Orangemen 
be neither Conservatives or Liberals in the future but Protestants first and 
foremost. 106 
Tensions between Orange leaders and a 'Protestantism before Politics' faction 
amongst the membership were high during the 1920s, due to the Irish Treaty and 
Unionist support for the 1918 Education Act. Tension peaked in 1922 when Grand 
Lodge withdrew its representatives from the Scottish Unionist Association ~'as a 
protest against the treatment of Ulster [and] the Irish Peace Treaty,,107. This withdrew 
Grand Lodge from a Unionist conference which backed the Treaty '~solely on the 
grounds that ... the alternatives were impossible". Although Sprot protested 
"surrendering to the murder gang of Sinn Fein" he received little support, and the 
Treaty "was carried by an overwhelming majority,,108. SUA acceptance of the Treaty 
revealed the dominance of moderate, pragmatic, figures in Scottish Conservatism. 
Only three Scottish Unionist MPs signed the backbench 'Die Hard' manifesto of 
1922. The manifesto demanded withdrawal from the Coalition, a return to traditional 
Conservative values, a more forthright stand against Socialism, and attacked the Irish 
Treaty109. Amongst the bulk of Scottish Unionism pro-Coalition sentiment remained 
remarkably strong. 
lOS Marshall (1996: 153) 
106 Quoted in McFarland (1990:201) 
107 GH 12101122. This representation - two seats on the powerful Western Divisional Council's 
executive committee - was won in 1913. 
lOB GH 20/01122 
109 The 'Die Hards" were "peripheral figures with ... little chance of success" Webber (1986:23) 
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THE ORANGE & PROTESTANT PARTY 
Calls for a Protestant party were raised during the "episodic estrangements" between 
Orange and Unionist, and in 1922: "Dissent culminated in a characteristically half-
hearted political adventure"llO. Shortly after the SUA conference, the Order 
announced the formation of the Orange & Protestant Party (OPP) having: 
"unanimously decided that the time had now arrived when the Orange Order should 
make an independent stand in all spheres of political work in upholding and 
defending their Orange and Protestant principles"lli. 
We should be cautious in reading too much into the OPP. For Marshall it was 
straightforward "damage limitation": 
The formation of what appeared to be a separate political party probably did 
just enough to appease the resentment that many rank and file Orange men felt 
for the Scottish Unionist Party at this time whilst enabling the Grand Lodge 
to channel that resentment in a more constructive direction than might 
otherwise have occurred had it done nothing at all. 112 
At no point did the OPP stand candidates against Unionists, and its first electoral 
foray proved disappointing. Standing two candidates in Motherwell during the 1922 
education elections, the OPP discovered the limited scope, even at a very localised 
level, of the Orange vote. A disciplined turnout in an Orange stronghold was not 
enough to secure the return of Ephraim Connor, a high profile Orange activist I 13. 
At their next opportunity, the 1922 General election, activity was again centred upon 
Motherwell. In 1918 local councillor, Hugh Ferguson, opposing the official 
Coalition-Unionist nominee, came fourth and last with 11 % of the poll. In 1922 the 
Unionists withdrew their candidate from Motherwell in favour of a Liberal, and 
Ferguson, standing with OPP support (and Ephraim Connor as his election agent), 
came a good second. The winning candidate - Walton Newbold - was the first 
avowed Communist elected to Westminster. Ferguson's evident popularity, and his 
110 McFarland (1990:213) 
III GH 22/02122 
112 Marshall (1996: 117) see also G. Walker (1992: 186) 
IIJ GH 10/04/22. Connor was a regular columnist in the Orange Standard and a militant anti-
socialist. G. Walker (1992: 184); Mcivor & Paterson (1992: 137); McShane & Smith (1978: 124-5) 
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determination in standing, persuaded the Unionists not to contest the seat in 1923. 
The Times noted: "Motherwell is an extraordinary constituency ... Nowhere outside 
Ulster is there more bitter enmity between Protestants and Roman Catholics": 
As Unionist candidates go, Mr. Ferguson stands alone. He is the Kirkwood of 
the right. In the circumstances it is not surprising that his candidature has not 
received official [Unionist] recognition. Nevertheless, where Motherwell is 
concerned it would be unwise to leave him out of account. 114 
Ferguson captured Motherwell at his third attempt, benefiting from a focused anti-
Labour vote: 
MOTHERWELL & WISHAW 1922 & 1923: 
1922 % 1923 % 
Newbold (Labour) 8262 33 Ferguson (Ind.) 9793 42 
Ferguson (Ind.) 7214 29 Newbold (Labour) 8712 37 
Maxwell (Liberal) 5359 22 Maxwell (Liberal) 4799 21 
Colville (Nat.Lib.) 3966 16 Poll- 77% 
Poll- 81% 
The 'Protestantism before politics' faction now had Parliamentary representation but 
this merely served to illustrate their marginality. Taking the Unionist whip, Ferguson 
proved a figure of ridicule lls. Proposing that "another Oliver Cromwell arose" in 
Ireland, Ferguson received a number of rebukes from the Speakerl!6. His 
Parliamentary achievements were to provoke the Catholic Relief Act and the charge 
from his own benches that he was "loathed by everybody"! 17. 
Ferguson was unseated in 1924, Labour helped by Liberal withdrawal. Rev. James 
Barr's candidature stamped Labour's campaign with a resolutely Protestant hue -
undermining Ferguson's central platform. For the Times: "The crux of the issue is 
whether the natural desire of the Roman Catholics to defeat an Orange candidate will 
be strong enough to send them to the polls in support of a Protestant clergyman 
114 Times 28/11/23. The comparison with Kirkwood was not intended as flattery. Ferguson's 
social background and fiery temperament (see GH 05/04122) alienated 'respectable' Tories. 
115 171 HC Debs 5s: 551, 556 (19/03124) 
116 See 171 He Debs 5s (19/03124); (24/03/24); 172 He Debs 5s (15/04124). 174 He Debs 5s 
(18/06/24); 175 He Debs 5s (09/07124) 
117 191 HC Deb 5s: 238 (03/02126) 
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wearing Socialist colours"lIs. The straight fight assisted Ferguson's vote, but the 
larger rise in the Labour vote suggests that Motherwell Catholics were happy 
supporting a Socialist clergyman, and so too were erstwhile Liberals: 







Motherwell bucked the 1924 trend as the only Scottish seat Labour took from the 
Unionists. Ferguson's political career switched to education, but he managed only a 
single term (1925-28) on Lanarkshire Education Authority. Ironically, the election 
which removed Ferguson from Parliament returned McInnes Shaw, "a man firmly 
entrenched in the Scottish Unionist establishment". Shaw's Grand Mastership "was 
almost certainly the death knell" for the Opp119. 
THE 'ORANGE VOTE' 
The limited success of the OPP in Parliamentary and educational politics highlights 
that an 'Orange vote' in inter-war Scotland "a highly questionable phenomenon". To 
a large degree this is because "the Order cannot easily regulate the political 
behaviour of its membership,,120: 
The 'Orange vote' only existed in the sense that there were a number of 
constituencies in West Central Scotland which contained a sizeable Orange 
presence but this fact on its own could not guarantee the election of a 
Conservative candidate ... Therefore, great care must be taken when 
discussing the Orange vote; it was always episodic or particular in character 
d . I h 121 an never a unlversa p enomenon. 
As a key Unionist concern between the wars was the absorption of middle-class 
Liberalism, appealing to Orange sentiment was potentially damaging to the Unionist 
cause: 
118 Times 21110124 
119 Shaw urged .. those who would associate the Order with politics not to do so. By making the 
movement political, they would rob the Order of a great deal of its strength". Marshall ( 1996: 124) 
120 Walker & Gallagher (1990b:92) 
111 Marshall (1996:87) 
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The Tories, therefore ... became increasingly distant from the device of 
playing the Orange working-class card, which had been dabbled with in pre-
war years. The party, of course, would not spurn such support, but as a 
general rule, it did not strive officiously to solicit it. In the later 1930s ... the 
Scottish Unionist Association carefully detached itself from involvement with 
a renewed Ulster loyalist agitation. 122 
There was also a clear propensity in traditional Orange areas to consistently elect 
Labour candidates. 'True Blue' Bridgeton was a Labour stronghold never threatened 
by the Unionists, and where Shaw's candidature in 1935 saw the Unionist vote/all. 
In the Orange heartlands of Ayrshire and Lanarkshire many lodges enjoyed "a kind 
of rapport" with the leftl23 • In 1923 the Order responded to the election of a Labour 
Government by insisting: 
that any member, male or female of the Orange Institution who joins the ILP, 
Communist or other socialist political party or who allies themselves 
politically with those bodies is to be expelled from the Order. Disloyalty 
cannot be tolerated. 124 
Grand Lodge "found it increasingly difficult, and indeed hopeless" to stem such 
'disloyalty': "Their political message ... was often simply ignored, and its success in 
winning the Orange working class vote for the Unionists was ... strictly limited". 
Labour's advance depended in great part in securing the support of Protestant 
workers: "some of this vote, it can be suggested, was also Orange-coloured" 125. 
Some inter-war Unionists "still used the language of loyalism" to appeal to the 
Protestant working class 126, but many Protestants, including Orangemen, placed class 
interests over such appeals. There is evidence that some Unionists saw their 
commitment extending no further than talking an appropriately Protestant game. 
Orange readers of Buchan's Three Hostages must have read 'Sandy Arbuthnot's' 







Walker & Gallagher (1990b:91) 
Quoted in G. Walker (1992: 190) 
G.Walker (1992: 194) 
G.Walker (1995:77) - emphasis in original. 
187 
"Dumb Dogs" and "Bonneted Chieftains" 
The chief row was about Irish Home Rule, and I thought I' d better have a 
whack at the Pope. Has it ever struck you, Dick, that ecclesiastical language 
has a most sinister sound? I knew some of the words, though not their 
meaning, but I knew that my audience would be just as ignorant. So I had a 
magnificent peroration. "Will you men of Kilclavers," I asked, '''endure to see 
a chasuble set up in your market-place? Will you have your daughters sold 
into simony? Will you have celibacy practised in the public streets?" Gad. I 
had them all on their feet bellowing "Never!,,127 
"THE KIRK'S DISGRACE", c.1922-1938 
There has been recent interest over what Stewart Brown describes as "'the official 
Presbyterian campaign against the Scoto-Irish Roman Catholic community in 
Scotland", aptly described as "The Kirk's Disgrace,,128. This campaign needs to be 
placed within its social and political perspective. The central question is whether a 
defensive, conservative Presbyterianism managed to place anti-Catholicism at the 
heart of Scottish politics. It did not: there was no shift in state policy and the 
campaigners abjectly failed in reasserting the Kirk's social authority. The anti-Irish 
campaign was "a new departure" for the Churches: "aimed not so much at converting 
individual Roman Catholics, as at marginalising, and even eliminating an ethnic 
minority whose presence was regarded as an evil, polluting the purity of Scottish 
race and culture,,129. The language of race was emphasised, the grievance portrayed 
as national, not religious. The campaign: 
sought to revive the Church's waning social authority by uniting the Scottish 
people against a religious and ethnic minority which they labelled as 'outside 
the covenant', and which they sought to make the scapegoat for Scotland's 
post-war social ills. In the campaign ... the Church of Scotland was not 
simply swept along by a popular nativist movement outside the Church ... 
Rather, certain Presbyterian Churchmen, with the enthusiastic support of 
successive General Assemblies, encouraged and used nativist sentiment for 
th o I" I 130 elf own ecc eSlastlca purposes. 
The campaign began with two overtures to the Church of Scotland' s General 
Assembly of 1922. The first called for restrictions on Irish immigration and revision 
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privileges which the Scottish people had given them". The motion passed. in "a thin 
house", only on the Moderator's deciding vote131. The proposer. Rev. John Maclagan 
[Glasgow Merrylees], later conceded that it faced considerable opposition: "The 
feeling ... was that it was a very doubtful question for the Church to handle,·132. The 
second overture, introduced by Rev. Duncan Cameron [Kilsyth], complained that: 
Roman Catholics of Irish origin ... were not only alien to Scots in religion; 
they were also alien in race. They had come to Scotland to take jobs from 
Scottish workers, to exploit Scotland's welfare resources and to stir labour 
unrest ... Irish Catholic men were also seducing innocent Scottish girls into 
mixed marriages 'to betray the faith of their fathers'. The presence of the 
Irish Catholic aliens, he prophesied, would soon bring racial and sectarian 
warfare to Scotland. 133 
Both Cameron and Maclagan were involved in anti-Catholic educational campaigns 
in early 1922: Cameron's overture was approved by Glasgow Presbytery in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1922 education elections 134. The resultant Assembly 
Committee reported in 1923 that the Irish Catholic community: "was alien in both 
race and creed, and could never be assimilated; its presence therefore had a · very 
sinister meaning for the future of our race' ... the Roman Catholic Irish in Scotland 
were a 'menace,,,135. The Assembly established a Joint Committee of the Scottish 
Churches, bringing the CoS, the UFC, and the FCoS together in face of this 
'menace,136. Bruce suggests that committee creation may have been undertaken to 
blunt zealotry: 
before making much of the Kirk's decision to set up a subcommittee to 
examine the Irish problem we might note that the Church of Scotland has a 
long history of establishing subcommittees as a device for side-tracking 
. d th· th· 137 monomaruacs an elf en USlasms. 
\Jl SJ.Brown (1991:19) 
132 Scotsman, 27/07/28 
133 SJ . Brown (1991 :20) 
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Bruce's suggestion contains some truth, but the 'monomaniacs' in question held 
senior positions within the Church and a 1928 deputation to the Home Office was led 
by highly regarded Churchmen138• This hardly negates Bruce's claim, but it is clear 
that the campaign was led by Churchmen of the highest standing. By contrast. few 
Churchmen voiced dissent over the campaign - and those who did garnered little 
public support139• As senior Kirk figures adopted the campaign, emphasis was put 
upon 'respectable' arguments surrounding race and national character. In 1927 Rev. 
John White assured his Church that: 
They dealt with this very difficult, delicate, and important question entirely 
from the racial point of view. The religious factor did not enter the question 
at all ... Uncontrolled immigration was always a menace to a community. 
especially if it was to continue alongside the emigration of young and 
energetic native-born citizens. 140 
The campaign followed hard on the heels of Irish Partition and we have already seen 
that the Treaty pushed to the fore a 'Protestantism before Politics' faction within the 
Orange Order. The coincidence of a 'Rome on the rates' campaign in educational 
politics; the formation of the OPP; and the launch of a bitter Kirk campaign against 
Catholics is suggestive. Anger over Ireland, economic anxiety, and suspicion of 
Labour-Catholic links created the circumstances for the campaign. Anti-Irish 
attitudes were made more respectable, in that it could now be argued that the 
(CatholiclNationalist) Irish had forfeited their right to British citizenship. Although 
the Government continued to recognise citizens of the Irish Free State as British 
subjects, the events of 1916-22 and the fragile relationship between Dublin and 
London afterwards, gave credence to claims that the Catholic Irish were . disloyal' . 
To this charge was added the insistence that separation should be rewarded with the 
redefinition of Irish immigrants as aliens, and a restriction of rights to entry and 
welfare. This was not solely the view of Protestants, nor indeed of the Conservati ve 
right, as we shall see. 
138 E.g.: Rev. James Harvey, UFC Moderator 1925-26, CoS Principal Clerk 1929-30; Rev. John 
White. CoS Moderator 1925-26, 1929-30. 
139 See Times 30/05123 
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To some degree, however, the Presbyterian case was weakened by its gross 
exaggerations. As early as April 1923, the Clerk of Glasgow Parish Council claimed 
that: "The rumours as to a large influx of Irish immigrants were quite unfounded ... 
Neither is there any indication of any attempt on the part of such immigrants to 
benefit by the dole given by the parish councils"141. There were other reasons why 
the campaign's chances of success were limited, not least the weakness of the anti-
Catholic caucas amongst Scottish Unionism. Desire to pursue a radical anti-Irish 
agenda arose in precisely that constituency whose political marginality ensured that 
the Presbyterian campaign would prove fruitless. 
THE FAILURE OF THE KIRK CAMPAIGN 
In 1928 the Churches presented their case to the Home Secretary, William Joynson-
Hicks and Scottish Secretary Sir John Gilmour. They complained that Scotland had 
become "a dumping ground" for "Irish undesirables" since the USA had reduced 
immigrant quotas; and "that the Irish population of Glasgow are so shiftless that they 
draw 70 per cent of parish and other relief funds". Insisting "their case ... was based 
solely on racial, economic, educational, and civic considerations" they advocated 
immigration quotas and the repatriation of those Irish claiming welfare "within a 
given time of [their] arrival in Scotland". This second point, which entailed a return 
to pre-1922 relief arrangements, was already the subject of negotiation between 
Dublin and London, and here the politicians were "sympathetic in their attitude"142. 
The deputation was promised "the fullest enquiry", and handed a statistical 
bombshell: 
the Home Secretary produced some figures as to the number of non-Scottish 
people employed in certain industries and areas which did not tally with those 
submitted by the deputation. The [deputation] were inclined to question the 
. h d uffi . th' . th 143 offiCIal returns, but a not s IClent au onty to questIOn em. 
140 Times 31/05/27. White told the 1928 Assembly that "He hoped the discussion ... would be 
from the point of view of race and not of creed." Scotsman 29/05128 
141 GH 24/04123 
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Governmental criticism was hardly surprising: at a 1927 Inter-Departmental 
conference the Dominions Office insisted that the IFS-bom "were British subjects by 
birth ... and as such could neither be excluded nor deported from this country"l",",. 
The Scotsman flatly rejected claims that the campaign was concerned with purely 
secular matters: "it is quite impossible to keep [religion] out of the controversy ... 
[and] it would be unreal to pretend that the religious aspect is a matter of 
indifference". The Scotsman concluded that the wider implications of restricting 
immigration outweighed any benefits: "we have never had any barrier upon the 
immigration of British subjects, and it would be a big departure to fix a quota for 
Irish immigrants, as yesterday's deputation desired,,145. Here was the crux of the 
matter. Whilst the Free State remained a Dominion its citizens remained British 
subjects. The difficulties of maintaining border controls between the IFS and 
Northern Ireland, and the likelihood that such action would lead to Dublin's 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth, made it difficult for the Government to even 
contemplate such measures. 
Edinburgh's Scotsman was not alone in its criticism of the campaign. In March 1929 
the Glasgow Herald "dealt a serious blow to the Presbyterian campaign". The paper 
"demonstrated what was already obvious": that economic recession had reduced 
immigration to "a mere trickle", and that barely 0.2% of claimants on Glasgow's 
poor relief were Irish-born. The Herald concluded that the Presbyterian case could 
"no longer be effectively pressed"I46. The Government, which found "no evidence of 
any considerable immigration from Ireland to Scotland", clearly concurred 147. In 
January 1929 "the Home Office insisted ... that no statistics or other infonnation be 
supplied to the Scottish Churches" on this issue148. 
After seven years the Presbyterian case reached a dead end, the Conservative 





Quoted in Delaney (1999:243) 
Scotsman 20/07128 
SJ.Brown (1991 :34-35). See GH between 20 & 26/03129 
Quoted in Delaney (1999:245) 
192 
"Dumb Dogs" and "Honneted Chieftains .. 
with the 1929 return of a Labour Government. After repeated requests, the Churches 
gained a hearing with Scottish Secretary William Adamson in May 1930, but were 
refused any concessions. Several days later, the campaigners insisted "'there is good 
reason for alarm concerning the type of people coming to us from the Roman 
Catholic parts of Ireland". For the campaigners: ''too many of our people. employers 
of labour, legislators, educationalists, and journalists have allowed tolerance to pass 
into indifference, to the great hurt of the cause which has been committed to US,·149. 
At the 1930 General Assembly Rev. J. Hutchison Cockburn (Dunblane Cathedral) 
insisted: 
The invasion of cheap labour and of alien and unabsorbable people had been 
going on for three generations [and] was going on yet ... They must demand 
from the Government full statistics or a Commission of Inquiry. (Applause) 
... The situation was one of grave anxiety, and a really serious menace to 
Scottish civilisation and culture. (Applause). 
In a resolution "gladly accepted" by Cockburn, it was suggested that the campaign 
was "proceeding in the wrong fashion" by seeking legislation. Instead the campaign 
should persuade Scottish business "to employ Scottish labour where such is 
available": "no Government would undertake to stop the immigration. Their appeal 
was not to the Government, but to the patriotism of their Scottish labour 
employers" 1 S0. 
This strategy had inauspicious beginnings. In December 1930 Cockburn alleged that 
Catholic Irish foremen gave employment preference to fellow countrymen at 
Peterhead's harbour works. Government investigation found that no Irish foremen 
had been employed at the works, and that of the 370-strong workforce, only two 
were Irish-bom 151 • Such allegations destroyed the credibility of the campaign. and 
further alienated an already hostile Government. An attempt to revitalise the 
campaign was made in 1931 when ministers were asked for information on 
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their parish to confront the Roman Catholic threat". Around one-third of ministers 
did not respondl52. 
By the mid-1930s Assembly interest in the campaign was declining, not least 
because successive Governments had ignored it. A "heated debate" in 1935 "broke 
the usual unanimity on this issue". One minister asked: 
Was it worthy of the Church of Scotland, at a time when materialism was 
rampant and sheer paganism not only beyond the Rhine but in their own 
midst, that they should engage in that agitation against a Church which, 
however they deplored her errors, did stand for spiritual things. and on the 
side of Christ?153 
A last, forlorn, shot of the campaign was made in 1938 but this "proved to be the last 
official call by the Church of Scotland" against the Catholic Irish in Scotland 154. 
IRISH IMMIGRATION 
There is a deep irony regarding the failure of the campaign in that Irish immigration 
gained Parliamentary currency at precisely that time the campaign was effectively 
dead. Gallagher has argued that it was during the 1931-35 Parliament that "the most 
forceful cries for a regulation of Irish immigration to Scotland were heard", and that 
"legislation did not result was due to Scottish members being unable to convince 
English fellow Tories of the urgency of the problem,,155. In fact, demand for 
legislative action came between 1937-39 from English MPS156. The Hansard indexes 
reveal that the Presbyterian campaign did not result in a high level of Scottish 
Unionist questions to the Government. Only two questions were tabled concerning 
Irish immigration over 1925-26 - both by Scottish Unionists - and both received the 
reply that no statistics were available 157. In 1927 Labour's Tom 10hnston (Dundee) 
lSI SJ.Brown(1991:36-37) 
IS2 S.J.Brown (1991:38) 
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was supplied with figures of arrivals from, and departures to, the IFS at Scottish 
ports. These negated claims of sustained immigration: 
PASSENGERS AT SCOmSH PORTS I58: 
Arriving Leaving for Surplus 
from IFS IFS 
1924 20,954 19,862 1,092 
1925 20,309 21,539 -1,230 
1926 18,333 15,357 2,976 
In one of the few Parliamentary interventions supporting the campaign, Argyllshire 
Unionist Frederick MacQuisten told the Scottish Health Committee in 1928 that the 
poverty problem in Scotland was exacerbated by: 
a considerable invasion of people from the South of Ireland who have a 
different standard of living from the Scottish people ... There is a currency 
law known as Gresham's law, which lays it down that bad money drives good 
money out of circulation, and in the same way the Irish people are driving 
out the Scottish people, to some extent. 159 
Government action, however, was limited to the pursuit of an agreement with Dublin 
regarding the anomalous position of repatriating those chargeable on local poor rates 
to their parish of origin. Whilst this had been technically possible prior to Partition, 
no arrangements had been agreed with the IFS, and Conservative and Labour 
Governments entered long negotiations to secure a post-Partition agreement. 
Labour's Scottish Secretary William Adamson confirmed in 1929 that the 
Government were still considering the questionl60• Ramsay MacDonald, frustrated 
by Dublin's refusal to agree to a reciprocal agreement, subsequently complained it 
was "becoming a perfect scandal ... the question ought not to be allowed to arise,,161. 
The evidence of the 1931 Census could not have been pleasing to the campaigners. 
Numbers of Irish-born in Scotland, far from increasing, had declined sharply over the 
1920s. Further, more of the Irish-born were from Northern Ireland (550/0) than from 
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Irish' as euphemisms for 'Irish Catholic' this fact went some way in discrediting 
their claims. Residency figures gave the lie to wild claims of 9~000 Catholic Irish 
immigrants entering Scotland each year162: 
RESIDENCY OF SCOTLAND'S IRISH-BORN, 1931: 
% by column BomNI BomIFS 
Over 50 years 14 9 
20-49 years 51 46 
10-19 years 19 23 
Under 10 years 12 18 
Not stated 4 4 
N= 67905 55487 
Around 18,500 persons of Irish-birth, therefore, became resident in Scotland between 
c. 1922 and 1931, many of whom may have come via a long residence elsewhere in 
Britain. We cannot tell what proportion of these arrivals were Catholic, but quite 
clearly the campaigns claims as to immigration were grossly - and irresponsibly -
exaggerated. It might be noted that the number of Irish-born persons in England & 
Wales increased between 1921 and 1931 by over 26,000, the first recorded increase 
since 1861. Again, however, this hardly constituted an invasion of the Irish, Catholic 
or otherwise. 
Irish migration to England, however, did increase considerably over the 1930s, in 
particular with economic recovery after c.1935. Parliamentary questions on this issue 
became more frequent often containing accusations that Irish workers were given 
preference over local labour. The Government's response was to point towards the 
Census, which showed that across Britain the number of Irish-born residents had 
declined 163. Concern was not restricted to the Conservatives, one Welsh Labour MP 
urged the Government to double the contributions to employment insurance for 
seasonal agricultural workers "so as to put a bar upon the import of this labour from 
Ireland". Other Labour members also called on restrictions on Irish immigrants 164. In 
161 Quoted in Delaney (1999:248) 
162 Claim quoted in S.J.Brown (1991 :28) 
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1937 the Government appointed an Inter-Departmental committee on Irish 
immigration which reported "no evidence of any marked increase in the number of 
persons of Irish Free State origin applying for relief'. Further: 
The general conclusion which is drawn is that there is clear evidence of a 
recent increase in emigration from the Irish Free State into Great Britain but 
that the immigrants are being absorbed into employment ... there is no 
evidence that they come here with the specific purpose of obtaining, when 
unemployed, assistance from public funds on a more generous scale than is 
obtainable in the Irish Free State. On the contrary, it appears that many of 
them readily obtain employment ... [in] work of an unskilled character for 
which ... it is said that it is difficult to fmd an adequate supply of equally 
satisfactory applicants already available in this country. 165 
Claims about abuses of the welfare system persisted but elicited little Government 
sympathy 166. The restrictions on Irish immigration implemented in 1939-40 were 
provoked by IRA bombs and the outbreak of world war167. Wartime labour shortage 
was eased by workers recruited in Eire, and free entry to the United Kingdom was 
reintroduced in the later 1940s 168. 
CATHOLICS, THE IRISH-BORN AND CRIME 
Elsewhere, however, there is evidence which helps to explain the depth of feeling 
against the Catholic community held by some ministers. Viewing individual moral 
failing as central to crime and social discontent, the campaigners pointed to the 
disproportionate presence of the Irish-born, and of Catholics, in Scottish prisons: 
165 329 HC Deb 5s:24 I 1-13 (03/12/37) 
166 E.g. 344 HC Deb 5s:2147 (03/03/39); 346 HC Deb 5s:53 I (20/04'39). . 
167 The IRA campaign killed five and injured 70 in Coventry. The Prevention of Violence Act 
(1939) required Irish citizens in Britain to register with the police and 167 had been deported under 
emergency legislation by May 1940. See Delaney (1999): Drudy (1986b): 361 HC Deb 5s:290 
(23/05/40) 
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These statistics, at face value, support the Presbyterian claim that Catholics were 
disproportionately responsible for Scottish crime. A less shallow analysis, of course. 
would have considered the extent to which the prison population represented wider 
disadvantage, and perhaps a degree of legal discrimination. experienced by 
Scotland's Catholics. Put simply: Catholics were disproportionately to be found 
amongst Scotland's urban poor, and if that same urban poor provided the majority of 
Scotland's prisoners, then one might expect - independent of any cultural factors -
that Scotland's Catholics would be over-represented in Scotland's prisons. There is 
indeed convincing evidence that disproportionate numbers of prisoners were from 
low status occupations 170. The tendency toward crime - or more accurately 
imprisonment - was a socio-economic rather than religious characteristic of 
Scotland's Catholics. Contemporary Government Reports themselves tend towards 
this view, in that they saw the causes of crime, to some extent, as social. A number 
of reports carried, as illustrative appendices, short prisoner biographies. The 
following are for Catholic prisoners in the mid-1920s: 
A very little drink upsets her and she makes a fool of herself. Husband 
practically a total abstainer. Prisoner active and of good address. 
Has been idle for more than a year. Single. Does not drink. Strong and active. 
Seems a decent lad who would do well if he could get steady employment. 
Finds he is more easily intoxicated since he was gassed [in the war] ... Seems 
a decent hard working man. 171 
169 Annual Report of the Prison Commissioners/Prisons Department for Seolland. 1926. 1927; 
1932. 1935. 1938; [hereafter 'Prison Report 1 
170 In 1926 50% of male prisoners were described as . general labourers ': in 1938 60° o. 
171 Prison Reports. 1926. 1927 
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For the campaigners, however, idleness or drunkenness were individual failings and .... . 
the prison statistics simply confirmed their belief that Irish Catholics had lower 
moral standards - and a greater propensity to sin - than Protestant Scots. 
THE POLITICAL LIMITATIONS OF ANTI-IRISHNESS 
It is clear that, in terms of its legislative aims and its hope for a return of Presbyterian 
social authority, the Kirk's anti-Irish campaign must be described as a failure. 
Although successive Governments were concerned about the effects of Irish 
immigration, no action was taken. Successive Governments viewed the Kirk 
campaign as an ill-informed irritant. The issue of how much public support the 
campaign garnered is far less clear cut. Stewart Brown rejects the view that the Kirk 
was "swept along by a popular nativist movement outside the Church" and argues 
the campaign was pursued for essentially "ecclesiastical purposes" 172. Williamson 
insists that the 1923 report, and the subsequent campaign, resonated weakly beyond 
"the upper echelons of the Church of Scotland": 
It was a self serving document giving vent to frustrations of the Kirk in 
Scotland as the nature of Scotland became less uniform and more diverse, 
and therefore less under the control of the national church. The fact that the 
Kirk report failed to gain any credibility outside of traditional anti-Catholic 
circles is testimony to a growing reconciliation with the Catholic 
community .173 
A number of writers did align themselves with the tenor (if not the practicalities) of 
the campaign. Two prominent members of the Scottish Party, a right-wing 
Nationalist pressure group, contributed to the debate in language rivalling the most 
emotive elements within the Kirk. George Malcolm Thomson, predicted that 
Scotland would be Catholic by the late twentieth centuryl74, and was critical of the 
Kirk's "callous indifference" to the Irish menace: "the public spirit of the Church is 
suspect. They think of congregation rather than nation,,17s. Andrew Dewar Gibb 
172 SJ.Brown (1991 :20) 
173 Williamson (1998:24) 
17~ Thomson (1927 & 1928). To Liam Mcllvanney, Thomson was "utterly unrepresentative of 
literary Scotland" - Sunday Herald 09/04/00 
m Thomson (1927:56.16) 
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argued that without the Irish, Scotland ''would be the most law abiding country in the 
world": 
Wheresoever knives and razors are used, wheresoever sneak thefts and petty 
pilfering are easy and safe, wheresoever dirty acts of sexual baseness are 
committed, there you will find the Irishman in Scotland with all but a 
monopoly of the business. 176 
Gibb was a respected expert in Scottish law but his electoral record was an 
uninspiring one and his presence in the nascent Scottish Nationalist movement was 
to tinge it with the taint of anti-Catholicism for decades. Whilst figures such as Gibb 
and Thomson viewed the Catholic Irish presence in Scotland as an unmitigated 
national disaster, other Nationalists took a very different line. In 1926, for example. 
Christopher Grieve argued that Irish immigration was "destined ... to be the best 
thing that happened to [Scotland] for over 200 years,,177. Such Celtic ism was 
influential amongst Nationalists during the early 1920s, but by the later part of the 
decade had moved to the fringes of the National Party of Scotland (NPS)17S. During 
the 1930s a number of Nationalist writers - Grieve, Edwin Muir, Lewis Grassic 
Gibbon, William Power - described the Reformation as a national disaster, and 
Presbyterianism an un-Scottish "cultural aberration,,179. Compton Mackenzie. 
Catholic novelist and Nationalist, went further, insisting that "Satan himself '" can 
fairly be regarded as the first Protestant of all"lso, 
Finlay notes that: 
The nationalist movement was perhaps unique among Scottish political 
organisations for containing within its ranks active pro- and anti-Irish factions 
which both believed that the issues of race and religion were crucial to their 
d d' f S 'h ' al' lSI un erstan lng 0 cottis natton Ism. 
The relationship of the Nationalist movement to the religious question highlights the 
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Protestant Scotland. In 1932 Unionist Robert Home claimed "it would be a very 
natural thing" if Scotland's Catholics were to support a left-leaning and pro-Irish 
Nationalist Party: 
They could easily form the determining element in the balance between the 
Scottish parties, and you might find that ... Scottish Home Rule turned out to 
be a form of very insidious Irish domination in our politics. While I have 
every respect for the Irish people, that is a result I do not wish to see in 
Scotland. f82 
Labour's George Buchanan disagreed, insisting that: "part of the motive power 
behind [Scottish Nationalism] is anti-Irish,,183. Nationalism was caught between two 
accusers: to the right they provided a vehicle from which the influence of the 'Irish' 
would be disproportionately increased; whilst some on the left saw them as using 
sectarianism to divide the Scottish working class. This reflected the Janus-faced 
nature of the movement itself, as one of the rare forays into sectarianism by a 
Nationalist candidate illustrates. In the Hillhead by-election of June 1937, the SNP's 
John MacCormick argued for repeal of the 1918 Education Act and complained over 
the welfare claims of recent Irish immigrants. This had little electoral impact, the 
SNP taking 9% of the poll. More revealing was the "great resentment" within the 
party itself: "I cannot agree to the tactic of appealing to a popular prejudice against a 
class who is attracted to Scotland under capitalism, to become our poorest wage 
slaves,,184. MacCormick's campaign in Hillhead jarred with a leftward drift in the 
SNP which left right-wingers like Gibb feeling increasingly isolated. Gibb, Party 
chairman from 1936 offered his resignation in 1939 over this drift, and because he 
felt that: "The Party has a curiously contradictory determination not to do anything 
which would wound the feelings of Irish Roman Catholics" I 85 . 
The campaign against the Irish, therefore, had only limited political support. Whilst 
there were elements within Unionism which gave vocal support to the scapegoating 
of Scotland's Catholics, these were without much influence. And whilst leading 
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dabble in the murky waters surrounding the campaign, other leading Nationalists 
found the campaign deeply disturbing. It must be stressed that the Nationalists 
remained on the fringes of Scottish political life - the key players remained the 
Unionists and Labour, and here support for the Presbyterian campaign (and sectarian 
posturing more broadly) was muted at best. 
The campaign did find favour exactly where it might be expected - from various 
small militant Protestant political organisations. The key achievement of the 
campaign was to grant to these bodies a degree of ecclesiastical sanction they had 
never before enjoyed in the twentieth century. These bodies, however, were 
unconvinced that the campaign was being fully supported by all sections of the Kirk. 
The Scottish Reformation Society (SRS), for example, complained in 1930 that: 
there is still much apathy among many excellent Christians, and a refusal to 
look at the growing menace which Rome brings to a community. It is not 
easy to persuade some people that we are simply taking our stand as 
upholders of the Reformation, and ... of religious and political liberty .186 
As we shall see, the refusal of established political parties to pick up the themes of 
the campaign allowed fringe Protestant political groups to lay claim to policies 
proposed by Scotland's mainstream Protestant Churches. Unable to persuade 
'respectable' parties of the justice of their campaign, the Churches found that their 
calls were answered by populist demagogues with whom they were loathe to be 
associated. 
CONCLUSION 
Although a failure, the Kirk campaign is nevertheless crucial to our understanding of 
religious conflict. That one of Scotland's key social institutions should embark on a 
bitter anti-Catholic campaign could only sour religious relations for decades to come. 
Several points, by way of conclusion, should be emphasised. Firstly, the campaign 
stemmed from the fear in some ecclesiastical circles that Presbyterianism was losing 
direction and influence. a fear fusing, in right-wing Kirk circles, with anxiety over 
IRS Gibb resigned in 1940 and developed an anti-Semitic outlook. R.J.Finlay (1994: 198) 
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the growing power of the left, continued emigration and the feared . End of 
Scotland'. What stands out in the history of the campaign is that, by and large, the 
wider clergy and laity remained silent. This lends some credence to Bruce's claim 
that the General Assembly administratively sidelined the campaign into 
subcommittees. The campaign did not engage the attention of the Presbyterian 
~ 
Churches to the extent of the union negotiations or the Forward Movement, although 
it must be stressed that the scapegoating of Scotland's Catholics was undertaken by 
Churchmen of the highest influence. The wider clergy, if it cannot be clear that they 
shared these Churchmen's views, were certainly culpable by their silence. Overall, 
Aspinwall's view of the campaign seems appropriate: 
the much noted General Assembly outburst against the Irish race was a dying 
kick of a fading mentality. The declining Irish migration, the social 
catastrophe of the depression, [the resucitation of a] more socially concerned 
Presbyterianism, and more secular concerns gradually relegated old religious 
controversy to the margin. 187 
As for Scotland's Catholics themselves, there can be little doubt that the campaign 
had a substantial effect on their confidence over their place in Scottish society. The 
Presbyterian campaign propelled Scotland's Catholics even more firmly into the 
Labour camp - thus a central impulse of the campaign proved a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Similarly, the campaign drew the Catholic community defensively 
inward, ironically enough given the campaign's complaint over Catholic insularity. 
This circling of the Catholic wagons was evidenced by Charles Diamond's 1928 
claim of rising circulation for his newspapers: "to which the bigotry of the ruffianly 
attacks upon the race and creed of our readers has already contributed much and 
must continue to contribute a very great deal more". Characteristically controversial, 
Diamond ridiculed the "bonneted chieftains" of the Kirk. The resurgence of 
Catholicism in Scotland, and the Presbyterian backlash, was: 
surely proof that barbarism is again giving way to civilisation. Some of the 
furious outbursts to which I refer remind us of the last dying outburst of 
Paganism before the steady advance of Christianity. These Pagani in our 
186 SRS. Annual Report /929-30. The 1934-35 Report warned "What we really fear is not 
Romish aggression but Protestant indifference". 
117 Aspinwall (1989:79) 
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midst are out of date. It is perhaps useless to talk reasonably to these 
fomenters of hatred and of national animosities. 188 • 
Diamond's dismissal of Protestantism as unchristian barbarism did not reflect the 
entire spectrum of Catholic opinion, but it does indicate that - in the late 1920s at 
least - there were influential Catholic figures prepared to confront the bigotry of the 
campaigners with a little bigotry of their own. 
ISS For Diamond. Presbyterianism sprang from "the revolutionary and demoralising ~octrin.cs 
preached by those who assisted to plunder the Church and rob the poor". the Reformers bemg "\ lie 
religious revolutionaries". Scotsman 30/01128 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
"A HAPPY SOLUTION TO A DIFFICULT PROBLEM" 
A central issue in the debate over 'sectarianism' in Scotland is that of separate 
Catholic schools, an issue highlighting the mythologies surrounding Catholic-
Protestant relations in modem Scotland. The journey of Catholic - and Episcopalian -
Church schools from their refusal to join the state system in 1872, to their entry in 
1918, is a fascinating and illuminating story. Whilst relatively little academic work 
has been published on Episcopalian schools, there is a broad literature on Catholic 
education l . Missing from most treatments of the subject, however, is an explanation 
of Catholic educational separatism. Treble, for example. dispenses with 
Catholicism's "conscious repudiation" of State education in 1872 by noting that it: 
owed much to the emphasis which was placed by bishops and clergy upon the 
value of religious education. But ... they were also consciously influenced by 
their own perception of the limited potential of the board school. For whereas 
they accepted that the training of children in a Catholic atmosphere could 
deepen their commitment to the Faith, board schools were seen as either an 
instrument for advancing the interests of the Church of Scotland or, at worst, 
as a force promoting the growth of apathy and leading ultimately to 'the 
possibility of Secularism dominating National Education·.2 
Two impulses are present here. One is suspicion that religion would be either ignored 
in the new state system, or would prioritise the majority faith. The other rests on a 
theological emphasis on 'religious' education. Catholic educational separatism can 
only be understood in the context of two facts: that separatism was not limited to 
education, but was pursued in the social, political and personal spheres; and, that 
Catholic separatism was a global phenomenon. Over the nineteenth century 
Catholicism developed "a vast and complex system of parallel institutions" including 
schools, labour and business organisations, youth movements, and - in some states -
political parties3• Whilst such 'pillarisation' was most obvious where Catholic 
political organisations developed furthest - in the Netherlands for example - it was 
also present to a significant degree wherever Catholicism had a notable presence. By 
Skinnider (1967); Kenneth (1968); Treble (1978; 1980); Gourlay ( 1990) 
Treble (1978: 111) 
Herberg (1960:233-4) 
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c. 1900, Glasgow Catholicism was a "self-enclosed world in which the Church had 
duplicated every movement of Protestant and secular social service and charity· .... 
Such duplication characterised the Catholic experience throughout the modem world. 
In terms of the Catholic 'struggle for the schools', the religious question was 
answered in Scotland more comprehensively and earlier than elsewhere. In 1960, 
Herberg noted that state funding for US Catholic education remained an "area of 
bitter controversy [and] the focus of religio-comrnunal conflicC5. State funds were 
conceded in Australia in 1963 and New Zealand in 1970 - almost a century after the 
establishment of state education. Denominational school funding in Ontario sparked 
electoral controversy as recently as 19856• In England the State-Church compact of 
1902 did not go as far as the Scottish settlement, and provoked a level of organised 
dissent quite missing in Scotland after the passing of the 1918 Act. Many of the 
educational difficulties faced by Catholics in Scotland were faced not only in other 
'Protestant' countries, but also in 'Catholic' societies (such as Italy, France, Spain 
and Portugal), where secular Liberal governments were often violently hostile to 
Catholicism. 
It is crucial, therefore, to acknowledge that the Scottish settlement was a remarkable 
legislative reform, and provided an international benchmark by which Catholic 
educationalists could measure their achievements. Mgr. William Brown, whose 
"radical courage" helped reconcile the Scottish Church to reform, "confidently 
asserted [in 1936] that the 1918 Act had given Scottish Catholics a school system 
better than any in the world"'. 
MODERNITY AND 'CATHOLIC SEPARATISM' 
As we have seen, the Catholic Church reacted to the upheavals of the nineteenth 
century by condemning them, and withdrawing - even in ostensibly Catholic 
societies - behind the institutional walls of the faith. One hymn, published in 1862. 
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I shun the haunts of those who seek 
To ensnare poor Catholic youth 
No Church I o~ no schools I know 
But those that teach the Truth.8 
The argument for Catholic schools in Scotland must first and foremos~ therefore, be 
seen as a Catholic argument, rooted in the presumptions and fundamentals of 
Catholic thought and practice. Williamson has argued that "there has been a 
tendency ... to devalue the overtly 'Catholic' aspects of the social and political 
behaviour of the Catholic community": 
Catholicism is not simply a means of identification, a tag to separate one 
section of the community from others for the convenience of social scientists 
and historians. It brings with it a 'world view' and series of obligations that 
go to the core of individual identity. My purpose here is simply to put the 
'Catholic' back into the Catholic community, so that when we look at the 
development of a community defined to a large extent by their religiosity that 
religion is included in the discussion.9 
Williamson's point is a useful one - 'religion' is often relegated to no more than a 
marker (or at best a complicator) of class, ethnicity or nationality. Such analyses 
emphasise the external, 'anti-Catholic' factors in Scottish Catholic separatism and 
ignore global Catholic practice. To do so is to relate - and to privilege - only part of 
the story. Likewise, to dismiss opposition to, or suspicion of, Catholic aims and 
actions as simply reactive anti-Catholic bigotry undervalues religious and political 
idealism as a framework through which behaviour is constructed and understood lO• 
CATHOLIC SEPARATISM IN SCOTLAND 
Before examining the genesis and the consolidation of the state-Catholic educational 
settlement, and reactions to the 1918 Act, it would be instructive to pose a very 
simple question: why do Catholics insist on their 'right' to maintain separate 
schools? One Scottish newspaper recently dealt with this issue in one sentence. 
7 Quoted in Anson (1937:197) 
8 Second verse of Hymn No. 62 (,I am a faithful Catholic') in the Crown of Jesus Hymn Boole. 
London & Dublin, 1862. Quoted in Litvack (1996:81) 
9 Williamson (1998:12) 
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claiming: "Catholic schools came into existence in the 19th century as Irish 
immigrants encountered violent hostility in the Protestant-run schools .. l1 . Hickman 
argues that the "proselytising intent" of Protestant-run schools in England "'ensured 
that segregated schools became the hallmark of Catholic educational policy": 
Where schools run by Protestants respected the right of Catholic children not 
to take part in any religious exercises of which their parents might not 
approve, the Church raised no objection to Catholic children attending them, 
for example this was the case in parts of Scotland. 12 
Hickman refers here to the Church of Scotland's 1829 decision to allow Catholic 
children to attend its schools and be excused from religious instruction. In effect this 
meant that a "conscience clause" operated in the bulk of the Scottish school system 
by the 1830s: the Church of England resisted this principle because it implied a 
separation of 'secular' and 'religious' instruction, "a principle hotly denounced by 
many Anglicans" 13. Separate schools for Catholics in which "no formal creed was 
taught" were set up by Glasgow's Catholic Schools Society from 1817, 
predominantly funded by Presbyterians 14. Such schools did not satisfy Catholic 
aspirations, however, and Church-managed schools (providing secular and religious 
instruction) were operating from the mid-1830s ls. It is very difficult, therefore, to 
posit Protestant proselytism or 'bigotry' as the key motive for Catholic separatism in 
Scotland. 
A more useful explanation for Catholic separatism can be found in the teachings of 
the Church itself. Canon Law lays out that: "Christ's faithful are to promote Catholic 
schools, doing everything possible to help in establishing and maintaining them"16. 
Separate schools form part of a historically developed critique which insisted that 
10 To some extent the privileging ofsocio-economic or 'political' motives over the 'religious' is 
an expression of the influence of secularisation - we should be exceptionally cautious. however. of 
applying presumptions of a secularised or ecumenical worldview to the past. 
1 SoS, 25/04/99 
12 Hickman (1995: 124) 
13 Murphy (1971: 12,38-9) 
14 By 1831 the Society had 5 schools, catering for 1400 Catholic children. Skinn ider (1967: 14-
5}. See also Aspinwall (1996:162); M.Mitchell (1998:124) 
1 Handley (1947:191) 
16 Code of Canon Law, 800 (2) 
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Catholicism was the only bulwark against the evils of modemity17. To many 
Catholics, non-Catholic schools were dangerous. In 1924, Edinburgh' s Bishop 
Henry Graham, warned that: 
In these schools our children are deprived of all Catholic instruction; they are 
daily under the influence of teachers belonging to the Protestant religion or to 
no religion, who may, even in secular subjects such as History. instil into the 
children's minds many things contrary to Catholic faith and principles; they 
are placed in the midst of surroundings hostile to the faith and in an 
atmosphere that chills their religious fervour and tends to indifferentism; they 
are in danger of growing up with a weakened if not a perverted faith. 
insufficiently instructed in their religion and looking at everything from a 
Protestant point of view; and through their close companionship with 
Protestant friends, run the risk of lapsing finally into the evil of a mixed 
marriage - fitting retribution of a career spent in the teeth of the Church's 
prohibition and fulfilling the Scriptural warning, "he that loves the danger 
will perish in it". 
Catholic education had at its centre the education of the soul: secular education 
provided for life in this world, only Catholic education provided for life in the next. 
This demanded: 
Catholic teachers, trained to teach and mould the children in a Catholic way; 
the visits of the Priest; the constant round of religious observances; .,. 
encouragement for frequent and daily Communion; the Catholic pictures and 
statues; Catholic companions - in short, the ~'Catholic atmosphere" ... They 
will never go far astray after that in later life, and if they do, you can bring 
them back because of their early ~rounding in the faith. But if that is wanting, 
what have you got to work upon? 8 
This was the touchstone of Catholic educational demands: "the Catholic Church is 
contending with the Devil and the World and the Flesh for both the body and the soul 
of the child,,19. 
This view was emphasised at the highest levels of the Church. Whilst Leo XIII. in 
1898, praised Scotland's public schools as ''thoroughly efficient", he emphasised the 
17 Pius IX denounced the view that "Catholics may approve of the system of educating youth 
unconnected with Catholic faith and the power of the Church". Pius IX (1864:48). 
II Graham (1924) 
19 Graham (1924) 
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"vital importance to defend most strenuously" separate Catholic schools2o. The 
'Catholic atmosphere' could not be abandoned, and it "could not be guaranteed 
except by the daily contact of believing teacher with believing child,·21. 
'THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SCHOOLS' 
During the legislative debates of 1917-18, Sir John Struthers of the Scottish 
Education Department (SED) praised the 'Highland solution' by which Catholic-
dominated School Boards provided Protestant teachers to give religious instruction to 
a Protestant minority. Pupils received their secular education together, and their 
religious education separately: 
It is a matter to be regretted that this liberality of view was not followed by 
the School Boards of Scotland generally, otherwise there is a reasonable 
probability that the necessity for the provisions of Clause 18 of this Bill 
would never have arisen.22 
Would more 'liberality' from the Boards have 'solved' the religious question? The 
Highland solution was not one that could have been extended. Mixed schools were 
acceptable to the Catholic Church only where Catholic control of the Boards ensured 
that a school's 'atmosphere' and staff were Catholic. Only in the context of some 
Parish Boards in the Gaidhealtachd before 1918 did such an eventuality exisr3. 
The Catholic demand, therefore, was that the state recognise the principle of Catholic 
atmosphere. The 1872 Act had side-stepped the religious question because the 
Liberals were neither prepared to concede state-provided denominational schools, 
nor able to impose a fully non-denominational solution. The 'Cowper-Temple' 
Clause in the English Act of 1870 restricted religious instruction in state schools to 
'undenominational' Bible reading, forbidding the use of "religious catechism or .... 
formulary distinctive of any particular denomination". The clause was unacceptable 
20 Leo XIII (1898:12). Leo conceded that Catholics sometimes found placing their children in 
non-Catholic schools unavoidable, but insisted that "Wherever the Church has allowed this to be 
done. it has only been with pain and through necessity" Leo XIII (1897:4). 
21 Beales (1950:381) 
22 Quoted in a letter to the Herald from Fr. George Donaldson. Lecturer at Scotus College. 
Bearsden 10/04/99. Clause (and later Section) 18 legislated for separate denominational schools. 
2.1 Of 32 Catholic schools in the Argyll & Isles Diocese. 2S were "Board Schools under 
Catholic teachers". Catholic Directory for Scotland. 1915. 
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to Catholics and - crucially - to Anglicans, and these bodies remained outside the 
English state system, and outside rate aid24. To Catholics the 'undenominational' 
claim rang hollow: "Bible teaching by the lay teacher, and interpreted by the 
individual, which is Cowper-Templeism at its most irreducible minimum, is ... 
Protestantism to the Catholic, and sectarian, denominational, dogmatic,·25. 
In Catholic and Anglican eyes it was unjust that rate aid was given to 'dogmatic' 
schools but withheld from 'denominational' schools. In Scotland the question was 
less complex as most Scots were Presbyterians. As Presbyterians were providing 
most of the schools for the new state system, they argued that there should be 
statutory recognition of the Presbyterian tradition in these schools. The 1872 Act, 
however, went no further than allowing School Boards to provide religious 
instruction according to local opinion, a permissive 'fudge' which suited Gladstone: 
Why not adopt frankly the principle that the State or the local community 
should provide the secular teaching, and either leave the option to the 
ratepayers to go beyond this sine qua non, if they think fit, within the limits 
of the Conscience Clause, or else simply leave the parties themselves to find 
Bible and other religious education from voluntary sources? 26 
Whilst in practice the 1872 Act allowed for Presbyterian instruction in Board 
Schools across most of Scotland, the refusal of statutory protection rankled the 
Churches. The segregated time-tabling of religious instruction also led to a marked 
decrease in the religious content of school textbooks27• As in England, Catholics and 
Episcopalians remained outside the new state system. Whilst in England most 
schools had thus remained 'voluntary', in Scotland only a small minority remained in 
the 'voluntary' sphere. The Catholic system was to expand significantly over the 
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PROVISION OF SCOITISH SCHOOLS, 1876 & 191923: 
SCHOOL TYPE 1876 % 1919 % 
BoardlPublic 2091 75 3048 92 
Church of Scotland 420 15 3 * 
Free Churches 124 4 1 * 
Roman Catholic 102 4 226 7 
Episcopalian 70 3 49 2 
2807 100 3327 100 
SCHOOL BOARD POLITICS 
In 1872, the Lord Advocate had dismissed calls for mandatory religious instruction 
as "eccentric and superfluous": "If the teaching of religion is to be safe in the future: 
if it is not only not to be hindered, but to be stimulated and promoted so as to be 
made efficient, it is not by statutory enactment, but by the feeling of the people 
themselves,,29. School Board elections were often, therefore, fought on 
denominational lines as the Churches sought to ensure that 'the feeling of the people' 
was met. The minority Churches also felt compelled to secure Board representation: 
whilst their communities were liable to pay the education rate, they had an interest in 
the fiscal conservatism of the Boards30. Secular interests also contested Board 
elections, often under the guise of 'economy'. Ratepayer interests were increasingly 
active as educational provision (and therefore expense) burgeoned. By the 1890s the 
Boards were dominated by interests stressing economy. A further secular interest 
was represented by the entry of the Labour movement into Board elections, although 
Labour's electoral record here was a dismal one. 
With such a diversity of interests, a complex interplay of principle and self-interest 
ensured that the Boards operated on an increasingly consensual educational agenda. 
This is not to say that candidates in the Board election did not utilise robust religious 
rhetoric, only that it was, on the whole, just that - rhetoric. Prior to the 1888 
campaign in Glasgow the Glasgow Herald predicted "some pretty play of a non-
scholastic character" between a 'Knoxite' caucus and the Catholic nominees, but also 
21 Darragh (1978:232); Report of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland (hereafter 
Report on Education). 1919-20. 
29 211 HC Deb. 3s:303-306 (06/05/1872) 
212 
"..4 Happy Solution to a Difficult Problem .. 
noted that "within the Board-room these antagonists seem to get on very well 
together,,3l. More broadly, the centralising impulse of the SED and the gravitation 
toward a recognisably educational (rather than denominational) consensus 
contributed to "a fundamental shift in educational ideology", and the: 
perception of fading evangelical, and indeed Presbyterian, control of Scottish 
education .. .Issues of 'social justice', of providing free books, meals. 
spectacles and shoes, now symbolised the welfare function of education 
rather than its evangelical design.32 
Religious intransigence on the part of Board members was rewarded with 
marginalisation. An initial rallying of Presbyterian interests was not sustained 
beyond the mid-1870s, and by the time that Presbyterian divisions had been bridged 
by c.1918, a pragmatic and secular educational agenda had been firmly established33 . 
THE SCHOOL BOARDS & VOLUNTARY SCHOOLS 
The shift in educational ideology meant that the economic demands made upon 
minority Church schools increased substantially: 
It was not fully foreseen that [1872] was but a beginning, as education 
demands would grow, causing costs to rise. The Act of 1872 opened an era 
in which Government legislation would continually outstrip Catholics' most 
strenuous efforts. 34 
Whilst the minority Churches resented their exclusion from rate aid, many on the 
Boards disliked the existence of state-funded schools outwith their control. Many 
Boards rejected the voluntary demand for a share of the education rate arguing that 
secular education was offered to all, regardless of religious background, under the 
protection of the conscience clause. Crucially, voluntary schools represented an 
economic challenge, attracting Treasury Grants which would otherwise have gone to 
the Boards. (In passing it might be noted that claims that Catholic schools were 






See Splaine (1894) for a Catholic critique of educational "extravagance". 
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funding provided most of the income for British denominational schools3s). Crieff 
School Board, for example, lobbied the SED in 1891 against recognising a new 
Catholic school. They argued that the two voluntary schools in the town would earn 
£200 in Treasury Grants each year, much of which had hitherto accrued to the 
Board's own two schools. As the conscience clause had operated in Crieff without 
complaint, they viewed the new school as unnecessary. In an attempt to stop what 
they regarded as inefficient educational provision, the Board offered to "cease giving 
any religious teaching" in their own schools, if the two voluntary schools were 
closed. The minority Churches and the SED rejected the offer36• 
By the late nineteenth century many Boards accepted that the minority Churches 
would not accept mixed or 'secular' schools, and held out the offer of rate aid in 
exchange for a role in the management of voluntary schools. The principle of 'No 
Control, No Rates' could provoke a furious response from the minority Churches: 
"So this is what it has come to. If we want any help out of the rates, to which of 
course we have to pay our quota, we must give up the management of our schools, 
those schools which we have loved and cherished,,37. 
In certain circumstances, however, there was considerable co-operation between the 
Boards and the Catholic Church. In 1908, finding that the Church was unable to 
provide 'Day Industrial Schools' for its 'delinquent' children, the Board provided 
two such schools exclusively for Catholic children with an entirely Catholic staff and 
a 'Catholic atmosphere' to the satisfaction of the Church. The opening of the second 
school was in defiance of legal opposition from local Presbyterians38• The Glasgow 
Board also provided a Truant School at Springboig, for more serious 'delinquents', 
from 1905. Catholic and Protestant children were "fully integrated" with the 
exception that religious instruction was held separately. This contrasted sharply with 
35 The New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967) claims that Scottish "Catholic schools were 
supported entirely by the voluntary contributions of the faithful until 1918" (see entry under 
"Scotland"). 
36 Handley (1947:224-5) 
37 Splaine (1894:24) . ' 
31 The legal challenge arose from a Presbyterian congregation who retal~ed some properl~ 
rights dating from the 1872 Act. The Board won the case at the Court of Session. See Roxburgh 
(1971: 193). Byrne (1907) offers a highly coloured view. 
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the rigid segregation of denominations at Liverpool's Truant School39. The success 
of these schools in overcoming religious obstacles provided considerable hope that a 
future settlement was possible. 
NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT 
On the Catholic side pressure on resources increasingly led to an acceptance that 
some public control might have to be conceded: 
Between 1873 and 1919, the Catholic Church was unable to meet the 
educational needs of the whole Catholic population: it had too few schools, 
too few properly qualified teachers, meagre post-primary provision, and in 
Lanarkshire at least gross overcrowding by 1918-19, with more than one third 
of its schools enrolling more pupils than they had places. From 1900. the 
Church was keen to enter the state system on a basis that would protect its 
influence upon Catholic education, and many of the city school boards 
agreed. 40 
In fact, as early as 1896 the Catholic school managers in Glasgow had approached 
the SED: "stating that in return for rate aid the Catholic schools of Glasgow were 
willing to submit to the school board, provided they retained proprietary rights to 
their school buildings, with control of staff and school management,,41. The ensuing 
discussions foundered on the recognition that continuity of policy on ad hoc bodies 
was impossible without Parliamentary legislation: such legislation was politically 
impossible before c.191 O. 
The Balfour Education Act of 1902 had granted to voluntary schools in England and 
Wales the settlement sought by Glasgow Catholics in 1896. English denominational 
schools gave one-third of the places on school-management committees to local 
government nominees, in return for substantial rate-aid. The Churches retained 
control of recruitment and responsibility for the upkeep and provision of school 
buildings. The Churches were not, therefore, entirely relieved of the financial 
burdens of their schools, although they retained a large degree of managerial control. 








"A Happy Solution to a Difficult Problem" 
education to County and Borough councils. Many Liberals saw this as an assault on 
local democracy, and secularist and Non-conformist alike baulked at the religious 
settlement, especially to the extensive Anglican system. Welsh opposition was 
particularly fierce, and Nonconformists complained about 'Rome on the Rates'. The 
Liberal assault, led by Lloyd George, extended beyond Parliament, and Carmarthen 
Council refused to implement the Act. A campaign of 'passive resistance' between 
1903 and 1905 led to the prosecution of up to 30,000 for non-payment of the 
education rate. By 1906, with the return of the Liberals to power, the campaign had 
petered out, and attempts to redraw the 1902 settlement were stifled by the Anglican-
Tory majority in the Lords42• 
In Scotland, a further attempt to reach a compromise was initiated by Glasgow 
School Board in October 1910, and the Liberal Government - whose educational 
policy had warmed considerably to the possibility of solving the religious question -
offered to legislate if the parties could reach a settlement. The negotiations, however. 
foundered upon a Catholic "fatal obsession" with the English settlement43 . 
Scotland's Catholics, rather unrealistically, hoped to improve upon the financial 
aspects of the Balfour Act while surrendering an equal degree of control. By March 
1912 the SED had given up hope of a settlement and the proposed Bill "was no 
longer a practical consideration,,44. 
THE 'MUNRO' SETTLEMENT 
The situation in Catholic schools worsened considerably after 1914, and the war 
acted as a spur towards compromise. A concerted effort was made in Edinburgh, 
where the Board and the minority Churches met between 1915 and 1917. Handley 
implies that the negotiations foundered on the need for legislative sanction. while 
Skinnider suggests that strong opposition from the Archdiocese of Glasgow ended 
the initiative4s• In fact the Conference sat over 31 meetings, with an assurance of 
Government support, and despite internal Catholic opposition. Whilst the Catholic 
A. Wood (1960:386); Beales (1950:384-86); Dugdale (1936:329-30); Murphy (1971 :94-96) 
Kenneth (1968:94) 
Skinnider (1967:51-51); Kenneth (1968:94-5) 
Handley (1947:237); Skinnider (1967:56-7) 
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Church could not agree to the Conference's Report in 1917. the key issues were now 
well rehearsed and clarified. That the Episcopalians did come to a settlement in 
Edinburgh increased the desire for a settlement on Catholic schools46. 
The only significant opposition to the Edinburgh Conference came from within the 
Catholic community, in particular from the Archdiocese of Glasgow, which 
represented a significant majority of Scotland's Catholics. Unease was not limited to 
the West: a majority of Fife's Catholic Education Board, for example, voted against 
the Edinburgh proposals in late 191647. An anonymous pamphlet, circulated to the 
clergy, attacked the negotiations as: 
an error of the first magnitude. It is worse - it is a crime. . .. it means the 
selling ... of a sacred trust; and the parties implicated in this unholy and 
illegitimate bargain should be held responsible for the violation and betrayal 
of that trust... We are asked to part with our children ... a cruel and heartless 
suggestion ... contrary to all Catholic instinct and tradition. It is like selling 
our heritage - our Catholic children's inheritance - for a miserable mess of 
pottage. 48 
The pamphlet insisted that "anti-Catholic prejudice" would ensure any settlement 
"would be received with hostile opposition": 
Under this proposed scheme .... our schools simply cease to be what they 
formerly were, namely, purely and essentially Catholic schools. The children 
are to be surrendered to the absolute control of Protestant clerical and lay 
managers of the Protestant School Boards. 49 
Senior clerical interests seemed to agree - Glasgow's school managers, in early 1917. 
decided to oppose the concession of any degree of control in return for rate aid
so
. 
The Scottish Secretary, Robert Munro, asked of Scotland' s Catholics in August 
1917: 
46 Report of Conference, submitted to Edinburgh School Board on 06/06/17 - Minules of (he 
Edinburgh School Board (hereafter Min. EdSB) (1917 :341-346) 
47 Minute Book, Fife Catholic Education Board. 13/12/16. Scottish Catholic Archi\es 
(hereafter SeA) S M 1 3/16 
... (Anon.) 'Rev. School Manager' (1916:6-7) 
49 (Anon.) 'Rev. School Manager' (1916:6) - my emphases. 
~ Skinnider (1967:56-7). See also Kenneth (1968:97-10 I) 
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Are they willing to bring their schools under public control, subject to 
suitable safeguards both in the matter of choice of teachers and religious 
instruction, and so enjoy the benefit of rate aid? I cannot hold out any hope. 
so long as they decline to do so, of any such aid; but if ... they can 
affirmatively answer that question, it is obvious that the position ~f the 
schools would in every particular immediately improve .... I think that I am 
right in saying that from the moment they assent to my proposal the Catholic 
community would never regret having come in on the tenns I have ventured 
to suggest. 51 
That Winter, Munro introduced his Education Bill. Among its proposals were that 
administration should be conducted by County Council committees rather than 
Parish ad hoc bodies. Voluntary schools would be wholly transferred to these 
committees in return for full public finance - the school buildings could be sold or 
leased to the County as the Churches saw fit. Religious instruction in transferred 
schools would be guaranteed by statute, and the Churches would enjoy a religious 
veto on staffing. Compared to the 1872 Act, the minority Churches were being asked 
to give up less in return for considerably more than had been offered in 1872. Under 
the tenns of the 1872 Act there had been no compensation for transfer (Presbyterians 
gifting their schools to the Boards), and, as we have seen, legislative protection for 
religious instruction had been refused to the Presbyterian Churches. 
Presbyterians saw, in a Bill which had "a good many desirable objects", the 
opportunity to secure the mandatory clause. They felt that the advance of 
Presbyterian unity enhanced the strength and justice of their demand. With legal 
protection for religious instruction proposed for the minority Churches, it was felt 
that the Government was now at liberty to extend legislative sanction to the 
Presbyterian majority52. There was considerable opposition to the Bill's 
administrative proposals, and a spirited defence of the ad hoc principle forced Munro 
to accept elected Education Authorities at the County level. Otherwise the Bill 
remained substantively unaltered from the Second Reading onwards: Presbyterian 
hopes for mandatory religious instruction had been frustrated once moreS). 
97 H.e. Deb. 55:463 (08/08/17) 
Scotsman 14/05118; 23/05/18 
See Kenneth (1968: 117) 
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Little organised discontent emerged concerning the proposed transfer of voluntary 
schools. A meeting of Scotland's larger School Boards unanimously supported the 
transfer of voluntary schools into the state sector, although they disagreed on the 
details. Whilst a majority of representatives voted to "approve generally" Munro' s 
transfer scheme, a significant minority voiced "strong disapproval" that it would not 
"ultimately obviate the need for establishing, at enormous public expense. a dual 
system of elementary public schools". Clearly significant numbers on the Boards still 
held out hopes of a unified - mixed or secular - schools systemS4• The Bill's Second 
Reading, however, was characterised by the warmth with which the transfer 
proposals were welcomedss. Doubts remained most deep rooted amongst Catholics. 
The first half of 1918 saw a deepening of Catholic misgivings. Bishop Graham 
advocated outright rejection of the legislation: 
I question very much whether any Protestant [sic] government will give us 
the safeguards we consider necessary to preserve the Catholic character and 
control of our schools. If the Bill passes, it will pass embodying not our 
safeguards for Catholic schools but Protestant safeguards - and we know 
what these are worth. Personally, I have no hesitation in saying that I am 
utterly opposed to handing over our schools no matter what conditions and 
safeguards we secure ... To make them State schools is the first step on the 
downward path towards secularising them. 
The Bill proposed the scrapping of Grants for Voluntary Schools remaining outside 
the new state system - a mechanism clearly designed to force the hand of the 
minority Churches. Graham saw this as: "a piece of coercion very much to be 
resented, and a very curious kind of repayment to Catholics for all that they have 
suffered and sacrificed for education in the country, under conditions of brutal 
injustice, for half a century past"S6. 
The Bishops accepted the legislation at the eleventh hour. Mgr. William Brown 
persuaded the Bishops that they would never achieve a settlement along the lines of 
the Balfour Act, and that Munro's proposals were in fact betterS7. The brute facts of 
S4 Report of Conference of Larger School Boards, Edinburgh, 08/02118: Min. EdSB (1918) 
ss See 107 H. C. Deb. 5s: 1074-1168 (26/06/18) 
S6 Quoted in McEwan (1973: 136). The • coerc ive' clause became Section 18 (5) of the Act. . 
S7 Brown was an English cleric appointed by Rome as • Apostolic Visitor' to Scotland. On hIS 
intervention, see Skinnider (1967) 
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demography and economy made it clear that: "On the demand side ... the Church in 
the West of Scotland during the 1920s [would be] faced with a potentially massi \"e 
programme of reconstruction. But on the supply side its funds were quite inadequate 
to meet all these needs"s8. 
The following tables demonstrate the rapidity with which wartime Voluntary School 
expenditure outstripped income, despite a significant increase in Treasury Grants. 
The improved situation in the 1918-19 figures reflects extensive state assistance 
given in the payment of teachers' salaries before the Act was implemented. Catholic 
teachers, it might be noted, warmly welcomed the Bill and were at the forefront of 
Catholic support for legislation. Reform offered Catholic teachers not only improved 
pay and conditions, but improved security and career prospectsS9: 
INDEX OF INCOME & EXPENDITURE OF SCOTTISH VOLUNTARY 
SCHOOLS, 1912-1960: 
Index of Index of Income as % 
Income Expenditure of Expenditure 
1912-13 100.0 102.3 97.7 
1915-16 102.8 103.2 99.6 
1916-17 123.5 139.4 88.6 
1917-18 146.2 159.3 91.8 
1918-19 145.1 142.1 102.1 
Note: Base is Income in 1912/13: 100.0 = £306,295 
To a large extent the problems faced by the Voluntary schools were caused by 
declining voluntary contributions: 
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO VOLUNTARY SCHOOLS, 1912-19
61
: 








sa Treble (1978: 126) 
S9 See T.A.Fitzpatrick (1990). Archbishop Maguire "deprecated" the teachers' welcome to 
Munro's Bill. 
60 Reports on Education 1914-1921 
61 Reports on Education 1914-21 
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Given the urban poverty of the Catholic community, it is likely that wartime belt-
tightening hit Catholic schools particularly hard. In some industrial areas in 1916-17, 
voluntary SUbscriptions accounted for as much as one-quarter of Voluntary school 
income: as the demands of the war intensified, this source of funding became 
increasingly precarious
62
. Despite the economic reality, the feeling of coercion 
lingered. In time, however, even Bishop Graham was reconciled, viewing the Act 
"as a happy solution to a difficult problem ... The transfer of the schools had been an 
act of justice on one side and an act of faith on the other,,63. 
CATHOLIC UNCERTAINTY 1919 - 1922 
After the Act became law, many Catholics remained suspicious: "that the gains of 
1918 could still be lost in the face of overt hostility',64. The Glasgow Observer 
warned: 
some of the largest public authorities are manned (as to the majority of their 
membership) by individuals bitterly hostile to either Catholic claims or 
interests and resolutely bent on penalising the Catholic schools as far as the 
letter of the law will allow.65 
This was a "sweeping claim unaccompanied by even the most superficial analysis", 
and was certainly not borne out by subsequent experience66. Many Catholics, though, 
remained resolutely hostile to the Act. Attempts to reorganise the Catholic Education 
Council in 1921 foundered as the Glasgow clergy "absolutely refused" to co-operate 
due to their continuing opposition to the Munro Act. The Bishops dropped the matter 
until 192567• 
The implementation of school transfer proved largely unproblematic. Where 
disagreements arose over financial terms, the Authorities and the Churches were 
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smoothness of the transfer were remarkable68. By June 1921. all of Scotland"s 
denominational schools had transferred to the new Authorities. The folloYting tables 
highlight the regional concentration of the Catholic and Episcopalian systems. Whilst 
over half of Scotland's Catholic schools, and over three-quarters of the Catholic 
school roll were found in the Industrial West, the district contained only one 
Episcopal school: 
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BY TYPE & REGION 191969: 
Region Total Public Catholic Episcopal 
Schools Schools Schools Schools 
Industrial West 795 669 125 1 
East of Scotland 555 493 51 11 
North East 501 470 14 17 
North & Highland 1,089 1,049 24 16 
Southern 387 371 12 4 
SCOTLAND 3,327 3,052 226 49 
PUPILS BY TYPE & REGION 19197°: 
Region All Public Catholic Episcopal 
Pupils School School School 
Pupils Pupils Pupils 
Industrial West 410,926 326,842 83,671 413 
East of Scotland 188,344 171,201 14,670 2,473 
North East 106,073 97,047 6,464 2,562 
North & Highland 89,813 86,107 2,303 1,403 
Southern 38,358 36,350 1,309 699 
SCOTLAND 833,514 717,547 108,417 7550 
In all the regions, Catholic school rolls exceeded the Episcopalian. Only in nine of 38 
Authorities did the Episcopalian roll exceed the Catholic: of these only 
Aberdeenshire could boast an Episcopalian roll in excess of 1,000
71
. 
68 E.g. GH 04/12/20. The Churches received £280.000 between 1920-24. and £140.000 in 
1929-30. Reports on Education 
69 Report on Education. 1919-20 
70 Reports on Education, 1919-20 . . 
71 The largest number of Episcopalian children (1.202) was found an Edanburgh. 
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Some commentators have suggested that the focus on Catholic schools by opponents 
of the Munro Act indicates that anti-Catholicism was a central motive for 
opposition72. However, whilst anti-Catholicism undoubtedly had a role. Catholics 
drew the greatest fire not merely through having the greater number of schools 
transferred, but by the fact that over much of urban Scotland the Catholic Church 
was the only denominational beneficiary of the Act. There were several positions 
from where the Act could be criticised. To focus on anti-Catholicism obscures the 
wider sources of opposition to the Act, and simplistically discounts critics of the Act 
as 'unprincipled' anti-Catholics. 
That the Authorities approached the particular concerns of Catholic education in a 
positive light allayed Catholic doubts73. Given the Irish War and the economic crisis 
which occurred at just the time - 1920-22 - that full implementation of the Act was 
undertaken, there was "surprisingly little friction" between the bodies concemed74. 
Catholic problems were treated sympathetically: faced with recruitment problems in 
1920, for example, Dunbartonshire petitioned the SED to recognise Catholic teachers 
trained in Ireland, accepting the Catholic demand for Catholic staffs. Lay voices 
found the Act allowed them to articulate grievances. A pupil strike at S1. Ann's RC 
school in Cadzow ended when Lanarkshire Education Authority agreed to investigate 
parental grievances. The Authority refused to investigate events prior to the school's 
transfer in 1918: the Act opened up new opportunities for Catholic parents to express 
dissent. Remarkably, in the St. Ann's case the parents sought redress for the school's 
allegedly lax approach to religious instruction, redress not obtained through the 
Church. It is profoundly ironic that Catholic parents had to resort to the statutory 
protection for such instruction to ensure that the school maintained a properly 
'Catholic atmosphere,76. 
72 See Chapter Two. . 
73 Several studies indicate that by and large the Authorities embraced the Act WIth some 
enthusiasm. See Treble (1980); Roberts (1967); McCaffrey (1991) 
74 Gallagher (1987a: 139) . 
" The SED refused to recognise the courses at Irish Colleges (which were shorter than In 
Scotland and England) as adequate training. GH 07/02120 
76 GH 26/04120 
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Lanarkshire was also the site of a dispute over who had the right under the 1 918 Act 
"to deal with deficiencies in the provision of Catholic school accommodation as and 
when they arose". All parties agreed that the existing accommodation at Whifflet RC 
school was inadequate - but whilst the Church proposed to pay for a £8.500 
extension to the existing premises, the Authority insisted that a new £25,000 school 
was provided at the Authority's expense. The Church did not dispute the Authority's 
right to define the educational needs of Catholic children, but argued that it should 
provide accommodation only where the Church explicitly repudiated such a role. 
After three years of dispute, Crown Office arbitration ruled in favour of the Catholic 
claim77• In 1928, however, the Church in Lanarkshire voluntarily waived the rights it 
had fought to secure. Treble offers two reasons for such a fundamental - and swift -
change in policy. Firstly, Catholic mistrust was eroded through the positive reality of 
Authority-managed Catholic schools. Secondly, there was a sobering realisation of 
the enormity of the task of transforming chronically overcrowded Catholic schools: 
Archbishop Mackintosh and his advisers were ultimately compelled to 
acknowledge that they had gained at best a Pyrrhic victory. For when they 
turned to translate the consequences ... into financial terms they soon realised 
that the Church lacked the requisite resources to discharge the burden which 
d 78 she had so strenuously fought to place on her own shoul ers. 
The Whifflet case reveals the willingness of the Authorities to invest in Catholic 
education. The contentious question rested upon who set the agenda and defined the 
needs in the new era of Catholic schooling. Many of these issues were finally 
resolved in a long running and bitter dispute between the Catholic Church and the 
Stirlingshire Education Authority. 
EDUCATIONAL CONFLICT IN STIRLING SHIRE 
A bitter clash between the Catholic Church and the Stirlingshire Authority was only 
defused with a House of Lords' ruling and the winding up of ad hoc authorities in 
1930. The dispute hinged on whether or not an Authority was obliged to extend the 
system of Catholic education transferred to it in 1919. In 1922 the Authority declined 
a Catholic request for a school in Bonnybridge, arguing that existing accommodation 
77 Treble (1980:33) 
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was adequate to meet local educational needs; that a separate Catholic school 
represented unnecessary expense; and, further, that the Catholic children of the 
district had been hitherto educated in non-denominational Authority schools (\\ithout 
complaint) under the protection of the conscience clause. Rev. Edward Miley. priest 
at Bonnybridge, did not accept the 'undercrowding' argument and hinted that 
Bonnybridge might provide a useful test case: 
If this reason for refusal ... were admitted, it could easily be made to prevent 
any new Catholic school at all being built and would lead to the extinction of 
existing Catholic schools when these got worn out ... In our humble 
judgement the claim is a just, indeed, an irresistible one. If Bonnybridge is 
not a good case, then there will never be a good case for any new Catholic 
schoo1.79 
Whilst the SED sympathised with the Catholic case, the Church was informed that 
"in view of the precise terms of ... the Act of 1918 [the SED] could take no further 
action to secure the provision of a school."so. The Authority then offered to provide, 
in non-denominational schools attended by Catholic children: 
a suitable Roman Catholic teacher to give such Roman Catholic pupils 
religious instruction for the same time as is set apart for the religious 
instruction of other pupils ... or alternatively, to agree to the Roman Catholic 
Church ... appointing an instructor to give ... religious instruction. 
Should this offer be unacceptable to the Church, the Authority further offered to co-
operate with the Church authorities: "in preparing and presenting to the Court of 
Session, at mutual expense, a special case to determine what facilities ... the 
Education Authority is under a legal obligation to provide"sl. It was apparent, 
therefore, that the Authority too were keen to make a test case out of the issue, and 
relations between the two bodies rapidly deteriorated. It should be noted, however. 
78 Treble (1980:34) 
79 Rev. Edward Miley, Bonnybridge to Bishop H.G. Graham. Edinburgh 28112/22. See "Joint 
Print of Documents for the Parties" (hereafter, Bonnybridge Documents). SCAt ED9/106/3 
80 Proof of Closed Record of Action. Co urI of Session \J!12l27. SCA. ED9!106rI-2 
II Stirlingshire Education Authority (hereafter. SEA) to Rev. James MacDonald. Bannockburn. 
Bonnybridge Documents. 
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that Stirlingshire acted alone - no assistance was forthcoming from the other 
Authorities82• 
THE STIRLING SHIRE DISPUTES 
Ignoring Catholic opposition the Authority adopted the policy of mixed religious 
instruction in their schools. This had particular implications for post-Qualifying 
education, as there was no Catholic secondary school in the County. Hitherto the 
Authority had provided bursaries for Catholic children to attend Catholic secondary 
schools outside Stirlingshire. As 'adequate religious instruction' was now. in the 
Authority'S view, being provided within the County, no further Bursary would be 
granted. The SED refused to give their statutory sanction to the proposed scheme. 
resulting in a public enquiry conducted by James Fleming, Sheriff of Fife & Kinross. 
The key issue was the 203 Catholic children receiving Authority bursaries to attend 
Catholic schools outwith Stirlingshire: the Authority claimed that their scheme 
would reduce bursary costs by 75%83. With regard to religious instruction the 
Authority argued that: "the religious beliefs of the parents ought to be taken into 
close consideration, but the precise method in which their desire should be carried 
out is a matter of public policy which we are elected to decide,,84. Fleming ruled that 
"as matters now stand, the immediate bringing in to operation of the Scheme is not 
feasible", and he found the Authority's policy on religious instruction was: 
"hopelessly insufficient and ... a system to which [Catholics] could not 
conscientiously approve,,85. He insisted that the Authority "seem to have no option. if 
they are to fulfil their obligations ... but to pay for suitable education" as the 
Catholics had insisted. Further, Fleming was unimpressed with the Authority's 
apparent desire to make the issue the Munro Act itself: 
82 The Association of Education Authorities in Scotland (AEAS) provided legal assistance to a 
number of individual Authorities. At no point was any such assistance offered to SEA on the 
'religious' issue. Minutes o/the AEAS. (hereafter Min.AEAS) . 
13 Typescript Enquiry report of Sheriff Fleming to the SED, 28/03/25. Hereafter: Flemmg 
Report, SCAt ED9/ 104 
IW Fleming Report - emphasis in original. The Authority had come to an amicable agreement 
with the Episcopal Church on the same tenns offered to the Catholic Church. 
" Fleming Report 
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As the inquiry went on it became more and more apparent that the 
predominant feeling in the minds of the majority of the Authoritv is that the 
Act of 1918 has given an undue preference to denominational bodies, and 
that therefore they would restrict their actings as regards these bodies to what 
~ey are clearly. bound ~ do. Suggestions as to the riFal of the Act of 1918 I 
discarded as bemg outside the scope of the enquiry. 
The Church was keen to press its claims, and they built and equipped a school in 
Bonnybridge themselves, requesting that the SED transfer it under the provisions of 
Section 18. The Authority refused the SED's transfer request, moving the dispute 
into the Courts. The Catholics insisted that under Section 18( 1) the Authority was 
obliged to transfer the school. The Authority countered that with 600 unoccupied 
school places in the district the school was not required; that a school built against 
the wishes of the Authority was outside the spirit and the letter of the 1918 Act and. 
finally, that no school could be transferred without Authority consent87. Whilst the 
Catholic case was at first successful in the Court of Session, the ruling was 
overturned on appeal by a vote of 3-1 and the subsequent Catholic appeal moved the 
dispute to the House of Lords88• The Lords found by six votes to four (the narrowest 
possible majority) in favour of the Catholic appeal89• The Scotsman devoted most of 
a full page to the decision, and made extensive editorial comment, underlining the 
historic nature of the decision. 
The Scotsman welcomed the decision, arguing that going back on Section 18 "would 
be to the detriment of the children", and that had the Catholic case lost then: "it 
would be only a matter of years before the children of Roman Catholic parents would 
be again outside the public school system ... Such a development would obviously 
defeat the object of the 1918 Act,,90. The Catholic Church emerged from the disputes 
in Stirlingshire with two very important principles established by precedent. The two 
86 Fleming Report ... . 
87 Scotsman 21/03/28. Section 18 (7) stated that a school built after the Act may WIth the 
consent of the D~partment be transferred": the Authority argued that 'may' did not constitute 
compulsion. 
88 The dissenting judge in the Court of Session decision was Robert Munro. now Lord Alness. 
the political architect of the 1918 Act. 
89 The original case at the Court of Session was heard in March 1928; the Lords ruled on the 
matter in December t 929. The dispute lasted over 7 years. 
90 Scotsman Editorial, 17/12129 
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cases secured for the Church an interpretation of the Munro Act which would not 
merely maintain the system of Catholic schools, but extend it. 
INTERPRETING STIRLINGSHIRE 
The dispute in Stirling shire threw up a number of issues, not least the question of 
whether 'religious' concerns outweighed the rights of an elected Authority to define 
the local educational agenda. It raised the spectre (and it proved exactly that) of 
budgets thrown into chaos as the SED authorised denominational schools against the 
wishes of the Authorities. Whilst a 'respectable' case could be constructed from the 
Bonnybridge affair, some reactions to the Lords' decision were explicitly sectarian. 
One Authority member complained that the decision: "put his loyalty to the test": 
"He was asked to subscribe to a foreign potentate, and to pay rates to propagate a 
creed that was alien to him and to the people of Scotland ... we were being 
overridden by an organisation that was nine-tenths political,,91. 
It is impossible to discern how much of the Authority's position - defended for 
almost a decade in defiance of the SED - was motivated by anti-Catholic sentiment, 
and how much by a sincere desire to protect the interests of Stirling shire 's schools 
and ratepayers. Indeed, it is probably impossible to separate the two sources of 
opposition to Section 18. The important point is that neither aspect should be denied. 
It is likely that opposition to the Catholic case gained momentum, and had its resolve 
hardened, by anti-Catholicism. Sectarian posturing, it must be noted, was not 
conspicuous in the dispute until it was reaching the bitter end. 
The Church of Scotland's General Assembly in 1930 demonstrates that 
disappointment over the failure to establish an integrated school system fuelled 
opposition to the Munro Act and resentment towards the continuing Catholic 
insistence on segregation. It also reveals that the Kirk was not inclined to push the 
issue with any degree of vigour. One minister noted sadly: 
91 
It must have been the dream of those who framed the Education Act of 1918 
that at last they were going to have education placed on a truly national basis 
Scotsman. 10/01/30 
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in Scotland ... that in the schools of the country all children. irrespective of 
thereligious beliefs of their parents, would sit side by side. That dream had 
assuredly not been realised [and] it was quite evident that the Roman 
Catholics would never accept mixed schools. 
A Stirling shire minister failed to rouse the Kirk with his dire warnings that: 
They now had no deterrent whatever to the ambitions of the Roman Catholics 
in Scotland ... the compromise which the Education Authority of Stirlingshire 
offered to the Roman Catholic body was ... fair and reasonable, although it 
was ignominiously rejected. The whole of Scotland looked to this great 
Church for a lead ... He asked that a definite and decisive lead should be 
given. 92 
The Assembly referred the matter to its Education Committee, viewing no other 
action as necessary. The following year the Committee Report complained that the 
Bonnybridge case placed the interests of "ratepayers in jeopardy" and recommended 
further consideration of the matter. Moving an amendment seeking to close the 
matter, Sir Henry Keith, Chairman of Lanarkshire Council Education Committee 
argued that dispute would have been avoided had "there been the exercise of 
common sense [on the part of the Authority] and a greater observence of the golden 
rule". For the Assembly to continue its considerations would "create a ferment of ill-
will and sectarian jealousy, which they would not get rid of for many years". 
Although the unamended Report was authorised by a large majority, the Assembly 
had in effect deferred action yet again. This reflected the fact that segregated 
education was functioning smoothly in many parts of Scotland. As if to demonstrate 
this fact, Keith left the debate to participate in the official opening of a new Catholic 
school near Airdrie, taking the opportunity, alongside Archbishop Mackintosh, to 
praise the Munro Act. That same day Scottish Secretary Willie Adamson opened 
another Catholic school at Tranent, hearing Archbishop Macdonald praise the Act as: 
Hthe greatest that had been passed for many centuries ... it would be appreciated 
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'ROME ON THE RATES' 
No understanding of the educational settlement would be complete without 
contextualising the Protestant backlash to the terms of the 1918 Act. Whilst the 
following chapter will consider political Protestantism in the 1930s, the concluding 
part of this chapter will consider the political impact of those protesting against the 
'endowment' of Catholic schools in the decade following the Munro Act. Handley 
argued that the Act: 
aroused resentment among certain of the official upholders of Scottish 
Protestantism who regarded any concession to Catholics as the inroad of the 
death-watch beetle in the fabric of their religion. In such an atmosphere the 
old discord was renewed. In Glasgow the education authority election of 
1922, the first following the working of the new act. was heralded with a roll 
of anti-papal drums ... A slogan was born that continues to rally opponents of 
the Education Act of 1918: "Rome on the rates!,,94 
Whilst the 1922 election was the first following the implementation of the Act, the 
inaugural elections of March 1919 had immediately preceded the coming into effect 
of the Munro Act. There had been no "roll of anti-papal drums" in 1919 - and 
neither was the issue prominent in 1925 or 1928. The slogan 'Rome on the rates' 
too, did not originate in 1920s Glasgow, but had a longer (and possibly English) 
provenance9S• The Protestant 'backlash' against the religious settlement in Scottish 
education differs substantially in tone and scope from the Liberal outcry that 
followed the English settlement of 1902. In 1919 the central issue for Protestant 
educational interests remained the necessity of securing 'Use & Wont' (the 
continuation of traditional Bible instruction) through representation on the 
Authorities, and not sniping at the privileges conferred on the minority Churches. 
The Orange Order recommended candidates - as it had done since 1873 - on the basis 





of vital importance that good, sound Protestant candidates should be electe.d 
who will see to it, while justice is done to every individual no matter what hiS 
religion or his creed may be, that the Bible shall continue to be taught in the 
public schools.96 
Handley (1947:303) 
The slogan featured in the protests against the 1902 Balfour Act. and may have a longer 
GH28/03/19 
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The Scottish electorate were unexcited about this new era of education and the 1919 
educational polls were abysmally poor97. The minority Churches, however. were 
relatively successful in persuading their congregations to the polls. Whilst candidates 
supporting 'Use & Wont' received "substantial representation" on Glasgow's 
Authority, the "most striking success" was the return of all 12 Catholic candidates. 
Catholic candidates were successful across urban Scotland, and, where organised, the 
Episcopalians also increased their representation98. Catholic success, and the more 
modest gains of Labour, were not initially seen as problematic by the majority of 
Glasgow's Authority members. When one (Moderate) Authority member resigned in 
1919 the Authority co-opted a Labour nominee in his place, increasing the Catholic-
Labour minority to 19 out of 45. 
By 1921 , however, the size of the minority was causing concern to some, stimulated 
by issues other than education. Ireland was immersed in a bitter war of reprisal; 
Labour was emerging as a significant electoral force; and the long fought 
Temperance campaign had come to a crunching halt with the abject failure of the 
Local Veto polls. Unemployment spiralled in 1920-21 and showed little promise of 
short-term improvement. These processes were subtly interwoven. Economic 
conditions improved Labour's electoral outlook at the same time that 'disloyal' Irish 
Catholics were demonstrably supporting the Party. In return, Labour tempered many 
of its long held principles to suit this electorate. Labour's commitment to Ireland 
was long-standing and unchanged - but the principles of integrated secular education. 
and of Temperance were shelved at the very time that the Irish Question was coming 
to a bloody 'solution'. 
Added to these political processes was the fact that the implementation of the 1918 
Act had placed an added and disproportionate burden on the rates99 . Parish Councils 
complained that the Act "was a cumbrous, unworkable, and appallingly expensive 
97 Edinburgh. 19%; Glasgow. 27%; Dundee 21 %: Aberdeen 13%. 
91 GH 07/04/19. Episcopalian organisation was never more than loose. 
99 Between 1913-20 the amount levied by the education rate rose by 1650 0 whilst Treasury 
Grants rose by 155%. Min.AEAS (v. I): 145 (12111120) 
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machine"l()(). In November 1919 rural Parish Councils in Lanarkshire threatened to 
refuse to levy the education rate in protest at the "extraordinary sums" demanded of 
them
101
• The transfer of denominational schools did not feature in these attacks. 
leading Munro to point out: 
that in criticism of the expense of the Education Act it is often forgotten that 
the entire cost of the voluntary schools in Scotland has now been taken over 
and is borne by the local authority, and that this to a large extent accounts for 
the increased cost. 102 
Pressure on the Authorities did not only come from the ratepayers. With the onset of 
a global recession from 1920, there was considerable pressure from the SED to curb 
spending: "Just when the initial difficulties appeared to be easing. when the new 
Authorities had time to form their plans ... the demand for drastic retrenchment in 
public expenditure supervened" 103. 
The spark for the sectarian campaign in Glasgow came from a "semi-private" speech 
by a leading Catholic, reported in the Glasgow Herald with its "context carved 
away"l04. Professor John Phillimore, Catholic convert and Glasgow University 
lecturer, described Scotland's Universities as "undefended cities" open to be 
"captured" by Catholic scholars lO5• One UFC minister, complaining of "provocation 
and aggression" and "Jesuitical proselytism" in "execrable taste", warned that "a 
widespread and deplorable apathy prevailed" in education with an ""indifference to 
the Roman Catholic menace"l06. A CoS minister warned of "a most unholy alliance 
between the Roman Catholic Church and the representatives of the advanced Labour 
Party" which aimed to capture a majority of Education Authority seats \07. Whilst the 
Glasgow Herald placed economy at the head of its concerns regarding the Authority 
100 GH 30/09/20. The religious question was not aired at anti-Munro Conferences organised by 
rural parishes between 1919-21. See Poor Law & Local Government Magazine. Dec. 1919; 
Sept. 1920; Nov.1920; May 1921 
101 Scotsman 07111/19. See also Poor Law & Local Government Magazine, January 1920 
102 /33 H.C.Deb.5s:1544 (26110120) - my emphasis. 
103 Report on Education, 1921-22. In 1921 some £ 150,000 (one third of the Education 
Authorities' total capital expenditure) was paid to the minority Churches for the purchase of schools 
transferred. 
104 Handley (1947:302) 
105 See Phillimore (1922: 184-185); McEwan (1979) 
106 Rev. W.T. Bankhead (UFC). GH 15/02122 
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election, it too referred to the "measure of understanding" between Catholics and 
Labour: "plainly a considerable danger exists of their obtaining a majority on the 
Authority" 108. 
James Maxton dismissed the notion of the 'unholy alliance' as an attempt to obscure 
squabbling over "which of the two teams of rival Protestants was to be on top", a 
struggle based primarily on "personal ambitions and personal aggrandisements .. IOQ • 
Division between the Orange Order and the Unionists over Ireland meant that some 
were keen to develop a distinctive 'Orange' voice on the Authority. free of the 
restraints of broader Tory interests. There was little unanimity between those 
ministers peddling an anti-Catholic card during the election, and senior Orangemen 
stayed entirely aloof from the No Popery drum beating I 10. All Moderate candidates, 
however, insisted that apathy placed the continuation of 'Use & Wont' in real 
danger. The result was a spectacular, if brief, reversal in the fortunes of the Catholic 
and Labour interests on the Authority. Maxton insisted that Labour had been the real 
target: "It is the Protestant churches ... which will suffer in the days to come ... It is 
not good business ... for the Protestant churches to stand blatantly as the enemies of 
the working class even when the attack is made behind the mask of religion"lll. 
The campaign succeeded in rousing Protestant electors to the defence of 'Use & 
Wont' but the momentum was short-lived, and by 1925 the minority parties had 
regained much of the lost ground. That there was no Moderate return to the 
'sectarian' card suggests that it was the specific congruence of Irish bloodshed. 
economic crisis, Orange-Unionist division, and the fear of Labour which lay behind 
the 1922 'drum beating' rather than the provisions of the Munro Act per se: 
107 Rev. J.Mac1agan (CoS), GH 22/02(22 
108 GH 04/03/22. The Herald's list of candidates made barbed comments about some Labour 
candidates and noted the Irish Republican connections of several Catholic nominees. GH 2~/03n2 
109 GH 04/03(22 
110 There was clear collusion between three UFC Ministers - Rev. D. McQueen, Rev. J. V. 
Logan; Rev. T. Cameron - and an Independent Presbyterian Rev. J.M. Brisby. Rev. J. Maclagan (CoS) 
peddled a strongly anti-Catholic line. but did not co-operate with the Brisby-UF~ c.lique .. Oth~r 
Orangemen avoided the sectarian issue. See also Gallagher (1987a: 185) on Catholic infighting In 
1922. 
III Quoted in Knox (1987:35). 
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VOTES - GLASGOW EDUCATION ELECTIONS, 1919-1928 112: 
1919 1922 1925 
Party Votes % Votes % Votes % 
Moderate 66437 55 176803 68 130115 62 
Labour 12658 10 26392 10 26587 13 
Catholic 39288 32 53290 21 53929 26 
Others 3150 3 2414 1 90 * 
TOTAL 121533 258899 210721 
Turnout 27% 57% 46% 





























The most striking aspect to the Glasgow results (and this was mirrored across 
Scotland) was the very poor support shown to Labour candidates. Labour long fared 
poorly in educational politics, being without a "strong voice" on Glasgow School 
Board before 1903 113• Over the 1920s Labour strongly established themselves in 
Glasgow gaining between two-fifths and one-half of Glasgow's Parliamentary votes 
- four or five times the proportion gained in education elections. It is clear that many 
voters separated their educational politics from the politics of local and central 
government. Whilst this has been a recognised feature of Catholic politics, there has 
been less recognition of a Protestant combination of support for Labour with a 
traditionalist affection for religion in educational matters. 
THE IMPACT OF 'SECTARIAN' POLITICS 
Discerning the electoral impact of 'sectarian' over and above denominational and 
party-political preference is, because of the vagueness of educational Moderatism, 
difficult. There is, though, strong evidence to suggest that bigotry was never 
prominent in Authority politics. That the 'Rome on the Rates' campaign in Glasgow 
was limited to a small coterie of Ministers in 1922 and that "the hubbub had died 
112 
113 
Only First Choice Votes shown. 
Roxburgh (1971 :220) 
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down" by 1925 suggests that the sectarian card was of short-tenn utilityll ... More 
direct evidence relates to most significant entry into an education poll of an explicitly 
anti-Catholic party, the Scottish Protestant League (SPL) in Edinburgh, 1925 11:'. The 
SPL hoped to exploit a controversy - initiated by themselves - over the re-housing of 
a Catholic school in premises recently vacated by non-Catholic children. Seven 
candidates were put forward, SPL leader Alexander Ratcliffe arguing that the Munro 
Act: 
metes out gross injustice to the Protestant ratepayers for the benefit of Roman 
Catholics ... The sectarianism of Rome is propagated in our public schools at 
the expense of the ratepayers, while the sectarianism of Presbyterians. 
Baptists or Methodists is not. Public and national schools for all is the 
election cry of the 'Protestant' candidates ... 116 
Ratcliffe gathered together a fairly plausible list of candidates, including a Parish 
Councillor and a future Moderator of the Free Church 117. Their entry into the poll. 
however, came under fierce criticism from both clerical and the "ratepayer' elements 
on the Authority, one Minister noting tartly that Authority "Members ... were not 
sent back to amend the clauses of the Education Acts, because they had no power to 
do SO"118. 
The Capital's electors seemed to agree; while Ratcliffe scraped past the Quota on the 
thirteenth and final count in South Division, the six other candidates polled woefully 
short. Ratcliffe's victory was achieved in the Division containing the 'controversial' 
school, suggesting that whatever electoral mileage could be made by the SPL was 
strictly parochial1l9. In the following table each Division's quota (the number of 
Votes required to secure representation on the Authority) is shown to highlight just 




Gallagher (1987a: 136). Phillimore (1922: 185) dismissed the campaign as a "stunt". 
On the OPP in Lanarkshire see Chapter Five. 
EN 02/03125 
117 Professor John R. Mackay was Moderator in 1929-30. 
118 EN 25/02125; 04103125; 09/03125 
119 Edinburgh South had (marginally) the highest Divisional poll. and Ne~ington ward (where 
the controversial school was sited) also polled relatively highly. However. given the low turnout 
(South Division 26%; Newington ward 33%) this should not be overstated. 
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SPL CANDIDATES, EDINBURGH EDUCATION ELECTION 1925 12°: 
Candidate Occupation Division Vote % Quota 
George W. Taylor Retired Clothier Central 294 5.-1 912 
John Forrester Consultant Engineer West 256 2.8 1284 
James S. Lawson Teacher West 55 0.6 1284 
Horace Caldwell Coal Merchant South 410 3.6 1426 
Peter Campbell House Painter South 129 1.1 1426 
Alexander Ratcliffe Railway Clerk South 1041 9.1 1426 
Prof. J .R. Mackay FCoS Lecturer Leith 481 6.5 920 
With a total of 2,666 votes (5.7% of the poll) the SPL had gained a toehold on the 
Authority, and Ratcliffe won some kudos in the small milieu of militant 
Protestantism
l21
• Ratcliffe's sojourn on the Authority was, however, an unhappy one: 
without allies amongst his fellow members he was unable to make any impact on the 
politics of the Authority and had a poor attendance record. Neither Ratcliffe nor the 
SPL stood for the Authority in 1928122. 
One Education Authority did attempt to make an explicitly 'Protestant' stand against 
the Munro Act in the mid-1920s. Caithness Education Authority, a body with no 
transferred schools in its responsibility, circularised the Authorities in June 1925 
seeking support for its contention that: 
Section 18 of the Education (Scotland) Act, 1918, is inimical to the best 
interests of Scottish education in as much as [it] provides facilities for the 
maintenance and propagation of an alien creed at the ~ublic expense and also 
leads to administrative extravagance in its operation. 12 
The plea received no support from any other Authority in Scotland. The Association 
of Education Authorities in Scotland (AEAS) did not discuss the religious clauses of 
the Munro Act at all between its inception in 1919 and its winding up eleven years 
later. Opposition to Section 18 appeared in only three motions in the life of the 
AEAS - two Stirling shire motions were heavily defeated without discussion in 1926: 
120 Only First Choice Votes shown. Minutes of Edinburgh Education Authority. (Min. EdE . .f): 
179-184 (1925) 
121 The contention that "widespread hostility to Catholic schools being state-aided helped get 
him elected" [Gallagher (1987a: 1 5 I)] seems exaggerated. 
122 Ratcliffe raised no motions in the Authority after November 1925. and had effectively ceased 
to attend its meetings six months before his tenure actually expired. ,\lin. EdEA 1925-1928 
123 Quoted in Min.EdEA: 14/02125 (p58S) 
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and a Caithness protest over the Bonnybridge ruling failed to find a proposer in 
1930124. 
The most telling judgement about the record of the Authorities in administering 
denominational education came from the Catholic Church itself. By the late 1920s 
the taking over of education by the local councils was firmly back on the political 
agenda. The Catholic Church was quick to point out that the proposals might well 
mean the removal of religious interests - Protestant and Catholic - from the local 
administration of education, a situation unacceptable to both the Church and the 
Kirk: 
There is no suggestion in the White Paper of any method whereby this 
representation is to be continued. The Government's proposals involve the 
introduction of sectarian controversy into town or county elections. This 
cannot be contemplated with satisfaction or composure. 125 
The 'sectarian controversy' referred to related not to 'anti-Papal drumbeating' but to 
the general desire of different Churches to ensure their educational interests were 
safeguarded. For Catholics this meant ensuring sympathetic management of their 
schools, to Presbyterians it meant the continuance of 'Use & Wonf. That the 
Catholic Church saw the elected Authorities as a defence against erosion of their 
educational position calls into question Callum Brown's assertion that Presbyterian 
ministers utilised opposition to the Munro Act in Authority elections as "a spark for 
Protestant reassertion,,126. To some, local government reform offered an opportunity 
to curb the (already waning) influence of the Presbytery by limiting the number of 
religious representatives on the new education committees. Senior Catholics. rather 
than welcoming the curbing of Presbyterian influence, believed Catholic interests 
would suffer as a consequence: 
As far as I can gather the non-Catholics on the Town and County Councils 
are anxious to be rid of their ministers as far as possible; that means ... they 
124 Minutes of Association of Education Authorities in Scotland (hereafter. Min.A£AS), (\',3): 
(17/03126); ( 19/05126); (19/03/30) 
12$ Minutes of Catholic Union of Glasgow, Vigilance Committee on Education, 27/07'28, SCAt 
DEI01/l/3. Catholic priests and Orange chaplains collaborated in opposing the measure. MinA£AS 
(v.4): (26/09128); (10/10128); (19/12128) 
126 C.G.Brown (1997: 145) 
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will not readily agree to the co-option of anything approaching that maximum 
permissible, because if they did, they would have amongst them more 
ministers than they would want to have ... That this objection to ministers 
exists and that it is widespread in the West I am certain .... possibly the 
dislike ... merely indicates increasing secularism .... , and unless we take care 
it will be our turn next. 127 
The central concern for Catholic educationalists, therefore, in 1929 as in 1872, was 
not the relation between Catholic and Protestant, but between the interests of religion 
and the claims of the secular state. Despite some evidence that the Labour 
Government attempted to play Catholic and Presbyterian interests against each other, 
the issue of representation was settled amicablyl28. 
CONCLUSION 
'Sectarianism' offers a fatally limited framework within which we can understand 
the evolution and expansion of Scottish Catholic education. The Catholic Church 
achieved a very generous settlement in 1918 which did not simply guarantee the 
survival of distinctively Catholic schools, but expanded the scope and depth of 
Catholic education. In the aftermath of the settlement the relationship between 
Catholic schools and the institutional agencies of education - the Scottish Office, the 
Authorities and the SED - was, on the whole, a positive one. By 1930 the right of 
Scottish Catholics to separate schools, fully funded by the State, was an entrenched 
reality. Only two Authorities made a stand against the religious provisions of the 
Munro Act, and both found themselves friendless. Stirlingshire succeeded only in 
securing an interpretation of Section 18 which well suited the desire of the Catholic 
community; and Caithness found that few cared to even discuss their theological 
objections. The SED, in their behaviour after 1918, played absolutely true to 
Munro's promise that the Catholic community "would never regret having come in 
on the terms I have ventured to suggest" 129. 
The Scottish settlement did not produce a backlash in any way comparable to the 
Liberal campaign of civil disobedience waged in England & Wales bet\veen 1902-
127 Abp. Mackintosh (Glasgow) to Abp. Macdonald (St Andrews & Edinburgh) 07/12129, SCA, 
DEIOII2IS. 
128 "RCs on Education Committees (County Councils) 1928-30'; SCA, DEIOI 
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06. Within this comparison lies the crux of the failure of a . Protestant backlash' in 
education in the 1920s. Whilst the 1902 Act was a Tory measure which raised the 
ire of secular and Nonconformist Liberals, the Munro Act sprang from very different 
historical circumstances. Politically, the Munro Act was the child of the wartime 
coalition, and thus belonged as much to the Scottish Unionist as to the Scottish 
Liberal. Those Unionists who disliked the reform resided in a party dominated by an 
English Anglican majority historically committed to denominational schools, and the 
Scottish Liberals saw the Act as a triumph of Liberal tolerance. Even in an era when 
educational politics were directly accountable to the ballot box, no significant 
attempt to repeal Section 18 took place. Politically, at Parliamentary. national and 
local educational levels, a practical consensus on Catholic schools fell into place 
which left little room for sectarian politicking. In the 1930s, however. as the 
following chapter will show, militant Protestant chafing against this consensus was 
to capture - albeit briefly - a mood of popular Protestant nativism in both Edinburgh 
and Glasgow. 
129 97 H.C Deb. 5s:463 (08/08/17) 
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CHAPTER 7: 
"THE REFORMATION MUST BE FOUGHT AGAIN" I 
The last chapter demonstrated the marginality of anti-Catholicism in Scottish 
educational politics. This chapter will investigate the intrusion of militant 
Protestantism into the municipal politics of Scotland's largest cities. The Scottish 
Protestant League (SPL) in Glasgow, and the Protestant Action Society (PA) in 
Edinburgh achieved remarkable, but brief, success in the 1930s. On one level their 
success suggests a deep reservoir of latent anti-Catholicism. At another the rapidity 
of their emergence and decline suggests that this reservoir was not deep enough to 
sustain a successful movement even in a limited area. Militant Protestant success was 
largely contingent on localised and short-lived social and political factors, not on the 
vibrancy of anti-Catholic sentiment. The militant Protestant politics of the 1930s 
represents a conscious attempt, with markedly limited success, to mobilise anti-
Catholicism into political form. The historiography on the militants is interesting: 
only obliquely referred to the contemporary Catholic commentator Compton 
Mackenzie, and ignored altogether by Handley in the 1940s2, they re-emerged from 
obscurity with the publication of studies by Bruce and by Gallagher in the 1980s3. 
Few subsequent accounts have ignored the phenomenon. Indeed, these organisations 
have been central to the view that the inter-war period represents the high point of 
religious conflict in modern Scotland. Writing of PA, for example, Devine has 
claimed that: "It was Cormack's supporters who were behind the most violent anti-
Catholic riots seen in Scotland this century ,,4 • 
MILIT ANT PROTEST ANTS 
Both SPL and PA were heir to a 'Protestantism Before Politics' tradition which 
believed that "the Unionists and the [Orange] Order were weak-kneed and supine 
representatives of Protestant interests"s. This critique had some history. Some 
militant Protestants - such as Harry Long in the late nineteenth c~ntury and Rev. 
Protestant Action slogan, 1935 
Mackenzie (1936); Handley (1947) 
Bruce (1985a); Gallagher (1985b, 1987a, 1987b). 
Tom Devine. Herald 18/07/98 
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James Brisby in the early twentieth - were content to forge a quasi-independent path. 
emphasising an 'Orange' worldview, but staying within the mainstream right. -
Others, such as Hugh Ferguson, began as independent representatives of a 'true blue' 
outlook but, with political success, embraced mainstream Unionism (and, in 
Ferguson's case were dropped as soon as their popularity waned). Others still 
remained resolutely independent. Two Kirk Ministers, Glasgow's Rev. Robert 
Thomson and Fife's Rev. Jacob Primmer were indefatigable campaigners against 
Catholicism in the later nineteenth century. Thomson stood twice - unsuccessfully -
for Glasgow Council, and served for nine years on Glasgow School Board despite his 
Church's opposition to his candidacy6. Primmer became a CoS missionary in Fife 
during 1876 and promptly "entered into a thirty years war with his own 
congregation, his Presbytery and the General Assembly,,7. From 1888 Primmer and 
Thomson, toured Scotland, their outdoor meetings courting violent controversy. and 
it was Primmer who provided the vision for later militants. 
SCOTTISH PROTESTANT LEAGUE 
In 1920, Alexander Ratcliffe (1888-1947) launched his SPL in Edinburgh before a 
"large audience [from] various evangelical Protestant denominations". A "new 
aggressive Protestant movement", the SPL was "evangelical, undenominational. and 
non-political" and would oppose" spiritualism, Christian Science, and various other 
systems of anti-Scriptural teaching [and] Roman Catholic Sinn Fein"s. Despite this 
remit the SPL was essentially anti-Catholic, born days after a leading Sinn Feiner 
warned an Edinburgh rally: 
6 
7 
If England wants an Irish Question then we will give her an Irish question on 
her own soil. We will let them see that two can play at the game of Armies of 





• EN 29/09120; GH 29/09120 .' 
9 EN 15/09120, Six weeks later a policeman was seriously wounded an Both\\ell leadmg to the 
arrest of 21 Republicans, nine of whom were convicted in 1921. See GH :!9! 10/:!0; T,"I('\ 07/12·'20; 
21/03121; Patterson (1993); Cooney (1999) 
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Whilst his tenure on Edinburgh's Education Authority was a miserable one, 
membership raised Ratcliffe's profile and, by the late 1920s, he boasted Lord Scone. 
a young Unionist activist, as Honorary SPL President. Ratcliffe was good box office. 
2,000 paying to hear "escaped nun" Edith Auffray in Edinburgh during 192810. 
However, Ratcliffe was increasingly frustrated by the ineffectual nature of militant 
Protestantism in Parliament and he duly contested the 1929 General Election at 
Stirling & Falkirk. It was an obvious choice: sitting MP, Labour's Hugh Mumin. was 
Catholic and the Division was home to the Bonnybridge controversy. Ratcliffe 
attacked Mumin for his Catholicism and challenged Unionist candidate Douglas 
Jamieson over his Protestant commitment. Mumin refused to "debate the religious 
question" and Jamieson dismissed Ratcliffe as "a man who opened his mouth and 
spoke of religious subjects alone". Ratcliffe offered to withdraw should Jamieson 
pledge to seek amendment of the Education Act: Jamieson replied .. that it was made 
in the knowledge that it could never be accepted" 1 1. Bruce suggests that the rejection 
"looks foolish" with hindsight12: 
















There were good reasons for refusal, not least Catholic concerns over Labour's 
education policies. Scone, with an eye to his political future, complained about 
Ratcliffe's candidacy against a fellow Unionist and resigned from the SPL
13
• 
In 1930 Ratcliffe moved his base of operations to Glasgow and entered the municipal 
fray in 1931 with three candidates. Two, against expectation. were successful. In 
1932, eleven candidates stood, winning one seat, and in 1933 the SPL ran twenty-






Scotsman. 14-17/05129, 27/05129 
Bruce (1985a:51 ) 
Scone was Unionist candidate against Jennie Lee in North Lanark - See Chapter 5 
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22% of the Glasgow vote, marginally behind the Moderates, and in those seats it 
contested the SPL was the most popular party. The SPL advance may have been 
even greater had there not been signs of disharmony. In two East End wards fonner 
members stood against the SPL and from here the SPL disintegrated as Ratcliffe' s 
autocratic grip alienated his followers. Of seven councillors elected on an SPL 
platform, four resigned the whip between 1933-34, all criticising Ratcliffe's 
dictatorial style. Only five SPL candidates stood in 1934, as did four Independent 
Protestants. All, including Ratcliffe, were defeated. No SPL candidates stood in 
1935, and Independent Protestant candidates were comprehensively defeated. Of the 
four councillors elected on an SPL platform in 1933 three stood in 1936 as 
Independents. All four lost, three humiliated at the foot of their polls. In 1937 
Ratcliffe polled weakly in Camphill, and various independent Protestants fared very 
poorly. This was the end of electoral Protestantism in Glasgow - a spectacular but 
ultimately brief phenomenon: 
SHARE OF MUNICIPAL VOTE: GLASGOW 1929-35: 
% by column 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Moderates 43 58 47 29 24 36 35 
Independent Moderates • 5 2 2 
Independent 3 • 1 2 1 2 3 
N ati onal ists 1 2 • 
Labour 53 39 43 31 32 40 45 
ILP 2 2 20 11 12 12 
Communists/Other Left 1 • 2 5 4 2 
Scottish Protestant League 5 11 22 5 
Other Protestant • 1 2 
SCOTTISH PROTESTANT LEAGUE AND 'INDEPENDENT PROTESTANT' 
RECORD IN GLASGOW MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, 1931-38: 
Wards Seats Seats Total % in wards 
contested won lost Vote contested 
1931 3 2 12579 -1-1 
1932 12 1 31438 30 
1933 26 4 72451 32 
1934 9 2 19847 26 
1935 8 1 6772 10 
1936 6 4 9098 17 
1937 2 2966 24 
1938 1 507 8 
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PROTEST ANT ACTION 
PA emerged in mid-1933 after a schism in the Edinburgh Protestant Society (EPS). 
Until c .1934, however, Edinburgh anti-Catholicism was dominated by the 
conservative Presbyterians of the Scottish Reformation Society (SRS) and Protestant 
Institute. Critical of 'unorthodox' attacks on Rome, they reacted to a play staged by 
the SPL by insisting: "we must attain our objectives by teaching and example. It is 
unscrupulous to carry out attacks by means of a play"14. As 'unscrupulous methods' 
began to demonstrate political potential, however, Edinburgh's 'respectable' No 
Popery held back those wishing to pursue a similar course. In the late 1930s 
Cormack's newspaper denounced the SRS: "And while [the] common vulgar men 
were working, the reverend poltroons talk, talk, talked, and did nothing but hinder. 
Words, words, words, wind, wind, wind"ls. 
The choice of title for Protestant Action suggested that some militant Protestants felt 
a more active approach would yield results l6. In 1934 three Protestant municipal 
candidates stood in Edinburgh. The EPS polled poorly in Newington and P A had 
mixed fortune, faring badly in affluent West Leith, but winning North Leith, one of 
Edinburgh's poorest wards. PA profited from the coincidence of several high-profile 
Catholic events in the city and organised spectacular protests. In 1935 PA ran five 
candidates and supported an Independent in South Leith. Two other Protestant 
organisations ran candidates: the Protestant Progressive Society (PPS) and the 
Protestant Defence Society (PDS), both offshoots of the now peripheral EPS. In all. 
the Protestants won 18,000 votes, 23% of the poll. There was, however, just one 
victory, in South Leith, although there were close seconds, the PDS losing in DaIry 
by four votes. 
Whilst SPL success was followed by defections, success in Edinburgh united militant 
Protestants behind Cormack. In 1936 they won 35,000 votes, pushing Labour into 
third place. In the wards they contested, Protestant candidates were by far the most 
14 Rev. Hector McPherson. quoted in Gallagher (1987a: 140) 
Protestant Action. 02104/38 
16 Initially. however. PA did not differ greatly from the EPS. 'Protestant Action' may have been 
chosen simply as a retort to 'Catholic Action'. 
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popular. Six seats were won, giving P A a bloc of nine seats and Connack struggled 
to maintain discipline, briefly assuming personal control of PA, for which Ratcliffe 
derided him as a "Protestant pope" 17. In 1937 PA contested thirteen wards, and 
supported the PPS in DaIry. Unusually Cormack stood in both North Leith and 
Gorgie, his reasons unclear. Gallagher suggests desire to consolidate his grip on the 
party, a lack of suitable candidates, or both 18. It proved a costly error: opponents 
successfully accused Cormack of egotism and opportunism. After a tense campaign 
there was only one P A victory. Moderates had strategically withdrawn from some 
wards, and P A was not strong enough to beat Labour in straight fights. Despite 
taking 28,000 votes P A had suffered a defmite setback. 
PA did not self-destruct like the SPL. Councillors, whilst enjoying more autonomy, 
remained aligned with PA. All eight candidates in 1938 belonged to, or were backed 
by, PA. Cormack won South Leith, giving PA all three of the ward's seats, but 
elsewhere Protestantism polled poorly and one seat was lost. In early 1939 PA failed 
to make any impact on a DaIry by-election, and failed to contest a by-election in 
Broughton caused by the death of one of their own councillors. As war approached 
the militant Protestant advance had collapsed: 
SHARE OF MUNICIPAL VOTE: EDINBURGH 1929-35: 






British Union of Fascists 
P A & other Protestants 
.7 
.1 
Gallagher (1987b: 139) 







1934 1935 1936 
53 42 37 
1 3 
36 34 29 
3 1 1 
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MILITANT PROTESTANT RECORD IN EDINBURGH MUNICIPAL 
ELECTIONS, 1934-38: 
Wards Seats Seats Total % in wards 
contested won lost Vote contested 
1934 3 1 4837 21 
1935 9 1 18109 36 
1936 13 6 35002 -/1 
1937 14 1 1 27810 34 
1938 8 1 1 14999 37 
DIFFERENCES IN MILITANT PROTESTANTISM 
Municipal Protestantism in the two cities thus seems very similar - both emerged 
from obscurity, scored remarkable successes, then evaporated. There are important 
differences, not least militant Protestantism's deep internal fractures. In 1935 
Ratcliffe derided PA as a criminal "Protestant Underworld", and several of 
Ratcliffe's Glasgow rivals appropriated the label of 'Protestant Action' 19. In 1937 
both the SPL and the Communists published damaging allegations about PA 
finances. Ratcliffe's authoritarianism bitterly divided the SPL from its erstwhile 
allies in the East End, and they stood in electoral competition with the SPL, and then 
with each other. Whilst the SPL went from success to internal squabbling, the picture 
in Edinburgh was reversed. After internecine struggle between P A and James 
Graham's EPS during 1933-34, Cormack's North Leith victory, and Graham's 
expulsion from the EPS, did much to bring the different factions together. By 1936 
most groups had united around Cormack. 
Alongside esoteric anti-Catholic lectures, militants attacked the Education Act and 
'Free State' immigration. Labour were criticised for defending 'Catholic' interests, 
and the Unionists and Moderates for ignoring • Protestantism'. Catholics were 
accused of discriminating against Protestants, of monopolising sectors of municipal 
employment, and of enjoying an undue share of Public Assistance. Militants 
complained that 'loyal' Protestant ratepayers were subsidising a . disloyal' minority, 
and that priests were involved in immoral and criminal activities. Here there were 
many similarities, in substance if not tone, with the Kirk's anti-Irish campaign. 
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Despite mainstream Protestantism's hostility towards the militants. there is no doubt 
that the 'Kirk's Disgrace' gave them a depth and respectability they would othel"\\;se 
have been denied. 
If there were few differences of substance between the militants. there were 
considerable differences of style. Following an internal purge during 1934. Cormack 
lectured on "Leadership: What it Entails!" and shortly afterwards PA's stylistic 
approach changed, perhaps as younger activists took over many functions. P A began 
to offer musical entertainment followed by, as one advert described. a "Bright 
Sparkling Address on a Burning Topic: It's Real Hot, Whew!" The new PA 
promised entertainment and enlightenment, spicy allegations about local priests as 
well as a critique of Poperi°. A few pennies at Oddfellow's Hall offered Protestants 
music and a furious oration from Cormack, undoubtedly a talented speaker. 
Cormack's key weapon was the simplicity of his message. Cormack insisted that PA 
would not co-operate with ex-Catholics, because 'Once a Papist. Always a Papist': 
"To be born and raised a Catholic was a stain that could never be erased,,ll. This 
broke the militant Protestant consensus (not always reflected in practice) that the 
enemy was Catholicism, not individual Catholics, for which Ratcliffe damned 
Cormack as "a coward and a humbug,,22. From its inception P A described itself as 
'100% Protestant' but the slogan 'Once a Papist' was coined during PA-EPS conflict 
in 1934. James Graham, himself an ex-Catholic, derided it as '"Absurd and Stupidly 
Ignorant". However, by the 1936 elections PA was supporting Graham, and Cormack 
maintained long-standing connections with ex-Catholic evangelist Mrs Walter 
Young. Cormack lectured at Young's mission in 1931 on "Should Protestants Be 
Bitter Towards Roman Catholics?" his co-operation with converted Catholics 
providing the answer. The slogan, therefore, was as much a weapon against Graham, 
as a deeply-held principle. Its utility was wider. When Cormack urged that Catholic 
bodies be banned from public halls, Ratcliffe denounced PA as "intolerant pro-
19 EN 06/07/35; 06/11/35 
20 Notices. EN 24/03/34; 07/04/34. On one contemporary priest still exciting (uriosit) see 
Herald. 29/ II /00 
21 Gallagher (1987b:79) 
21 Protestant Vanguard. 29/06/35 quoted in Bruce ( 1985a: 10 I). PA insisted' We do not attack a 
System only. we attack those who keep the System in being. i.e. Papists", £S 30'03 35 
247 
"The Reformation Must Be Fought Again" 
Romanists who would deprive Romanists of their rights". For Ratcliffe. the 
touchstone of Protestantism was civil and political rights for all, the key character of 
Catholicism its denial of such rights. Cormack's opposition to granting Catholics 
access to public halls thus "savours of Popery',n. The cumbersome gymnastics of 
such 'logic' made 'Once a Papist' attractive for its simplicity. 
SOURCES OF ELECTORAL SUPPORT 
Who supported the militant Protestants, and why? The obvious answer is that they 
were supported by urban Protestants viewing the presence of Catholicism in their 
midst with distaste. Such an answer begs two questions: why did anti-Catholicism 
become politically viable at that moment; and did militant Protestants focus upon 
religiously mixed wards? McLean, in analysing Glasgow's Labour vote, concludes 
that the SPL vote in a given ward "probably bore little relation to the proportion of 
Catholics [in that ward]. The enemy did not have to live next door to be hated or 
feared,,24. Indeed all but two of the thirteen Glasgow wards with no Catholic church 
during the 1930s were contested by Protestant candidates. Lack of a church need not 
mean absence of Catholics, but in several wards with a heavy concentration of 
Catholics, SPL candidates did poorly, or did not compete at all. A different pattern 
emerged in Edinburgh where P A took votes in precisely those areas where Catholics 
had a sizeable presence. Catholicism in both cities was crucially different, however. 
In Glasgow, Catholics comprised around a quarter of the population, and in some 
wards considerably more; it was well organised and (at least within the Labour 
movement) politically influential. Edinburgh's Catholics made up less than one tenth 
of the population and were less politically organised. They were not faced with a 
rival 'Orange' comnlunity, and neither were they as well assimilated within the 
Labour movement. All this suggests that Edinburgh Catholics were less able to resist 
the challenge of militant Protestantism in their own neighbourhoods. Edinburgh's 
left was weak and there was no 'machine' to direct the Catholic vote. While the SPL 
were to avoid. or fail in, certain wards because of a sizeable and organised Cathol ic 
Notices. EN 01/09/34; 02105/31; 02104135; 08/04/35 
McLean (1983:225) 
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political presence, there was no such obstacle for P A who successfully exploited fear 
of Catholic advancement in specific localities. 
Yet anti-Catholicism alone cannot explain the success of either party. They also 
exploited more secular concerns and benefited from voters disillusioned with 
Moderatism but not yet reconciled to Labour. Where did militant Protestants win 
seats? Detailed ward data are scarce, but some judgements can be made using the 
1931 Census. The following table groups wards according to a measure of housing 
quality: persons perl 00 windowed rooms (PWR). The table also shows the number 
of times each ward was won by LabourlILP between 1921-38: Labour-Moderate 
voting bifurcated roughly according to housing, suggesting that this is a useful 
surrogate measure for c1ass2S . The table then shows the best performance by 
Protestant candidates as a proportion of the electorate (rather than only those who 
voted) in each ward. Wards where Protestant candidates emerged victorious are 
highlighted in bold: 
See Miller (1985) for the utility of this measure at ward level. 
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PROTESTANT ELECTORAL RECORD BY WARD: 
GLASGOW PWR Labour % EDINBURGH PWR Labour % 
wms elect. wins elect. 
Kelvinside 65 Morningside 66 
Pollokshields 80 Haymarket 75 
Cathcart 87 30 Newington 77 13 
Park 91 Corstorphine 80 
Langside 96 21 Merchiston 85 7 
Camphill 98 32 
St. Bernard's 93 
Whiteinch 123 1 16 Colinton 96 4 
Pollokshaws 125 1 19 St Stephen's 98 
Dennistoun 133 36 West Leith 102 11 
North Kelvin 135 St Andrew's 108 13 
Partick East 141 16 Porto bello 108 16 
Partick West 141 5 17 Broughton 109 24 
Blythswood 143 
Sandyford 143 3 14 Liberton 125 4 9 
Govanhill 155 2 23 George Square 132 17 
Calton 135 5 21 
Maryhill 175 8 18 South Leith 144 29 
Fairfield 176 16 20 Gorgie 152 14 25 
Springburn 176 18 Canongate 155 8 26 
Townhead 176 10 15 St Leonard's 160 15 27 
Woodside 176 14 12 St Giles' 162 8 15 
Provan 178 14 DaIry 163 13 21 
Shettleston 178 15 22 Central Leith 169 3 26 
Kinning Park 184 7 27 North Leith 183 9 26 
Ruchill 185 11 25 
Anderston 187 12 13 
Exchange 188 2 13 
Cowlairs 190 13 15 
Kingston 192 14 20 
Gorbals 194 18 13 
Whitevale 195 7 19 
Govan 201 15 21 
Calton 204 16 17 
Parkhead 207 17 21 
Cowcaddens 209 16 20 
H utchesontown 229 18 
Mile End 238 18 19 
Dalmarnock 247 17 31 
Some of the best results for the SPL were achieved in Glasgow's middle class wards, 
whilst Edinburgh's militant Protestants fared best in the city's most working class 
areas. In both cities most victories came where the Labour presence was weak. As 
Labour success in Govanhill and Kinning Park came after the decline of the SPL. all 
250 
"The Reformation Must Be Fought Again" 
SPL victories except Dalmarnock, came where Moderatism was dominant. In 
Edinburgh, the left was weaker, dominating only three wards. In all three PA polled 
well, although only one (Gorgie) was taken. The other Protestant gains were in 
solidly Moderate or politically unpredictable wards. Whilst the SPL had a broad 
appeal extending into Glasgow's affluent suburbs, P A was largely limited to working 
class areas where Labour were poorly organised. 
The 1930s also witnessed the acceleration of suburbanisation. Edinburgh and 
Glasgow's population rose by 5% between 1921-31, but in both cities population 
declined in older central areas and increased markedly on the suburban fringes. The 
SPL and P A mapped on to these changes differently. The SPL proved more popular 
in 'receiving' areas than in the declining inner city, whereas the reverse was true in 
Edinburgh. In large part this reflects the class differences already implied. Whilst the 
SPL could win a growing middle class suburb such as Cathcart, similar areas in 
Edinburgh were barren ground for P A. Where P A won ten of their eleven seats in 
Edinburgh's nine most working class wards, the SPL garnered only two victories in 
Glasgow's 22 most working class wards. 
Ratcliffe himself believed the SPL vote benefited from disgruntled Moderates, 
although the evidence suggests a considerable proportion came from erstwhile 
Labour supporters26. Distinct patterns are difficult to discern, but examination of 
individual ward results suggests that the SPL attracted votes from both right and left, 
including many former Moderates who had recently ceased to vote. In some working 
class wards, particularly those with an Orange tradition, the SPL was more likely to 
benefit at the expense of the Moderates. This seems to have been particularly true in 
parts of the East End, such as Dalmarnock in 1931, where the Moderates apparently 
haemorrhaged votes to the SPL. Across Glasgow as a whole, results suggest that a 
significant proportion of SPL voters had previously supported Labour, and that many 
others used the SPL as a stopping off point as they moved from Moderate to 




Bruce (1998:07) seems accurate in this respect. 
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was, in comparison to Glasgow, fairly undeveloped. Many P A voters were fonner 
Moderates, but P A success in the most working class wards suggests that they also 
attracted votes from the Left. Nowhere is the picture so confused as Central Leith 
where PA won a 1935 by-election apparently by taking Moderate votes. Subsequent 
elections in the ward make little sense unless there was tactical anti-PA voting. In 
1935 and 1936 this benefited the sitting Moderate councillor, but in 1937 - perhaps 
because of the Moderate failure to hold the seat - Labour benefited. The only middle 
class ward to elect a P A councillor was Broughton where, in 1936, the defending 
Moderate was a Catholic, James Gonnan. Labour supported Gonnan by withdrawing 
and Moderates urged "Vote for Gorman and uphold the dignity of your city,·28. On a 
relatively stable poll, however, the Moderate vote dropped by around a quarter whilst 
the P A vote doubled. Many Labour voters, it might be assumed, had supported PAin 
the absence of their own candidate, a conclusion strengthened by the reduction in the 
PA vote when Labour reappeared in the ward the following year. In both cities, 
therefore, the Protestant vote was not simply drawn from disillusioned Moderates, 
but also from a substantial proportion of erstwhile Labour voters. In Glasgow a 
substantial number of voters appear to have shifted from Moderate to Labour, 
supporting the SPL for a year or so in between. It is difficult to find evidence of this 
in Edinburgh because no elections were held 1939-44. 
A final factor regards turnout. Some Protestant candidates appear to have reaped the 
benefit of unusually high polls, and it is possible that many who either did not 
customarily vote, or who had recently ceased to vote, found a temporary home with 
the SPL or PA. However, Protestant success often contributed to a higher poll the 
next year, many tempted out to oppose the Protestants. In Edinburgh, five PA 
victories coincided with an increased poll, three with a stable polL and two with a 
reduced poll. With the exception of South Leith, PA victories saw an increased poll 
and Protestant defeat the following year. The Glasgow picture is less clear as two 
seats were won in seats where Moderatism had previously won unopposed. Of the 
remaining victories, four coincided with an increased poll and only one with a 
21 EN 26/10/36; 02/11/36 
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reduced poll. Only once was SPL victory followed by a higher poll the next year and 
it worked against them. 
The key effect of the intrusion of militant Protestant parties was an energising of 
local politics after a fairly dull period from the late 1920s. The 1933 election in 
Edinburgh was "sleepy and enervating,,29, with only ten wards contested and a 
turnout of 35%. The PA challenge in working class wards gave a vibrancy to later 
elections - in 1936 the poll had risen to 51 % - and worked to Labour's long term 
benefit. If there was any doubt over the commitment of Edinburgh' s Catholics to the 
left before 1934, there was none afterwards: in attacking the 'Catholic block-vote'. 
PA ensured its heightened organisation and commitment to Labour. Apathy in 
Glasgow politics was lower and 55% polls were common. Between 1932-34. with 
the SPL at their most popular, the polls rose to 60%. The SPL, too, wedded Catholics 
more firmly to the left, and they pulled back from political apathy those disillusioned 
with the Moderates but not yet trusting Labour. 
"WE HAVE ONLY ONE 'PLANK' ... " 
In a city so utterly dominated by Moderatism, the long term political impact of PA 
was slight, and its continued survival dependent on the illusion that it offered an 
effective alternative in working class wards. In 1934 Cormack insisted: 
We have only one 'plank'. It is a comprehensive one. Wherever in the 
political life of our country, municipal or national, the Papist beast shows its 
head we must crush it or, at least, keep it in subjection. [PAl is composed of 
Protestants of every political party who want ... to defend our Protestant 
faith. 30 
Such a 'plank.' was of strictly limited value, but PA took care to make it seem 
relevant in specific locales. In slum clearance areas, for example. there were 
concerns over the future use of cleared land and over where people were to be re-
housed. Clearance caused localised housing shortages and rent increases; landlords, 
including many leading Moderates, were thus accused of profiting from the failure of 
Corporation house-building schemes. PA emphasised these issues in North Leith in 
29 EN 08/1 1133 
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1934, where defending Moderate Andrew Murray, "favoured the transfer of people 
from areas which were grossly overcrowded to other areas where they could have 
decent houses, sunshine, and pure air,,31. With Labour and Moderate sharing this 
position, PA was well placed to benefit from those who feared their communities 
were being tom apart. Shopkeepers in clearance areas saw their customer base 
shrink, whilst those customers left behind were frequently unemployed and 
desperate. On such concerns PA focused their 'plank': the new Corporation houses 
on peripheral estates were disproportionately leased to Catholics; Labour was in 
thrall to the Catholic vote; Catholic managers and foremen ensured Catholics were 
given Corporation jobs. P A fought dirty, claiming that Murray was engaged to a 
Catholic and intended to convert, drawing him into the Ne Temere controversy. That 
the rumour was absolutely false, and that in 1935 PA claimed that Murray was linked 
to the anti-Catholic Hope Trust, illustrates their audacity. PA organised effective 
heckling in 1934 and 1935, their opponents facing incessant questioning on religious 
issues and jeers and catcalls when, and if, they replied. Many refused to address 
religion as they viewed it as irrelevant - such silence was represented by P A as 
evidence of "Popish intrigue in local affairs,,32. 
Such tactics were limited, with constructive policies inevitably demanded. This was 
precisely the problem that had faced Ratcliffe in Glasgow. The SPL whip was 
concerned only with religious issues, on others councillors voted as they pleased. 
Whilst the general tone of SPL policy was, for the Glasgow Herald, "essentially a 
socialist case wrapped up in the vestments of religion,,33, individual candidates 
adapted their policies to local audiences. The SPL was left without a political identity 
beyond anti-Catholicism. In 1934 one opponent argued that ''the whole foundation of 
the SPL programme was to 'Kick the Pope', take that away and there is nothing left", 
an accusation Ratcliffe accepted: "Yes we do kick the Pope! That is our job! That is 
our programme!,,34. The SPL cast around for controversies to exploit, and 






PA slogan 1934. EN 0611 1134 
GH06/11/33 
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measures and the violence associated with the left. The 1931 elections followed 
unemployment riots and a "free fight" over budget cuts in the Council Chamber3S. 
Ratcliffe targeted Dennistoun and Partick East where Moderates were deeply split 
and appealed to Labour voters appalled at recent violence36• Ratcliffe attacked 
Labour's "hot-headed policy" and Moderatism' s "vacillating methods": 
"Representing on the one hand a thoughtless demand for the impossible, and on the 
other a narrow-minded ... and clannish effort to run civic affairs on party lines, the 
result of which has been incompetence and waste,,37. 
A different approach was taken in Dalmarnock where a rowdy and violent campaign 
employed a notorious gang, the 'Billy Boys' as 'stewards'. "Respectable' and 
'rough' elements of the SPL came together at a Partick rally where local youths 
surrounded the hall, outraged at the presence of the Bridgeton gang38. The following 
year, Ratcliffe focussed on Labour's working class wards, particularly in the East 
End suggesting that he viewed Dalmarnock - rowdy campaigning and 'Kicking the 
Pope' - as the way forward. By 1933 Ratcliffe changed his mind and targeted 
Moderate seats, including those represented by Orange tinged councillors in working 
class wards. Relations with Orangeism were frosty and Ratcliffe targeted such 
councillors in 1933, claiming that: "During the two years I have been in the 
Glasgow Town Council, the Orange members in the Council have been struck dumb 
on every question pertaining to the Protestantism and Orangeism of Scotland,,39. 
The change in focus was profitable, winning four seats, all from the Moderates in 
middle class wards. Another twelve Moderates were unseated by LabourlILP where 
they would have won if they had taken the votes given to the SPL. However. it is 
doubtful they would have taken these votes. Many of the lost seats were originally 
won through anti-Government sentiment in 1930, and Moderate losses in 1933 were 






Vanguard, 29/09/34 quoted in Gallagher (1987a:155) 
GH 16/10/31. On riots see Chapter 4. 
Scotsman 20/05/31: GH 07/1 0/31: 14/10/31 
GH 30/10/31 
GH 02/11131 
Bruce (1985a:53) quoting Protestant Vanguard. 
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was much weaker. Of the twelve Moderate seats lost to Labour in 1933. three were 
held by the Moderates in 1934, whilst LabourlILP held three and gained six. In other 
words, without the complication of the SPL, Labour took Moderate seats in 1934. 
However, with Labour taking over the administration of Glasgow in 1933. the SPL 
appeared as an obstacle to Moderate revival and in 1934 an electoral pact was 
agreed. This gave the SPL a clear run against Labour (and a claim on Moderate 
votes) in a number of wards, and seemed to assure Ratcliffe's successful defence of 
Dennistoun. For the Moderates, it ensured that the SPL would not continue to grow 
at their expense. The Moderates got the best of the deal: the SPL stood only five 
candidates, three in safe Labour wards. However, Matthew Armstrong. a long-
standing Moderate with Orange connections, had lost Kingston in 1933 largely 
because of the SPL, and stood in Dennistoun as an Independent Moderate. Senior 
Moderates failed to dissuade Armstrong40, and the left (excepting an Independent 
Communist) withdrew. The Orange Order endorsed both candidates, and Armstrong 
made contact with Catholic Union representatives in the ward. With the Glasgow 
press and many Glaswegian pulpits urging an anti-Ratcliffe vote, Armstrong won by 
300 votes41 • 
Whilst the SPL seemed to be unsure of where its core support really lay, oscillating 
between centrist populism and 'Kicking the Pope', PA' s programme remained 
consistently focused, seldom contesting middle class wards and canvassing working 
class enclaves in those they did. PA claimed to be a "worker's party", attacking 
Labour for offering "a half-hearted, craven, jelly-fish Communism,,42, and demanded 
public works to boost employment and a religious census of Corporation employees. 
Success hinged on the fact that Edinburgh as a whole escaped the worst ravages of 
the Depression and did not qualify for Special Area Assistance. Thus. deprived 
pockets of the city felt doubly burdened - ignored by both Westminster and the 




See Fonvard. 20/10/34 
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Edinburgh, a measure Edinburgh pursued with some arrogance43. Leith was acutely 
sensitive to economic crisis, its dockworkers suffering particularly high levels of 
unemployment
44
• In the mid-1930s Leith contained 19% of Edinburgh's population 
and 25% of its total unemployed, over a third of those 'temporarily stopped'. and 
90% of those 'normally in casual employment'4s. 1930s Leith was an unemployment 
blackspot without political influence. As one Leither complained: 
It is well known that Leith is one of the most distressed areas ... but the port 
cannot be classified as such nor be given any special benefits because of her 
misfortune in being amalgamated with Edinburgh ... Edinburgh and Leith are 
rather like Dives and Lazarus, Dives being utterly indifferent to the sores and 
pains of Lazarus at his gate. Dives does not want to be bothered or 
interrupted in his pleasures, and so he shuts his eyes to the misery so near 
by.46 
P A harnessed such resentment, winning in three of four Leith wards and the Port 
became the heart of the Protestant movement. Although P A's offices were in central 
Edinburgh, its 'social offices', running games' nights, mother and toddler and 
pensioner groups, were in Leith. Yet only a decade before, in the 1925 Education 
elections, the SPL failed miserably in Leith, taking 481 votes across the entire Port47. 
In 1936 PA was Leith's most popular party, taking 9,438 votes, 41 % of the total. 
This remarkable turn around in militant Protestantism's appeal in Leith suggests that 
anti-Catholicism was less important than more secular, and time specific, issues. 
P A appealed to sections of the working class who felt unappreciated by both Labour 
and Moderate. The SPL also attracted those who saw neither established municipal 
party as representing their aspirations, but were rather more successful amongst the 
lower middle class. Marshall's explanation of militant Protestantism is of limited 
value applied to the SPL, but accurate for P A: 
43 75% of Leith electors opposed amalgamation in a postal ballot whilst .Edi~b.urgh. Council 
argued it would "be no great hardship ... to surrender the sentiment of being a Lel~ CItizen In favour 
of the sentiment of being a citizen of the Scottish Capital" - Town Cler~ ~f Edinburgh (1919:24). 
Similar Acts expanded Glasgow (1912) and Dundee (1913) over local OPPOSItion. . 
44 32% of insured dockworkers across the UK were registered unemployed In 1935. Board of 
Trade (1939: 142-143) 
4$ EN 07/11/33; 08/09/36 
46 Letter to EN. 1412135 
47 See Chapter 6 
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[Their] success was essentially a reaction to the disillusionment many people 
felt at the inability of the existing and traditional parties to deal effectivel\' 
with their problems. Ordinary people at the sharp end of economic recessio~ 
are not often interested in the myriad and complex issues surrounding their 
plight, they simply want something done about it, and fast . .J8 
"THE YOUNG FELLOWS" 
A number of authors have regarded PA as a 'fascisf organisation, given their 
scapegoating of Catholics and their use ofviolence49• This is a poor analysis. Firstly, 
inter-war fascist movements glorified violence in a manner that P A or the SPL never 
did. Secondly, most militants at the time rejected fascism as a Catholic doctrine. It 
did not escape their notice that fascism arose in Catholic Southern Europe, and all 
the Edinburgh groups took an explicitly anti-fascist stance when Mosley's BUF 
organised in the city. This opposition was not simply rhetorical - PA posed the 
question "Fascism or Protestantism. Which?" - the BUF was physically attacked by 
PA supportersso. PA's anti-fascism was largely 'theological', in that they viewed 
fascism as 'Catholic' but they also viewed Mosley (with some justification) as 'pro-
Irish,sl. Neither was PA characterised by anti-Semitism: indeed one of its 
councillors, Esta Henry, was Jewish. Henry was a Canongate jeweller who had been 
a Moderate Parish councillor in 1928 and an unsuccessful municipal candidate 
during the early 1930s. In 1936 Henry stood as an Independent in Canongate. but. 
largely through expedience, joined PA before the poll. Henry remained within the 
P A orbit until c .1938, and her adoption brings into question P A's claims to be '1000/0 
Protestant'. Ratcliffe derided Henry's candidature and was to come to see Jews, 
rather than Catholics, as the greatest threat to Protestant liberty. The only substantial 
link one can make between Scottish militant Protestantism and fascism during the 
inter-war period is Ratcliffe's late decline into Hitler-worships2 . 
.. 8 Marshall (1996:143) . . . . 
.. 9 For example, "neo-fascist thugs", Darner (1997: 191), .. the faSCistiC Cormack . Calder 
~989:20), "fascist connections and racist sympathies", Williams & Walls (2000::!33) 
See EN 03/03/34; 21106134. 
SI See McFarland (1990:217) 
S2 See Holmes ( 1989) 
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If militant Protestantism did not share fascism's exaltation of violence. it did see 
violence as a legitimate strategy. Whilst Williamson is right to caution that "it is easy 
to concentrate on the more colourful elements of the SPL, but they were never more 
than a minor inconvenience to the Catholic community,,s3, the SPL was involved in 
violent incidents. One Dalmamock election meeting "was the scene of panic" as 
violence flared, and was followed promptly by "Uproar in Partick" as the gang-
connections of the SPL backfired54• In 1935, seven were arrested as "running fights" 
disrupted an SPL meeting55• However, the SPL did not adopt physical confrontation 
as a deliberate strategy and neither was it adept at producing public spectacle. In 
1931 "several thousands" protested against a Corporation reception for the Catholic 
Young Men's Society (CYMS). The protest coincided with an Empire Day rally of 
Young Unionists, and the end effect was that the Unionist day was ruined. 
Disrupting remembrance of the City's war-dead was hardly a positive outcome for a 
party espousing 'loyalty', and this seems to have been the first and last SPL mass 
demonstration in Glasgow. Undoubtedly Ratcliffe had an eye for controversy but 
lacked the manipulative skill to tum them to his advantage. A visit to Fauldhouse in 
1935 resulted in thirteen arrests after what was "according to the Procurator Fiscal ... 
nothing short of a riot". The court clearly disagreed, feeling that the SPL had 
provoked violent opposition, and all thirteen were admonished56. 
It is with P A that violence is most often associated. Various events during what 
Gallagher terms "The Hot Summer of 1935" have been described as "riots"S7. PA 
was fortunate that its rise coincided with a number of high profile Catholic events in 
the city. Such events were by no means a recent development in Edinburgh: in 1929 
Catholics celebrated the installation of Archbishop McDonald and the Emancipation 
Centenary. The city authorities attended McDonald's consecration, after which the 
clergy walked in procession "witnessed by large crowds,,58, and the Centenary saw a 
public procession of 2,000 Catholic children whose "distinctive banners and flags 
53 Williamson (1998:25) . . . 
54 Two were hospitalised at Dalmarnock; and the 'Billy Boys' left Partlck "amIdst a hall of 
bottles, stones and iron bars". GH 31/10/31; 03/11/31 
55 EN 19/08/35 
56 See Bruce (1985a:72): EN 13/07/35; 30/07/35: 16/08/35 
S7 Gallagher (1987b:35); G.Walker (1995:75); Knox (1999:201); Tom Devine. Heruld 18/07,98 
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attracted considerable attention"s9. Such public displays of Catholic faith drew no 
notable protest and throughout the early 1930s Catholics held regular meetings at the 
Usher Hall and smaller venues without harassment from militant Protestants60. 
It was 1934 before militants organised successful protests against Catholicism' s 
Edinburgh activities; EPS demonstrators heckled a Catholic speaker and then walked 
out of the Usher Ha1l61 . On the same day PA complained over a BBC broadcast from 
a Catholic Church, a programme cancelled when "it was found that the microphone 
wires had been 'mysteriously' severed,,62. In May 1934 there was a "melee" between 
the EPS and Catholics at the Mound after which James Graham was prosecuted63. 
These were isolated events with no other Catholic function disrupted before 193564. 
It was a planned Council reception for the CYMS which ignited the sectarian issue. 
and PA benefited from Catholic plans for a Eucharistic Congress in Momingside65. 
Eucharistic Congresses had already proved controversial in the British Isles. In 1908. 
a procession of the Host in London was cancelled after its legality was placed in 
doubt, and in 1932 De Valera used the Dublin Congress to publicly snub the United 
Kingdom66, PA could hardly have wished for a better political opportunity than a 
Catholic display of strength and devotion in an affiuent suburb. 
From its electoral debut PA had a reputation for roughness, with Labour activists 
complaining in 1935 that "they could make no progress against rowdyism, even at 
outdoor meetings". Cormack retorted, "why squeal now when the same medicine is 
administered to themselves, which they loved to administer to their opponents,,67. 
sa EN 24/09/29; Scotsman 25/09/29 
S9 EN 15/10/29; Scotsman 16/10/29 
60 The larger Catholic rallies featured Hilaire Belloc (25/10/30); Cardinal Bourne (06/06/31 ); 
Bishop Henry Graham (04/03/33) 
61 EN & Evening Dispatch 01/02/34 
62 Evening Dispatch, 01/02/34. The report clearly implicates (the as then unknown~ PA. 
63 Graham was fined £3 for assault. A similar charge against George Ballantme. future PA 
councillor, was not proven. EN 14/05/34; 23/05/34; 05/06/34; 06/06/34 .' , 
64 On well publicised - and well attended - meetings with no reported dIsruptIon see, £.\ 
01/11134; 17/11/34; 08/12/34; 05/01135; 09/02/35; 11/02135; 23/03/35 
6S EN 28/03/35. There is no evidence, as Bruce (1985a:89) and Calder ( 1989:20) suggest. that 
the Church planned a procession along Princes Street. . ., .. 
66 On London see Chapter 4 and Machin (1983); on Dubhn see P.Murray ( .. 000). T,m(.\ 18-
24/06/32 
67 EN 24-25/04/35 
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Certainly P A's electoral tactics during 1934-35 were no more violent than Labour 
tactics in some areas dwing the General Election of 1935, and considerably less so 
than Labour's Parliamentary campaign in Leith in 192968. PA did, however. see 
violent physical confrontation as a useful propaganda tool. Addressing the Usher 
Hall, Cormack warned that Edinburgh would learn "what a real 'smash up' was" if 
the CYMS reception went ahead. Supporters were urged to mobilise "even if for 
nothing else but to cry 'No Popery''', and told in an aside that "they could leave the 
other part of the business to the young fellows,,69. PA demonstrations that summer 
were large and boisterous - 10,000 gathered for the CYMS protest, and 10,000 for 
the main anti-Congress demonstration - although many were attracted by curiosity 
rather than active anti-Catholicism. These events have been described as "the most 
violent anti-Catholic riots seen in Scotland this century,,70, yet they seem to have 
been characterised by noisy confusion not physical violence. The CYMS protest 
"passed without any serious developments", although there was a brief confrontation 
in the Cowgate which "blew over quickly". Three arrests were made, two of drunken 
opponents of PA71 • As the Congress approached, PA focused its campaign on its 
closing Mass at St Andrew's Priory, Morningside. No protest was planned for the 
first two Congress days. On the opening day of the Congress Cormack arranged a 
rally at the Usher Hall, drawing his followers away from premature confrontation. 
There were, however, some minor clashes on Princes Street that evening, and PA 
quickly announced a demonstration for the second day, against a rally of Catholic 
women. Gallagher is wrong to claim that "A suitable opportunity for venting hate did 
not present itself until ... the second day of the Congress,,72, rather it seems that 
Cormack preferred to focus on the final day but was overtaken by events. Notably 
this was the only major PA protest at which Cormack was not present, suggesting 
that he was not entirely happy with the fairly impromptu arrangements. 
61 Liberal MP Ernest Brown had a torrid time at the hands of Labour supporters in 1929. and 
ironically his then opponent, Alex Paton, became a fierce critic ~f P,A tactics ~ee EN 23-24/05/29; 
Scotsman 28/05129. On the Left's acceptance of electoral 'ruffianIsm from their own supporters see 
New Statesman and Nation, 09/11/35 . 
69 See EN 18/04/35; Scotsman 27/04/35. The statement was reported to the Pro(uralOr FIscal 
but was ambiguous enough for no further action. 
70 Tom Devine. Herald 18/07/98 
71 Scotsman & EN 29/04/35 
72 Gallagher (1987b:49) 
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This protest, involving around 1,500 demonstrators, proved to be the most violent 
with outbreaks of fighting, although "the situation never got out of hand". Eleven 
arrests were made and nine men subsequently convicted, the court imposing harsher 
sentences than previously handed down for 'sectarian' offences 73. All of the men 
were working class by occupation and residence, and two - convicted of fighting 
each other - were next door neighbours in Prestonfield. The following day was very 
tense, yet the Police seemed remarkably unprepared for the size of the crowds in 
Morningside. Around 10,000 Catholics attended the Mass, and 10,000 more gathered 
outside, to demonstrate or to spectate74• Nevertheless, the evening did not produce 
much in the way of violence. Several buses carrying Catholics were stoned but these 
were isolated cases on the fringes of an evening marked by confusion 75. Cormack 
spent the evening desperately trying to keep the crowd under his leadership, and the 
image of a Priory besieged by demonstrators is inaccurate. Some priests left the 
Priory unaware of the presence of protestors76• One Catholic recalls that protestors 
"were cordoned off by a fairly strong contingent of police" and that ''there were no 
major incidents of violence to mar the day". He recalls, however. that there was a 
large degree of tension and that: 
The atmosphere was not calmed by the presence of a group of [Catholic] men 
who set up camp in the grounds as self-appointed guardians that weekend. 
and armed themselves with a strange assortment of items to serve as clubs. 
Fortunately their martial arts were not called upon.77 
The News praised the "peaceful persuasion' of the Police who kept in check those 
who would have hoped ''to create serious trouble on a large scale". Indeed the night 
73 Scotsman 25/06/35' EN 26/06/35 Graham had been fined £3 in 1934 for assault. those 
convicted after the CYMS pr~test were fined £1 (or 7 days) for breach o/the peace: those convicted 
for (sometimes minor) offences during the Congress were fined £10 (or 30 days). . 
74 Some estimates _ Calder (1989) suggests 35-40,000 protestors and 30,000 Catholics - are 
preposterous. The numbers quoted are from Scotsman, EN & Ev~ning Dispatch 26/06/35. . .• 
" Priests were asked to report their experiences to Fr. Michael Bruce at St Pet~r s: MO~lngsldc 
_ see SCA DE t 62151-52. Three priests reported separate incidents of stoning. resulting In minor cuts. 
bruises and shock. Press reports suggest at least two other incidents. 
76 See SCA DE16215 1 
17 Letter from Abbot Alban Boultwood OSB. Washington DC. to Michael Turnbull. June IQQQ. 
I am very grateful to both for penn iss ion to cite their correspondence. 
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yielded only four arrests, all involved in the stoning of a bus. The four were heavilY 
fmed and warned that a subsequent conviction would see themjailed78• 
Small scale confrontation continued throughout the summer. One of the worst 
incidents saw "angry scenes ... scuffles and blows" between PA supporters and 
Canongate Catholics. Police dispersed the crowd and P A regrouped for a St. 
Leonard's meeting where further violence broke out involving a recently formed 
Catholic Vigilance Association (CVA)79. The CVA had gone to the assistance of a 
priest, caught on the outskirts of the PA meeting, and one of its number was 
seriously assaulted. In response to the CV A Cormack announced the formation of" A 
Real Vigilance Association": Kormack's Kaledonian Klan80. Much has been made of 
the 'K's', but it would appear that they did not exist as a 'paramilitary' force. as 
some have claimed, but rather as a grand title for Cormack's 'young fellows'. The 
name was a conscious reference to the North American Klan as well as a sneering 
reference to an obscure and short-lived Ratcliffe 'bodyguard'. the Knights of 
Kaledonia Klan8). Although the 'K's' were never seriously organised. Cormack's 
homage to the North American Klan - who in the inter-war period were characterised 
primarily by their urban focus and their anti-Catholicism rather than rural racism82 -
has fuelled claims that P A was 'fascist'. Several weeks after the St. Leonard's clash 
nine were remanded without bail after a fracas at an Abbeyhill dance hall, in which 
"Cormack's bodyguard" was implicated83 . A study of the local press - which 
frequently reported 'sectarian' disturbances in the city - between April and 
December 1935 suggests that a total of 38 criminal charges were brought in 
connection with such incidents84• Almost half of the charges (18) related to violence 
in Abbeyhill dance halls where Leith P A supporters clashed with Southside youths, 
many of whom were Catholic. Whilst this total undoubtedly underestimates the 
number of disturbances in the city during the high point of religious tension. it does 
78 Again the sentence was £10 or 30 days. EN 26/06/35; Scotsman ~?/06/35 . 
79 McDonald insisted that the CV A should comprise only practlsang Catholics and should be 
"non-aggressive". Press reports suggest CVA activists chafed at this second rule. EN 01 '08/35 






On Klan anti-Catholicism see K. TJackson ( 1967); Moore ( 1991 ); Calderwood ( 197~) 
EN 17/08/35; 21/08/35; 24/08/35 
Around two-thirds appear to have been Protestants. 
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suggest that the extent of the disorder has been exaggerated. P A . s physical presence 
on the Edinburgh streets was also a brief phenomenon. In North Leith
1 
during the 
1936 election, P A speakers were drowned out by opponents who "kept up a 
continual barracking by the singing of Irish songs", an affront P A was not strong 
enough to overcome85• 
REJECTING THE MILITANTS 
One reason for the exaggeration of P A violence is the shock experienced in a city 
relatively unused to 'sectarian' controversy. Catholics were shaken by the turn of 
events in a city where, until very recently, their activities were rarely criticised. let 
alone physically challenged. Archbishop McDonald had considered cancelling the 
Congress, but was persuaded that it would not be disrupted86. McDonald 
subsequently wrote to the Scottish Office complaining that the fact that "a riot ... did 
not actually take place" was due only to Police action "deserving of the highest 
commendation" and the "commendable self-restraint" of Catholics. He further urged 
that steps be taken against PA's "incitement to violence,,87. McDonald was furious at 
press reports of "minor disturbances" largely "confined to the lower elements". 
insisting there had been "a serious riot" in Morningside (contradicting his earlier 
view); that Catholic feelings were ignored; and that stern action was required88. The 
scale of the violence was rapidly magnified by the absence, in McDonald's view, of 
an adequately wide and sympathetic recognition of the Catholic experience. 
The publicly expressed commendation of the Police masked private concerns about 
non-Catholic indifference to, or even sympathy for, Cormack' s protests. These 
concerns were echoed by Gallagher: 
The fact that no major Edinburgh institution such as the Kirk, the police, or 
the press took a major stand against Cormack or consistently sought to deflect 
EN 15/10/36 
16 See letters from McDonald to Sir William Thomson, Lord Provost. 05 '05 '~5. and from Sir 
Godfrey Collins. Secretary of State to McDonald. 15/05/35 in Scottish Catholic Archi\'e5 (SCA) DE 
162149/1-2 
17 McDonald to Collins. 16/07/35 SeA DE 162149/4 
U See reports and McDonald's responses in Times 06 & 14/0835; Spectator 09 & 16/08 '35 
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public opinion away from him ... causes apprehension even at a distance of 
fifty years. 89 
In fact a number of institutions were consistent in their hostility to P A. Edinburgh' s 
Lord Provost publicly warned Cormack before the CYMS protest that .. the whole 
power at the disposal of the authorities" would deal with "any disturbance" and that 
the authorities would "not be intimidated", a message repeated before the 
Congress
90
• Edinburgh's press was implacably hostile, the dailies taking a firm 
stance against militant Protestantism even before its electoral debut. Whilst PA 
notices were still accepted and PA activities reported, the press consistently 
editorialised against them. The Courts treated those convicted of sectarian offences 
particularly harshly: convictions after PA demonstrations during 1935 drew fines of 
£10 (with an option of 30 days gaol), much more punitive than sentences for more 
serious charges without sectarian motivation. There is also evidence that the Courts 
were lenient towards Catholics provoked by militant Protestants91 . The authorities 
were hampered by the fact that Cormack was adept at stretching the limits of the law 
and were concerned that a Court appearance, far from chastening Cormack, would 
afford him publicity. These concerns were well-founded. In 1936 James Graham and 
another PPS figure were convicted of breach of the peace, the Sheriff noting that 
"The time had arrived when the authorities must take up a firm attitude and put down 
these disturbances,,92. Charges against PA leaders were unexpectedly preferred six 
weeks after a protest against a Catholic meeting, the delay suggesting the authorities 
were encouraged by the lack of interest in Graham's prosecution. Cormack's trial. 
however, opened amid "extraordinary scenes", and interest remained high 
throughout the case. The charges were relatively innocuous - breach of the peace -
and the fines unremarkable (£1 each with an additional £20 surety for good 
behaviour on Cormack), the intention clearly being to warn P A over its future 
conduct. Cormack, however, revelled in the publicity and refused to pay93. He was 
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Scotsman 26/04135; EN 10/06/35 
See cases reported EN 01/08/35; 06,11/35 
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surety against Connack's wishes94• The authorities may well have thought that 
Cormack's popularity was on the wane, but the Court case did him no hann and later 
in 1936 PA hit their electoral peak. The case does seem, however. to have been a 
deliberate attempt to curb P A activities. 
No mainstream religious figure publicly supported PA, nor indeed the SPL. Only 
three clerics supported PA: Rev. Percival Prescott, an independent evangelical~ Rev. 
James Trainer, an independent evangelical who had links with. but was not a 
minister of, the UFC; and Rev. George Goodman, a student pastor with the UFC who 
broke his PA links when given a charge at Dysart95. All of the other "religious' 
figures associated with PA were lay evangelical preachers96. To some extent the 
initial Kirk reaction was that PA was not 'their' problem: their ministers were not 
involved, and PA supporters were regarded as 'unchurched' and religiously ignorant. 
Presbyterians did, however, express their disgust with PA in the press and within the 
Edinburgh Presbytery97. An outright condemnation not only of PA but of "Our 
Attitude to the Church of Rome" was written by leading Kirk figure Rev. W.M. 
McGregor and published as the leading article in the CoS magazine Life & ~Vork in 
September 1935. The article warned: "if Protestantism can be vindicated only in such 
ways, its day is nearly done", and claimed that in the face of .... a rising tide of 
paganism both in faith and morals": "It is not inconceivable that some day all who 
call Jesus Lord may be driven to stand together, acknowledging and assisting one 
another, in order to save the nation from the deluge,,98. 
The significance of McGregor's article must be emphasised. Here was the Principal 
of the CoS, condemning militant Protestantism and the Presbyterian anti-Irish 
campaign in the Kirk's flagship publication. To some extent it was a sobering 
warning to those attempting to revive the anti-Irish campaign that they were 
providing succour to disreputable militants. The following month the Edinburgh CoS 
Gallagher (1987b: 128) . . 
9' Goodman served at Dysart until 1945. Trainer became a South LeIth counCIllor. and the 
provenance of his ecclesiastical title remains unknown. I am indebted to John Fulton, UFC General 
Secretary. for infonnation relating to these two men. 
96 This tits well with the argument developed in Bruce (1986) 
97 E.g. Scotsman 27106/35; EN 18/07/35 
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Presbytery noted that recent events "had caused much heart-searching and deep 
concern to many of their people" and rejected as "fundamentally unchristian": "all 
methods of violence, all interference with personal freedom, and every word and 
action which expressed the spirit of hatred". In 1936 Edinburgh UFC Presbytery. 
whilst remaining critical of "Romish error", unanimously denounced PA as 
"unworthy of our religion and injurious to its good name,,99. In short. press, civic 
authorities and mainstream Presbyterians did oppose P A and attempted to deflect 
opinion away from them. That they did not oppose them more might well be 
explained by the belief, perhaps a prescient one, that P A was riding on an outburst of 
socio-economic anxiety "mass hysteria, as experience shows, dies away as quickly as 
it arises"}oo. 
CONCLUSION 
Much has been made of the brief popularity of militant Protestant parties during the 
1930s. Most analyses, however, have focused on their sensational and violent aspects 
and not on the underlying basis of what was, essentially, a brief moment of electoral 
protest. At its peak, militant Protestantism attracted 23% of the vote in Glasgow, and 
31 % in Edinburgh, and this has hitherto received less analysis than it merits. Militant 
Protestantism reveals all the paradox of populist politics - by necessity they were 
outsiders, and their distance from the discredited policies of the established left and 
right parties in municipal politics was central to their appeal. The electoral pact in 
Glasgow, however, stripped the SPL of any sense of offering an alternative. The 
rapid decline of the SPL in a city that has long been associated with religious 
division was remarkable, and illustrates the underlying shallowness of the political 
aspect of such division. Put simply, anti-Catholicism was not strong enough to 
sustain a Glasgow party at municipal level even in the polarised 1930s. Edinburgh 
offers a quite different insight because it did not have a strong tradition of religious 
division. What makes Edinburgh so enigmatic is that the extent of violence has been 
historically magnified by the fact that Edinburgh's Catholics were simply stunned by 
the rise of P A. Their surprise illustrates how marginal organised anti-Catholicism 
98 
99 
Life & Wort September 1935 
EN 02/1 0135; Evening Dispatch 05103/36 
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had been in Edinburgh throughout the fust three decades of the twentieth Centur)', 
Yet much of Edinburgh's working class, frustrated at their lack of political 
representation in a relatively prosperous city dominated by Moderatism, turned to a 
party whose only 'plank' was crushing the 'Papist Beast'. PA polarised Edinburgh 
politics, and inadvertently galvanised a hitherto ineffectual left, rapidly undennining 
the very basis of its own appeal. 
Whilst the success of militant Protestantism in municipal politics reveals the 
existence of a strong cultural divide between Scotland's urban Catholics and 
Protestants during the inter-war period, it also reveals its strict political limitations. 
In the realm of Parliamentary, educational, and municipal politics, anti-Catholic 
sentiment was too ephemeral to provide the ideological basis for successful political 
organisation. On the surface PA, SPL and OPP; the election of Hugh Ferguson; and 
the Presbyterian anti-Irish campaign, suggest the vibrancy of anti-Catholic politics in 
inter-war Scotland. In fact, they are the proof of the marginality of religious 
particularism in Scottish politics. Unlike Northern Ireland there were no major 
secular cleavages in Scottish society which dovetailed with ethnic or religious 
cleavages. In Ulster, conservative Protestantism operated as a 'sacred canopy' under 
which Protestants united in defence of their economic and political interests. In 
Scotland, the key issue was class, and here Labour provided a · secular canopy' 
within which individuals of all religions and none found their economic interests 
represented. Whilst the 'Kirk's disgrace' did try to weld national and 'sectarian' 
interests together, it lacked support and remained within the confines of the General 
Assemblies. To a large extent the 1920s and 1930s saw the final kick, rather than the 
peak, of 'Protestantism before Politics' populism. The OPP was a short-lived failure 
without legacy, and the SPL and P A - strictly limited by time and location -
ultimately served to strengthen Labour. The limitations of the militant Protestant vote 
confirmed what the UnionistIModerate elite already knew - 'Protestantism before 
Politics' was political fantasy. 




"REALITY IS ALWAYS A LITTLE MORE COMPLEX" 
This study has sought to demonstrate that Scotland is not a 'sectarian' society. at 
least when that term is used as an analytical concept rather than a pejorati\'c 
description. Scotland is an increasingly secular country and although religion 
remains important to many Scots, it does not provide a significant marker of political 
and social cleavage. Nor did it represent such a line of cleavage at what is usually 
taken to be the key period of modem sectarianism. In the impoverished and polarised 
1920s and 1930s religious conflicts were localised and ephemeral. They were, to all 
intents and purposes, epiphenomenal to broader, secular, cleavages and conflicts in 
Scottish society. One crucial question, then, remains. Why is it that religious division 
- or, in the popular lexicon, 'sectarianism' - has emerged as a controversial topic at 
the end of the twentieth century? Why, when religion is declining in its social 
significance, when the relations between churches tend towards the warmly 
ecumenical, should questions of 'sectarianism' excite the minds of both the media 
and the academy? In a sense, the current debate over religious conflict is a lacklustre 
echo of the more polarised grievances of the inter-war period, which themselves 
invoked a mythical religious past in response to a moment of national crisis. The 
present debate has proved even more ephemeral. To some degree the actual religious 
conflicts of the inter-war decades were prompted by fears over the 'End of Scotland', 
concern that Scotland's day as a distinctive and identifiable national community 
were over. In contrast, late twentieth century debate over perceived religious 
conflicts is prompted by the 'rebirth of Scotland'. With constitutional change and the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the Scots are confronted by questions of 
identity: Who are the Scots; where are we going; where have we been? 
The relative recentness of the debate on religious conflict in modem Scotland might 
be gauged from a chronology of academic literature. In the forty years between 
Handley's Irish in Modern Scotland (1947) and Bruce's No Pope of Rome (1985), 
books concerned with 'sectarianism' were remarkably thin on the ground. Since 
then, and particularly during the 1990s, there have been a number of works 
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specifically or secondarily concerned with religious division '. Some of this research 
has begun with the assumption that 'sectarianism' has been brushed under the carpet 
"shoved to the side, perhaps out of embarrassment, perhaps out of a belief that it has 
gone away" or perhaps to "Let [anti-Catholic] sleeping dogs lie·':~. There is. of 
course, another possibility, one supported by this study. The absence of a debate. and 
of an academic literature, on religious conflict stems from the fact that such conflict 
has been episodic, localised, and relatively insignificant. To claim that religious 
conflict is relatively insignificant is not to deny its existence, or its localised impact. 
only to argue that when placed beside other conflicts - over class, over gender. 
between generations - it pales in historical and contemporary significance. If 
religious conflict did not command the attention of Scottish academic enquiry in the 
1950s or 1960s (when Scotland was a more religious society) it was because it was 
seen, and rightly so, as marginal to the important issues of Scottish life. For sure. it 
was not marginal to the victims or perpetrators of religious bigotry (Protestant, 
Catholic or otherwise), but, at a societal level, religious conflict has been virtually 
absent in the Scottish twentieth century. Why, then, the debate at the secularised end 
of the twentieth century? 
Much of the debate is marked by reference to a vaguely-defined 'sectarian' past. For 
some commentators, for example, the lack of contemporary evidence for economic 
discrimination suggests that the discrimination which 4 used to happen' has simply 
found new homes. If it happened in the past, goes the logic, we should assume it is 
happening today, albeit in different, and residual, forms. Reilly, who draws heavily 
on notions of a virulent anti-Catholic Scotland in the past and (marginally less so) in 
the present, sees little to celebrate in the decline of religious bigotry in the Scottish 
labour market. For Reilly this decline was driven by the rise of credential ism and the 
shift of ownership to the multinational company. He notes: "A man, your sworn 
enemy from birth, attacks you every time you meet. One day you come across him 
wearing a straitjacket. It's a relief not to be attacked, but has he changed or do you 
I Handley (1947); Bruce (1985a, 1998); Gallagher (1987a: 1987b); McFarland (1990);~alkcr 
& Gallagher (1990); Devine led] )(1991 & 2000); I.S. Wood [ed.] (1994) Brad.ley (1995e); .G\\alker 




owe it to the straitjacket?" This metaphor rests on two assumptions: that anti-
Catholicism was a key characteristic of Scotland in the past (and embedded in the 
structure and culture of the Scottish economy); and that it survives in Scotland~ albeit 
constrained by the new structural realities of the labour market. Anti-Catholicism has 
declined "Not in the souls of men but in the world of business"). The present 
existence of anti-Catholicism in the Scottish Protestant soul, therefore. is 'proved' by 
Scotland's anti-Catholic past. Yet this is a view not supported by this study. Anti-
Catholicism was not a defining part of the polarised Scotland of the 1920s and 
1930s. Although it is beyond the scope of the present study, there is also evidence 
that neither was anti-Catholicism a defining feature of earlier eras in Scottish 
history4. 
Dissenting vOIces have only recently begun to emerge from within Scottish 
Catholicism, criticising such appeals to the 'sectarian bad old days'. Historian 
Bernard Aspinwall argues that Reilly and others, "the self-appointed guardians of 
Catholicism", are "stuck in their Tardis around 1939, crying wolf or barking up the 
wrong tree at some imaginary threat,,5. He argues that the "myth" of a socially 
isolated Catholic ghetto has proved a "political tool" for various elements within the 
Catholic Church and Catholic community, "a device to sustain a particular world-
view". For Aspinwall, "Reality is always a little more complex'.6. Another historian, 
Owen Dudley Edwards, also finds much to criticise in the current debate. viewing 
James MacMillan's "catalogue of grievances ... as bitter as it is archaic". To 
Edwards, MacMillan's Festival speech - drawing as it did on the arguments of Reilly 
- looked "like the launch of a lobby, and a pretty solipsistic, self-centred one at 
that"'. This directly links the MacMillan debate - and much of the current literature 
on religious division - to contemporary political events. The establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament has redrawn the political map and brought certain issues of 
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Scottish politicians. What is interesting is that the launching of a political lobby - if 
it amounted to such - by certain Catholic figures, largely to protect the present 
system of Catholic schools, was a failure. MacMillan may have provoked debate 
over 'sectarianism' in Scotland, but it was a short-lived and unfocused debate. unable 
to sustain itself. Notably there was, and is, no identifiably 'Protestant' or 'secular' 
lobby in opposition to, or in competition with, this Catholic caucus. Indeed, this 
might be extended to the academic debate more generally. Whilst it is possible to 
discern a 'Catholic' perspective in research on Scotland's religious divisions. it is 
much more difficult to identify 'Protestant' or 'non-religious' perspectives. In 
politics, and in the academy, there is no symmetry on this issue, whether between 
Protestant and Catholic, or indeed 'religious' and 'secular', perspectives. 
Such were the immediate political factors surrounding the emergence of a debate on 
religious division. Another factor was at work, however, operating on a deeper and 
more subtle level. The debate on constitutional change in Scotland focused on issues 
of self-government, self-determination, Home Rule. The self and the Home here were 
national - Scottish/Scotland - and raised difficult questions. Home Rule for whom: 
who are we? The debate on religious division thus fed into, and off, a broader debate 
around Scottish national identity. Indeed MacMillan opened his speech on a 
deceptively positive note, immediately locating his lecture within the context of the 
Parliament, officially opened the previous month: 
There is a palpable sense of optimism in Scotland at this time, Women and 
men of goodwill detect that the circumstances are ripe with opportunity and 
challenge. The arrival of our new devolved parliament, the latest step in the 
nation's desire to slake its thirst for democracy, seems providential in its 
timing on the eve of the new millennium. 
Further, MacMillan argued that: '''If Scotland is ever to establish a genuinely 
pluralistic democracy where differences are not just recognised and respected but 
celebrated, nurtured and absorbed for the greater good, we will first have to clear a 
seemingly insurmountable hurdle", This hurdle was Scotland's '''endemic'' anti-
Catholicism, part of "a very Scottish trait - a desire to narrow and to restrict the 
'7' .. -
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defInition of what it means to be Scottish"s. MacMiUan claimed his speech was made 
"in the new spirit of inclusiveness, [because] no part of Scottish society should feel 
less than fully involved in the 'new Scotland",9. 
Benedict Anderson defined the nation as "an imagined political community": 
"Regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each. the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" 10. Notions of social 
cleavage - whether on religious lines or otherwise - might imply defects in. or 
limitations to, this comradeshipll. Indeed much of the debate around social inclusion 
stems in part to who shares in the comradeship of the nation. Central to ideas. to 
imaginings, of the nation is belonging: but who belongs, who is other? National 
identity represents a claim about belonging, whether of oneself or of another. 
dependent upon "identity markers": 
those characteristics of an individual that they might present to others to 
support their national identity claim [and] those characteristics that people 
use to attribute national identity to others, and to receive claims and 
attributions made by others. 12 
Kiely et al found that such claims, attributions and receipts in terms of Scottish (and 
English) identity "are usually based on various combinations of the basic markers of 
birth, ancestry, residence, upbringing and commitment, backed up by other 
markers,,13. Here the alleged 'Scottish equation' noted in Chapter One is important, 
as it implies that religion (Protestant = Scot; Catholic = Irish = alien) was an 
important marker for Scottish identity. The evidence presented in Chapter Three -
that self-claimed Scottish national identity is equally high amongst Catholics, 
Protestants and the non-religious - suggests that religion is no longer a salient 
national identity marker in Scotland. This highlights that identity claims, attributions 
and receipts are historically fluid and dependent on their context. In a Scotland where 
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Scottishness is assigned primarily on the basis of birth and residency. the . Scottish 
equation' ceases to make sense. Crucially, the 'imagining' of the nation posited by 
Anderson is not fIXed, it is a constantly evolving process in which . identity markers' 
- the boundaries of the imagined community - are adopted and discarded. The 
'Scottish equation' may have made sense in an era when Scotland was a relatively 
comfortanble part of an Imperial Britain which was, by contrast to 'Catholic' France. 
'Protestant,14, but by the latter twentieth century the meaning of Scottishness had 
changed. The defining political question of late twentieth century Scotland has not 
been Scotland's position within the British Imperial project but of Scotland's 
position within the United Kingdom. That, and the fact that Scotland and Britain 
have undergone sharp secularisation since the 1960s, has rendered the 'Scottish 
equation' meaningless. 'Scottishness' has long represented a claim to distinctiveness 
within the United Kingdom, particularly in relation to Englishness. Over the course 
of the twentieth century, new forms of Scottishness - largely and increasingly 
secular and pluralistic - have emerged and developed. To a large degree. 
'Scottishness' is a claim to distinctiveness and an implicit demand that this 
distinctiveness take political or institutional form. For Peter Worsley: "Cultural traits 
are not absolutes or simply intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide 
identities which legitimise claims to rights. They are strategies or weapons in 
• • ,,15 
competitions over scarce resources . 
The debate over religious division can be seen as stimulated by the broader debate 
over what it means, at the end of the twentieth century and at a watershed in Scottish 
history, to be Scottish. It is not surprising that at a decisive historic moment Scots 
have turned inwards, simultaneously beset by doubts and enlivened by confidence, to 
contemplate their Scottishness and Britishness, and, for some, their Irishness or other 
identities. The last years of the twentieth century have propelled the Scots into 
uncharted territory. Such moments are bound to provoke self-contemplation and a 
gazing into, in Gellner's phrase, the historical 'navel' of the nation
l6




See Colley (1992) 
Quoted in McCrone (1998:30) 
Gellner (1997:90-10 I) 
274 
Conclusion 
Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx notes the tendency, at crucial historical moments, to 
invoke the phantoms of the past: 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they 
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The 
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of 
the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves 
and things, in creating something that has never yet existed. precisely in such 
periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past 
to their service and borrow from them names, battlecries, and costumes in 
order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise 
and this borrowed language. Thus Luther adopted the mask of the Apostle 
Paul. .. 17 
At the point of creation of "something that has never yet existed" (a democratically 
elected Scottish Parliament) the ghosts of a 'sectarian' past have been anxiously 
invoked. Yet in their very invocation they have been exorcised - how else can one 
explain the all so brief public interest in the spirits summoned up by James 
MacMillan? This, as this study has shown, is perfectly explicable. MacMillan's 
'ghosts' were, by and large, bogeymen, imaginary terrors, created in, and for, the 
present through a selective interpretation of the past. History here "is not a product of 
the past, but a response to the requirements of the present,,18. Again, this is to be 
expected, and hardly specific to MacMillan or to Scotland: .• All profound changes in 
consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias"19. 
Also in the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx remarked that important moments of history 
repeat themselves "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce,,20. This study has 
not followed a chronological structure, and began by noting the farce, MacMillan's 
1999 speech, and closed with the tragedy, the spasm of sectarian hysteria in 1930s 
Edinburgh. Drawing parallels between MacMillan and John Cormack may seem far-
fetched (and, perhaps, odious) given that Cormack sought to build a political 











comparison. Both appealed to a sense of religious grievance resting upon myth and 
exaggeration, and both found that such an appeal had little staying power. \Vhilst 
Cormack's tragedy spawned a localised political movement, street protests and 
violence; MacMillan's farce produced a brief flurry of letters to the Herald and a 
collection of academic essays. Cormack's momentum collapsed within four years, 
while the publication of Scotland's Shame? failed to reinvigorate the Herald's 
letters' pages only months after MacMillan's speech. Both men depended on the 
invocation of the 'Other' - for Cormack the Other was the politically rapacious 
Papist beast, whilst for MacMillan the Other was personalised in the figure of 
Donald Findlay. Both were criticised for living in a distant past, of attempting to 
revive a dead history. Whilst MacMillan's complaints were criticised as "archaic", 
the Edinburgh press attacked Cormack for attempting to revive conflicts from .. the 
far past,,21, To Aspinwall, the Kirk's Disgrace of the 1920s was ~~a dying kick of a 
fading mentality", Cormack "a prisoner of history - like some of his opponents"n. 
Much of the current debate around sectarianism has proved imprisoned in an 
imagined history, invoking exaggerated terrors at the outset of a new era for 
Scotland. History need not feast "like a nightmare on the brain of the living", for it 
"is not the dead weight of the past on the present, but the very means whereby 
identity is shaped in an active and ongoing fashion,,23. The shaping of Scotland's 





Go from the grave. The shrill flutes 
are silent, the march dispersed. 
Deplore what is to be deplored, 
24 and then find out the rest. 
O.D.Edwards (2000:5); EN editorial 19/04/35 
Aspinwall (1989:79, 82) 
McCrone (1998:63) 




DE:\OMINATIO:\AL CO:\lPOSITIO:\ OF THE SCOTTISH 
ELECTIO:\ Sl~RYEYS 
CLAIMED RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIO\:: 
1974 1979 1992 1997 1997R 1999 
CHURCH OF SCOTLAND 530 319 442 365 295 521 
CATHOLIC 137 88 148 126 105 201 
OTHER RELIGION 193 98 127 110 75 161 
Christian - no denomination 1 -19 5:; :;r\' .'os 
Episcopalian! Anglican 75 38 35 ..,-_I :;5 30 
Other Presbyterian 78 35 1 .., .., , - - J 
Baptist 12 6 /\ -I II 
Methodist 6 3 1 
Brethren -I ') 1 
, 
- J 




Other Protestant 1- 15 11 5 
..., ..., 
Other ( 'hristian 12 1 () 
()ther, Non-Christian 3 9 '" 6 1-
NO RELIGION 304 218 235 270 200 594 
Don't Know 1 
RefusedlN ot Answered '"' 5 5 1 1 1 1 -' 




LOGISTIC REGRESSIO:\ 'IODELS 
Sotes: 
Reference category (where applicable) in brackets; 
significant results are highlighted in bold, with direction of effect gi\,l?n in Lbt 
column; 
'n.s.' denotes no significant effect at .05 level. 
CHAPTER 2 - PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS CO:\FLICT. 1997: 
Dependent variable: Believing religious conflict to be ""cry' or "fairly ,criou,' 
Independent variables: age: church attendance; class identity: gl?nder: Occup~ltil)nal 
class (non-manual or manual. according to Registrar General classification): region: 
religion; religiosity. 
Source: Scottish Election Survey, 199 7 
Number of cases in model: 805 
Variables B Sf:' R Exp ,\'ig. f~trf('( 
( B) 
Constant .35 
... , ._'- .2664 
Age -.03 .00 -.17 .97 . ()OO() ne~ati, t' 
Area (Rural) .19 .0000 
West Central Scotland 1.21 .25 .1~ 3.36 .0000 positi\c 




.OO~O ncgati\ t' Non-manual -A~ .15 -.08 .6~ 
Appendices 
CHAPTER 2 - PERCEPTIO:\S OF RELIGIOlS CO~~FLICT, 1999: 
Dependent variable: Believing religious conflict to be 'yer\"' or 'fairlY 't:riou,' 
Independent variables: age; attitude to separate Catholic SCi1Cl l 11s: chur~h 3ttenJ.mcc: 
class identity; gender; occupational class (by Goldthorpc-lleath ~ rOt! red 
classification); perception of Scots-English conflict; religion. 
Source: Scottish Parliamentary Election Surver. 1999 
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V cry serious conflict 
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CHAPTER 2 - :\ORTHER" IRELA:\D, 1997: 
Dependent variable: Believing :\ orthern Ireland should remain in CK. 
Independent variables: age; church attendance: class identity; gender: occupational 
class (non-manual or manual by Registrar General classification): re~ion: religion: 
religiosity. ~ ~ 
Source: Scottish Election Survey, 199~ 
Number of cases in model: 803 
Variables B SE. R 
Constant -.89 .23 
.21 
-.68 .26 -.07 
Religion (Other religion) 
Church of Scotland 
Catholic -.1.06 .3.t -.09 
No Religion .43 .24 .03 






.51 .0102 ncgatiH~ 
.35 .0017 ncgatiH~ 
1 . .54 .07.5.5 n.s 
1 A9 .01.t9 positi\c 
NB - this model was re-run adding In party identification as an additional 
independent variable. There was no substantial difference between the models. and 
party identification was not found to be a significant predictor of wishing \: I to 
remain within the UK. 
CHAPTER 2 - MAINTAINING SEPARATE CATHOLIC SCHOOLS, 1999: 
Dependent variable: Believing that the Government definitely/probably should 
maintain separate Catholic schools. 
Independent variables: age; church attendance: gender; occupational class (b: 
Goldthorpe-Heath grouped classification): perception of religious contlict: religion. 
Source: Scottish Parliament(//~l' Elccfion SWTCY, 1999 
Number of cases in model: 114.5 
J 'or i (/ hI ('s B S.£. 
Constant -1.89 .26 
Religion (Other religion) 
Church of Scotland .21 .29 
Catholic 1.68 .30 















.0000 po,iti\ l' 
.841 1 n.s 
Appendices 
CHAPTER 2 - :\OT ~tAI~TAI~I~G CATHOLIC SCHOOL~. 1999: 
Dependent variable: Believing that the Government definitely/probabl~ ~hould 
NOT maintain separate Catholic schools. 
Independent variables: age; church attendance; gender: occupational class tby 
Goldthorpe-Heath grouped classification): perception of religious contlict: religion. 
Source: Scottish Parliamentary Election Sun'ey, 1999 
Number of cases in model: 1145 
Variables B SE. R Exp Sig. Ejtecr 
(B) 
Constant .61 .28 .0291 
Religion (Other religion) .18 .0000 
Church of Scotland .08 .22 .00 1.08 .7229 n.s. 
Catholic -1.15 .25 -.12 .32 .0000 ncoati\c " 
No Religion .03 .23 .00 1.03 .8828 n.s . 
Protestant-Catholic (no .05 . 0248 
conflict) 
Very serious conflict .65 .28 .05 1.91 .0219 positi\c 
Fairly serious conflict .47 .25 .03 1.60 .0578 n.s 
Not very serious conflict .18 .24 .00 1.19 .4661 n.s 
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CHAPTER 3 - VOTE 1:\ GE:\ERAL ELECTIO:\. OCTOBER 19-;~: 
Dependent variable: voted Consen'ative 
Independent variables: age; class identity: gender: occupational class (split bctw~~n 
ABCla and C1 bC2DE): religion. 
Source: Scottish Election Survey, 197.j 
Number of cases in model: 746 
Variables B SE. R Exp Sig. f.-ljl'ct 
(B) 
Constant -2.26 .39 .0000 
Religion (other religion) .11 .00 1-' 
Church of Scotland -.00 .25 .00 1.00 .99-'-' n.s 
Catholic -1.08 Al -.08 .3~ .0081 negatiH~ 
No religion -.71 .30 -.07 049 .0169 neoatiYe b 
Age .03 .01 .IS 1.03 .0000 positiH~ 
Class identity (none) . 1 -' .Ooo~ 
Middle class .31 .28 .00 1.36 .2691 
Working class -.88 .2~ -.12 Al .0002 negative 
Middle class (ABCla) .85 .20 .I~ 2.33 .0000 positivc 
CHAPTER 3 - BEING AGAINST THE SNP, 1999: 
Dependent variable: Being strongly against/against the S:\ P 
Independent variables: age: church attendance; class identity (forced): g~nder: 
occupational class (non-manual or manuaL according to Goldthorp~ Heath 
classification): religion. 
Source: Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey. 1999 
Number of cases in model: 1149 
Variables B SE. R 
Constant -~.42 .~-+ 
Non-manual occupation .50 .14 .09 
:\ 1 iddle ChlSS identity 040 .IS .06 
Age .03 .00 .18 
Exp ,\'ig. E//ect 
(B) 
.0000 
1.6S .0003 po,itiH.' 
1049 .OOSH po,iti\ l' 
1.03 .0000 po,it i\ c 
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CHAPTER 3 - BEST :\A TIO:\ALITY: BRITISH, 1999: 
Dependent variable: Claiming nationality which best describes self i, · British' 
Independent variables: age: church attendance: class identity (f~)r(ed): ~l'nd~r; 
occupational class (non-manual or manual, according to Goldthorpe Heath 
classification); religion. 
Source: Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey. 1999 
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Religion (other religion) 




B s.E. R 
-3.42 .40 
.59 .25 .07 
.70 .23 .10 
.05 
.05 .34 .00 
-1.29 .59 -.06 
.17 .34 .00 

























CHAPTER 3 - BEST NATIONALITY: SCOTTISH, 1999: 
Dependent variable: Claiming nationalit), which best describes self is 'Scottish' 
Independent variables: age; church attendance; class idl'ntity (forcl'd); g~ndl'r: 
occupational class (non-manual or manual, according to Goldthorpc I k;lth 
classification); religion. 
Source: Scollish Parliamentary Election Surl't!y. 1999 
Number of cases in model: 1149 
I 'ariables B s.E. R 
Constant -.51 .08 
t\ 1 all' -.36 .13 -.06 
Exp Sig. L.'lIt!cf 
(B) 
.0000 
.70 .OO~3 ncoati\c ,... 
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CHAPTER 3 - CLASS PREFERRED TO:\.-\ TIO~ALITY. 1999: 
Dependent variable: More in common with an Engli"h penon of the 'arne cia", 
Independent variables: age: church attendance; class identitv (forc~J): ~enJt:L 
occupational class (non-manual or manual, according to' Goldthorpe~ Ht:ath 
classification); religion. 
Source: Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey. 1999 
Number of cases in model: 1149 
Variables B s.E. R 
Constant -1.56 .11 
Male .54 .14 .10 
Exp Sig. Eti~'c{ 
(B) 
.0000 
1.72 .0002 po"itive 
CHAPTER 3 - NATIONALITY PREFERRED TO CLASS, 1999: 
Dependent variable: More in common with a Scottish person of opposite class. 
Independent variables: age; church attendance; class id~ntity (forced): ~l'ndt:r: 
occupational class (non-manual or manuaL according to Goldthorpc I kath 
classification); religion. 
Source: Scottish Parliamentary Election .\url'ey, 1999 
Number of cases in model: 1149 
Note: none of the independent variables proved to be associated with prefcrrin~ 
nationality over class. 
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